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Abstract
This thesvs is a study of autocratic rule among the Ngoni 
of Songea district, Tanzania, Two royal families and their 
associates, with some hundreds of followers, immigrated into 
Songea in the mid-nineteenth century and there built two large 
and powerful states over which they ruled until 1962, Though 
rank and privilege distinguished the immigrants from their 
East African adherents, the two accepted and followed a common 
life style for their mutual benefit. The leaders were 
factious and, within thirty years, had produced some major 
divisions within the states as members of the royal families 
and some of the more important military leaders moved towards 
isolated independence. The Germans entered at this point and, 
talcing advantage of disunity, gained the submission of the 
Ngoni. The changes brought by submission led to a rebellion 
in 1905 which failed^  due to various factors including political 
division. The leaders then adapted to colonial life.and 
consolidated a new. type of control. British takeover and the 
subsequent implementation of Indirect Rule facilitated the 
consolidation of autocratic control through its support of 
traditional leaders. This power began ebbing during the 19^0s 
and 1950s-under the impact of changes pushed by colonial 
administration, though only after Tanzanian independence is it 
removed completely and the rule of the royal families brought 
to an end.
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Introduction
The Argument* X
"The feared Wangoni consisted, in fact, of a small 
group of elite troops of Kaffir, Tonga and Kalanga blood 
around whom were grouped thousands of native slaves who quickly 
became imitators of tine Wangoni".(1) Wren making this statement, 
John Booth estimated that this elite comprised approximately 
one and a half percent of the total population of the Ngoni.
This thesis is a study of that elite, of its formation of two 
kingdoms from a conglomeration of loosely-organized peoples 
and then of its hundred years of rule over these kingdoms.
The first serious study which was made of this elite, 
and particularly, of the royal families which led it, which were 
of Kaffir, otherwise known as Ngoni or Swazi(2), blood, was that 
by a British colonial government sociologist, P,H.Gulliver, in 
195^-3. His study, An Administrative Survey of the Ngoni and 
Ndendeuli of Songea District, had been undertaken partly to 
explain why government schemes for the implementation of 
’Local Government’ and for faster economic development were 
getting nowhere in the district, Gulliver lay much of the 
blame on the royal families who, he felt, needlessly resisted 
all change. He strongly criticized their* right to have power, 
stating that they were leaders merely because the British 
colonial policy of Indirect Rule "formalized a dying system" (3) ,
(1) John Booth, "Die Nachkommen der Sulukaffern (Wangoni) in 
Deutsch Ostafrika " , Globus , Ixxxviii, (1905) » PP .197-201,
222-6.
(2) Their southern African name, Ngtmi, changed to Ngoni during 
their migration northwards, see J.A.Barnes, Politics in a 
Changing Society, (Manchester, 1 9 6 7), 2nd.edT, ManUP, p .9:■rw>/>tfnrM»g^ tnlr*vri Wfr ■wWmfa'a " * r W r f O- t
They refer to themselves as Swazi, see Elzear Ebner, History 
of the Wangoni: Revised Edition, (1 9 6 8) , typescript, S0A,9*”i0.,
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which lingered on in Ngoni country until the 1950s because 
the ’’deadweight of inoperative tradition” hung ’’especially 
heavy” there.(%)
The aim of my researoh was, initially, to test this 
thesis* Even to begin with, Gulliver’s reasons for the 
survival of the rule of such a small group in the present 
century seemed to be superficial. Moreover, his evidence 
suggested alternative explanations for its survival. For 
example, the conservative leadership which he condemned for 
maintaining the backwardness of the kingdoms, was not the 
dying one he claimed it to be but, on the contrary, was very 
much alive and responsive to the conservative will of the 
people. Data accumulated in the course of research in 
Taneania, England and Germany, as well as that available in 
the writings of the German missionary, Elsear Ebner, confirmed 
this, Gulliver does seem to have erred in disparaging the 
adaptability of successive Ngoni leaders. He also erred in 
disparaging their legitimacy. Evidence assembled for this 
study confirms that the members of the Ngoni royal families, 
as well as a few close associates among those who immigrated 
into southern East Africa, were accepted by the majority of the 
Ngoni people in 1950 as legitimate. Moreover, the data 
accumulated during the present study suggest a variety of 
alternative reasons for the survival of autocratic rule.
The most important of these is based on the implications 
of the ethnic composition of the Ngoni, Booth was correct when
(3) P.H.Gulliver,MAn AdministrativeSurvey of the Ngoni and 
Ndendeuli of Songea District”, typescript, Cory Papers, 
U.Dar es Salaam library, p.115; see also p,vi for his 
recommendations for future policies of the government,
(1) Ibid,, p.v.
■ ■ 12 
writing, in 1905, that the Ngoni comprised an dlite dominating 
a mass of imitators. Moreover, it is felt that unless this ethnic 
composition is understood and appreciated, it is not possible to present 
a feasible interpretation of Ngoni history. Shis has been shown in many 
studies which have been one-sided historically because of their omission 
of material which is often critical to the^explanation of events. Examples 
of such omission include: Gulliver's work, in 195^(1), which failed to 
appreciate the interaction between the military and political leaders 
in Ngoni society during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries ; 
Ebner's, in 1959(2), which underestimated the importance of rank within 
Ngoni society; and those of John Iliffe, in 1967, Igor Kozak, in 1968, 
and O.B.Nfetpunda and G.P.%angara, in 1969,(5) which all underestimate the 
local nature of political life.
In short, there has been a general failure to appreciate the particular 
ways in which the migrant Ngoni adapted to their exotic environment in 
East Africa, Once these are appreciated, it becomes possible to explain 
Ngoni political history more intelligibly. For example, the interaction 
between the military and political leaders, which Gulliver wrote about, 
was one of co-operation, as it had been in southern Africa, rather than 
of competition as he imagined it to be. Again, Ebner depicts Ngoni society 
as it was in the present century rather than as it had been before colonial 
rule, when the emphasis on rank, brought from southern Africa, was still 
strong.(4) Finally, Iliffe, Kozak, Mapunda and Mpangara underestimate the
(1) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey.
(2) E,Ebner, History of the Wangoni," (Peramiho, 1959), Mission Press.
(3) John Iliffe, "The Organization of the Maji Maji Rebellion", JAH, v.8, 
(1967)., n,3; Igor G,Kozak, Two Rebellions in German 3&st Africa: Their
-^ tttdy in Microcosm, (Howard U., 1968), MA thesis; O.B.Mapunda and 
G.F.Mpangara, The Maji Maji War in Ungoni, (Dar es Salaam, 1969).
EAPH, M aji M aji ResenrclTpaper^rulT ”*"*
(*f) Hilda Kuper shows the importance of rank in An African Aristocracy.
Rank Among the Swazi, (London, 19^7), OUP. 1 - -----
complexity implicit in rule by the royal families as well as 
the means by which this southern African 'elite' and their East,
African 'imitators' accepted the maji in their rebellion of 19Q5*
The Ngoni migrants adapted to their environment in East Africa 
by retaining some aspects of their southern African culture and way- 
of life while adapting others to the ones of their East African 
captives. Those which they retained included the political structure 
and organization of.rule by royal families, aspects of the military 
structure, their name and certain aspects of their culture and economy. 
Those which changed included political organization on the village 
level, much of the military Organization, the language, many aspects 
o£ religion and most of the culture and economy. Because leadership 
continued to be restricted to members of royal families wh-o, in 
southern African s^y^e, fought it out amongst themselves to decide 
who would succeed each time one leader died, in time these rivalries 
led to the emergence of royal factions which reacted differently to 
events. This created a fluidity in politics which complicated Ngoni 
reactions to events such as the rebellion of 1905 end the succession - 
of 1952-4. On the other hand, the fact that the Ngoni migrants adopted 
the East African culture of their East African 'imitators* in so many 
other respects helps to explain why their rule survived the imposition 
of colonial rule.
The 'political' emphases of this study were also adopted for 
other reasons. One was that research materials proved available. 
Moreover it is in political life that the one certainty in Ngoni 
histoxy seems to be. This certainty was the recognition, if only 
by default, of the existence of autocratic rule among all sections 
of Ngoni society, and the moulding of perceptions of political life 
in terms of this acceptance. Autocratic mile, in this case, meant 
the rule of two royal families over the kingdoms the Ngoni built in
southern East Africa: the Gama family for the Njelu kingdom 
and the Tawet©family for the Mshope kingdom* Political life 
within the two kingdoms was a matter of manipulating this social' 
fact. Thus, various branches of the ruling family could dispute 
who should;hold the top positions, important leaders could dispute 
the powers held by the ruling family, and other sections of the 
population could dispute the extent to which other groups in the 
kingdom could dominat^them and, consequently, whether they wished 
to remain in either of the kingdoms.
Thus this thesis is essentially a study of the rule of two 
autocratic royal families in the Ngoni country of southern East 
Africa and the way in which they built their kingdoms and preserved 
their rule over them.
It opens with an analysis of the. founding of the two kingdoms. 
Ngoni migrants from southern Africa brought with them to the. lands 
east of Lake ftyasa their centralized political structures with royal 
families, a military sophistication they had acquired from Shaka and 
others, and an openness towards state-building acquired by the need 
to assimilate captives during their migrations. In the lands east 
of lake Nyasa, three Ngoni migrant groups met. The Maseko, Njelu 
and Mshope first met in unfriendly circumstances, then went to war. 
against each other.■ The Njelu and Mshope won and thereafter had the 
land to themselves.
Then we analyze'the early growth of the two kingdoms. To begin 
with, their numbers were small and the leading members within each 
kingdom were often independent-minded. As Ngoni military policies 
proved ever more successful and both kingdoms increased in size, new 
groupings: emerged with greater, powers under ^ he somewhat loose ., 
tutelage of royal families. In the 18?Os there arose the HChe \
(1) It is now known as lake Malawi*' . . ■ r
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challenge. The Mshope bore the first brunt of contact, though 
the Njelu were quickly dragged in as a result. Two wars followed, 
after which the Mshope kingdom underwent a traumatic succession 
crisis and the Njelu state relocated itself and began segmenting.
Next Comes the period when the Ngoni establish an empire.
Both kingdoms acquired distinctive military reputations, large subject 
populations and considerable wealth. Political structures in both 
kingdoms became increasingly differentiated. Mshope developed as a 
very centralized stfcfee following its leader's successful destruction 
of internal political opposition. In Njelu the growth in population 
accentuated segmentation. More factions arose there as young leaders 
among the 'true Ngoni1 - as the1 migrants called themselves - set to 
carve out their own spheres of influence. A succession crisis in 1889 
brought severe conflict between two branches of the royal family* This 
remained unresolved throughout the 1890s, and the kingdom acquired two 
ri^al leaderships and some very independent leaders at lower levels* 
First coastal peoples and then the Germans arrived during these years 
and found various niches in the Complex and badly integrated political 
structure in Njelu. Then a German military force entered the kingdoms 
and received unexpectedly easy submission.
Chapter Four studies the decline of Ngoni power. The Germans 
introduced many changes in Ungoni, including the ending of military 
activity and the restructuring of administrative lines of authority.
The 'true Ngoni' in both kingdoms were severely affected by these, 
though for many Ngoni subjects - the so-called 'sutu' - limited change 
took place. In the midst of decline, Njelu underwent another succession 
crisis, which kept the royal family as divided as ever.
Then came *feji Maji with its promise of a return to pre-German 
conditions. The Mshope leaders, still under the strict control of
their pre-1897 chief, Chabruma, entered wholeheartedly into 
rebellion# A disunited Njelu was unable to resolve differences : 
among the leadership and a number of 'true Ngoni' abstained from 
rebellion# The 'sutu' were forced into rebellion by those of 
their leaders who participated* The rebellion was crushed,, and the 
leaders and people were severely punished.
Chapter Six studies the beginning of a new and very different 
period in Ngoni political history: the replacement of the. military 
basis of 'true Ngoni' control by an administrative one# The leaders, 
who had not participated in Maji Maji now assumed control over the 
kingdoms# After World War One, the ^ British ,took over as the colonial 
power* They decided first to retain the existing leadership, then 
actively to support it. The leaders reacted favourably to this policy 
and began reasserting authority over subject groups the Germans had 
removed from their control. There were odd byproducts* In Mshope, 
the Palangu branch of the Tawete family, kept under control by 
Chabruma since the 1880s, now rose to a position of considerable power.
With the advent of the policy Of Indirect Rule, the royal 
families in both kingdoms reached an apex in their administrative 
control over Ngoni society# The Ndendeule(l) of Likuyu, independent, 
since 1897r came under Ngoni control once again. The Njelu kingdom 
made gains in new areas. When the British sought to^modify Indirect 
Rule, the leaders resisted unwelcome changes and gradually stopped 
their Implementation. Internal feuding in Mshope reached new * 
heights as the Palangu and Ghabruma branches of the Tawete clan 
quarrel in 1925-6, 1930-"I and 1938. In Njelu, the leaders appointed
(1) This spelling will be used in preferance to the Ndendeuli one 
favoured by Gulliver because it appears to be the mo’re commonly
• used one. ■ .. :f
: "" ' 1?
after Maji Maji consolidated.their control. Various 'sutU' 
groups dissented from time to time, though without much 
success*
After the Second World War, the British colonial government 
sought to introduce far-reaching political and economic changes, 
only to be met by frustration. Succession crises occurred in 
both kingdoms, ensuring years of sustained local political 
activity. In Njelu, in 19*H and again in 19^9-50, non-ruling 
branches of the royal family bid for power.using new criteria 
of colonial interference, administrative competence, seniority 
and educatioi^ fco advance their causes. Widespread resistance 
to colonial administration brought victory for supposedly 
unpopular rulers as far as the British were, concerned. In 
Mshope, a 1952 succession was contested, by the Palangu and 
Chabruma families amidst a powerful bid by the Ndendeule to 
secede. The Chabruma faction won, and the Palangu group allied 
with the Ndendeule who thus achieved their aim.
Since the mid-1950s political life in the district has been 
very complex. During the 1950s, Ngoni leaders resisted 
encroachment o£ their lands by former subjects, while they passed 
the last years of colonial rule in general opposition to 
colonialism. The movement for territorial independence^spear­
headed by the Tanganyika African National Union, first received 
a favourable response from Ngoni leaders'who hoped for increased 
powers as a result* But this.hope was ultimately frustrated when 
chiefly rule was abolished after territorial independence bringing 
the end of royal family rule among the Ngoni. The Ngoni population 
now began adapting to political life as Tanzanians rather than 
Ngoni. -
These, then, are the main emphases of this study. It will 
be noticed that the more recent years arevcovered more fully, by.
the evidence gathered during research than are the 
earlier ones, but in order to sustain balanced argument as well 
as to Satisfy the restrictions on word length imposed by a 
doctoral dissertation, these later years are covered more 
briefly than the evidence warrants, ffhe interest of this 
thesis is thus not only the intrinsic one of examining intricate 
political transformations but also an empirical one. It is a 
contribution to recent Tanzanian history at the district level, 
offering what I believe to be a more accurate and detailed 
interpretation of Ngoni history than are existing ones, as well 
as clearing up some anomalies in published data dealing with 
the Ngoni. It also shows that reaction to colonial rule is a 
more complex matter than, romantics of either the colonial 
persuasion or the nationalist one normally allow. .Finally, it 
sheds further light on some of the results in Tanzania of one : 
of the most crucial developments in nineteenth century Bantu 
Africa, the Mfekane.
The.Sources.
The sources used in this thesis fall into three general 
categories: oral, unpublished and published.
The^collection of oral materials has, unfortunately, been 
a very minor aspect of my research. The main reason for this 
was a government x-ejection of my application to visit Songea, 
the area under research. Songea, in Ruvuma Region, borders 
both Jfc>9ambique and Malawi and, at the present time, has 
considerable strategic military significance for Tanzania, 
Because of this, the Government, of TanzaniaV a few years ago, 
restricted general travel in Ruvuma and its two neighbouring 
regions. Then, in 1970? it restricted entry for the purposes 
of research. When I arrived in Tanzania in .1969, the 
government attitude towards field research in Songea was
still undecided. I had hoped, as a citizen of a friendly 
government, to be given permission to Visit at least Peramiho, 
the large Roman Catholic headquarters in the district. But this 
proved to be impossible. Clearance for field research was not 
given, and my research was restricted almost exclusively to Dar 
es Salaam. There X was able to conduct vexy few interviews as 
the reject ion of research clearance severely hampered the _ . 
contacting of possible informants even in Bar es Salaam. *
Some collecting of traditions and oral evidence was done 
outside Tanzania. In Britain, through the kind assistance of 
D.B.Dudbridge, I established contact with a number of individuals 
who had once served as British colonial officials in Songea. These 
men included Messrs. A.H.Pike, G.T.Scott, A.S.Stenhouse, G.Guise- 
Williams and B.C.Hill. They were an extremely interesting and 
helpful group of men who provided me with considerable data on 
aspects of their administrations and on general life in Songea from , 
the late 1920s until the late 1950s. 1 also met, independently, Mr.
Ralph Ibbott, the British adviser to the Ruvuma Development ;>
Association from late 19^2 until 19&9* He provided some extremely 
valuable information on the workings of Tanzania's most fascinating ujamaa 
project. In Germany, I had the Opportunity to meet and interview 
Fr.KLzear Ebner, a remarkable missionary, forty-one years resident 
in Songea, who has known and collected historical information from 
many of the leading Ngoni of the past forty years. More is said about 
Ebner below and it is safe to say that were it not for the materials 
he collected and for his constant, willing assistance, both made 
available to me, this thesis would not have been possible.
Although I was restricted in collecting oral traditions 
and evidence in Tanzania, I nonetheless was most fortunate
in having at ray disposal the extremely rich and. varied 
body of oral traditions collected by Ebner, by various 
students at the University of Bar es Salaam, by students 
from the Peramiho Secondary School, and also by sundry other 
individuals,
Elzear Ebner's collections were undoubtedly the most 
valuable of i.11 these sources. In 1959» Ebner published a 
History of the Wangoni. The materials contained in this 
history comprised the single most Important source of materials 
available to the writer* It contains exhaustive details on 
most known major events in the nineteenth century history 
of the Ngoni, based on traditions collected by Ebner since 
1930. It follows a thematic approach in having sections 
which cover most major events in known Ngoni history. Etoner 
did not attempt a political analysis of the data as a whole, 
though he did offer explanations for many isolated events.
In 1 9 6 8, he completed a revision of this history in which 
he modified some explanations given in 1 9 5 9* An example of 
this was the omitting of the age of Hawai, the ruler of Njelu 
from around 186^ until the early 1070s, upon his ascesion to
"tcMrt
the chie^ship. He appears to have doubted the information given 
by an informant. A copy of this revised work has been deposited 
at the Benedictine archives at St.Ottilien. Because he lacks 
the time to prepare the work, Ebner does not intend to publish 
this edition. In addition to the History. he has assembled a 
mass of datajon the social and cultural life of the Ngoni. These 
have been written up as two unpublished volumes entitled: Texts 
in New-Kingoni with Translation; (vol.) 1. Narratives. Fables. 
Riddles. Proverbs. and (vol.) 2, Manners and Customs in the Land 
of the Ngoni. Copies o^both volumes are deposited at the 
Benedictine archives at St.Ottilxen. The above materials
provided the * most important sources of data on
nineteenth century life among the Ngoni. Finally, 
whenever I had queries on details of Ngoni history and 
sought information from Ebner, who still lives in Songea, he 
interviewed former Ngoni leaders and informed me of their 
opinions.
Something should be said here about the data collected 
by Ebner, His works can be considered primary data almost 
entirely in that they involve a selection rather than an 
interpretation of the materials collected by the author.
Ebner selected those materials which he^ ras able to verify 
through having had them received by two or more independent 
sources or which corelated with published materials he read.
Those instances where data on the Ngoni has been interpreted, 
as, for example, the migration of the Mshope Ngoni, are 
considered and treated as secondary materials. They are 
limited in number. As regards use of pimary data, X have V 
been able to check many of Ebner's traditions with independent 
written sources, and have thus been able to work out suitable 
controls for his data as a whole.
Less important to my research than the works by Ebner 
have bean the materials collected by students. These have 
tended to be of varying quality and value. That collected 
by students of the history society at Peramiho Secondary 
School and published in the society*s journal, Our I3ast, 
have proved of little relevance. Most of the traditions 
published relate to aspects of Matengo and Nyasa history, 
while those dealing with the Ngoni add little that Is not 
known. The qian behind much of this student research is 
Lambert Doerr, another German missionary. He was the first 
to recommend to me the many possibilities of a study on relations
.between;/the Ngoni'migrants and their subject peoples. /The 
^materials collected by /the students at the University "of j '
Dar es “Salaam proved to be of much greater value. They 
"’p^vidp&'/info twp; important periods in Ngoni- , ; .
history: the Maji Maji rebellion and relations between the 
Ndendeule ahd Hgoni between 19^5 and 1968. The materials :■ 
on Maji; Maji.were collected as part of a university project 
to prepare a complete study Of that rebellion. Copies .of these 
materials are available from the university library. Two of 
the students involved in the project, 0.B.Mapunda and G.P. ' 
Mpangara, amlyzed; the materials; relevant to Ungoni and,- in 
•'*969,. published this analysis as fhe Maji Maji War in Ungoni.
A study of" relations between the dendaie and the Ngoni Was ■
made. by /UtB.M i,Newa, as, partial fulfillment of his B.AV: degree 
requirements. Newa supported the Ndendeule and,wrote a polemical 
report; pn the Ndendeule separation from the Ngoni and subsequent 
participation in TANU. Nonetheless, it is an extremely useful 
document and provided considerable data on events for which : " 
little .information has been available elsewhere.
other. contributions to oral information utilized ; 
further■;the.histories; collected by-colonial'officialsi. The 
most ...important was the . history of the Ngoni written by 
Dotninikus Missoro‘ Mbqnani Tawete in the 1930^ .1 a copy;'of. which 
he gave to B. J.Dudbridge, who later deposited it at Rhodes 
House* Missoro was leader Of .-the Mshope goni kingdom and his , 
history reflected the views of his people in their relations.
With the iTjelu and with'various subject peoples within and “ 
neighbouring the Mshope kingdom; His detailed.history provides, 
/an excellent complement to the work by Ebner. A second, very 
interesting group of traditions * collected by the same official
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were an autobiography and a biography of Palangu Tawete, 
a very important leader in Mshope from around 1880 until the 
late 1930s. The biography was written by Falangu’s arch-rival 
Dominikus Misforo Mbonani Tawete. The contrasting versions 
give a useful insight into the rivalries within the Mshope 
royal family. Finally, a history was collected from two 
Ndendeule Jumbes which offers valuable information on Mshope 
in the 1880s and 1890s*
The principal sources of unpublished written materials 
were the Tanzania National Archives, the East Africans section 
of the library of the University of Dai/es Salaam, the Potsdam 
archives, the Public Records Office, the mission archives of
of
the Universities Mission to Central Africa (now the
United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel), the 
Benedictines of St.Ottilien and the Italian Cons^Lata Fathers,  ^
and Rhodes House,
Of these sources, the Tanzania National Archives were 
undoubtedly the most useful. They contained an unexpected, though 1 
most welcome, mountain of data on Songea district. In the course 
of a year in Bar es Salaam, I looked through an estimated two 
hundred linear feet of material. A considerable amount of this 
was of little or no value* Still, that which was useful has 
become the basis of my analysis of Ngoni history during the 
present century. The materials read come under four categories: 
German, District, Provincial and Secretariat.
The materials in the German files were few in number and 
limited in v ue. Some twenty files had material of relevance 
to Songea, though only nine of these contained anyway useful 
information. Relevant data comprised: 1905 district statistics 
and notes on development; settler schemes for the distriot; 
lists of traders 1 9 0 5-8 ; details of the economic loss to
ZH
traders causedjby the Maji Maji rebellion; 190S annual 
report; and isolated information on mission activity. In 
all, they provide some insight into German rule but leave 
a considerable amount unexplained.
The materials contained in the Songea district files 
were of much greater use. For one thing, these were much 
more voluminous: some 207 files plus various records and 
books. Among the most useful data was that contained in 
the oft-denigrated District Books. Of major interest were 
the varied comments on Indirect Buie. Many parts of these 
books appear to have been written in 1925. when Indirect 
Buie wa^being implemented, and many parts in the late 1930s, 
when the Ngoni Federation broke up. So. in one instance, they 
showed the colonial impression of the faults and the good sides 
of the men who were to assume power amongjfthe Ngoni and, in the 
other, they give much information on why the government failed 
in its attempts to evade the implications of Indirect Rule 
through the Federation, In addition, they had interesting 
material on internal trade, the trade conducted by the 
missions, government facilities and the extent of government 
involvement in the district. The files themselves contained 
scraps of information on practically every aspect of oolonial 
rule in Songea between 1926 and 1955* In many instances, 
information was inadequate or incomplete. But, at other times, 
some highly useful data were collected. These included: early 
1930s monthly reports; Falangu-Chabruma conflicts in the 
1 92 0s and 1930s; * succession troubles of 19^9-5**; various 
annual reports; handing-over-the-distriet notes; Native 
Treasury annual estimates and budgets; 19^0s agricultural 
reports; the rise of TAiJD in Songea district; union develop­
ment; development of tobacco, wheat and coffee as cash crops;
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schools in the 1 9 2 0s and 1950s; mission conflict; 
reports on exploration for minerals. In all, they were 
helpful for the entire period between 1926 and 1955, but 
particularly useful for the 1926-39 period.
The Provincial files were of limited value. Some 
forty-seven that appeared to have materials dealing with 
Songea were reviewed. In the event, most contained nothing 
of value. References which were found to be useful included 
data relating to; the abolition of the Ngoni federation; 
district handing-over-notes; the Mchapi benevolent witchcraft 
movement of 1 9 3 3j labour; agriculture, with particular reference 
to totoaoco production; missions and schools. They supplemented 
district materials covering the 1 9 2 6 -5 5 period, though only 
when dealing with tobacco and schools are they of considerable 
value.
The Secretariat files fall into two categories: the Early 
Series, containing the four-digit files covering the period 
from 1919 until 1926, and the remainder, the five-digit files. 
The Early Series, which I saw through the kind assistance of 
Mr.Karugila, contained the extremely useful annual reports 
from Songea district. Because these annual reports came direct
rcdhar
from the district*than through provincial authorities who 
summarized them, as after 1 9 2 6, they are considerably more 
detailed than annual reports of later years. furthermore, 
being the records of the first years of British administration, 
when much had to be learnt of the country, they tended to be 
far more comprehensive than those of later years. They are 
the main source of data for Ngoni history from 1919 until 
1926. The files covering the years after 1926 are not too 
useful. I looked at some fifty-three files whose titles 
suggested thai^they might have materials on Songea, but found
limited data on only a>"few subjects. These were; settler 
land alienation; a 1,92? economic report; taxation; tobacco, wheat, 
and a I9V3 report on cash crops; labour and mission conflict# The 
data on the missions and on agriculture were the most useful.
In all the Tanzania National Archives provided considerable 
thesis material for the 1897-'!959 period, with parliculacij 
valuable data for the years 191^9-1939.
The German colonial archives nt Potsdam in the German Democratic- 
Republic have not been visited. I applied to use the archives but was 
turned down for political reasons. The;', government of the German 
Democratic Republic feels that the attitude of the Canadian government 
towards it is unfriendly and until Canada '/ceases opposing membership 
of the German Democratic Republic in international cultural and 
scientific organizationsj the German Democratic Republic will not offer 
reciprocal conditions".(1) Disappointing as this is,: however/ it should 
have little effect on the thesis for it appears that these archives 
contain, few materials on Songea. A fellow researcher, Mr.Lome Larson, 
who has been, there, informs me that there is a Songea file which contains 
only one, safari report of and this has been published and read.,' In , 
other files, there is some data on taxation and various-tour reports but 
this also appears to be largely available in published form. There is 
some data of territorial importance on events such as the Maji Maji 
rebellion* .Fortunately, a third rdsearcher, G.C.K.Gwassa, who has 
also been at Potsdam, has microfilms of this material and has kindly 
permitted me to see.these. As MT.Gwassa is writing a thesis On Jfeji 
Maji, it is to be expected that he has seen all the material Available 
011 Songea until 1905 at least. Accordingly, I am confident that my 
failure to visit Potsdam will be-of minimal adverse effect on my thesis.
At the Public Records Office, the records of the War Office and 
Colonial Office were consulted. In the War Office records, the diaries of
(1) Ministry of Interior, DDR to Redmond, 85/55/07Rst of 10.5.1972.
Brigadier-General E.Northey were looked at. The materials 
in the Colonial Office were only briefly consulted, after 
it was decided that territorial correspondence of the type 
available there contained very little information on districts. 
One important series of materials, noticed by a fellow 
researcher, Lorne Larson, were noted. These answered the 
Secret Circular MP 02h/lh of 1919, regarding the collecting 
of information on the position of natives under German rule.
It contained a number of documents on the position of people 
in Songea during German rule. This source, moreover, notes 
that ,fno German records of any value are in existence here 
(Songea)"(1), suggesting that the few available records at 
the Tanzania National Archives and believed to exist in Potsdam 
may, in fact, be all the German government records on the 
district to be found anywhere.
The archival materials at the University of Bar es 
Salaam were very helpful. They comprised: the papers of 
P,H.Gulliver and other data in the Cory collection; newspapers, 
particularly of the German period; government reports, circulars 
and other documents; and university research papers. Of the 
holdings in the Cory collection, the works by Gulliver were 
the most important. Chief among these is his above ci 1: ad 
Administrative Survey. In this work, Gulliver studied aspects 
of Ngoni political history as late as the 1 9 5 0s, analyzed recent 
Ndendeule nationalism, gave valuable details on each Ndunate. 
or administrative unit, in the two kingdoms, then studied the 
political life and economic development of the Ngoni and 
Ndendeule. The facts he presents are most useful; his analysis, 
as suggested earlier, is less satisfactory. Gulliver conducted 
research in Songea during 1952 and 1953, immediately after l/
(1 ) FRO/CO/6 9 1/2 9 , S9 1 7 , BPO to Secretary, 21.2.1919.
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the succession crisis in Njelu kingdom had been resolved 
and during the height of the Mshope kingdom's succession 
dispute. As part of an administration determined to push 
political change and economic development from above, he 
was highly critical of the Ngoni, yet sympathetic towards 
the Ndendeule; the principal reason presumably being that 
the former were rejecting government policies while the 
latter were more receptive, Tanzanian government, and other, 
documents in the library were also most useful, particularly 
for a study of developments during the past decade.
Mission archives varied in the importance of their 
holdings. The Benedictine archives at St.Ottilien had few 
materials on Songea, The archivist informed me that there 
were few unpublished, materials relevant to Songea, Some 
district materials were lost during the Maji Maji rebellion, 
others during the first World War and, apparently, some may 
have been destroyed during the Second World. War,(1) The 
archives at Peramiho appear to contain a good amount of 
data. Some of this was made available to me by John Iliffe, 
who spent some time at these archives. The mission 
materials were useful for information on the 1 8 9 7 -1 9 1 6  
period.
Kwiro mission at Mahenge, now run by the Swiss 
Capuchin Fathers had, before I9I6 , been a Benedictine mission.
A considerable amount of information oil the years of Benedictine 
adminis tration remain there * Some of this is relevant to
(1 ) Franz Szczypior, "Die Sozialwirtschaft von St.Ottilien
fdr auswMrtige Missionen in apostolischen Vikariat Dares­
salam, seit der Grundung daselbst bis zur Ausweisung durch 
die Englander, 1888 bis 1920”, (Julius-Maximilians U,, 
f923), PP.36-7 states that a number of records from Songea 
were lost during the First World War; L o m e  Larson, who 
also worked at the archives at St.Ottilien, found very 
little on Songea. 1 am grateful to Larson for showing me 
his copy of Szczypior's work.
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Songea. The archives at Mahenge were recently researched 
and catalogued by Larson, who kindly showed me all those 
files which were of relevance to Songea, These included: 
the 1912 and 1916 letters of Emil Blohm, a planter-trader
in Songea during these years; select issues of Rafiki Yangu
\toooos issues o f  i k e  Pecawitno o w l  CKrante&s,'
and Ostafrikanisohe Zeitung;^ and a few letters on mission
activity. The Blohm files, which give a valuable insight
into the thinking of a third party actively involved in the
colonial experiment in Songea from 1911 until 1 9 1 6, were
particularly useful,
A final mission archive consulted was that of the 
Universities Mission to Central Africa (UMCA, now part of 
USFG) in London, The UMCA had been in southern East Africa 
and by Lake Nyasa from the 1870s onwards, and its missionaries 
had had regulax^ontact with the Ngoni between the 1870s and 
1897* The many reports they wrote on Ngoni raids and on the 
Njelu kingdom, known through visits there in 1882, 1886, 1887 
and later, proved particularly valuable in complementing Ebner's 
work and in supplying insights he was unable to obtain in the 
traditions he collected. the missionaries who wrote on the
Rgoni, three - w, P, Johnson,W.C *F orter and 0 .Maples - 
provided consistently valuable information.
Rhodes House, oxford, houses a collection of records 
of colonial officials, the records relevant to Songea were 
looked at. They, few in number, provided information on*
D.M.MTawete *s valuable History of the Wangoni, referred to 
above, a few reports, financial statements and other da£a on 
the district from 1926 onwards.
Three other archives and collections were consulted. One 
was that of the Royal Commonwealth Society, which possesses many 
documents and magazines on German Bast Africa which cannot foe
found elsewhere* Another was the archives of the 
Tanganyika (nowjfanzania) African National Union in Bar es 
Salaam from which, through the kind assistance of John Iliffe, 
a ’’history of TANU in Songea”, written in 196*4-, was obtained. 
This history is in actuality a response to a questionnaire on 
aspects of TANU’s district history. Its value is limited as it 
tends to concentrate on Ndendeule participation and general 
government reaction - possibly because those completing the 
questionnaire were Ndendeule, or because that was where the 
action was. The third collection consulted was that of 0. 
Guise-Williams. This contained: district notes; safari diaries, 
various economic data, and a few brief histories.
The third main category of sources consisted of published 
materials. Tour distinct types of data can be delineated. They 
follow a chronological pattern: pre-l89**» 189**-1 9 1 6, 1 9 1 6 -1 9 5 0  
and 1950 onwards.
The works published prior to I89*f were reports by people 
who had contact of sorts with the Ngoni. They include the 
works of general travellers and missionaries, such as David 
Livingstone, Joseph Thonrjson and William Beardall, and of the 
missionaries of the Universities Mission to Central Africa, 
such as W.P.Johnson.(1) Johnson’s works are perhaps the most 
valuable in the quantity and quality of information provided 
on the Ngoni in the late nineteenth century.
After 189*1- came the reports and works of German visitors, 
scholars, missionaries and government officials. The Germans 
tended to be highly thorough in seeking out information and the 
many works they published proved to be extremely valuable. They 
contain the earliest collections of oral traditions
(1) The titles of their works and the works of authors mentioned 
below can be found in the bibliography.
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evidence along with considerable information on 
contemporary political, economic and social life in the
Veft
two kingdoms. The major sources include '£on»AI>r*-nce» G.
Lieder, Lt.von Behr, Paul Fflchs, Algons Adams, Friedrick 
Ftflleborn, Graf von Gotzen and the Englishman John Booth, 
while minor sources include Walter Busse, H.a.d.Richter,
Simon Trossman and Johannes H&fliger. These works are the 
main source of information on the history of the Ngoni between 
189^ and 1916.
From I916 until 1950 very little was published
on the. Ngoni. What was published tended to comprise short 
articles in Tanganyika Notes and Records. on matters such as 
utani relations and Ngoni raids during the nineteenth century. 
Authors included Eberhard Spies, R.deZ.Hall, G.W.Hatchell,
R.E.Moreau, Meinulf Kusters and A.S.Stenhouse. Their publications 
supplemented archival material and occasionally offered some 
useful information on issues not covered elsewhere. While 
research on the Songea Ngoni languished during these years, 
that on the Ngoni in Malawi was flourishing in works by Read 
and Chibambo.
In 195*** the date of Gulliver's first work on the Ngoni, 
began the fourth and most productive period of research on the 
Ngoni. Gulliver completed two very useful works that year and 
another in 1955# This was followed in 1959 by Ebner’s seminal 
History of the Wangoni and James J.Komba>& interesting God and 
Man. a study of Ngoni religion. Since independence, research 
has been undertaken with a renewed vigour and among interesting 
and informative works to come out recently are a religious 
study by Gosmas Haule, a cultural study by Hans Stirnimann, 
and works on Maji Maji by John Iliffe, Igor Kozak, O.B.Mapunda 
and G.P •Mpangara.
Though considerable, it must be admitted that these 
sources are not exhaustive. For the reasons which have 
been explained, I have neither been able to work in the 
field nor to visit the archives at Potsdam. However, enough 
material has been collected to challenge existing interpretations 
of Ngoni politios during the past hundred years and to suggest 
some plausible alternative ones.
Chapter 1 
The Migrants and Their State
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The Mfekane, or the wars and disturbances which accompanied, 
the rise of Shaka's Zulu state(1) in the early nineteenth century, 
revolutionized many societies in Bantu Africa, Besides radically, 
changing the, lives of Nguni and other peoples of southern Africa, 
it changed those of many others in Central and Bast Africa, as 
those more northerly lands were devastated by groups fleeing from 
Shaka1s grasp. This thesis, is a study of two migrant groups, the 
Maseko and the Njelu-Mshope, and the state they established east 
of lake Nyasa,
All the migrant societies shared much iJGybommon, They had been 
formed from loosely-organized and fluid societies, each usually 
comprising a leading clan and various lineages from diverse clans 
which chose to affiliate with it. Segmentation and fission were 
common, as lineages became dissatisfied with one leader and moved 
off to join another,(2),
Heading each society dr state was a chief, selected from a 
particular agnatic lineage within a leading clan. Usually he was 
called an inkosi. Various officials assisted him in ruling. One 
was an Induna, usually a commoner of ability, loyalty and .
(1) J,B,Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath, (London, 1966), Longman, p,5,
(2) Paragraph based on N,J,vanWarmelo, A,W*Hoernle and I.Schapera 
in I.Schapera, ed., The Bantu-Speaking, Tribes of South Africa, 
($ape Town, 1953), Maskew. Miller; A.T.Bryant, The Zulu People, 
(Pietermaritzburg, .1967), 2nd.ed,, Shuter & Shooter, ppV4So'-T;
J.A.Barnes, Politics in a Changing Society, (Manchester, 1967), 
2nd,ed,., Man. UP.
trustworthiness, who lived at the capital and acted as the 
inkosi*s right-hand man# In addition to him, there was a 
tribal council, made up, as a rule, "of the Chief's private 
advisersf some of his more distant relatives, all sub-Chlefs 
and headmen*of local divisions and portions of the tribe, and 
various influential commoners appointed because of their ability"*(1) 
This council was the effective governing body of the society* A 
hierarchy of subordinates managed administration on a lower level.(2) 
Ey the late eighteenth century, the structures of these societies 
appear to have been coming under increasing pressures. Omer-Cooper 
comments that by this time "the general conditions which favoured 
small-scale political organization and encouraged fissile 
multiplication had been reversed. Lack of space and the demands 
of more serious warfare dictated larger units and the process of 
aggregation began".(3) Increased warfare also changed aspects of 
social organization. 'Ehe circumcision ceremonies, which helped to 
bind societies together, Were replaced by the formation of age- 
regiments among the youth. The regiments, formed every few years, 
were seconded to royal homesteads. Though regiments were not active 
throughout the year, most states now had a stable and effective 
military-force.(4)
Using improved military techniques, a few states were already 
rising to positions of considerable importance within Nguni society 
by the early nineteenth century. By the 18200, the Zulu section of 
one of these states was acquiring mastery throughout south-east
(1) Schapera, op cit, p.182.
(2) Ebr further details see Hoernle and Schapera in Schapera, op cit.
(3) Omer-Cooper, op cit, pp.26-7.
(k) Ibid., p.28.
■Southern Africa, and the powerful Zulu empire was being born.
The Zulu state rose through the mastery of its inkosi, Shaka, 
a reckless, though masterful, warrior who radically altered the 
fighting techniques of his followers and, as result, crushed all 
opposition.(1) These techniques, later adopted by the societies 
under study, included making the regiments permanent, rather than 
part-time, fighting forces, modifying weapons, for example by 
shortening the throwing-spear into a stabbing spear called an 
assegai, and changing the frontal style of attack into a cow-horn 
one. (2)
As the more successful military states expanded, many small 
groups living in their vicinity were faced with the choice of 
fighting or fleeing. Among those to flee were the people of the 
Maseko clan, who left with a neighbouring people, the Msane, who 
had fought against, and been defeated by, Shaka. Another 'state' 
which preferred fighting to fleeing was the Ndandwe, a powerful 
people which sought to challenge Shake's control. When it in turn . 
was defeated, however, one of its sections, led by the Jere(3) clan, 
did flee. Aspects of the subsequent history of these peoples form 
the basis of this study: two of them eventually ended up east of 
Lake Ifyasa.
During the migrations, each people led/bhe life of the despoiler, 
moving in on one people after another, capturing individuals and
(1) Shaka's rise to power hasbeen written about by many authors,
eg. Omer-Cooper, op cit, ch.IX, so will not be dealt with here.
(2) Ibid., pp.29-33; Bryant, op cit, pp.504~7.
(3) Y.M.Chibambo, fly Ngoni of Ify-asaland, (London, 19^ 2)., USCL, p. 13;
J.B. Lancaster, "Tentative chronology of the Ngoni", JRAnthS, 
v.lxii, (1937)i PP*77-90; E.Ebner, History of the Wangoni:
Kevised Edition, (1968), typescript, SOA, p.13.
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plundering the wealth of the land before deciding to move on 
again, These predatory migrants, while retaining many aspects 
of their southern African social organization, such as a centralized 
political structure, the age-regiments and the military system they 
had acquired from the Zulu'-, made some modifications in answer to the 
demands of constant movement. Barnes, who has studied the Jere 
migration^), identifies three such, changes, lilrst, the men in 
military regiments lived with the rest of the population rather than 
separately, presumably for convenience and improved defence. Secondly, 
captives were integrated as individuals rather than as groups. Thirdly, 
the traditional tendencies to segmentation and fission that had led 
to the very formation of the two migrant groups with which we are 
principally poncerned, were controlled. There were at least two 
reasons for this. One was self-preservation. The two migrant groups 
appear to have been quite small at the beginning: the Jere numbering 
about a thousand according to Barnes(2), and the Maseko probably still 
fewer, and unity helped ensure the successful conquest of enemies.
A second reason was the power of the leadership. Ah effective, strong- 
willed leader retained pride in his own rule and punished attempts.to 
discard it. Once self-preservation on the long march northwards was 
no longer a problem and no strong-willed leader was in control, 
segmentation and fission quickly, reappeared.
In addition to the changes demanded by the life-style of a 
migrant society, there were changes associated with ethnic integration. 
The most important of these changes resulted from the constant 
assimilation of captives. In the military sphere, non-Nguni adherents
(1) Barnes, op cit, pp.6-7.
(2) Ibid.
who proved themselves to be successful warriors rose to
positions of leadership. One of the most important examples of such
warriors among the people under study was the Kalanga captive,
Songea Mbano, who was to become the single, most-renowned leader 
east of Lake Nyasa in the late nineteenth century.("I) However, 
the process of devolving authority appears to have remained largely 
restricted'to the military sphere, apparently because captives 
accepted the restricted royal clan basis of rule. Newcomers were 
able to exert considerable pressure in the political sphere as they 
themselve^acquired influence within the society. For instance, at 
a late stage in the Jere migration, the society's leaders heeded 
the warnings of; "recently captured Chewa religious'leaderssto punish 
another segment of, the assimilated population which was suspected 
of disloyalty.(2.) Captives may also have modified certain Nguni 
political rules. For example, they appear to have modified Nguni 
succession laws among one section of the Jere. This is discussed 
in detail in Chapter Two. In the cultural sphere, it was the 
captives who apparently brought about the changeof the very name 
Nguni to 1Ngoni1, a change which seems to have been effected by the 
time the migrant societies reached the Zambezi River.(3 ) The 
modified name, Ngoni, is used henceforth as it is the one used by 
the people themselves.
Both the Maseko and the Jere moved in a north-easterly direction, 
following the coast into Portuguese Ifest Africa.(A*) The Jere settled
(1) Further details on his life are given in chapters 2 to 5.
(2) Ebner, History of the Wangoni, (Peramiho, 1959)*, Mission P.,p.33; 
Chibambo, op cit, p.23.
(3) Ebner, Revised History, p. 10 has comments on the change.
Ct-/ Details of migration can be found ini Barnes, op cit, for the Jere 
and M.Read, The Ngoni,of Nyasaland;(London. 1970), 2nd.ed., Cass* 
see also Ebner, Revised History, pp.12-8.
behind Laurenso Jerques and plundered the Thonga while the 'Maseko v 
passed on tOrthe Sabi River where they raided amongthe lozi.
Within a short while, the Jere came into conflict,with a third 
Nguni group, the Gaza, by whom they were defeated. They then moved 
north-west and plundered the lands of the Karanga, From there, they 
moved into the region of the Sabi River where they met and defeated 
the Maseko* In a second battle the Maseko defeated-the Jere who 
then moved on to the Zambezi River which they crossed: on 19^November, 
1835^ .^ 3) Meanwhile* the Maseko moved to the Busi River where they; 
plundered the Venda. There they met and fought the Gaza, Who were . 
also moving northwards. In defeat, the Mhseko pushed north to the 
Zambezi, which they crossed at a point just below Tete, on a date 
estimated by one author as 1839*(2)
After crossing the Zambezi, the Maseko entered KalumbiEy this 
time, their first inkosi, Ngwane, had died and been replaced by a 
brother who acted as Regent. This brother died in the land of the 
Kalumbi and was replaced by another brother. Under his;leadership, 
the Maseko moved on into the land of the Ntumba, at the bottom of 
lake %asa, where they settled and began plundering. While they 
were here, the chieftainship passed to Mputa, the son of Ngwane, 
who had now come of age.
Shortly after Mputa took over, the Maseko decided once again 
to move on. (3 ) They moved up the east side of Lake Nyasa, passing 
through the countries of the Yao(*0 and Nyasa(5), many of whom they
(1) Date noted in A.T.Bryant, Olden Times in Zululand and Natal,
(London, 1929), p.^63. — —  —  _
(2) Gerhard J.Liesegang, Beitrgge zur Geschichte des Reiches der Gaza 
Nguni im stidlichen Mozambique,~1^20-lS93, M), Koln U., 1^7,pTW.
(3) M.Read, "Native; Standards of living and African culture, change. A", 
Africa, v.11, (1938), n.3, supp.,p.31 notes why they/moved.
(0 von Prince, "Geschichte der Magwangwara nachErzShlung des Arabers 
Rashid bin Masaud und des Fissi...", MadS, v.VII, (fe). n.3.p.21*f.
(5) W.P.Johnson, Nyasa, The Great Water, TOxFord, 1922), OUP, pp.102-3.
captured and integrated, .and around .18^ 5(1), they reached the 
Ruvuma(H) River. On the other side lay the . land, which we shall 
call southern East Africa* in which tli<y decided to settle.
Meanwhile, the Jere Ngoni had crossedjthe Zambezi and moved 
into the land of the Senga, whom they subdued with little difficulty. 
After a four years long stay, they moved north-east into the land 
of the Ghewa and captured many Ghewa and Ifumbuka. After leaving here, 
they journeyed north-west, following the borders of the Kamanga country, 
eventually feaching Ufipa,. below Lake Tanganyika. At Ufipa,
Zwangendaba, the great irikosi of the Jere died. The year of his death 
is given by some as-■ 1.8^ 5» by thers as 1848.(3)
After Zwangendaba's death, the Jere Ngoni split up due to inability 
to agree on a successor. This inability was due to factors both 
particular to Jere society and general to. Ngohi society. Three 
particular factors; stand out. One was the-pressure brought by the 
integration pf so mimy peoples (4.), a pressure which had shown'itself 
on the march inthe Ghewa-Thonga troubles. A second was the power 
vacuum which Zwangendaba had left as no one group could overwhelm 
the many forces which Zwangendaba appears to have played against 
each ether. A third was the complexity of this particular succession. 
Zwangendaba had chosen a certain Loziwawa to be his 'Great wife’ and 
she. bore him a heir named Mpezini. But Zwangendaba once, found cause 
to suspect her of treason and disowned; the heir though, according to
some traditions he later restored the heir. During the period of
'• ' -r* ’ . 
■n-.HT.-r- I. — ....... .................................... .................... .. ■ „ ! — I .......................................  ,     - ■ ■ ■ - I I . . - -----
(1) Ebner, History, pp.6l-3has 1844.
(2) Ruvuma is the current spelling and is used henceforth, 
y?; Chibambp, op cit, p.23 has 1848; Barnes, op cit, p.16 prefers 184-5.
(4) Barnes, op cit, p.87. . ; . . .
• >  ^ vVv \. " . ■ - :/
S££ n£*T 
map, 
f?£v.S£i> 
secTiCu cf
n r -  Z- I I
40 °
AR ES SALAAM
f'y/
Anrnbe
Kilwa Kivinje 
KilwaMasoko 
• Kilwa Kisiwani
Mopambique^
Cabo
Delgado
OP APPGo**™ Ar£_ Ro u t e s  O f  NGortt m v6R A TiO N S  i n T o
Southern East Africa
MILES
O 100 200 300
ROurc of 
IhJELO ANt> 
mSi4oPE. n60nI
RootE. OP (Y\f\Sc-<<0 NUCh{
3007750^83101^37^07657660032
disgrace, a second 'Great wife1, Munene nzima, was appointed 
and bore another heir, Mbelwa(i). When Zwangendaba died, 
apparently without having resolved in his own mind whether he 
preferred Mpezini or Mbelwa to succeed him, the Mpezini faction 
refused to recognize the Mbelwa one and va.ce versa* (2)
The more general factors;producing fission in Jere society 
arose from the very nature of Ngoni society* Ngoni society had 
been a continually segmenting onerprlor to the rise of militarism 
in the late eighteenth century when segmentation was restricted for 
a time* Its capacity for expression remained,however, and as the 
Jere state expanded and its constituent lineage segments increased 
in number and power, it reasserted itself as pressures to separate 
became proportinately stronger.(3) Consequently, when one segment 
became unable to live with another, as it did after Zwangendaba's 
death, fission became inevitable. Secondly, the custom of nominating 
a^heir only late in the leader's life, to prevent usurption, - ■£-
necessitated the appointment of interim leaders, or Begents,(4) 
who then could push the claims of their groups.
Ntabeni, a brother of Zwangendaba, became Regent after the 
letter's death. He recommended that Mpezini succeed, but the Mbelwa 
faction rejected this and nothing happened. When Ntabeni died, his 
son, Ngodoyi, split off from the state and moved off northwards along 
the eastern side of Lake Tanganyika. Others tried to stop him but 
failed to. A second brother of Zwangendaba, called Mgayi, then
(1 ) Also spelt Mwambera. :
(2) Chibambo, op cit, pp.26-9; Barnes, op cit, pp.19-23.
(0) Read,. The Ngoni, pp.52-^ notes;.that the appointing of a Regent 
was integral to the ;Ngoni. political .system. It gave time for 
the selection committee to decide:on the suitability and 
legitimacy of the heir. T ,
<3 ) Barnes, op cit, p.12,
became Kegent. When he died a few years late:** leaving the 
succession as unresolved as ever, the Mpezini and Mbelwa. 
factions broke away from each.other, the former going westwards, 
the latter towards the sohth-east.
Among the u.zj nduna who had been with Zwangendaba during the 
migration was Zulu Gama, the eventual founder of the Njelu(1)
Ngoni. He is. described a^ 'a military adviser to Zwangendaba, to 
whom he became related through marriage,(2) while his clan is 
remembered as the one which found a suitable crossing point at 
the Zambezi River(3). He is further mentioned in connection with 
his eventual break from the Jere migrants. (4-) A second of 
Zwangendaba's t zj,nduna was Mbonani Tawete, the founder of the 
Mshope(3) Ngoni. He, unlike Zulu Gama, has received no mention 
from historians of the migration. This has' led to; some speculation 
on independent march and/or entry. Spiss in 19o4, Cameron in 1923,
Sources anti
and Ebner in 1939 hav e all mentioned it. (6) Their reasons, however,
. . • .A ; . • • *
are dubious and, as all other authors whorhave written extensively 
on the Ngdni claim that Mbonani migrated with Zulu as part of the 
Jere Ngonilitter interpretation is followed here*
When the Jere Ngoni broke up following Zwangendaba1s death,
Zulu and Mbonani appear to have followed Mbelwa.(7.) They became 
fairly important leaders witin his state and,. after a period of
(1) Njelu is the name of Zulu’s father. Zulu's state was known by 
both his and his father's name.
(2) J.B.Lancaster, "Tentative chronology of the Ngoni", JHAnthS, v. 
Ixii,^ (19370|i p.80. . *
(3) Ebner, Hevlsdd' History» p. 13.
(4) Omer-Cooper, op cit,p.73; Barnes, op cit, pp.21-3.
(3) Mshope is the name of Mbonani's fatheri ;Both names were also 
used. tov identifyhis-state. *
(6) C.Spiss, "Kingoni und Kisutu", MSQS, 1904, p.2; Donald Cameron, 
.My Tanganyika Serviceand some Nigeria, (Iondon, 1939), pp.59-6o.
(7) Ebner, History^?p.71; P.H*Gulliver, "A history of the Songea 
Ngoni", ™ ,  hj4l, ;(.1933)1 pp. 19-20.
tension between them and the inkosi, Mbelwa, due possibly to the 
threat posed by their power,;they split off and moved away oh* their, 
own. Mbelwa sent an army against the dissidents, only-to be 
defeated arid forced to retreat. (1) Zulu and. Mbonani then moved . 
eastwards, crossing over Hkinga and Usafwa at the north end of lake 
Nyasa 'and heading down, xnto tFpangwa..(2) Within a short while they 
were to come into contact with the Maseko Ngoni, who had b|/then X 
settled to the south-east of them.
' 11
The lands east of lake Nyasa and north of the Ruvuma into which 
the Ifeseko and Njelu-Mshope Ngoni had migrated have a widely varying 
physical environment. Topographically, these lands comprise four 
distinct zones. Beginning in the east is a coastal plain, mostly 
less than 300;feet above sea level, which continues ten to fifteen 
miles into the interior% exxcept along the Ruvuma River, where it 
.continues for about 100 miles. The coastal plain merges into a 
lowland plateau, some 630 to 1600 .feet in height, which extends for 
another 100 to 250 miles ..inlands The, third zone is a still higher 
plateau, of 1600. to 3000 feet, which stretches in part as far as 
Lake Nyasa. Where itdoes not, it is broken by the livingstone,
Mrfcogoro, Matengo and other jfountains, which rise to well over 
3000 feet.(3)
Natural vegetation varies; from the thick evergreen bush and 
forest of the coast and the dense bush of the Makonde Plateau to
(1) Read, The Ngoni, p.71; Barnes, op cit, pp.19-22; Chibambo, op cit,p. 
26-9.
(2) Ebner, History, pp. 63 <72-3 < he gives one date of entry as 1856.
Stirnimann in an interview (2.1970) suggested they bypassed Upangwa. 
All other .sources state-otherwise and are. accepted.
(3) International flap of the World. Series 1301, sc-36 Songea, sc-37 Lindi
the savanna grasslands of the far west, the north-west and
parts of the south-east. Most of the region, however,,is covered-by
a small bush and grassland mixture, commonly known as 'miombo'.(l)
Soil types vary, though a few types predominate. The most 
widespread, soils,; are 'those of catenary associations, in which a 
red soil occurs in admixture with other types. The western third, 
of the region contains soil of a red to nori-calcareous sequence.
The^central third has red soil on Karroo sediments, giving predominantly 
grey, silty soils. The eastern third has red soil on undulating topography 
giving sharp transition from red to black soils.(2) pie red, often 
sandy, soils are difficult to cultivate with tmditonal implements.
Crop yields vary considerably from year to year. The water retention 
rate within the soil is vexy low.-;. Moreover, in some of these soil 
formations, fertiliser is Of little use in raising crop production.(3)
The exceptions^o the generally poor soils are found in the highlands 
in the west and ,in the southern parts of the central and eastern areas.
An extensive network of rivers and'streams covers most of the ~.
region, the exception being the central area. However, the river 
flow is seasonal for the most part and, during the dry season, from 
May to November, the water levels are low, if existent at all. These 
semi-arid conditions have affected settlement patterns, and 
concentrations of people have tended to occur where water is 
most easily available.
The wet season comes between December and May• Rainfall averages 
between thirty and fifty inches per annum, though wide variations
: ~ 11 ■;....... ............. . — —   'v?. ■ -------- - --- ---------- , „ „ '
;(1) E;W.Russeil, The Natural Resources of East Africa, (Nairobi, ■
1962), map's. , " 7  ' " —  —— —
(2) Tanganyika Atlas, soils, (1946). -
O) The Economic Development of Tanganyika.. (Baltimore. 19619. John 
Hopkins P., IBRD, pp.18-9. ■ ^ ---
occur from year to year. The average amount of rainfall 
is above the minimum required for intensive arable cultivation^), 
though there is also a high failure probability rats in the eastern 
parts of the region,(2) ;
These environmental conditions sustain sever&l endemic . ,
diseases. The easternmost three-quarters of the region favour 
the tsetse fly* which spreads trypanosomiasis among cattle and 
sleeping sickness among men. The prevalence of tsetse restricts 
cattle-keeping to the western quarter,and to small pockets of 
land in the south-east. This ecological fact was v$ry important / 
to, the cattle-minded Ngoni.
On the whole then, the region is a challenging, though 
reasonably favourable one. Three areas - the west, south-cehtre and south 
east - enjoy good soil, rainfall and vegetation conditions; During 
the past two hundred years they have been the only areas, of known 
permanent,, intensive settlement. Of the three, the Ngoni were to 
select the finest for their settlement: the western one.
As regards existing clusters of population, there were :
probably three discernible north of the Ruvuma by 1800. The
first was in the west, in the valleys of the I^togoro and other 
and
mountains^ branching out along the shores of the more permanent, 
smaller rivers that flow into the Ruvuma and Ruhuhu. A large 
population group, later called the Ndendeule, lived west of the 
Jfetogoro Mountains. To their south-east were a cluster later 
known as the Matengo, while to their north-west were the Pangwa,
A few population clusters were scattered near rivers, for example,
(1) Russell, op cit, states this level is 30 in.p.a,,
(2) W. A. Banco,. The Geography of Modern Africa, (New York. 19641. 
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the Ngindo were -along the Luwegu, the Njalila were along
the Njalila and the Nindi were along the Msinje.(1)
A second population cluster lived in the south-central part 
of the region. These were the Mwera and'they inhabited many of 
the shores of the large tributary streams of the Ruvuma that cover 
this region.(2) Small groups of Mwera were apparently pushing 
eastwards around 9800.
The third cluster, that of the tfekonde and related peoples, 
lived in the south-east* Adams suggests thatby the early 
nineteenth century the Makonde had spread Out from the Mbemkuru
River to the Makonde Plateau and lands/further south. The Makonde
■ - 5
occupied most of the land north of the Ruvuma while the Matambwe, 
a related people, lived along the Ruvuma. ELsewhere, north of the 
Ruvuma, there were few' inhabitants.
East of the .take and south of the Ruvuma lived four groups: 
the Ifewia, a people related to the Makonde, lived in the east on 
and near the Mawia Plateau, the Makua and Yao lived in the central 
region, east of and along the Lugenda River, and the Nyasa lived 
along the lakeshpre.
The peoples ndfth of the Ruvuma who were the more affected by 
the Ngoni and are, consequently, of greater interest to us had an 
administrative organization around 18O0 about which we know very 
little. Their political organization appears to have been clan- 
based (3 ), with some having religious leaders over:wider groupings.(4)
(1) Ebner, History, and Gulliver« "A history" have further details
(2) G.A.Adams, Lindi:und sein Hinterland, (Berlin. 1902), pp.46-9.
(3) TDB, v.4 names many of these,- albeit for a later period, eg.p.227 
has Ndendeule ones; see also TNA/SBB, v.2, p.t).
(4) The Matengo, as will be shown below, had religious leaders by 1840
Military organization was comparatively unsophisticated. Warfare 
appears to have taken the form of raiding ard isolated fighting, 
and no effective military organization or structure appears to have developed 
Economic life was based primarily on agriculture, though hunting, 
fishing and pastoralism were also practiced where conditions were )(.
favourable*(1)
In the early decades of the nineteenth century, various political 
and economic changes took place throughout the region, indicating 
that the region, though backward, was not in any sense static* One 
of the most important of these changes was a series of ethnic 
migrations into the region north of the Ruvuma, Here it is important 
to realize that the Ngoni were not to be the only immigrants to 
disrupt life in southern East Africa at this time. Both before and 
contemporaneous with the- Ngoni entries were immigrations from three 
other areas: west and north of Lake Nyasa and south of the Ruvuma.
The movement from west andunorth of the lake was the result of wars' 
and dispersions, particularly those of the Jere Ngoni moving up from 
the Zambezi, of population expansion and famine, and of the desire 
to find better land for Cattle-keeping, hunting and trading. Among 
those who entered from these areas were the Henga, Mwera, Sisya,
Tumbuka, Sokile, Mapapyi, Bena and Nyakyusaf(2) The main immigrants , 
from south, of the Ruvuma were^ the Makua and the Yao. Both were part 
of larger complexes of peoples that themselves became involved in 
wars of conquest and in conflicts of, trade during the 1820s and 
1830s.(3) These struggles pushed large sections of both Yap and
(1) Further details on lile-in southern Mst Africa before 1850 are/ 
available in a separate paper writteh by the,author. \ . 7 :
(2) Gulliver, "A history", p.29*. Ebner, History, p. 93; TDB, v.4,p.223*
(3) E.A.Alpers, The Role of the Yao in the Development of Trade-in 
l*st-Central Africa, 1^9^850, ®), London U,, 19^:Mams, 
op cit, p.^8. ?4..:
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Makua north of the Euvuraa, into the south-central and south­
eastern parts of the region.
lh.ese immigrations had several effects; Politically they 
appear to have: increased the pressures for ' group consolidation,
while economically, they helped change patterns of livelihood.(1)
The complete picture an the early nineteenth century, then,
..was one of considerable flux among the peoples east of Lake Nyasa.(2)
It was into this fluid world that the Ngoni entered around 1845, in 
search of cattle and other scarce resources. They were, now to 
sweep the peoples of this region into a new world and to alter 
radically the lives of many others in East Central Africa.
ill
The exact details of the entry and rule of the Maseko Ngoni; 
are difficult to establish as they were later expelled under 
difficult conditions which caused many of the events of their 
reign to be forgotten in oral traditions.Yetsome attention 
must be paid to their- rule, as they began the Ngoni presence in 
southern East Africa which was tc last f o c e n t u r y . ; Moreover, 
their rule influenced events that happened long after their 
departure. The following analysis of the Maseko state is based 
oh the few extant reminiscences of their years in southern East 
Africa and on deductions from their changing patterns of integrating
the Nindi, subjugated in the 1840s, the Ndendeule, in the 1840s and
1850s, and the Njelu^Mshope, around 1858.
After crossing the. Ruvuma, the Maseko|moyed through the
settlements of the Nindi, whom they plundered and absorbed* No 
resistance is remembered as having been offered by this people.
(1) Further details, again, are available in an unpublished, paper
written by the author.
(2) Omer-Cooper, op cit, p. 83 is incorrect in suggesting otherwise.
Those who could, fled, "many of these going jto the Matengo 
Mountains in their north-east* Before long, the Maseko pushed 
on to the area of the Mhtogoro. Mountains /.where lived the 
Ndendeule. They ,decided to settle here and: Built a place they 
called Mngongoma, near the, Hanga River.(1) From here they began 
to set up a new state* - ~
-The Ndendeule offered almost as little resistance as did the 
Nindi* The general picture of the invasion represented in I ' 
subsequent traditions is one of shock and; inability to react 
effectively. Indeed, traditions recall that the Ndendeule acquired 
their very name at this time, when their frequent! forlorn utterance 
of ’what are we to do?1, in their language something akin to 
’ndendeule’, wasVappiied to them by the conquerorsv(2) Unable;- 
to resist effectively, many-Ndendeulefled iowards the east and 
north-east.
After the Mngongoma area had been pacified, the Ifeseko 
plundered the peoples "of neighbouring-regions. To the east\ they 
raided among the Ngindo, forcing those who escaped further north 
and east. To the south-west they plundered the . Mat engo who, as a 
result, began withdrawing into the Matengo Mountains. To the west, 
they raided the Nyasa, Manda and ‘Other small population groups. JEy 
the late 18*K)s , the Ndendeule, ^ M^ tehgo, Nindi; and other peoples, of 
the lands bordering the eastern side of lake Nyasa had experienced 
their first stage of political interaction with the Ngoni intruders.
0) Ebner, History, pp.61-3; F.Fttlleborn, Das Deutsche Njassa und 
Ruvuma Gebiet, (Berlin, $906), p.133- Prince, op citjp.ai^T""" 
called the settlement ’Ngongoma’. j
(2) Gulliver, "A history”, p.29; Kbner, Histoiy, p.^9 translates it 
as ’how should, .I do, it?’. .
They had been captured or dispersed(1) and had already seen 
considerable disruption of their existihg, life-styles.
A second stage of interaction now began^. It started 
immediately after capture and involved integration into M&seko 
Ngoni society# At finet-',y*4nt©gf^ tion. was Mostly '-a passive 
reaction in which people were given new styles of life and 
forced to adopt them. In time, reaction became more active, 
as people saw advantages to the hew life,- and worked 40 benefit 
from them. The political, military and economic aspects of 
this integration can be noted here, though only briefly and 
sketchily* / J "
The main change in the political sphere clearly concerned 
participation in the well-organized and centralist Maseko - 
state. In the early years, captives appear to hdve joined 
the" clans of the people who had seized them, or tp whom they 
had been given after seizure. One example are the Matengo, 
who later followed the M&seko to the southern end of Lake Ityasa 
As the state expanded, this pattern of-particularistic 
assimilation appears to: have changed, , Soon the 
relatively small numbers of Maseko Ngoni apparently became 
unable to absorb further newcomers as^before* Group
(1) Lieder, G,, "Keisejvon Mbampa-Bai nach Kisswere am 
Indischen Ocean - nach>dem' Tagebuch • dee: GeplOgehJ-,, f%
MadS, v»X, (1897): 0,101 notes the dispersion eastwards 
of the Nindi, Gindo, Mr/era and Kuahda. f
assimilation then appears to have become the main 
method of integration. Examples of this kind of 
integration appear among the Ndendeule groups incorp­
orated within the Maseko state. With the change in 
methods of integration, came a change in manner of 
political expression. Captives integrated as individuals 
could exert little influence in Ngoni society relative 
to their numbers. Those integrated as a group, however, 
had the chance to acquire some political power, if only 
in a consciousness of separate identity. This appears 
to have gradually become a serious problem in the Maseko 
state as groups schemed against existing political 
structures, as described below.
The integration into Ngoni military life was a second 
important aspect of the formation of the new Maseko state. 
Initially, captives were absorbed into the army in much 
the same way as they had been on the march. Young men were 
placed in age-regiments under an induna selected by the 
inlcosi. There they were trained in Ngoni war methods, 
particularly in the use of weapons and in battle tactics.
By the 1850s, however, these military methods appear to 
have undergone some change. Though age-regiments did 
remain, units within the army came increasingly to reflect 
the composition of the population, and it appears that 
there were various regiments comprising almost entirely 
subject peoples of one society or another* for example, 
when the Njelu and Mshope Ngoni were subjugated in the 
late 1850s, their military organization appears to have
remained intact. Again, an Mshope tradition mentions 
some Njalila subjects of Mputa who were undertaking 
military expeditions.(1) Thus^ s by the 1860s, subject 
groups had military units which were capable of building 
new states independent of the Maseko Ngoni one. Perhaps 
local captives appreciated the opportunity to develop 
militarily like their Ngoni masters.
The adoption of Ngoni eoonomic life also appears to 
have brought many changes to traditional patterns. In 
agriculture, both distribution and organization were 
affected. Captives who formerly had worked in small, 
isolated and communal groups, now had to work in large 
ones, cultivating the fields of their masters, as well 
as tending to their own plots. Moreover, these plots came 
increasingly to be communally worked, as people abandoned 
small settlements to live in large communities. The 
pattern of large settlements may also have brought some 
modifications in traditional slash-and-burn methods of 
cultivation, though no information on this was found.
Other economic activities underwent varying changes.
Fishing probably declined in many areas, as those who 
lived by fishing either had to flee from easily accessible 
rivers or were captured and brought back to Mngongoma, 
Specialized economic activities probably declined, as 
local trade became increasingly hindered by Ngoni raids.(2)
(1) Tawete, op cit, section 30.
(2) Rangeley, op cit, p. 13 notes that/the Maseko stopped 
the Yao lake trade•
Cattle-keeping, as an economic activity, probably 
expanded, as captives came to know of and appreciate 
the Ngoni interest in cattle. For example, by the 
1860s, some Nindi who had formerly not kept cattle, 
now owned and used them.(l)
Probably the most important economic impact of the 
Ngoni entry was the awareness it brought to local peoples 
of the importance, ease and value of plundering. During 
the years of Maseko Ngoni rule, the local peoples them­
selves benefited little from raids, as captured goods and 
people were almost exclusively the property of the leaders.(2) 
But undoubtedly, they came to appreciate the value of this 
activity, for when later some of them became independent 
again, they were quick to turn to plundering as a major 
economic activity.(3)
Through the regular influx of captives and goods 
acquired by plundering expeditions, the Maseko state was 
becoming successful and well-established by the 1850s.
Its confident armies travelled ever further to seek spoils 
and greater glory.(4)
As it increased in size, the Ngoni state gradually 
became more complex. The political struoture remained 
centralized. Mputa, the apparently talented and able
(1) Waller, op cit, pp.30,4-3,63.
(2) Though some did acquire some goods, as, for example,
the Nindi noted in Waller, op cit, pp.30,^3.
(3) Beardall, W., "Exploration of the Rufiji River under
the orders of the Sultan of Zanzibar", PROS, v.III, 
(1831), n.ll, p . 652 talked of Mawanda and G-angi who 
were in the habit of putting on Ngoni costume and 
harrying their neighbours.
(if.) prinoe, op cit, p.21^ states they attacked ICondeland 
for cattle; They did not, however, attack Kilwa as 
Omer-Cooper states in Aftermath, p*75» £or they had 
left southern East Africa by this time.
SI
ruler from the early l8^0s until about i860, seems to
have taken care of that* He restricted settlement to
the area of the capital, removed rivals to himself, and,
at least with the Njelu and Mshope Ngoni, supported
military rather than royal clan leadership at lower
levels. But there werd limits to centralism. For one
thing, Mputa*s policies did not always ensure his sole
control. For example, restricting settlement patterns
and controlling rivals appears to have been an important
factor in permitting various subject groups to develop
and consolidate separate identities and eventually to
scheme against Maseko Ngoni rule itself. Had the various
rivals to the inkosi been given more control over sections
of the population, they would very probably, have been
able to restrict the development of separate identities by
subject groups.(1) The example of the Njelu and Mshope
Ngoni in later years, described below in chapters two and
three, brings this out clearly. A second limitation to the 
policy
*> of centralism was posed by the very expansion of the 
state. Growth fostered the rise of factions within Ngoni 
society and there appears to have been an increasing 
competition among groups within the ruling class as 
military leaders acquired more and more followers.
By the 18.50s, it seems that the Maseko Ngoni society 
had factions among its leaders similar to those already 
described for the Jere Ngoni at the time of Zwangendaba1s
(1) Chapter Two, sections two and three; Chapter Three, 
sections two and three.
mdeath. There also appears to have been factions among 
the subject population. After Mputafs death, factionalism 
became a critical problem.
In all, by 1858 the Maseko Ngoni had gone a good way 
towards establishing their empire in southern East Africa. 
They had subdued most of the indigenous inhabitants in 
their region of settlement and were on their way towards 
turning these captives into *new-Ngonif, of a lower order 
than themselves but espousing|bheir values. They were 
also laying firm economic foundations to their state, 
particularly through increased plundering of wealthy 
neighbours. However, there were prbblems arising from 
state formation. Integration was becoming a process having 
variable success, and internal political life seemed bound 
for trouble after the death of Mputa, when a successor 
would have to be chosen. But these problems were, to some 
extent, only to be expected. .Integration of peoples is 
often a difficult process, while Ngoni successions were 
frequently unnecessarily complicated affairs. Internal 
troubles could have been resolved granted the absence of 
other problems. But this was not to be. The Maseko Ngoni 
state was not to endure. Some fifteen years after the 
Maseko had crossed the Ruvuma, a second Ngoni migratory 
group, the Njelu and Mshope Ngoni, whose migration has 
already been referred to, settled on the fringes of the 
expanding Maseko state. Soon they were to expel the 
Maseko.
IV
Traditions describing the initial contact between the 
Maseko and the Njelu and Mshope vary. Some say that the Njelu 
and Mshope had come to join the Itself®, whom they had known at 
one time during the migration(1), while others say they did not know the 
feseko(2) 0 Whether contact came through accident or intent is of 
little importance. The Maseko Ngoni do not appear to have been 
interested in friendship for its own sake. In any case, Upangwa, 
where the Njelu and Mshope had settled, was becoming a profitable 
raiding area (3 ) and it is unlikely that they would have surrendered 
it to a newcomer out of charitable feeling. Traditions relate that 
Mputa first investigated the strength of the Njelu and Mshope and, 
finding that they were weaker than he, demanded that they should 
sUbmit and accept his authority#(4) Having no feasible alternative, 
the newcomers did so.
After the Njelu and Mshope submitted, Mputa took steps to 
ensure their continued subordination to Maseko rule. He required 
them to transfer their settlement to Mngongoma, apparently so that they could 
be observed more closely and kept under control. However, proximity 
alone soon seemed an inadequate safeguard, as the compliance of the 
new group had 'preserved its corporate identity from destruction and 
made feasible a delayed struggle for power. So inkosi Mputa appears 
to have determined to prevent this by destroying the leadership,(3 )
(1) Ebner, History, pp.73-6.
(2) John Booth, "Die Nachkommen der Sulu-kaffern (Wangoni) in Deutsch 
Ostafrika", Globus, lxxxviii, (1903), p.198; EH, s.583, Chief 
Mbonani (D• M.M,Tawete), Account of the Wangoni, Tanganyika, paction 
14. The author was inkosi of Mshope from 1926’ to 1932.
(3) Prince, op cit, p.214~notes an attack on Kondeland.
(4) Ibner, History, pp.73-6 ; Tawete, op cit, sections 13-7.
(3) Tawete, op cit, section 18 notes that Mputa planned to exterminate 
them.
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Accordingly, on three occasions, once a banquet, the second 
time a dance and the third, an isolated poisoning, Mputa 
succeeded in killing a number of the senior leaders and various 
warriors of Njelu and Mshope.(1) Their numbers included Zulu's 
only brother, Nganyane, and, apparently, the Mshope inkosi,
Mbonani(2).
In fear for their lives, a number of the royal Gama family 
decided to flee from Mngongoma to west of Lake Niyasa. Their 
numbers included Gwaserapasi, Zulu's eldest son and the one who 
had succeeded tothe inkosiship following Zulu's death in or en route 
to Upangwa in the late 1850s(3), Zulu's other sons Mcuzo, Fusi,
Mpofu and Mpofu's son, Mculayedwa. (k) The sons of Zulu and 
Mbonani who remianed near Mngongoma then went into seclusion.
While the royal families remained in the background, Regents 
assumed the leadership. Chikuse, a leading military induna of the 
Njelu, took command of that section, while Mdongoraani, and then 
Mandati, also leading military jxtnduna of their people, directed 
the Mshope. (5)
The disruptions among the leadership of the Njelu and Mshope 
affected all the Ngoni groups in southern East Africa. It assisted 
the Maseko by lessening any immediate internal threat posed by the 
Njelu and Mshope. It affected the Njelu by removing a large section
of the Gama ruling family from contention for the inkosiship for a
(1) These killings are described in detail in Ebner, History, p.77; 
Gulliver, "A history", p.20.
(2) Gulliver, "A history", p.20 and Tawete, op cit, section 21 state 
Mputa killed him though Prince, op cit, p.21^ states he died 
independently.
(3) Booth, op «it, p. 198 states he died in Usafwa; Ebner, History, 
PP*75-6 states he died in Upangwa.
W  Prince, op cit, p.21*f; Ebner, History, p.77.
(3) Tawete, op cit, section 2*f incorrectly claims Mdongomani led both
groups.
Mwhile, a development which facilitated two successions but 
made later ones extremely complex* Moreover, it helped 
weaken the powers of the Gama family over some of the leading 
iz.tnduna, such as Chikuse Nanguru and Songea Mbano# In Mshope, 
the killings appear to have weakened the hold of the ruling 
branch of the Tawete family over non-ruling branches. As these 
were all to show themselves later, they are discussed in detail 
then. Finally, the killings may have helped to reinforce the 
determination of the Njelu and Mshope to be free of the Ifeseko.
Ibr a few years after the killings, the Njelu and Mshope 
participated quietly within the Ifeseko state according to various 
traditions, taking part in wars, ceremonies and other activities. 
However, they also studied Maseko techniques and learned their 
weaknesses .-(1) These weaknesses seem to have m'ehifested A"{s'
themselves most in the policies of as&imilatiem Aa4, based on 
their later actions, the Njelu and Mshope became aware of the 
varying degrees of assimilation among the subjugated peoples and, 
particularly, of the fact that some groups longed for separation 
from the fl&seko. Accordingly, they appeai|fco have talked of a 
military alliance between themselves and these dissatisfied 
sujects with the aim of overthrowing the Maseko *-(2)
An opportunity for rebellion arose following an unsuccessful - 
war waged by the tfeseko against the Manda(3 ), around 1862 or 1863(A).
(1) Chibambo, op cit, p.31*
(2) Ebner, History, p.81; Tawete, op cit, section 12;, TDB, v.A, p.213.
(3) Booth, op cit, p.198; Ebner, History, p.78; Tawete, op cit, sections 
30-2 states merely that they fought the Nyasa.
(A) This date allows two to three years for the Maseko explusion and 
the subsequent Nindi (Mazitu) migrations which Livingstone met in 
1863 by the mid-Kuvuma.
The Njelu and' Mshope had participated as a reserve force in 
operations against the Manda and when Mputa, fleeing from defeat, 
sought refuge in their camp, they killed him#(1) Despite such 
good fortune, they seem to have been unprepared to challenge the 
Maseko just then, for they told|bhe tfeseko that Mputa had died of 
natural causes and they participated in the general mourning. It 
may have been that the Njel^knd Mshope only fully grasped the 
possibility of takeover at the tira^ of the killing. Either way, 
they quietly took advantage of the situation. As the mourning 
went on, they prepared for war by reaffirming their alliance with 
subject groups such as the Ndendeule and by preparing their warriors.(2) 
When all was ready, they attacked Mngongoma and defeated^the Maseko*
It remains unclear how the Njelu and Mshope were able to defeat, 
the more powerful Maseko as kfeseko traditions recall few events of this 
period, while those of the Njelu and Mshope merely note that they 
routed the enemy. However, three suggestions can be made in explaining 
the Maseko defeat. First, the Maseko may have been-weakened by a 
troubled succession. Evidence for this comes from conflicting reports 
as to who succeeded(3) and from the fact that not all the Maseko fled 
together - some remained with the Njelu and Mshope while others allied 
with various subject groups then set out to build their own empires(^ f). 
Secondly, the defeat of the Maseko may have been due to surprise.
(1) Tawete, op cit, sections 3 0 - 3 Chibambo, op cit, p.32 states that 
the Njelu and Mshope did not receive cattle from the raid and were 
annoyed.
(2) Tawete, op cit, sections 36-8 has many details on the alliance.
(3) Heads, The Hgon.c, p.93 and Prince* 00 cit, p.21 A- state that Cidawonga 
was made Kegent, while Booth, op cit,-.p*198 and Tawete, op cit, 
section 38 state Mputa1s son succeeded. Gidyawonga*s faction later 
opposed. Mputa’s son in a succession issue, see Read, The Ngoni, p.33.
(*f) FUlleborn, op cit, p. 133 states .the Mbunga were led.by one of 
Mputa' s 12.i.nduna,
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If later successions of.the Maseko are any indication, then the 
mourning period was one when military units could prepare and 
march on the capital, without being suspect in any way,, as part 
of the manifestations of grief.(1) Tawete. suggests this occurred 
when writing that the Njelu .and Mshope went on a military 
expedition to get cattle for the mourning then, , in the course of 
raiding, prepared for war.(2) Thirdly, the Maseko may have been 
weakened by the defection of Ndendeule. and other subjects who- 
allied with. the. Njelu and Mshope. Weakness is suggested, though, 
not really .explained, in a Maseko'.tradition which states that when 
.Cidyawonga was selected as Regent, the people said to him:. "We are 
at war. You must help us".(3)
When defeated, the Maseko were driven from Mngongoma. They and 
their subjects split into a number .of groups and. moved away in 
different directions. The largest body, comprising most of the 
original flfeseko immigrants.,, pushed, southwards and crossed the Shire 
River, at. the southern end of; Lake Nyasa. Traditions of the Njelu 
and Mshope state that they followed the fleeing Maseko as. far as 
the Shire River before returning northwards again.(4), They stayed 
at Mngongoma for a while "to make sure that Mputa1 s power was 
completely destroyed"(3), then returned.to their old home in Upangwa. 
They did this, according to Gulliver and Ebner, because they had, 
only been interested in eliminating the oppressor and in allowing 
local peoples.to regain their freedom, according to their earlier 
agreement.(6) ' ...
(1) Read, The Ngoni, p.33. ...
(2) Tawete, op cit, sections 3^-6.
(3) Ibid,, section 38; Read, The Ngoni, p,35*
(*f) Booth, op cit, p.,198; Ebner, History, p.81; Chibambo, op cit,p.32.
The leave-taking from the Mngongoma region, however, 
did not last long. The newly-released peoples, according 
to some traditions, were, unable to live peaceably among 
themselves, but instead began fighting against each other 
for control over the now leader “less state. The Ndendeule, • 
in particular, are pointed out as the culprits in these 
troubles. Some traditions go so far as to say that they 
used guns to achieve their aims(1), though this seems, highly 
unlikely given the negative attitude of the Maseko towards 
guns(2) and the absence of any known trade between this area 
and the coast in the 1860s. It seems likely that the traditions 
are spurious or re£exjbo later developments in the area. As 
groups such as the Ndonde, Manda and Njalila(3) despaired of . 
the Ndendeule threat, they went to the Ngoni for help. Apparently 
willing to have more captives, the Ngoni moved down once again 
from Upangwa, this time to Seluka, by the Hahga River, whence 
they proceeded to reconquer the region.(4)
Though the Ndendeule were unable to replace the Mhseko state 
by one of their own, their first major reaction to conquest was 
certainly an impressive one. They had become sufficiently proficient 
in military organization to become allies of the Njelu and Mshope 
Ngoni in overthrowing the Maseko and their failure to set up their
(5) p.48 Tawete, op cit* section 38.
(6) p.48 Ibid., section 38 states they stayed at Namkumula, later ' 
called Jfengua; P.H.Gulliver, An Administrative Survey of the Ngoni 
of Songea District, 1954, UDSM, typescript, p.9; E.Ebner, Texte in 
Neu-KIngoni: (volTl) ErziOilungen, Fabeln, RStsel, SprichwdrterT TT969). 
SOA, pp.59-61. . —   *---------
(1) TDB, v.4, p.218; Ebner, History, p.86: Tawete, op cit, section 38.
(2) Read, The Ngoni.
(3) Tawete, op cit, sections 38-46.
(4) Ibid.; Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, pp.9-10.
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own state may have been more the result of insufficient 
time to perfect the techniques of the Ngoni,. than of lack 
of spirit or determination. :Though the Ndendeule were unable 
to set up their own state, they were able, like other people* , 
to take advantage of the disruptions of the time, either to 
improve their defences against the Ngoni or, more spectacularly, 
to move off to set up their, own.kingdoms in new lands.
The most notable example of groups . who set up better; defences 
was that of . the Matengo and some. Nindi. During the Maseko raids, of 
$he i8^0s, many N&tengo had begun leaving the more exposed valleys 
and hills of the Ifetengo Mountains to move into the isolated and  ^
defensible Idtembo valley and hills. After the Maseko explusion, 
a number of Nindi subjects of the Ifeseko, led by Jfekita Kayuni, 
left the Mngongoma region and moved into the Idtembo valley where 
they allied with the Matengo. Within a few decades, the Nindi 
had been given political control over the Matengo-Nindi complex(1), 
a transfer of power which was to have considerable repercussions in 
and afteij|the 1930s*
Those who moved away from the Mngongoma region to set up their 
■own independent military states undertook what was to be the most 
successful imitative reaction to Ngoni contact by peoples east Of 
Lake Ityasa for almost a hundred years. Three major groups(2) are 
known to have left the Mngongoma region during these years of 
disruptions. One led by the- Nindi, possibly with Ndendeule admixture, 
appears to have set oht when the Maseko pushed south. They were the 
dreaded 'Mazitu1 whom David Livingstone encountered in his journey, 
up the Ruyuma River in 1865. (3) They plundered everything .in their
(1) TDB, v.4, p.221; Ebner, History, p.122. . ■
(2) A fourth, Ndendeule, group is mentioned by Tawete, op cit, section 
331 to have moved south of the Ruvuma.
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path and, when reaching the ;east, ..plundered the Xao, Makua 
and Makonde till they mobilized to expel them. Some then 
settled in impoverished communities along the Kuvuma while, 
others pushed south of the :Euvuma where they continued 
plundering until they faced N^ii expeditions.(1) ^
..The second and third groups to leave the Mngongoma region . 
were Ndendeule ones and it appears they only left after the 
wars against the Njelu and Mshope Ngoni fought for supremacy over 
the Mngongoma region. One group moved in a northeasterly direction, 
eventually settling in the KLlombero valley. There they became 
known as the Mbunga and,, to this day, form a separate community in 
that region. They Successfully, made-use o£ the military proficiency 
they acquired from- the .Ngoni--to' establish a-> state'r^/'their'i own- from 
which they plundered neighbouring peoples. (2) The other group moved 
towards Kilwa and they, or the Mshope,who pursued them, appear to 
have been the most likely group to have fought and defeated the 
Kilwa detachment of the army of. the Sultan of Zanzibar in 1868.(3) 
They were unfortunate in the end, for the Mshope caught up with 
them, then fought and defeated them and brought many back to the 
Mngongoma region as captives. (4) The impact of their incursions 
in the Kilwa region was sufficiently powerful to have devastated
ann area of hundreds of square miles in the Kilwa hinterland and
left it uninhabited for decades afterwards.(5)
(3) p.30 H.Waller, The Last Journals of David Livingstone in 
Central Africa,“Thondon, ‘I'twl.vTT, pp.33, 41-3, 32-37"63.
(1) H.Clarke, CA, v.1,n.12,,12.1883 distinguishes the Nindi and 
NgOni and describes their hostility towards each other.
(2) FUllebom, op cit, p. 135; Ebner, History, pp.83-4; TDB, tfehenge 
District Book; K.Johnston, "Native routes in East Africa from 
Dar es Salaam towards Lake Jtyasa", PHIS, v.1 , n.7, p.418; J. 
Thomson, "Notes oh the route taken.*.to TJhehe...1879", PH3S,
, v.ll, (1880), n.2-y p. 110. ‘ ' — v
(3) Described in K.CoUpland, The Exploitation of East Africa.
(London, 1968), pp*66-?. ~ ---- — -----  — 1
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After gaining control over the former subjects,of the 
now defunct Maseko Ngoni state, the Njelu ;and Mshope settled 
down to build their own states. Their first step towards doing 
this was the separation of the Njelu and Mshope into two 
kingdoms. No mention has been found of conflict having precipitated 
this separation and it seems likely that it was merely an expression 
of the traditional Ngoni tendencies to segmentation and fission.
There never had been one man ruling the two kingdoms. Bather, each 
had its own inkosi with his military nad administrative network, as 
will be described below. Consequently, the alliance they had till 
the split was presumably.one of convenience which was no longer 
necessary once the kingdoms had, secured their positions and faced 
no external threat.(1)
Each kingdom was henceforth to enjoy independent political 
and economic status and to have separate spheres of military 
expansion* Each would co-operate with the other.in the rare 
instances of major external challenge that were to face them later.
They were also at times to quarrel with each other, but their 
peace and lasting friendship was never to be irrevocably compromised.
It was now some forty years since the Njelu and Mshope had 
left southern Africa. During that time they had grown from being 
a small segment of a migrant society to two states which successfully 
challenged another migrant society and which absorbed a captive population 
many times their;size. Now they began an era of expansion which was to 
culminate in damaging contact \vdth the powerful Hehe state also growing 
up to their north.
C^ ) f&32 Tawete, op cit, sections 4-7-34.
m*52 c's*Srn:Ltht 1 fExplorationsfln Zanzibar Dominions’’, JBGS, supp.l88?/9,p.103-*f 
t ) Tawete, op eit, sections 39-62; Prince, op cit, p.213*
Chapter 2
A Spirited Growth, l860s-early 188OS ,
I .
Many of the details of the military expansion of these, 
years of early state-building are unknown* However, general ■ 
patterns can be discerned* They indicate that the Mshope Ngoni 
concerned themselves with consolidation in the region of the Hariga ■- 
River, then with expansion to the north-west. Njelu, on the 
other hand, turned increasingly to the south,, south-west, then west*
Why the Njelu pushed south from the Jfe.nga H.ver to the Lumecha 
River where they established a capital at Ngalanga.is not clearly 
known* (1) The move meant abandoning the Ndendeule population 
which lived there and to the north in favour of a region that was ■
apparently sparsely populated. Possibly the Njelu Ngpni wanted 
to move^ome distance away from the Mshope where they could have 
adequate room to expand and felt that movement southwards, offered 
better prospects than movement in other directions.
One of the first targets of the Njelu military leaders was the,
Nindi and Matengo settlements in the Matengo Mountains. Ey the 1870s
a good many of...both groups had. acknowledged their inability to 
withstand constant attacks and had submitted to the Ngoni*(2) While 
the conquest of the Matengo was .-going on, the Njelu began plundering.
: in the west and parts of the north-west. In the north-west-, they 
appear to have concentrated on Upangwa and the lands, such as Ukinga,
.(1) P.H.Gulliver, An Administrative Survey of the Ngoni and Ndendeuli of 
Songea District, 19f&* UDSM, typescript, p. 10: Ebner to' Redm ond-T 
.interviews, 17-21*10.1971.
(2) E*Ebner, Texte in Neu-Kingoni: . (vol. 1) Erzdhlungen, Fabeln, RStsel,
Sprichwdrter* (1969)V SOA, typescript, pp.68-7 2. ^
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behind it. The plundering of Upangwa appears to have been 
intensive. Recollections by the Pangwa indicate that Ngoni, 
not specifically Njelu, raids were very damaging. As the Pangwa 
were later to constitute a'much larger percentage of the population 
of Njelu than of Mshope(1), it seems likely that the Njelu Ngoni 
were responsible for most of the raiding among them. For the 
Pangwa, the memories of the raids during the 1860s and 1870s so 
surpassed recollections of the Njelu and Mshope settlement in their 
lands during the 1850s, that many recall the later attacks as the 
first contact with the Ngoni. (2) One tradition of. the raids noted,, 
that the Ngoni took so many cattle, captives and foodstuffs in 
their raids that the people-were on the verge of losing their 
separate identity. Accordingly, those still.free came to a 
compromise with the-Ngoni, by which they accepted a tributary 
status, agreeing "to .supply foodstuffs to Ngoni forces marching 
further north and north-west, on the condition that the Ngoni 
did not take everything but allowed them at least some means of 
livelihood. (3) Eiy 1880, most of the Pangwa appear to have 
ajscepted this tributary status and only small groups remained 
independent in poor, isolated communities in the forests and 
hills of Upangwa.
little information was found on raids undertaken to the 
north-west of Upangwa* As the above traditions suggests, however, 
they were not irregular. One of- the few references to Ngoni
(1) E.Ebner, History of the Wangoni, (Peramiho, 1959), p.92 states 
they are the largest group in Njelu, the third largest in Mahope.
(2) This led J.Stirnimann to doubt that the Njelu and Mshope entered 
from the west (interview, 2.1970), as noted above, p. 44,
(3) Stirnimann to Redmond, interview 2.1970.
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attacks, again whether Njelu or Mshope is not specified, 
is from a IMJA missionary who travelled through Usokile 
and commented on the many burnt-out villages and deserted lands 
which lay in the wake of the Ngoni. (1) Ebner records another 
from a Sokile captive who states that both the Njelu and the 
Mshope made many raids into Usokile, between Lake %asa and 
Tukuyu, because this region was rich in cattle.(2)
To the west,, most of the lakeshore appears to have come 
under attack. This region contained an-easy source of captives, 
foodstuffs, such as fish, and in certain areas, cattle. Much 
is known of the Njelu raids in this, region from the writings of 
various tMJA missionaries, who were actively proselytizing along 
khe lakeshore by the late "1870s. Njelu raids were frequent and 
damaging, and gradually forced the Nyasa to leave small, open, 
settlements and move to swamps and. other inaccessible areas-or
to amalgamate into large settlenents where ..they could defend
Bellingham -
themselves-. A IM3A lay worker, . • ■ , described the restricted
life-style that had to be practiced in these new .settlements:
"The people here (pear Mbamba Bay) do not get out of their 
villages till about ten; then at four PM they are off back 
in again for fear of the Magwangwara(3). Their dress and 
language is different to; any we have “seen. "They are 
Wangindo and Wanindi* The Magwangwara are constantly about 
here."(4)
The Njelu .appear to, have had only limited interest in the 
lands south of the kuvuma during the 1860s and most of the 1870s,
(1 ))W.P.Johnson, ^  African BeminiscencesC 1875-1895, (London, 1924)
uidA, p. 102. r ~
(2) Ebner, History, p.93, tradition of M.Chungu.
(3) V/.P.Johnson, Nyasa, The Great Water, (London, 1922) OUP, p. 110 
gives as origin of the word Magwangwara: "a name of terror meaning 
meaning 'the crows',iVgiven them because their warriors wore
crow's feathers stuck in a band over their heads and on a band:hanging 
down their backs."
(4) J.C.Yarborough, The Diary of a Working Man in Central Africa,nd,p. 111 -2
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apparently because tlie-west and north-west offered; 
sufficient diversion for the rather small.Njelu armies. ‘
They did raid some. Mtengula's, a town lying towards the 
southern part of the lakeshore, for example, ;was attacked 
in 1876, (1.). However,^ : on the whole, little was done .there*
Evidence to support: this’ statement comes from the, fact that 
a number of Yao settlements were'scattered'throughout this 
region in the 1870s, yet were dispersing in the 1880s, when 
Ngoni raids were known to be taking place* ' 3
The lands east of Njelu appear to have been ignored as 
well, again for the same reason that one can advance for lack 
of interest in the south. In addition to this appears to have'; 
been the physical barrier of the ifeiogoro Meuntains-which lay 
between Ung;oni. and-the east. Only when the Njelu induna, Songea 
Mbano, moved near these hills, was there incentive to cross them 
and go east.(2)
The Mshope spent some,time .conquering the Ndendeule^in the 
region of first, Seluka, then Mkutano, in both of which places 
they settled. This brought some involvement on their part in . 
the lands of the north-east, as many Ndendeule fled in that : *
direction to avoid capture. The raid on the Kilwa hinterland 
mentioned in the previous chapter appears to have been part of the 
consolidation of the Mshope control over the Ndendeule in the 
Hanga region where Mkutano was.
. r Following the conquest , of the Ndendeule:, the ’Mshope appear, 
to have devoted some attention to peoples in the north-east.
(1) Yarborough,, op cit, p.il.9.
(2) W.H.Hangeley, "The Ayao”, Nyasaland J., v.XVI, (1963), n.1, p.23 
is incorrect in stating they did- the Nindi (mzitu) were.
The Ngindo and those Ndendeule who still remained free 
began pushing east and south-east to av&id the Ngoni grasp*
Their movement, and those of the.Yao and the Nindi to the 
south, seem to have initiated a series of migrations which, 
were eventually to leave bare a considerable region in the 
centre of southern East Africa*(1)
Once the land which was to.be their homeland was secured, 
the Mshope appear to have turned their attention towards the 
north-west, a region whose cattle and human resources were to 
hold their interest for at least a decade* On the plateau lands 
td? the north-west of the Mshope state lived the peoples 
collectively identified today as the Bena-Sangu-Hehe complex.
All appear to have been cattle-owning at the time. Many were 
not politically centralized to any great extent, though a number 
had begun consolidating into three state entities. The less- 
organized groups were preyed upon by both their better-organized 
neighbours and the Mshope Ngoni who, by the early 1870s, were 
making regular expeditions into the region. By that time, the 
Mshope had become involved in a complicated series of interrelation­
ships among the three states in the region. As this involvement led 
to the Ngoni-Hehe wars of 1878 and 1881, which in turn.radically 
changed Ngoni society, they will be dealt with in greater detail 
when the wars themselves are discussed. Suffice it here to say 
that this involvement with other states seems to have kept the 
Mshope preoccupied for a decade.
The lands in the west received some attention from the Mshope 
though exactly how. much is hot known; An analysis of the ethnic
(1) Some traditions of migration are given in TPB, v.^ f.
~?S
composition of the Mshope population at.this time, after suitable 
fieldwork, might provide an answer. On present evidence, it seems 
probable that Mshope, as the northern kingdom, was as, involved as 
Njelu in the plundering of Usokile and its neighbouring lands, 
which has been noted above in the comments on Njelu expansion.
. In all, the military expansion of these years culminated 
in the effective consolidation of two state entities in Ungoni, 
both of which had established firm orientations in expansion.
The Njelu expansion was geographically more dispersed. To some 
extent this was because the Mshope interests in the north-west 
were sufficiently attractive to preoccupy the leader and his 
people. Yet there was another important reason. Njelu was 
evolving a more decentralized political structure than Mshope 
and this evolution was closely associated with greater 
individual independence of action in the military sphere.
This, in turn, affected other aspects of the organization of 
the two states. It is to the character of political organization 
in these two states that we now turn.
II
The military and administrative structures, of the Njelu. and 
Mshope kingdoms in the early 1860s Were similar, in the sense that 
both were based on the ones brought from southern Africa. But, by 1878, 
these structures had changed somewhat from each other and the kingdoms
T&'i
well on their ways to becomingjfcwo distinct entities*
The most crucial factors bringing this about involved 
the allocation of power to the constituent segments 
within each political community* One of the very few 
scholars to comment 011 thfe-i development of this 
differentiation is P,H.Gulliver. He remarks, when 
describing Njelu and Mshope political systems of the 
nineteenth century, that in Njelu, the inlcosi sought to 
strengthen the hand of the royal family at the expense 
of that of the military izinduna. while in Mshope, the 
inkosi did the reverse.(1) To some extent, this statement 
is correct. The inkosi in each kingdom did work to 
retain his control over the state he ruled, and challenges 
to this control did come from other members of the royal 
families, known as the wantwana, and the military izinduna 
to a much greater extent than any other group. However, 
it is important to note that the challenges offered by 
the two groups were of two quite different orders* The 
military izinduna could and did try to gain increased 
powers from the inkosi. However, they did not try to 
replace the inkosi as his position was hereditary and 
restricted to a royal family recognized by all members 
of the state. On the other hand, the wantwana. in 
addition to wanting increased powers, were also eligible to 
attempt usurption. Gulliver fails to make this clear.
Yet it is essential in adding a new dimension to Ngoni 
political life during these years. Consequently, an
(1) Gulliver, "A History”, p.2^-5; and see Ebner, History,
P.25.
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analysis of political life must, consider two types 
of challenges offered* Xt will be shown that the 
politioal challenge offered by the wantwana throughout 
Ngoni history was always the more serious one.
A number of factors determined the changing 
fortunes of each of the three interest groups: inkosi * 
wantwana and military izinduna* One was the personality 
of the inkosi* A strong and determined inkosi was better 
able to preserve his powers than a weak or indecisive 
one* Secondly, the numbers of wantwana or military 
izinduna helped to determine the amount of challenge 
an inkosi would face. Thirdly, the quality of wawtwana 
ant* izinduna determined the likelihood of their successful 
opposition to an inkosi. Finally, a verity of external 
factors were important. These included the type and 
orientation of expansion undertaken by the state, the 
enemies it encountered, and its success in integrating 
captives.
Three amankosi had reigned in the two kingdoms by 
1873. Njelu had two of them. The first was Hawai(l), 
who ruled from around 186^ until 187^.(2 ) Little is 
remembered of this ruler. There are at least two reasons 
for this. First, little of any significance is known to 
have happened during his reign. The kingdom just expanded 
without meeting any notable opposition. Secondly, in
(1 ) Also spelt Hayawa.
(2 ) 186*1- is estimated as it is not known when exactly
the takeover of the Maseko was complete and an inkosi
installed; 187*4- is noted by Gulliver, UA History11,
p.21. However T^rinoe, "Geschichte der Magwangsrara
nach Erzcihlung des Arabers Rashid bin Masaud und des
Fussi...", MadS. v.VXI, (189*4-), n.3, p.215 has I8 7 2.
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later years the kingdom experienced considerable 
change, and peoples’ memories tended to be dominated 
by this, resulting in details of Hawai’s reign being 
forgotten. This is most notably shown in the first 
Njelu history to be written, that by Tom von Prince 
in 189*4-, in which virtually nothing on Hawai is recorded 
though it uras written only twenty years after his death.
But political life in 189*4- was so complicated(l), that 
perhaps Hawai's reign was considered insignifioant.
What can be suggested about the man is that he appears 
to have been a reasonable ruler who guided his kingdom 
competently during its earliest years of expansion. He 
may not have been too forceful, foijfcluring his reign some 
military izinduna were able to consolidate reasonably 
strong positions of power.
Xn 187*4-, Hawai was * succeeded by Mharule, the senior
surviving son of Zulu. Mharule’s lineage segment was
apparently more eligible than Hawai’s(2), and his non­
selection around 186*4- seems to have been due to his youth(3). 
The/succession appears to have been resolved without 
difficulty. Hawai’s sons were too young to contest it, 
while Mharule had few brothers who were in a position to 
dispute matters. Most had fled to the west of Lake Nyasa 
in the early 1860s. One known possible contender seems
(1) See belowm Chapter Three, section IX.
(2) Gulliver, "A History”, p.21. It may not be so. Ebner 
says (interview, 16.10.1971) that Hawai was a son of 
najere and Mharule of Malinu Moyo, a Kalanga, As najere 
was Swazi, according to Booth (op cit), then she was 
likely to be the more eligible.
(3) Gulliver, "A History”, p.21.
to have been Putire, a second cousin once removed
of Mharule. He had a reasonably strong segment to
support his claims and is known to have often been
at odds with Mharule in later years. But no data
whatsoever was found to indicate that he presented
himself as a candidate, and it must be concluded that
Mharule was one of the greatest rulers the Njelu 
Ngoni ever had. A capable and successful man, he 
managed to maintain effective control over all segments 
of Njelu political society during its years of greatest 
expansion. He unified the Zulu family that Mputa Maseko 
had split in the late 1 85 0s, then used it to his own 
political advantage. One European observer was told in 
190t* that Mharule, who died in I8 8 9, had been a great and 
priident ruler who knew how to keep the tribe together 
while at the same time remain popular.(2) Ebner later 
added to this praise:
"Old people who had seen Mharule, said that he was of 
a yellowish skin ’like a European1 and of a tall 
stature. They said also that he xvas gene rap us and 
on many occasions he entertained his people with splendid 
meals and plenty of beer. He was fond of the nchuwa 
game (played with little stones) and spent hours with 
his friends at that game. They ascribed him also the 
gift of prophecy."(3)
By the time of his death in I8 8 9, he had built Njelu into
(1) Prince, op cit, p.218 states that there was no 
trouble over the succession.
(2) C.Spiss, "Kingoni und Kisutu", MSOS, 190*f, p.2; this 
is quoted in Ebner, Revised History, p.73.
(3) Ebner, Revised History. P.73.
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a much greater power than Mshope, while leaving a 
legacy of internal conflict that was only to be 
resolved in the disasterous Maji Maji rebellion o£
1905.(1)
Mshope had only one inkosi before 1 8 7 8, this 
being Chipeta.(2) He, unlike Hawai, has lived on in 
Mshope traditions as one of the most powerful and 
forceful rulers Mshope ever had. During his rule, 
his people feared no one. Time and again they challenged 
the Hehe and other powers to the north while becoming 
rich on cattle and oaptives. He appears to have been 
an intelligent leader wiith an ability that matched his 
determination to control his society. The military men 
who had acted as Regents before he came to power never 
achieved the powers that those who had been Regents in 
Njelu were to do,(3) mainly because of the personalities 
of the amankosi within the two kingdoms. Chipeta's 
interest in controlling his society more than that 
evidenced by Hawai, along with his remarkable military 
polities, were in the end to bringjbhe political community 
he commanded to a different end in the Hehe wars than 
that of the Njelu state.
One of the responsibilities accruing to each inkosi 
as the head of the state was the running of the military 
organization. Each inkosi was responsible for heading the 
army, for forming regiments when this was suitable, for
(1) See below, Chapter Five, section III.
(2 ) Also spelt Kipeta.
(3) See below, Chapter Three, section IX.
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deciding the time and place for war and plundering, 
and for controlling the economic benefits of plundering.
Marked differences evolved in the two kingdoms from the 
mid-l860s onwards over how each inkosi fulfilled these 
responsibilities. This differentiation partly explains 
Gulliver*s analysis of the need for each inkosi to 
manipulate power in Ungoni in different ways♦ Differing 
military policies were observed by the amankosi in two 
aspects of their power. First, while both were heads of 
their respective armies, only the Mshope inkosi appears 
to have participated in wars and plundering expeditions.
To some extent, however, this participation was irregular. 
Amon^the Swazi Nguni - the people from whom the Njelu and 
Mshope Ngoni claim their origins(l) - the inkosi rarely 
participated in any actual fighting.(2) This policy had 
evidently changed during the migrations when all Ngoni 
leaders apparently fought. Once permanent settlement 
was resumed, the Njelu inkosi apparently preferred to 
return to the older custom of non-participation in actual 
fighting. Gulliver suspects that this non-participation 
was a reason for the Njelu inkosi fs declining to exercise 
absolute power over his people,(3) This seems possible, 
though it seems more likely that an inkosi could just as 
easily preserve power by alternating authority among 
military units, as he could through fighting. In any
(1) Ebner, Revised History, p.9; many writers refer to 
them by this name •
(2) H.Kuper, An Afrioan Aristocracy. (London, 19^7), OUP,
P.123.
(3) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, pp.21-2 is quite 
definite about the loss of power through non-participation.
case, no alternating of power appears to have been 
done by the Njelu inkosi. Secondly, authority varied, 
in that while theoretically both amankosi decided when 
war was to be waged, in actuality only Chipeta appears 
to have exercised his control firmly. Two pieces of 
evidence suggest this. First, Chipeta's dogmatism is 
recorded in two instances of fission within his society.
In one case, a lineage head went on a raid without 
Chipeta*s permission and, for this, was banished from 
the kingdom by Chipeta, who then took the offender*s 
wife.(l) In a second case, some dissident members of 
the Tawete royal clan(2) left Mshope for Njelu when 
dissatisfied with Chipeta's rule. As they were a military 
section which later became reasondAy important in Njelu, 
their departure may well have been due to Chipeta's 
restrictions on their military freedom.(3) There are 
no known instances of fission or separation due to 
military dissatisfaction in Njelu. Secondly, independent 
waging of war appears to have developed in Njelu following 
the rise of separate military settlements in the 1870s 
under leading military izinduna. In Mshope, no separate 
military settlements are knoxm to have been formed, 
indicating a much closer oobtrol over politics by the 
inkosi.
(1) TNA/SDB, v.2, p.l2if, Palangu's biography, as told 
by Missoro; for further details on the power of the 
inkosi, see the compaaative studies in Read, The 
Ngoni of Nyasaland, (London, 1970), 2nd.ed., Cass, 
pp.^7 -7 7 on the Maseko (Gomani) and Kuper, op cit, 
p.5^ on the Swazi.
(2) Muyamuya and his brother Masaramani Tawete, Nkawirani 
Makukula and Masiwanyoni Magagura and his son Msukumbi. 
see Ebner, Revised History, pp.6 7-8 ; in History, p.119 
he states that they left before the second Hehe war.
(3) They established a separate settlement and seem to 
have been quite important from then on. The Magagura 
family were leaders at colonial independence in 1 9 6 1.
In adopting different approaches to military 
control, both amankosi appear to have been influenced 
by the division of authority within their societies.
In Njelu, there appears to have been very little threat 
offered by the non-ruling branches of the royal family, 
the usual main opponents to an inkosi 's oontrol, Zulu's 
only brother had been killed by the Maseko Ngoni while 
many of Zulu's sons had been forced to flee. Those who 
remained behind appear to have been too young before 1880 
to pose any political threat to either Hawai or Mhaxmle.
In Mshope, on the other hand, there appears to have been 
some threat from them* Mbonani's brother, Mnyukwa, led 
a strong segment of Mshope society.(1) As it did become 
a threat in the early 1 8 8 0s, it is possible that it was 
at least a challenge during the 1860s and 1870s. None 
of Chipeta's brothers appears to have been a threat, 
however, as neither oral traditions now written histories 
mention their power. Members of the Tawete olan, who 
were not of the royal family, may have provided some 
opposition. The aformentioned Tawete segment which moved 
south to Njelu seems to have been in this category.
Consequently Gulliver appears to be correct in stating 
that Chipeta wanted to restriot the power of the royal 
family and clan, while the Njelu nkosi wanted to enhance 
it. But one doubt must be expressed. The Njelu amankosi 
appear to have been unlikely, before 1 8 8 0, to have thought 
of enhancing the power of other members of the royal clan 
as there were very few eligible for this power. Moreover,
(1) See below, section IV, pp. an . According to traditions 
collected from the people of Mpepo, son of Mnyukwa, Mnyukwa 
and Mbonani were equal chiefs of the Mshope, thus making 
the former at least equal with Chipeta, TDB, Mahenge notes.
those who were, subh as Mbemisa, appear to have 
remained politically less important than the leading 
military izinduna.
Thus, it appears that, before I8 7 8, the military 
structui'e in Mshope was more complex than that of Njelu*
In Njelu, only the inkosi and very few other royal clan 
members had izinduna to manage their military expansion, 
while in Mshope, the inkosi and at least two other members 
of the royal clan were managing military expansion with 
izinduna.
Of the military advisers used by each inkosi, the 
religious leader was one of the most important. This was 
at least the case in Njelu where he is known to have 
advised the inkosi before major battles.(1) This individual 
in Njelu was Chikuse Nanguru, the man who aoted as Regent 
during the troubled years of Maseko domination. It is 
not clear how important the religious leader was in Mshope. 
It has not been possible to ascertain who held this 
position before 1880, an ind&catlon perhaps that he was 
not too important. As Chipeta seems to have been a 
strong ruler, perhaps he preferred to use the services 
of the religious leader to implement rather than assist 
the formulat5.on of his decisions. Along with seeking 
advice on wars, religious leaders were resp nsible for 
conducting ritual purifications and other oeremonies 
to ensure the success of campaigns and wars•
(1) See below, section IV, pp.
■M
The wantwana constituted a second class of 
military adviser. Only a few examples are known of 
the role they played in the making of military decisions.
One in Njelu occurred during the Hehe wars, when a brother 
of the inkosi persuaded the inkosi to reverse a decision,(1) 
One in Mshope, though less clear, seems to have been the 
takeover by the inkosi1 s uncle of military leadership in 
1878.(2) There are indications that before I878 the 
wantwana were less important in Njelu than in Mshope.
The reason for this, already previously mentioned in 
another context, was that the two successive amankosi 
of Njelu had few immediate relatives and these appear to 
have been young. Mshope, on the other hand, had the 
strong Mnyukwa segment to assist and possibly counteract 
Chipetafs power,
A third class of adviser was the military induna.
As the military izinduna conducted the campaigns decided 
upon, their advice was probably critical. There were not 
fflany izinduna in the two kingdoms before 1880, as the 
population of both states was still small.(3) Those 
remembered as important in Njelu include Chikuse Nanguru, 
Chombera Masheula, Mpambalioto Soko and Songea(4) Mbano, 
and in Mshope, Mandati.(5) It is possible that fewer
are remembered in Mshope because they were overshadowed
there by the wantwana, but this is only surmise. The
(1) See below, section IV p.
(2) See below, section V 9 p.,
(3) 3Tor population estimates, see section III, p.
(**) Johnson, op cit, p.110, Nyasa and Yao use Songela, 
coast men and Europeans use Songea. Songea became 
the more common spelling and is used henceforth.
(5) Ebner, Revised History, pp.^6, 68; Gulliver, An 
Administrative Survey, p.22,
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military izinduna appear to have been more important 
in Njelu than in Mshope throughout these early years 
of state-building* In Njelu they were experienced and 
capable men, who assumed a considerable proportion of 
the responsibility of leading society during the Maseko 
purges of the Zulu Gama family. During the reigns of 
Hawai and Mharule, they remained important advisers. 
Indeed, Booth wrote in 1905 that Chikuse Nanguru, Hawai's 
leading iinduna had so much power that people in Njelu, 
when he was there, were confusing Ghilcuse with Hawai. (1) 
Mshope had suffered less at the hands of the Maseko, so 
the izinduna thefee appear to have had fewer demands made 
qn their advice. A feiv manifestions of the greater power 
of the izinduna in Njelu over their contemporaries in 
Mshope may be mentioned. One was their apparent freedom 
to conduct campaigns on their own. It is not known 
whether they always sogght permission or not before 
conducting a campaign. However, it appears some did not. 
For example, it is unlikely that the Tawete group which 
broke from the Mshope and joined the Njelu would have 
felt the compulsion to ask permission all the time. In 
Mshope, permission apparently had to be asked. Secondly, 
the leading izinduna in Njelu were able to establish 
separate settlements of their own by the 1870s. Two 
are known to have been built: one by Songea, some distance 
east of the inkosi *s capital at Ngalanga,and one by
(1) J.Booth, "Die Nachkommen der Sulukaffern (Wangoni) 
in Deutsch Ostafrika", Globus, lxxxviii, (1905)»
P.198.
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Mparabalioto, west of the Luhereha River, at Mlcwera.(l)
It is probable that in their own areas these two 
izinduna began independently conducting wars, No 
separate settlements are known to have existed in 
Mshope by the 1870s, at least under military izinduna,(2) 
There appear to have been some settlements of captives, 
and over these there were administrators. For example, 
a Mt'wanga was appointed over a known Ndendeule 
settlement by Chipeta,(3) Thirdly, it appears that 
izinduna in Njelu onnducted military campaigns in 
different areas at the same time,(4) In Mshope, on the 
other hand, traditions of expansion suggest that only 
one region was attacked at a time and, thus, that 
izinduna were politically more controlled by the inkosi. 
The armies in both states, according to Ebner, 
continued to be organized in age regiments,(5) All 
young men, upon reaching the ages of 18-20 were enrolled 
in a regiment with their age-mates. There were from 200 
to 300 men enrolled in a regiment, writes Ebner, who lists 
some ten formed by the Ngoni - no specific kingdom 
mentioned - after their arrival in southern East Africa, 
Warriors assembled together duringjthe fighting season, 
which followed the main harvest in late summer, to 
practice the arts of war and prepare for expeditions,
(1) Ebner, History, p,99; interview, 17-21.10*1971.
(2) DMM Tawete, Account of the Wangoni. typescript, RH, 
section 65 identifies only Mtukano,which he states 
was a very large town ’’the size of Tabora”.
(3) TNA/SDB, v,2, p.B.
(4) As suggested above, section I, pp._£,<?-1$
(5) Ebner, History, p.1 8 9.
The men appear to have remained unmarried until their  ^
regiment was given a general dispensation, although an 
individual could he exempted through some distinguished action. (!)
While little information in addition to that of Ebner's 
was found during the,present study, the army does not appear to 
have been as organized as he.suggests. Though there were regiments' 
(noted in Appendix A), because the population was.small, there 
were not 200 men from 18 to 20 years of age available every three 
years to form a. regiment. Consequently, regiments were either 
formed less frequently than every three years or consisted of men 
from a larger age-groupiing than 18-20.(2) Secondly, regiments 
may hot have been the only form of military organization in Ungoni. 
They certainly were not by the 1880s, at which time there were 
village groupings of various leaders serving as distinct units.(3)
It is probable that Mpambalioto 's people at, Mkwe.ra fought as a
ctdtar
unit undifferentiated by age^  than as sections of national age 
regiments. It also seems certain that the Tawete group which 
joined Njelu had group forces rather then a number of sections of 
age-regiments.
The administrative structure in the two kingdoms appears 
to have been considerably less developed than the military one.. 
during these years of state-building iijsouthern East Africa.
(1) Y. M.Chibambo in Read, op cit, pp.29-33 gives a good description 
of this; Prince, op cit, lamented its passing.
(2) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.18 compares the Njelu and 
Mshope to the Ngoni west of lake Nyasaand states that the former
had a less^complex system of sub-chiefs, regiments and war parties 
nor were impis especially based on age-groups.
(3) See below, Chapter Three, section IX. Read, op cit, p.31, 
quoting Chibambo notes that the Maseko Ngoni also had. area and 
national units.
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The most,obvious reason for this was the small population.
This meant there were few settlements which, in turn, 
lessened the number of administrators needed. The inkosi 
was tfee head of the administration. (1) As such, he assumed! • 
a leading role in the management ofjfehe society. For example, . 
in financial matters he controlled a considerable portion of 
the wealth of the society. All booty taken in plundering 
expeditions belonged to him, to distribute as he wished. Most 
of the cattle in the society were entrusted to him as; head of 
the state, though, many in the community helped care for, and
eventually benefited from, these herds. His fields were among
the largest and to work in them, he could demand labour on a 
much larger scale than.other people* In the judicial, realm, 
he was the final arbiter and handled appeals from lesser 
authorities. Moreover, he alone could theoretically pass the 
death penalty. In general administration, he decided national 
policies towards neighbouring states as, for example, Chipeta did 
with the Bena and Sangu, he approved settlement patterns and, in 
a word, he had the final say in most matters that were of 
importance to the.society.
A council advised the inkosi. It comprised the leader’s 
senior relatives, including his mother and brothers, and his 
senior izinduna. Elders, called lidoda (pl.madoda)(2), chosen from 
ishe-ranks of aged warriors or heads of large kin-groups, assisted 
the council. In later years, as the two states expanded, the
0) TNA^i§B, v.2, p.12%, Palangu’s biography as told by Missoro;
for comments on the power of the Maseko inkosi, see Read, The Ngoni.
(2) Ebner to Redmond, interviews 17-21,10.1971'• "He does not recognise
the lidoda as military lieutentant, which Gulliver, labour Migration 
in a Rural Economy, (Kampala, 1955), p.iii and J.Komba, God and Man, 
PhD^ Pontifical U. of.the Faith (Rome), 1959, pp.21-2 do* There was 
a leadership category below induna, though they may also have been 
recognized as minor izinduna.
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inkosi, at least in Njelu, appears to.have used members of 
his council, specifically- his brothers, as representatives 
in various parts of his kingdom# This was not done before
1 880. ‘^ ' ..f
An: independent and less formal cog in the administrative 
network was provided by the wives and other female members of 
the inkosi*s household, a number of whom were installed in 
•houses' set up near the various settlements of izinduna#(1)
They were responsible for passing instruct!^ to and information y
from the izinduna.(2) . It is not: known if 'houses ' were established 
near the settlements of izinduna before the 1880s in either 
kingdom#. However, as Songea's and^Mpambalioto's settlements 
in-Njelu had 'houses' later, it is probable that they had them 
in the 1870s.
There was probably a tribal induna, or nduna.ya nkosi, 
fulfilling the functions forebears did in southern Africa, 
though no. data was found on any during these years# If villages 
were established, they would have been under mulumuzana (pi# 
alumuzana)(3)# who would have' been selected from senior members 
of Ngoni or other clans as well as from leaders of local kin groups#
(1) It is not clear whether izinduna were appointed to various 
'houses' or 'houses' set up at military settlements. In the
1880s it was the second, before then it may have been the first#
Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.18 says it was the first#
(2) Ibid#, v.*f, p,2T8; for Maseko equivalent, see 
Read, The Ngoni,.p#1^ #
(3) Also spelt mnumzane, alumzana, Ebner to Redmondj correspondence 
2.3*^970, 10^ .^ .1970; Ebner, Revised History, p.128:r"madoda' took 
part in discussions.at the court of thebhief; when they were
put at the head of a village, they were called mnumzana, umnumzana."
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Despite their similar administrative structures, effective 
power: in. the two kingdoms appears to have been based on different 
officials mainly because Njelu was more decentralized than Mshope. 
Though little information was found on the,.details of this 
difference, a few seem clear. One was that military izinduna, 
who were not part of the administrative network, nonetheless 
exercised administrative powers in Njelu, though not in Mshope.
One such power was the‘right to retain bounty and captives, which 
induna Songea seems, to have been exercising by the 1870s. Secondly, 
because. Njelu was segmenting more than Mshope, the 'house' system 
there was probably more developed.
Inevitably, the diverging military-and administrative structures 
and practices of the two.kingdoms in turn had their effects on the 
constituent societies, first, a loose central rule probably improved 
loyalty to the state, as segment leaders had5 opportunities to 
exercise some power, thus less reason to be dissatisfied with the 
status quo and to secede. No secession is known to have occurred 
from Njelu before -1878, while there was at least one from Mshope, 
as noted above. Secondly,, the decentraliztion in Njelu appears 
to have facilitated the integration of captives as individual 
leaders found it in their interest to collect and integrate as 
many followers as possible* There was less interest in assimilating 
captives in Mshope, as captives were identified with the inkosi.
While military and administrative Structures diverged, the 
two kingdom^nonetheless pursued a common aim in the integration 
of captives.. It is to this critical aspect of state-building that 
we.now turn.
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Integration remained as important to the Ngoni in 
settlement as it had been to them on the move* To 
illustrate this, it is useful to give some idea of 
relative numbers in the two kingdoms. The earliest 
attempt to identify constituent groups among the Ngoni 
was made by John Booth in 1905* Booth was a planter and 
trader who entered Ungoni around 1902. He was fascinated 
by the people among whom he lived, and sought to learn 
more about them and their way of life. In the course of 
doing this, he analyzed the population to determine the 
origins of the Ngoni. He calculated that, in 190 ,^ there 
were only some 3^0 Ngoni having southern African origin: 
1^0 members of the Grama clan, ^0 of the Tawete, and some 
150 of other Nguni clans. Then there were some 200-300 
Ngoni whose origins lay south of the Zambezi River. These 
included Thonga, Kalanga and Msuto. Thus, there were some 
500-700 Ngoni of pre-Zambezi adherence in 190 .^ Of Ifchis 
total, Booth estimated that over half were children.(1) 
Using these statistics as a basis, it is possible roughly 
to estimate the numbers in the kingdoms in the 1860s and 
1870s, Thus, removing two generations and taking into 
account the rapid growth in Ngoni population: Zulu Gama 
had at least twelve sons, who in turn had over one hundred 
children, and losses in the wars against the Maseko, the 
Hehe and other groups, one may conclude that there were 
fewer than 200 Ngoni of pre-Zambezi origin in Ungoni
(1) Booth, op cit.
around 1 8 5 8. Added to these were the Senga and Sulcuma 
captured north of the Zambezi but before the movemen-yto 
the east side of the lake. These may have numbered the 
same as, or slightly more than, the Ngoni of I3*'©-Zambezi 
origin, that is 200 to 400. When this number entered 
Upangwa around 1 8 5 8, they may have doubled their numbers.
This seems a reasonable computation, since the Pangwa are 
now the single largest ethnic group within Ungoni. After 
the two kingdoms of Njelu and Mshope were established in 
the earlji 1860s, these 2000 or so appear to have increased 
considerably. Prince estimated that by the early I880s,(l) 
there were some 8000 Ngoni in Mshope. As the Njelu state 
appears to have been larger, it may have had a few thousands 
more. Thus, there appear to have been 16-20,000 Ngoni in 
southern East Africa by the early 1880s. Though this 
number must be taken as only a rough estimate, it does give 
some idea of the significant role that integration of 
captives played in building up the two states. Numerically, 
the Ngoni increased tenfold in less than twenty years.
Methods of integrating peoples changed during settlement 
from what they had been on the maroh. Por one thing, not 
only the young of both sexes were taken. Adults were also 
brought back as they could be useful for working in the 
fields of the Ngoni, as well as for providing other services. 
Secondly, the Ngoni did not require everyone to move near 
them once they had submitted. Instead, they allowed peoples 
to accept a tributary status, and then to stay in their own
(1) Prince, op cit, p.216,
19#
homelands ttfhile providing regular services and goods 
for the Ngoni. The Pangwa are a good example of a group 
that stayed in their own lands. However, by adopting a 
more complex system of integrating peoples into their 
states, the Ngoni achieved a much more variable degree of 
success as regards the integration of captives. This 
later had an effect on the stability of the kingdoms.
The most unstable form of integration was that of 
peoples who remained within their own communities and paid 
tribute to the Ngoni. These peoples included those whose 
homelands lay outside the boundaries of the two Ngoni 
states and even some groups which lived within the state 
and were near actual Ngoni settlements* The Matengo 
settlements appear to have fallen into this category, 
which we may call that of 1 tribute settlement1, within 
the state.(l)
Prior to 1880, a village could accept tributary 
status through acknowledging a leader appointed by the 
Ngoni or through sending some of their number as hostages 
to Ungoni.(2) Though no examples of tribute settlements 
with Ngoni-appointed leaders were found for the 1870s, so 
many are known for the I880s(3) that it is very likely 
that the practice dates back at least to the late 1870s. 
The earliest documentary reference to the taking of 
hostages as a sign of submission is that of a report by 
the UMCA missionary, W.P.Johnson, in 1883:
(1) Details of these settlements are given below, Chapter 
Three, section III, as the dates of their being mentioned 
are all of the 1880s.
(2) ¥.P.Johnson, CA, v.I, 5*1883, notes that some go to 
Ungoni, There some are taught to fight while others 
become slaves.
(3) See below, Chapter Three, section III.
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11 •••their system was and is to insist, if a chief submits 
to them, that he or a number of his people should come 
and settle in the neighbourhood. Some of these, as well 
asthe actual captives of war, are taught to join in raids, 
others simply work as slaves, "(1)
tributary villages were responsible for supplying foodstuffs 
to Ngoni in transit and for giving occasional tribute and 
labour,(2)
Though tributary status caused economic, political and 
social upheaval and deprivation, it permitted the retention 
of a considerable amount of independence. Tributary 
communities continued to think of themselves as being separate 
from the Ngoni, Villagers pursued their traditional life as 
far as possible, while responding to the new demands made upon 
them by their overlords. Their affiliation with the Ngoni 
was a militarily-forced one, and when this went, few bonds 
remained between the two,
A more permanent form of integration was obtained with 
peoples brought back to IJhgoni as captives. There they were 
attached to an Ngoni or a captive family, or sometimes placed 
in a separate community near an Ngonj^ bne. As part of the Ngoni 
state, they were integrated into Ngoni life and culture. They 
adopted many Ngoni customs and practices and, for most purposes, 
considered themselves Ngoni in life-style. For instance, the 
men participated in the cattle economy as herd boys when young 
and possibly as owners themselves when older; they performed the 
same agricultural tasks as the Ngoni; they became part of the 
army and fought in the manner of their captors, and eventually 
could expect to reap some of the benefits of raiding. Female
(1) W.P.Johnson, CA, v.1, n.5, 5.188^.
(2) A.S.Stenhouse, "Agriculture in the Matengo Highlands", E&AgricJ, 
v.X, n.1, (July ,19^4),p,22 describes Matengo tribute-giving.
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captives were brought up in households similar to Ngoni 
ones, and performed the same tasks and enjoyed much the. 
same benefit as most others in the society. Eventually 
they married Ngoni or other captives,(1)
Still, there were differences between the. immigrant .
Ngoni, called 'true Ngoni', and their captives* The most
important one was in;status. All Ngoni who. had been integrated
once settlement east of. lake Nyasa began were called 'sutu',
meaning serfs or slaves.(2) Everyone knew to which of the two
sections he belonged and the rights and powers this brought
him. For example, the military an.d administration were controlled
by the 'true Ngoni1. The only known example of a 'sutu' becoming
an important leader was in a case of adoption, an act by. which he
was recognized as a 'true Ngoni1 anyway.(3) Economic life
favoured the 'true Ngoni'• The 'sutu' rarely had the right to
demand assistance in the cultivation of their fields and not many
owned cattle. Finally, social life placed restrictions on the
'sutu'. He could not marry a 'true Ngoni' woman, and when a 'true Ngoni' male
married a 'sutu' woman, he did not marry her by. lobato, as he would
a 'true Ngoni' woman.GO
However, integration was not entirely negative for the 'sutu'.
They became part of the military society and, through being successful
(T) Ebner, History, p.37 has notes on this.
(2). Ibid., p.8 ; Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.19 writes that 
the Chingoni words were 'mufu' (pi,'wafu Spiss, op cit, p. 119 
agrees; for the word's.use in Swazi Nguni society, see Kuper,
op cit, p.913.
(3) This was Mgendera, the son of the 'slave' Magodi who married the 
widow-of the Ngoni leader, Mawaso. .Mgendera was considered
• Mawaso's heir.
GO Booth, op cit, p.222 has notes on marriage attitudes.
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warriors, could achieve fame and prestige for themsalves.
Mary identified with their captors as a result and it was. 
not uncommon for captives to participate in Ngoni expeditions 
against their former communities.(1) They were allowed some 
economic independence. For example, Araakita, -the''rfatengo 
leader of a large tribute settlement, carried on a considerable 
trade with peoples on the lakeshore, exchanging Indian com for 
dried fish. (2) Again, the 'sutur were permittedjfco retain many 
aspects of their life and.culture. For instance, though they, 
welcomed 'true Ngoni' pre-war religious ceremonies for the good 
lucK they could bringthey kept their own faiths* (3) furthermore 
they could and did bring about some changes in * true Ngoni' 
society. Probably the most renowned of these changes was in 
language. 'When the- 'true Ngoni' entered the lands east of Lake 
% asa, they spoke their southern African language, Chingoni.
However,' new adherents;-to. their states, integrated in large 
numbers and from many ethnic groups, continued to use their 
separate languages* As these 'sutu' overwhelmed the 'true 
Ngoni' in numbers, Chingoni was gradually replaced by a new 
language which was an-amalgamation of local languages. As the 
Pangwa were the largest ethnic group among the 'sutu', their 
tongue contributed considerably to this new language,, called 
'KLsutu'* Efy the late nineteenth: century, this new language
(1) Ebner, History, p•112; Gulliver, Ar&dministrative Survey,; p.114 
states the 'sutu* embraced,their masters' ideology with Enthusiasm.
(2) W.Y.Campbell,. Travellers Secords of Ibrtuguese Nyasaland,
(lonflon, nd (pre-1699)), quoting W. P. Johnson, p.61.
(3) J.Komba to -Redmond, .interview 2*1970. The writer did not learn 
from whom His Excellency, Bishop Kbmba, .had learnt this. He did 
question many elders in his research for his thesis, op cit.
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had a l l  but replaced Chingoni. ( l )  Chingoni i t s e l f  was 
modified. Ebner w rites th a t grammatical forms were 
s im p lified  and shortened and new words were added.(2 )
Important examples of word changes were the very names 
inkosi (pl.amankosi) and induna (pi.izinduna) which became 
nkosi (pl.mankosi) and nduna (pi.manduna).(g) These modified 
forms, now dominant among the Njelu and Mshope Ngoni, are 
henceforth used in this study.
Gradually a new society was evolving in Ungoni, one having 
a unique culture and way of life that, in the end, had its basis 
in an individual's considering himself a part of the Ngoni state, 
while at the same time remaining either a 'true Ngoni' or one of 
the 'sutu'. This process was^ Lnevitably a slow one and, by the 
1880s, there were still probably only limited ways in which the 
mass Of the captives identified with their Ngoni masters. Yet, 
unlike among the Ngoni living west of the lake, there appears to 
have been no major instances of overt rebellion by captives.(^ f) 
fy 1878, two large and increasingly successful states were 
thus firmly established in southern East Africa and were on their 
way to a new era in their histories, that of contact with a 
powerful, outside world. Because the Ngoni had met no worthwhile 
opponent in over a decade of expansion, they were initially 
unprepared for the change wh&ch, thus, came rather more abruptly 
than expected with the Hehe wars.
(1) Booth, op cit, pp.224-6was disparaging about Kisutu; Spiss, op 
. wrote the first grammar and dictionary of Chingoni and Kisutu.
(2) Ebner, Revised History, p.115,
(5) Ebner to Redmond, correspondence 17.12.1970 writes:"The southern 
. African pronunciation appears not to have suited local language 
structures and may have been modified accordingly in daily usage." 
(k) Ebner, History, p.g8 notes the Kamanga and Henga rebelled* in 1875 
and 1879 respectively against Mbelwa's Ngoni.
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Efcr the 1860s the Hehe, who had earlier, observed and begun 
adopting the military tactics of the. Je.re Ngoni(1), were coming 
into contact with the Mshope Ngoni,.who were at the time pushing 
north and north-west under the capable leadership of Chipeta.
The lands to which both peoples were directing their attention 
were the wealthy cattle arid agricultural lands to the north­
east of Lake Nyasa. .The eastern .half of these lands comprised 
Ubena, at that time under the leadership of Mtengera, an unloved 
relative of the Hehe leader, J-fyugumba. The Hehe were interested 
in integrating TJbena into their expanding state,- while the Ngoni 
were interested primarily in plundering the wealth of its 
people.(2) So the Hehe entered into direct military conflict 
against the Bena, while the Ngoni, interested in preventing a 
Hehe takeover, assisted the Bena.(3) However, the Ngoni appear 
not to have been too committed in this matter,.'for their, support 
proved indecisive and, by 187 ,^ ^ugurnba had expelled Mtengera . 
from Ubena and had annexed this land.. (*f) Mtengera and his son 
Kiwanga fled eastwards into the manga plain where they settled 
after fighting and defeating the Mbuhga.
After conquering Ubena, Myugumba moved against Usangu, the 
western half of this region,, which at the time was ruled by Merere. (5) 
Once again, Myugumba was successful in war and drove Merere from
(1) Noland Oliver in J.Vansina ed., The Historian in Tropical 
Africa, (London, 196V), 0UP, -p.3o£T
(2) Ebner to Eedraond, correspondence 2.2.1970 comments on different 
policies of conquest. ;
(3) Fttlleborn, op cit, p.132*-; Ebner, History, p.97; ym/6/6&/k/3/6*
(k) W.Arning, "Die Wahehe", j^dS, v,XX,’ (I896) and v.X, (1897), p.60;
A.Adams, Im Dienste des Kreuaes, (St.Ottilien, 1899), p.4-3.
(3) Arning, op cit, 1897, p.^ol '
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Usangu into Usafwa, then annexed the eastern part of 
Usangu. However, Merere was not prepared to surrender- 
his., lands just then, and he entered into a military* alliance 
with the Mshope nkosi,-Chipeta, who was by then interested 
in hindering the Hehe. .'Thereupon the two, forces entered Usangu 
and defeated the Hehe. However, the victory was a short-lived 
one, for Mfyugumba returned in 1877(1) with his army to defeat 
Merere and conquer all of Usangu.
//.The Hehe appear to have been angered by the Ngoni interference 
in their military expansion, for a year after taking Usnagu, the 
Hehe army marched down into Ungqni. Chipeta and the Mshope were 
quite unprepared for the attack as they appear to have been unable 
to accept that another people would b^so brave or, to them, so foolish, as to 
enter their land. According to so traditions, they were surprised 
in the midst of celebrations.(2) Ebner writes they had time to 
mobilize quickly(3), though they were heavily defeated. The 
capital was burned, a number of senior leaders, including the 
hkosi Chipeta,were killed and those remaining were forced to flee ' 
for their lives. (4) The Hehe then prepared to push on to Njelu.
(1) Arning, op cit, 1897, p.60; Ettlleborn, op cit, p.13 ;^ Ebner,.
History, pp.97-103, gives detailed reasons fob supporting this
date.A.Redmayne, The Wahehe Peopled of Tanganyika, PhD. Oxford, 1965, /
p.1^ -0 mistakes this for the first Hehe-Ngoni war.
(2) Prince, op cit, p.215, Ettlleborn, op cit, p.13^ 5 Tawete, op cit, 
sections 67-8 , he states the Ngoni fought poorly because they 
were drunk; TDB, v.4, p.213.
(3) Ebner, History, pp.9^-103* Much of the following presentation 
ofthe Hehe wars is based on Ebner and Tawete, op cit, sec.65-82.
W  Balangu's brothers, Mslope and Chibamu, also died then, RH, s.585,
History of nduna Balangu.as told by nduna Palangu,
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In the interval between the attack on Mshope an^ |that on 
Njelu, the latter appears to have been indecisive in mobilizing.
The Mshope, who informed the Njelu of the onslaught, later 
claimed that the Njelu did nothing to assist them.(T) Njelu 
traditions tend to confirm this. One notes that Mharule sought 
advice from his religious adviser, Chikuse Nanguru and when the 
latter forecast an Ngoni defeat, he decided to do nothing.(2)
This. lack of response, though galling to the Mshope later, was 
quite understandable. The two kingdoms had been apart for some 
fifteen.years, plundering in separate regions, following their 
'different types of political life and generally minding their 
own affairs. The Njelu appear to have believed that they would 
hot be, drawn into this Mshope war(3) and so must have felt they 
had good reason to stay out. Mbreover, a request for co-operation 
which was an unusual request, must have required close deliberation.
The lack of an offer of immediate, assistance shows well how 
separate the two kingdoms now were and how fluid local,relations 
between them were, with local interests predominating. ;
..However, Njelu neutrality was soon .broken. Though Mharule 
was reluctant,to act, some of his leading officials were not*
His brother, Mbemisa, a relative, Ndembo Gama, and the Sukuma,
Kanyoka Ntara, all requested permission to lead their forces 
north against the Hehe. Mharule, though reluctant, agreed and
(1) Ebner, History, p.132 writes that Chipeta’s son, Chabruma referred 
.to the Njelu Ngoni as children and not warriors.
(2) Ibid., pp.97-105.
(3) Ebner to Redmond, interview 18.10.1972; Spiss, op cit, p . 2 wrote in 
1904- that the Hehe attacked Chipeta. He makes no mention of their 
effect on Njelu, thereby suggesting the war was an Mshope affair. 
Ebner, Ers&hlungen, p.62 tradition of P.Nanguru.
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and they went forth, They met the Hehe somewhere between 
the Mngongoma Mountains and Mkutano, In the ensuing battle^ 
the Njelu army was virtually annihilated* Mbemisa escaped 
only to die shortly afterwards, (1)
Not knowing of the disaster which had struck their army, 
the remainder of the Njelu political community were unprepared 
for the next move of the Hehe, the onslaught of Mharule’s 
capital at Ngalanga. The capital was burned and the fleeing 
Ngoni hotly pursued. Among the many who were killed while 
fleeing was Malinu, the-Queen Mother, (2) When the Hehe had 
chased the Ngoni as far as the Mngaka River, they turned back, (3) 
Shortly after the Hehe departure, the surviving Ngoni 
began preparing to revenge the humiliation their people had 
suffered. An Njelu army, led by Songea Mbano and Mpambalioto 
Soko, marched north to join an Mshope one led by Mnyukwa Tawete, 
Mandati and Mavimba(k)and together they pursued the homeward 
bound Hehe. They encountered the Hehe in northern Mshope and 
defeated and put them to flight. They then took the offensive 
and marched into Uhehe where they ravaged much of the land and 
dispersed many people. ^ Hehe force led by Myugumba attacked 
them but was, on the. verge of defeat before his son, Mkwawa’s, 
reconstituted force resumed the offensive and rescued it,(5)
(1) Ebner, History, pp.-98-l03; Prince, op cit, p.316; Gulliver, 
”A history”, p,23.
(2) W,P.Johnson, who visited Njelu in 1882 wrote that nduna 
Songea lamented to him that ’’the, old Wangoni have all been 
killed off”, GA, v.1, n.4, *f.l883,
(3) Gulliver, "A history", p,2h; Ebner, History, pp.99-100.
(*f) Arning, op cit, 1897, p,^7-8 states that the Mshope were
saved from annihilation by.the Njelu. Ebner, History, p.100.
(3) Tawete* op cit, section 77*-
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In a.further battle, Mkwawa drove the Ngoni from Uhehe.
Tension remained strong between.the two powers for the 
next three years* However, there.were no major wars because, 
followingjfche first series of wars in 1878, both .powers were 
involved-in difficult succession crises. In Uhehe, %ugumba 
died after dividing his kingdom between two sons and these then 
fought for exclusive control. ■ Mkwawa won. In the Mshope state, 
Chipeta!s sons and relatives engaged in a bitter struggle for 
the throne, described in detail below. After Mkwawa took the 
throne in Uhehe., he made plans for a second, decisive war against 
the Ngoni. (1)
In 1881(2), Mkwawa marched his army down into Ungohi for 
the second time. But the Ngoni had expected further hostilities 
and had prepared themselves by uniting in a military alliance. (3) 
The two armies met at Ngalanga, where they fought a bitter and 
costly battle. The Ngoni lost and retreated into the Lupagaro 
Mountains. The Hehe pursued them there and a second battle-was 
fought. This time the Ngoni defeated their enemy* (4-) The Hehe 
retreated into their own country hotly pursued by the Ngoni. In 
Uhehe, the Ngoni began plundering and collecting booty and cattle. 
However, the Hehe were by no means crushed and, mobilizing again, 
they met and fought the Ngoni and drove them from Uhehe..
(1) Adams, Dienste, p.^; Ebner, History, p.102.
(2) Ebner, History, p.103 prefers' 1881 to the 1882 date, given by 
Nigraann in Pie Wahehe, (Berlin, 1908)* He gives detailed, 
reasons, one being the fact.that the Ngoni raided in the east
in 1882. His reasons and the 1881 date is accepted by the author.
(3) Prince, op cit, p,2l6 states Mlamilo was commander;, Tawete, op cit, 
section 73 states an Mshope nduna, Ikulu Mandati was. This is 
unlikely. 1
(4-) Tai\rete, op cit, sec tion 81 states that the manduna Ikulu tfendati 
and Mavimba died in this battle.
Both wars ended inconclusively.-.and the two powerful 
and equal peoples Agreed to postpone any further conflict 
until the next generation had grown up.(1) They delineated 
boundaries and areas of influence that each subsequently 
adhered to* ‘ FToni then on, the.two powers retained a healthy 
respect and" fear for each other(2), while at the same time 
increasing an enmity that, a decade or so later, prevented 
their co-operation to expel a third enemy, the Germans*
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The wars against the Hehe brought many changes to Ngoni 
society. Soge were immediate and of little consequi nee, others 
lasting and very destEUftive* The kingdom which suffered the 
most was Mshope, whose lands bordered Uhehe and whose leaders 
had shown an active hostility towards the Hehe for many years.
One of .the most important results of the Hehe wars in 
Mshope was the killing of the nkosi, Chipeta. Since Chipeta’s 
death came prematurely, the succession had probably not been 
planned, for* . This heed not have been a problem, at least according 
to precedent in other Ngoni societies. 5br example, the Swazi 
considered it reasonable to select an heir after an nkosi's death(3 )
(1) Guilivef, An Administrative Survey, p.13; Ebner, History, pp.l0*f-3; 
TDB, v.A-, p.213; J.Idstowel, The Making of Tanganyika, (London, 1963), 
p.23; incorrectly claims a victory for the Hehe.
(2) W.P.Johnson, CA, v.i, h.7, 7.1883,P.108; Milleborn, op cit, p.133 
and Arning, op cit, 1897, p#^ -8 all have comments on mutual fear; 
R.Cornevin in Gann & Duigan, Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960, 
(Cambridge, 1969), p.4-08 incorrectly claims the Hehe were the only 
kingdom.in "the southern quarter of the German colony" around 1880,
(3) H.Beemer, "The development of the military organization in 
Swaziland", Africa, v.X, (.1937), p.6 .^
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while the Maseko, or Gomani, Ngoni had seldom decided on 
the successor before the nkosi!s death(1). However, succession 
did become a problem in,Mshope* ,• This was due, to an important 
extent, to the pressures on the Mshope to select a string 
successor to cOuhter the, Hehe threat. Complicating the issue was 
the general structure of Ngoni society and the ever present 
dichotomy between the need for unity in a military society and. 
the ever present tendency towards segmentation and fission.(2)
This problem waa intensified by the particular type of leadership 
which had been exercised by Chipeta, 'one;,in which a powerful 
leader had preserved control over his people through preventing 
Jbhe rise of powerful - factions that could take over in his place*
The result was severe internal disruption.
-.While the succession was being resolved, Chipeta*s ageing 
uncle:, Mnyukwa, was appointed Regent. (3) Two claimants offered 
themselves initially. Both were sons of Chipeta, one, Chabruma, 
bom of a Thonga woman, the other, Palangu, born of a Swazi 
woman. (^ ) Though Palangu appears to have been the more legitimate 
in tew# of blood(3) , the, throne went to: Chabi*uma(6 )^  He-was 
older and better trained in military tactics and appears to have 
taken part in the campaign against the Hehe* (7) These were
(1) Read, The Ngoni, p.55.
(2) See M.Gluckman,'Politics, law and Ritual in Tribal Society,
(Oxford, 1963) pp.xxi and for comments on kingship conflict.
(3)'Gulliver,, "A histort", p.23 states he was Regent for four years.
W  Booth, opcit* p.223; TNA/135/SDB;, v.2, p.IR^ f.
(3) Gulliver, "A history", p.23; for blood as a qualification among the 
Swazi, see Beeraer, op cit, p.6t. ?
(6) RH-, s.383, Palangu's autobiography names the. elders selecting him.
(7) Arning, op .cit, 1897, p..A8. ’ - ■ - '
apparently welcome-credentials to a people who feared. , 
the Hehe.
Palangu and his faction refused to accept the new nkosi 
and tried to break’ away. Chabruma sent his forces against them ; 
and, according to a tradition related by his grandson, he killed 
a number of Palangu's supporters, captured his wives,, and 
claimed booty from Palangu.(1) Palangu was captured but his 
lif^vas spared, apparently because senior advisers within the 
kingdom felt his murder would be needlessly divisive.(2) Relations 
between the two men appear to have improved later and Palangu 
appears to. have accepted1his subordinate status. However, his , 
faction did not forgive the injustice done to them completely and, 
one tradition notes, the house of Palangu's mother, Nakikonde,. 
became a centre of intrigue against Chabruma.(3) It was to be 1 
only with- Chabruma that Palangu and his faction accepted inferior 
status, and in almost every subsequent succession to the nkosiship 
in Mshope, they were to claim the throne.
5bllowing the resolution of the conflict between Chabruma and 
Palangu, a second, much more damaging^ conflict arose. After ' 
the Regent, Mnyukwa, died, his son, Mpepo, made a bid for the 
nkosiship. Mpepo's claim bore a close relationship to that 
Ntabeni had made against Zwangendaba's sons some thirty-five years 
earlier.(4) The basis to this bid needs som^discussion. .As Mpepo
(1) TNA/153/SDB, v.2 , p.124, Palangu's life as told by Missoro;
v.4, p.223 states that Palangu fled to Mharule’s.
(2) TNA/135/SDB, v.2,p. 124, Palangu's autobiography adds that he 
was giyen iikuyu and Mbunga, the eastern regions of Mshope, to rule 
TDB, v.4, p.223 states he was given Kitanda, a section of the east.
(3) TM/133/SPB, v.4, p.A; DKB, v.X, n.19, 1.10.1899, p.638 talks 
of the brothers being.rivals. .
(4) See above, p.- wi-
I/O
Was a ’brother’ of the dead nkosi, Chipeta, it is possible 
that the ’brother’ versus ’son’ claim arose here* Though a 
most unlikely form of accession for. the NgOni, that through 
’brothers' Was later to spring up in succession issues in 
the two kingdoms, and consequently merits some comment here.
According to Ngoni laws of succession,. the eldest son of the 
’Great wife' .was the heir. If he were not of age, a brother of 
the late nkosi acted as Regent in his stead until he was an adult.
The Zwangendaba Ngoni appear to have observed this practice 
sufficiently to dismiss the possibility of a ’brother' being 
preferred to a 'son'. However, the Njelu and Mshope could not 
claim to observe the laws so closely* Indeed, as late as the 
1950s*; individuals were claiming that 'brothers ', had prior rights 
over 'sons'.(l) Ebner.suggests an answer for this modification 
, of an important principle in writing that the Njelu and Mshope 
absorbed many Thonga, who practice succession by ’brother', and 
that perhaps Ngoni custom changed under their influence* (2)
However, it seems, more likely that succession by 'son' was the 
accepted principle but that, 1.6 a son was unacceptable or a brother 
in a strong position, then the latter could become nkosi in 
preference to the son* The opportunity of acting.as a Regent 
appears to have been a useful stepping stone to the throne, in that 
it permitted an outside,.usually a brother, to consolidate power*(3) 
Mpepo's faction appears?to have done this.
If a faction within a ruling clan failed in its bid for the
(1) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.iii; Komba,.op cit, p.17 
called it a'deviation from the-Zulu'; TNA/155/SDB, file C, v.*f,p.E.
(2) Ebner to Redmond, correspondence 2.2,1970.
(3) Beemer, op .cit, p.6k states that among the Swazi, brothers often 
sought to gain the position of highest power*.
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nkosiship, it could segment as was the practice in southern 
Africa during the eighteenth century, if the nkosi accepted 
this, or it could break away altogether from the kingdom. In 
this particular dispute, the unsuccessful claimant preferred 
fission.
According to one interpretation, Mpepo rebelled because 
he was jealous.(1) Another states this, jealously was based on 
dissatisfaction at being denied the cattle he felt himself 
entitled to under Ngoni laws of succession(2). As Palangu 
himself had earlier expressed the same grievance(3)» Mpepo's 
complaint may have signified a bid. for the nkosiship. Traditions 
of his people state definitely that he bid for the nkosiship. (4) 
Mpepo rebelled against Chabruma and a civil war began. Palangu 
supported Chabruma in this war because, according to him, he was 
offered spoils and the control of his own area afterwards. ( S ')
A possible added inducement was^ the fact that he was part of the 
family branch which Mpepo. was seeking to overthrow. In the 
bitter war which ensued, Chabruma defeated Mpepo. However, he 
was unable to bring Mpepo1s strong force under submission and 
the latter broke away from the Mshope kingdom and moved off on 
his own(6), with some two thousand adherents, comprising one- 
fourth of the Mshope kingdom('7).
(1) Prince, op cit, p.216.
(2) Gulliver, "A history", p.23 states that property and rank 
could be inherited separately and that Mpepo did not claim 
the nkosiship.
(3) INA/133/SDB, v.&, p. 12^ , Palangu's autobiography.
(*0 1PB, Mahenge District Book; TNA/135/SDB, v.2,p.B, an Ndendeule 
history, agrees as does TDB, v.^ f, p.21,8.
(3) TNA/155/SDB, v.2,p.12zf, Palangu's autobiography.
(6) Ebner, History, p.131 gives 1883 as the date of the move.
(7) Prince, op cit, p.216.
Mpepo inarched into manga in. the north-east. There he 
met Mten^uia1 s Bena who had fled from the Hehe in the 1870s.
His arrival ascerbated Ngoni involvement in the aftermath of 
the difficult succession crisis the Bena had just gone through 
after Mtenguia's death. Mtenguia's two sons, Kiwanga and x
i . y   ^ '
Sakamaganga had fought for the succession. The former had 
won and driven the latter south into the Ifinga area. There, 
Sakamaganga allied with Chabruma, whose support he used to 
renew his struggle to regain Ubena. Chabruma's support of his 
opponent had angered Kiwanga so when Mpepo entered his kingdom, 
the two made a military alliance and prepared for war against 
Chabruma. They led an army down into Mshope,only to be defeated 
by Chabruma, After this, overt hostilities ended between 
Mpepo, Kiwanga and Chabruma. Mpepo settled in the country of 
Mkasu, in the Kilosa area.(1)
The Mpepo fission was to be the second instance of fission among 
the Njelu and Mshope Ngoni, though it was not to be the last nor 
the most damaging,(2) Prior to that fission and in most later 
disputes, the Ngoni were able to resolve successions through force 
persuasion without there being any need for fission.
, A second major result of the Hehe wars for the Mshope was 
the imposing of limitations on its military exapnsion. Mere is 
said about this in the following chapter. The reorientation in 
military expansion was marked by the transfer of the nkosi's.
(1) A.T.Culwick, Ubena of the Rivers, (London, 1933), Pp.^3-7;
Prince, op cit, p.2lS; Fillleborn, op cit, p,133; A.M.West in 
Songea Annual Report, , in TNA/SEC/1733/22; Ebner,. History, pp.
-..131-2; Gulliver, "A history", p.23; TDB,. v.4, p.86.
(2) This dubious honour was to be held by the 1932-4 succession 
in Mshope, for which see Chapter Eight, section IV,
capital from Old Gumbiro to Usangila to its south-east.(1)
In Njelu, one effect of the Hehe wars was an increase 
in the decentralization which had been going on,since the 1870s, This 
occurred when the Njelu nkosi, Mharule, decided to move his capital 
further south to Mtunduvaro.(2) When he did this, some manduna 
who had previously lived with him moved away to live on their own.
One tradition suggests that this was done in order that the Ngoni 
might not be defeated in one fell swoop again.(3) Though this is 
plausible in that unaffected communities could mobilize while one 
of their number was attacked, it seems more likely that 
decentralization was the result of increased population and the 
natural inclination to segment which followed the change of 
capitals. (*f)
A second result of the Hehe wars in Njelu was the changing 
in direction of military expansion* Njelu, as,well as Mshope, 
was now restricted in its plundering to. the north-west and, 
accordingly,it turned east and south to a greater degree. This 
reorientation brought, ifc its wake, some changes in the economic 
benefits of military expansion. These included a probable decline 
in interest in cattle as there were no cattle in the south and east.
It brought political change as well, for in the lands they were now. 
to raid, the Ngoni were to find coastal peoples and Europeans, and 
gradually ~ both were to bring.considerable change to Ngoni
society.
(1) Ebner, History, p.152.
(2) Ibid. _t
(3) Ibid,, p.102.
(t) .This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three, section II.
One noticeable difference between the.disruptions caused 
by the Hehe and those which followed the Maseko explusionwas 
the absence of any major reaction by subject groups* In the 
1860s, these peoples had used the opportunity of the death of 
an nkosi and the subsequent disruptions to try and establish 
their own military states. However■, in the troubled times 
during and after the Hehe wars, nothing was done* Ehe main 
reason for this seems to have beenthe absence of powerful 
allies* In the 1860s, dissatisfied subjects could join with 
the Njelu and Mshope in overthrowing the Maseko, but in the 
1880s there was no available ally* Secondly, the Njelu and 
Mshope probably integrated their subjects more successfully 
then had the Maseko, mainly because they had more time in which 
to do it, many subjects having been under an Ngoni influence 
since the mid-l84os*
After the Hehe challenge had been met and successfully 
dealt with, the two kingdoms entered what Were probably the 
greatest years in their history* In the course of expansion and 
growth from around 1880 onwards, the Ngoni-were to meet-two 
new forces, the coastal peoples and the Europeans, who were to 
have a far greater impact on them than the Hehe had ever had*
Chapter 3
The Height of Empire, early 1880s-1897
I
The years from the time of the first Hehe war in 18?8 
until 1897 were those of greatest expansion for the Ngoni,
The peoples of both states had been set back for a while 
by: the Hehe, but after overcoming this, they met no further 
trouble for two decades. New lands were found to replace 
those cut off by the Hehe, and in these lands further 
populations and goods were available in ever greater 
quantities,
Of the two kingdoms, Njelu became by far the more 
important during these years. It had been restricted in 
the north-west by the Hehe, but soon found new lands in 
the south-west, the south and the east which more than 
made up for the loss. The reorientation was marked by 
a general movement of the Njelu people towards the south, 
nkosi, Mharule, set up a capital at Mtunduvaro, then 
at Magomero. (see map, page i.Z7 ). The two leading military 
manduna followed him southwards, Songea to Mzamara Hill 
and Mpambalioto to the Mtopesi River, then to Lilawala 
near gomba. Other manduna who had been living with the 
nkosi t now separated and establi&i^l their own settlements,(1) 
The location of these new settlements altered raiding 
patterns, Songea's settlement in the east looked out 
on to the wealthy Yao lands to the south as well as the 
vast region to the east where lived considerable numbers
(1) Ebner, History of the Wangoni, (Peramiho, 1959), 
mission press, pp,9 6 , 102, 1 1 5-6 , 131, 227,
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of people, Mharule's, Chikuse’s and Putire's 
settlements opened to the south and the west,
Mpambalioto*s se&llement in the west gave him greater 
opportunities there and to the north-west.
Little information was found on raiding undertaken 
in the north-west, Ffllleborn notes Ngoni attacks on 
the Konde(l), Wright mentions that the Kinga and other 
phoples welcomed missionaries in I89I as a defence against 
the Ngoni(2), while Spies talks of a war between Mharule's 
people and the Solcile(3). These suggest that the Njelu 
continued to have considerable independence of action 
in the lands atjthe north end of Lake Nyasa, possibly 
because the Hehe did not consider them integral to their 
sphere of influence. No references to any raids among 
the Bena or other northern groups were found, and it 
appears the Njelu i*ere not active in these sensitive 
lands.
Military expansion in the West completed the 
subjugation of the Matengo by the mid-l880s. (**) Some of 
the people captured were brought to Ngoni settlements, 
while others were set up in satellite communities to 
the west of Ungoni. The most famous of these satellite
(1)F .Fi^lleborn, Das Deutsche Nyassa und Ruvuma Gebiet,
(Berlin, 1 9 0 6) * Reimer, p • 03-^ 1. He does not specify Njelu.
(2 ) M.Wright, German Missions in Tanganyika 1891-19^1,
(Oxford, 197T) , "OUP, pp*38-9» 5^>-7 • Njelu not specified.
(3) E.Spies, "Observations 011 Utani customs amongthe Ngoni
of Songea District", TNR, n.16, (19^3), p.29.
(^) Ebner, History, p.125 has some good accounts of the 
wars against the Matengo and the Matengo version of 
how they started; TDB, v.kt p.221.
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towns' was.Amakita's, which lay astride one of the major 
routes from the lakeshore to Ungoni and was visited by most 
European travellers to Ungoni. The Matengo tribute settlements 
appear to have belonged to numerous Njelu manduna, including 
Songea(1), Chikuse(2), Putire and the nkosi,Mharule(3).
Interest in the lakeshore. grew considerably after.1880, 
particularly in the lands south of Mbamba Bay. By the mid-l880s 
most Nyasa communities notth of Chiteji’s had either learned to 
protect themselves from the Ngoni or had submitted. One missionary 
wrote in 1883:
"We saw the evil results of the terror of this tribe {Ngoni] 
all along the coast {of Lake Nyasa), for long distances there 
is not a house, all the people are collecting into a few great 
towns close to the water's edge. They have chosen the most 
unhealthy situations, each town having a marsh or water behind 
it. »(*■) 1
Those who submitted did so ■ to improve their lot wrote one missionary
who esiplained that a gropp from Mbamba Bay going to pay tribute to
nduna Songea in 1886 did so "that they might leave the rocks and caves
where they were living in, fear and come out and cultivate the land
and build houses in more convenient places".(5) %  the late 1890s
most of the land;between Njelu and Lake Nyasa was inhabited by Ngoni
and tribute-paying communities of Nyasa.
By the 1890s, the Nyasa had become pawns in a powerful struggle
between the Njelu,Ngoni and some of the leading Yao chiefs living
south of the Ruvuma. These chiefs, in their quest for slaves, were
moving in on lakeshore communities and the Ngoni, determined to
(1)C.A.Smythies, CA, v.V, n.^9, 1.1887; Smythies, (1883), p.27.
(2) G.A.Smythies, A Journey to lake Nyassa and to the Magwarigwara 
and the £ource""of the Rovuma in the year 18B&, (Zanzibar, n.d.)
p. 26".
(3) Ebner, History, p.149 has the history of a Jfetengo captured by 
Mharule.
(^) 1C.A.Smythies, CA, v^III, n.36,112.1885, p.167.
(3) USFG, A1.V, Box B, letters n.170-316, C.A.Smythies, n.d. (c.7.1886)
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protect their subjects and their raiding lands, were allying 
with serai-independent Nyasa chiefs.in attacking the Yao.(1)
The struggle bore resemblance to the contests between the Hehe 
and the Mshope Ngoni during the 1870s, though ;ihis time the 
Ngoni were in a superior position and by the 18.90s had the 
upper hand.
While some Yao were challenging the Ngoni, others were, in 
fear of them. Throughout .the 1880s and 1890s, one Ngoni military 
expedition after another marched sohth of the Ruvuma to plunder 
isolated Yao communities, to disrupt trade and to force a general 
shifting of population. Small Yao communities responded to the 
Ngoni threat by amalgamating into larger units or by. moving to 
safer ‘locations near the lake or further south or east. larger 
communities which suffered incursions moved to more favourable 
locations. For example,. Makanjila moved froni the Ruvuma to near 
the lake (2), while Mat aka moved to the edge of a mountain ridge (3)*
The impact of Ngoni raiding was considerable, given the size of 
some of the affected communities. For instance, Chiteji and 
Makanjila, both of whom submitted to the Ngoni, were reported to 
have 6,000 men each in 1882.(%) By the 1890s, according to Ebner, 
those who had Submitted included "Mataka.••the most important of 
all Wayao chiefs...Kalanji..*Kwisombe... Makanjila".(3) Ey the
(1) B.H.Barnes, Johnson of Nyasaland, (London, 1933), p. 114*.
(2) Smythies, A Journey, p.1o and p.9, Mataka moving.
(3) Ibid. “
(*f) W.P.Johnson, "The Rev.W.P.Johnson's journeys in the Yao country, 
and discovery of the sources of the Lujende", PROS, v.XV,
(1882), n.8 , p.48^. .
(3) Ebner, History, p.107; BSPG, A1.VI, Box 1, misc.letters n.1160-1998, 
Swinny to Penny, 13*3*^886. A Yao informed Swinny that Mataka 
submitted after the Sultan of Zanzibar had enjoined him to 
abstain,from war as far as possible;. Ebner, Texte in Neu-Klngonit (vol. 
*0 Erz^hlungen, Fabeln, Rhtsel, Spriphworter,. TT969 ) SOA, p. 73 
has.an interesting description of an attack on Zomba*
•' • '110
1890s, there were pressures in Njelu to annex part of
Yaoland.(1) Nduna Songea was.the most determined plunderer
of the Yao and a large percentage of his subjects were Yao
by the 1890s. ; Among otherswho attacked them were nkosi Mharule,
and the manduna Chikuse and Mgendera.
The lands east of Njelu came under systematic attack after 
the first Hehe war had pushed the Njelu. southwards. The plundering 
of this region was initiated by the spectacular attack on the TJMGA 
mission station and freed-slave settlement at Mhsasi in 1882.(2)
One missionary was told that Yao and other coastal peoples had 
persuaded nduna Sohgea to attack it.(3 ) It seems likely that Songea 
was looking for new regions into which to send his armies and looked 
upon the east as a good one. By attacking the missionaries first, 
he may have sought to neutralize., the most obvious threat to his 
expansion in the east. The missionaries chose not to resist and 
seven of their people were killed while twenty-nine were taken as 
captives to Songea.'s*(4) The missionary, W.C.Porter, was forced to 
go to Songea's and bargain for their release./ While there, he 
concluded an agreement whereby the mission was freed from further 
attack, apparently upon the payment of a regular tribute. (5 )
Though the missionaries were freed from attack, their neighbours 
were not and, from 1882 onwards, the Ngoni plundered Yao, I'fekua and 
Mwera communities in the east with impunity. Their devastating
(1) MMV6/68/3/3/1, traditioii of L.Fusi Gama.
(2) tJSPG, A1.VI, Canon Porter,, Memorials of Masasi 12.188o to 12.190^ 
p.28; R.G.P.Lambum, "The Ahgoni raid on Masasi in 1882", TNR, 
n.66, (1966), pp.207-13. . ;,f’
(3) Porter, Memorials, p.5^-. "
(*0 Ibid. ,p.29f‘Iaiaburnj, cit, pp.207-13.
(3) Porter, Memorials; Porter, "The Magwangwara", J. Manchester GS,
v . i i , (1886),' pp.263-82. 1 ' • ~-----------
\7A
attacks forced many peoples to find new and safer 
settlements. For example, the Makonde, who had been 
withdrawing into the Ifekonde Plateau before the 1880s, 
hastened their withdrawal and effectively cut themselves off 
from foreign influences,(1) The Makua and Yao built settlements 
on mountain ridges,(2) Places that were very vulnerable were 
deserted and, by the mid-l880s, the entire region between Masasi 
and Ungoni lay barren and largely empty,(3)
People in the east reacted to the Ngoni threat in much the 
same way as those elsewhere, A number submitted and began paying 
tribute, such as, for example, the important Yao chief I'fe.tola.(4) 
Some continued to hide, and remained subject to attacks into the 
1890s, (5) Very few resisted overtly. One who did was the Yao 
leader Machemba, who defeated an Ngoni force in;1888 and thus 
preserved independence*(6) The main Ngoni protagonist in
the east was nduna Songea, It was largely through his dominance 
in this important area of expansion that he later came to be so 
well known to coastal peoples.
Njelu expansion in the south-east, that is the lands below 
the Ruvuma and east of the Lujenda, went on contemporaneously
(1) Smythies, CA, v.IX, (1891), p.132 describes some of their 
defences; see also G.Iiebenow, Colonial Rule and Political 
Developments in Tanzania: The Case of the Makonde,(Evanston, 
1971), chs.2 and 3. ' " :
(2) Smythies, CA, v.V, n.51» 3*^887; FUlleborn, op cit, p.33*
(3) G.Ideder, "Reise von der Mbampa-Bai am Nyassa-See nack Kisswere 
- am Indischen O c e a n . MstdS, v.X, (1897), p.110.
(4) Farler, CA, v.XIV, n.l6l~ (1*896),, p . 83 describes him paying 
tribute of goats, cloth, etc; for a claim that he did not pay 
tribute, see Liebenow, op cit, p.48, .
(5) The Mwera were attacked quite late, eg. USPG, letters from 
Africans, A3» n.5644, I wish to thank Terence Ranger for 
noticing and showing me this reference.
(6) USPG. A1.VI, Box 1, Porter to Penney, 11,6.1888; Ebner, Histoiy, 
p.113-4.
with raids in the east. The peoples who lived in this region 
included the Makua, Mawia, lao and the Nindi (Musitu). The Nindi 
were major targets for the Ngoni who despised^hem as inferior 
imitators# As early as 1882, a British consul in Mcqambique, 
while condemning Ngoni and Mafiti(Nindi) activities, was nonetheless 
grateful for their enmity towards each other as it often preoccupied 
them and lessened the threat to others, (1) Ngoni. attacks on the Nindi 
continued well into the 1890s. The Makua were attacked from time to 
time(2), though the more isolated Mawia appear to have been left alone, .
While the Njelu state found, many new'and populous, lands,to 
plunder after the Hehe wars, Mshope appears to have become .spatially 
more restricted than before. This was because it lacked new regions 
into which to expand as the.lands to their north were controlled by 
the ^ehe and to the south by the Njelu, Moreover it lost the 
important raiding lands of thenorth-west. Finally, the state never 
fully recovered from the damaging civil and external wars of 1878 
and 1881 against the Hehe, 1881-3 against Palangu, then Mpepo, then 
around 1886 against Kiwanga and Mpepo and failed after 1886 to-make 
any remarkable military initiatives leading it to fall steadily 
behind Njelu in size and importance. . ;- , v ■ :V; .,
To the west, the Mshope appear to have raided,: like the Njelu, 
the Konde, Kinga and other peoples at the northern end of lake Nyasa.(3) 
They attacked the Bena frequently. One Bena tradition records that 
the Ngoni- came "to catch cattle, goats and people" and that people 
reacted by moving to the. forests and building small houses.(4-) A /
(1) PI. R. O'Neill, "Journey in the district west of Cape Delgado",
PROS, v.V, (1883), pp.393-^.. . ; ’
(2) USPG, A1.V1, misc.letters, 14-24-1608, J.IIainsworth to Travers,
23.11.1894. ".
(3) As noted on p.116, fns.1 and 2. -
(4) M.Samkichi to S.MWalongo, Our Past, (Peramiho);, 1.11,1966.
number of Bern gradually accepted tribute-paying status 
under the Mshope, One of these, the Bena leader, Pangamahuti, 
submitted to the Mshope, according to Tawete, "for his own 
safety", apparently against Hehe attacks.(1) By 1897, the 
Mshope had a substantial settlement complex in the north-west, 
apparently comprising mainly Bena, Other peoples from the west 
and north-west to suffer Ngoni incursions included the Pangwa 
and Matumbi.(2)
In their attacks in the north-east, their second major - 
region of military expansion, the Mshope plundered the lands 
of the Rufiji River, its tributaries' and the lands to its north 
and south, Ngoni raids had considerable impact in the southern 
part of the region where they were at' their most frequent. The 
Ndendeule, Ngindo and Rufiji(3) living in the region of the 
Luwegu and lower Rufiji were forced to flee to swamps and other 
inaccessible areas(4) or to vacate the region altogether. A, 
Benedictine missionary, travelling through the country in 1897» 
offered an exaggerated picture of the impact of Ngoni raids when 
writing:"Hundreds of burnt villages, whole regions lying 
devastated, thousands of dead and captive people accrue to him 
(Chabruma)".(§0 In some lands north of the Rufiji, the Ngoni
(1) D.M.M, Tawete, Account of the Wangoni, Tanganyika.
(2) FUlleborn, op cit, p.17^ ; A Handbook of German East Africa,: 
Admiralty, (London, 1916),~I.D. 1053, pp.5l",'T2. — — rr-
(3) The Rufiji were a mixture of population groups, see W.Beardall, 
"Exploration of the Rufiji River under the orders of the Sultan 
of Zanzibar", PROS, v.III, (1881), n.11-, p.
(4) G.ideder, "Zur Kenntis der Karawanwege in sudlichen Thiele 
des Ostafrikanischen'Schutzgebietes", fedS, v.VTI, (189.4),n.4, 
p.272. He found little lowland cultivation as people were 
moving to safer,places near the cbast.
(5) M.Hartmann, Missbl., v.IX, (1898), p.29.
forced the reorganization of settlement. The German traveller,
Ideder, found this in 1894 when writing that some people carried
on agriculture in large settlements, while bein^ very much on
guard against Ngoni incursions# (1) Others stayed out of,the way
of the Ngoni. Beardall wrote, in 1881, that the Mbunga feared and
avoided them.(2-) The nkosi Chabruma and nduna Palangu were responsible for
the raids in the east, ; -
Taken as a whole, the two Ngoni kingdoms east of Lake Nyasa
experienced considerable expansion from 1878 onwards. By 1897 the
Ngondjjwere known and feared from Kilwa to Delagoa Bay to both ends
of Lake Nyasa. As before 1878, their expansion had many effects. It
dislocated the peoples of a large region in East Africa and'forced’ ;
them to change their life-styles that they, might accommodate themselves
to a power they could not overcome. It affected long-distance trade,
throgh both disruptingcommunications and preventing the accumulation’
of trade goods* (3) It complicated the European presence in Jfest =
Africa in ways as diverse as burning European buildings and disrupting
European religious and educational efforts.
*> ' * - •
Behind Ngoni expansion and motivating it to take the direction it
did was the political system of the two'kingdoms. As will now be seen,
it was these that helped made Njelu expansion so varied and spectacular
and caused the Mshope growth to be quieter and less effective.
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The political differences which had emerged between the, ' 
two kingdoms before I88O, persisted after the Hehe Wars. ; ""P
Events past, such.as the Hehe .wars\ those; to come, such as 
contact with neighbours, and the personalities of leaders involved
(1) lieder, * *2ur Kenntis1', p. 272.
(2) Beardall,-op-fitV p.632.
(3) G1 Neill, dp *it, p.397;
in military expansion and internal political life, all 
helped to determine this distinction* Both events and 
personalities played differing roles within each kingdom 
which are therefore treated separately* Of the two 
kingdoms, Njelu appears to have had the more complex 
military and administrative life between 1883 and 1897*
This seems to have been largely because of the many bases 
of power comprising its political structure. This enlisted 
a more continuous and livelier participation in the affairs 
of the state from all sectors of the political community 
than did the centralized bureaucracy in the period following 
the Hehe wars. This popular participation was to be shown 
in both military and administrative life.
In military life, participation was increasingly 
shown in three ways. The first was in the formation of 
various fighting units. In this, the national age regiments, 
which had been decreasing in importance during the 1870s, 
were gradually replaced by territorial units, organized and 
commanded by the manduna in their areas of operation. Mot 
much is known about the age regiments during these years. 
According to Ebner and Tawete(l), they continued to be 
formedn on a regular basis. Possibly they assembled and 
fought in wars undertaken by the nkosi. These anyway 
appear to have been few in number and available information 
indicates that military men were waging most wars with 
their immediate followers rather than as part of any 
national regiment.(2) According to the evidence of extant
(1) As shown on the chart on age regiments, p.^ *?*?, A.H.
Pike to Redmond, intersiSrews, 13*9.1971* 22.9.1971.
(2) Ebner, Texte (vol.l), pp.64-6 describes one such war 
related by Petri Manguru in 1936.
traditions, the waging of wars by local rather than 
national forces was a common practice during Mharule*s 
reign in the 1880s. After his death and the serious 
split in the kingdom which followed it, described below, 
local rather than national waging of war seems to have 
become almost the exclusive method of military organization.
A second aspect of military localization was the 
consolidation of an independent command structure.
During the 1880s this was most evident in the case of the 
leading military manduna, such as nduna Songea, who had 
many lieutentants and a large army.(l) Lesser manduna 
were not so independent during Mharule*s rule. Traditions 
indicate that a number of them, including Towatowa Gama, 
Mgendera Grama, Msukumbi Magagura and Manjoro{2), sought 
Mharulefs approval before waging wars• At times, Mharule 
managed*to constrain even his leading manduna. For example, 
in 1886, after the Njelu Ngoni had lost many men in a 
smallpox epidemic, he forbade Songea to allow an expedition 
and threatened him with an attack if he disobeyed.(3)
Songea seems to have aceded to his wish. In the 1890s, 
after Mharule*s death, the independent command structure 
advanced considerably as uncertainties over state leadership
(1) Aocording to the son of one of Songea*s leading 
lieutentants, Songea had ninety-nine companies of 
fifty men eaoh, and one company of veterans, called 
makesa, in 0.Guise-Williams papers, tradition of 
Kazipiga, son of Mfaranyaki. This may be an exaggeration. 
According to a German estimate on the Ngoni population
in 1904 - which is questioned in Chapter Five, section IV 
the Ngoni kingdoms had 3^»000 people. This would give 
Songea probably no more than 6,000 followers, of whom 
1,000 to 2,000 would have been in the army. The German 
estimate, however, appears to be an underestimate.
(2) Bbner, Texte (vol.l), pp.^-8, 7 2-3 , traditions of 
Fetri Nanguru.
(3) Smythies, A Journey; and USPG, Al.V, Box B, letters 
170-316. ~
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led military men to plunder and wage war with little 
restraint. Independent military activity had its 
effects. For example, various manduna are known to 
have plundered groups who had already submitted to one 
nduna elsewhere.(1) Again, it became difficult for the 
Njelu state to present a united front to outsiders. This 
was to be cleafly shown when Europeans began entering 
Ngoni country in a hostile manner.(2)
The third aspect of localization was the growth in 
the numbers of military settlements after I8 7 8. The first 
major stage in segmentation followed the Hehe wars, when 
nfcosi and the leading manduna decided to establish 
their communities further to the south. These settlements, 
already noted above, comprised that of nkosi Mharule at 
Mtunduvai'o, then Magomero, then Mbinga, and those of the
manduna Songea at Mzamara Hill, Mpambalioto at the Mtopesi
River, then Lilawala, Chikuse at the Mkurumusi River near 
Mpitimbi and Chombera at Zomba. Other manduna who had 
been living with, or near, the nkosi, gradually moved 
further away. Masiwanyoni Magagura moved to the Namakinga 
River near Maposeni, then Mbunga on the lower side of the 
lower Mgugusi, Miamilo moved to the left bank of the 
Mgugusi River, Putire went to the Mtopesi River, then 
to the Lihongwe River and Mgungu Nquraayo settled near 
Mgazini.(3) A third stage in segmentation appears to
(1) Johnson, Nyasa, p.113.
(2) As shown below, second half of section XY.
(3) T.von Prince, "Geschichte der Magwangwara nach
Erz&hlung des Arabers Rashid bin Masaud und des
Fussi, Bruders des vor drei Jahren verstorbenen
Sultans der Magwangxirara", MadS, v.VXX, (1 8 9^) , p.
218; Leider, "Reise11, map; Ebner, History, pp.9 6 ,
102, 115-6, 131, 227; Revised Historyt pp.66-7*
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have come in the late 1880s, after a number of the 
nkosi*s brothers returned from the west side of Lake 
Nyasa xtfhither they had fled in the I860s.(l) In these 
neitf settlements, Mgendera settled apparently by the 
Luhira River near the Lupagaro Mountains and Fusi, first 
by the Mhangasi River, then near Luyangweni. A fourth 
phase in segmentation followed Mharule’s death in 1 8 8 9. 
Known to have moved around this time was Zamchaya, who 
moved to Maposeni on the Namakinga River, Magagura, who 
moved to near Mount Mara, and Zambangeya Gama who moved 
to the southern part of the Litenga Mountains•(2)
In their separate settlements, many Ngoni manduna 
were free to act quite independently and, through this, 
to gain considerable prestige and influence. As the 
size and populations of their sectors grew through wars, 
they became powerful and sometimes wealthy. The most 
notable example of a successful nduna was Songea Mbano.
—w  nnnnW|Wintwrt
probably the most powerful man in N^elu in the 189 0s.
The son of a Kalanga captive, Songea rose to a position 
of power which completely overshadowed that of the Ngoni 
family which had originally captured his father,,; } He 
appears to have been a highly intelligent and capable 
leader, and one possessed of excellent fighting abilities. 
In the 1860s, he had helped in the struggles against the 
Maseko, Later he was in the forefront in the wars against
(1) This is discussed further later in this section,
(2) Ebner, History, pp.115-6, 131-2; Prince, op clt; 
Leider, "Reise", map and p.102 states that Mlamilo's 
town had 1 ,0 0 0  to 2 ,0 0 0  huts in 189^» suggesting that 
some of these were quite large.
the Hehe• By the 1880s, he had built his army into 
what was probably the most effective force in the Njelu 
kingdom, and one which contained one-third of its total 
numbers, With his power, he was able to set himself 
up as a largely independent force within Njelu. His 
£>res.tige and fame spread well beyond Ungoni. Among 
the many comments on him is the following by a UMCA 
missionary, N,C.Porter>p made in 1882:
"He is not an unpleasant looking man, of about middle 
age, with a certain amount of dignity and se'lf- 
possession, and rather inclined to be merry and free 
withal, and generally, I should say, superior in his 
intelligence, and approach to right feeling to most of 
his people. He was muffled in a large coat of kaniki 
(dark blue muslin) lined with bright coloured shiti 
(printed calico); when excited he had what was, I suppose, 
a Kaffir click,"(1)
By the 1890s, when the royal family could not agree on a 
successor to the deceased Mharule, Songea apparently 
felt sufficiently important to reject subservience to 
any single faction within the royal family. He accordingly 
rejected the title of nduna and insisted that people 
accord him the greeting ’bayete1, which was traditionally 
reserved for the nkosi.(2 )
inn* imriiiiwnmniMi
The other manduna in Njelu had less power and influence 
than Songea. Some appears to have been as competent 
militarily as he. These included Mpambalioto, Chikuse 
and Magagura, all mentioned as major leaders of the four 
geographic region of Njelu in 189*K(3) These, generally, had
(1) Porter, "The Magitfangwara", pp. 13-^ -.
(2) Prince, op cit, p.218; noted in Ebner, Revised 
History, p.9.
(3) Lieder, Reise , p.219, he had the three in the 
western, northern and southern regions respectively; 
however, Ebner, History, pp.115-6, has Chikuse in
the southern, Putire in the western and Chombera in the 
norMxern. Both are approximately correct, eg., 
Mpambalioto, Putire and Chombera all fought in the 
western and northern regions*
some reason for being less powerful than Songea, For 
example, Mpambalioto had a less favourable settlement 
than Songea, Songea’s settlement was the easternmost 
one in Njelu and had access to the vast lands stretching 
to the Indian Ocean and down into Mopambique. Mpambalioto, 
on the other hand, lived in the north-west where he was 
restricted by the Mshope kingdom, the Hehe state, and 
three other Njelu manduna, Consequently, he had a much 
smaller territory from which to collect followers•{1 ) 
Military decentralization in Njelu after 1880 
therefore presents a varied picture. The population 
as a whole had been steadily increasing, encouraging 
the expansion into new areas. By the 1880s, the Njelu 
kingdom was probably three times the size it had been 
in the 1870s,(2) Secondly, the few military manduna 
reigning in the 1 8 7 0s were now, in the 1 8 8 0s add 1 8 9 0s, 
being supplemented by their sons as well as captives 
who had proven themselves in war. One notable example 
of a son becoming powerful during these years was Chabruma 
Gama, son of I-Iawai. By the 1890s, he was carving out his 
own sphere of influence in southern Njelu,(3) Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, decentralization was a 
logical progression from pre-1880 politics in Njelu. The 
growing control of the manduna over military matters that 
we have already noted, and the ineffective efforts by the
(1) Ebner to Redmond, interviews 17-21.10•1971«
(2) As shoxrn on the maps on pp. and .
(3) This sector is shown in map, German East Africa, GGD,^, 
1:500,000, Songea.
mnkosi to limit this control, inevitably led to the 
gaining of considerable powers by the manduna.
Military decentralization had certain advantages,
First, it permitted a rapid and sustained growth of 
the state, as its constituent members all saw personal 
advantage in growth. Secondly, the existence of independent 
centres of authority appears to have facilitated the 
integration" of captives. This was because such centres 
diffused the 'true Ngoni' among the 'sutu1, thereby 
permitting a closer and more sustained contact than 
would have been possible had all 'true Ngoni* lived 
together, Furthermore, it was to the advantage of 
independent 'true Ngoni' groups to make as many people 
as possible into Ngoni like themselves to increase their 
power.
Moreover, some problems attributed to decentralization 
are not strictly its result. For example, the German 
visitor, Prince, wrote in 189^ that the divided Njelu 
society, uncertain in its political leadership and having 
semi-independent sections, was declining in many ways. He 
wrote that the training of warriors was declining, that 
military practices, such as late marriages, were being 
relaxed, and that military units were no longer kept 
separate.(1) However, while Njelu society was admittedly 
divided and changing its military practices, it is hard 
to accept that it was in decline. Military expansion was 
at its height during the 1390s, hardly likely if it were
(1) Prince, op cit, p.220. He wrote that the slave trade 
and the abundance of women and beer helped the decline.
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disintegrating. Again, the changes in certain military 
practices were probably desirable in the decentralized 
form Njelu expansion had taken*
While fission may have resulted from continued 
military decentralization, and separation actually seems 
to have been considered by at least nduna Songea, as noted 
above, neither actually occurred. This appears to have 
been beoause the tendency towards fission and separation 
was offset by forces xriLthin the state which worked to 
unify the people. One of these was the status of the 
nkosi and the royal family. The state was identified 
with the royal family and the nkosi, as representative 
of that family, was the much-needed symbol of the state. 
Military men, no matter how important, lacked this aura. 
Secondly, the nkosi bound himself to the military manduna 
in ways such as marrying his daughters to them and their 
sons(l), while the manduna themselves identified, 
presumably, with the royal family with whom they had 
built a state, in the course of which they had shared 
so many experiences. Finally, the nkosi had various means 
to push unity. These means included the use of military 
force, as for example, the one made by Mharule against 
Songea. There was also administrative power, which we 
consider next.
While military life in Njelu fostered decentralization, 
administrative life could do the opposite* Indeed, while
(1) J.Booth, "Die Nachkomraen der Sulukaffern (Wangoni) 
in Deiitsch Ostafrika", Globus. lxxxviii, (I9 0 5 ), has 
a good discussion of this; Swinny stated that Songea 
married Mharule*s sister, CA, v.IV, n.^3, 7,1886,
wthe Njelu state functioned effectively, that is, 
while all sections of society accepted the structures 
and the holders of positions within it, it could 
control the possible effects of military diffusion.
Had there been no administration, the Njelu state 
would have been little more than a fighting force 
held together through fear or advantage, yet bound 
to disintegrate when these feelings had vanished.
After 1878 the structure of administration in 
Njelu became more complex than it had been before.
This was largely due to the expanding size and ever­
growing population of the kingdom. The components 
of this structure were the same as they had been 
prior to 1880, though it appears that now there were 
more having greater duties.
On a senior level in the administration and 
representing the nkosi in some of the larger settlements 
were the immediate relatives of the nkosi, called the 
wantwana. As far as is known, only one group of 
wantwana was appointed during these years. This group 
comprised the nkosi *s brothers and other sons who had 
fled west of the lake in the 186 0s and returned in the 
1880s. When they returned, Mharule sent some to live 
with or near the settlements of various leading manduna.
Two explanations have been given for the appointment 
of the wantwana to various parts of the kingdom. One 
by Gulliver states that Mharule wanted to increase the 
power of the royal family vis-a-vis that of the military
manduna, who were becoming an increasingly independent 
group*(1) He gives an example in the sending of Mkuzo 
to live near Chombera and Mpambalioto. Within two 
generations, Mkuzofs family was to take over pottfer from 
Mpambalioto*s descendants, and Gulliver sees this takeover 
as an example of the determination of the royal family 
to control the military manduna. However, this is to 
mate three mistakes. First of all, it is unlikely that 
a royal family appointee could have claimed the loyalty 
an nduna *s followers given the Ngoni system of loyalty 
to the captor. Thus, the reasons for the transfer are 
likely to have been exceptional.(2) Secondly, the 
wantwana, being representatives of the nkosi, would not 
have nedded to replace the military manduna as their status 
was above that of the manduna.(3) Thirdly, the case 
Gulliver cites appears to have been the only one of its 
type while the takeover that occurred was very much in 
line with traditional customs: the nduna waged war and 
the nkosi * s representative - say administrative nduna - 
administered. When war ended, the representative was 
the only one left with something to do.
A second explanation for their return and appointment 
to the settlements of various manduna is given by Ebner.
He asserts that an issue of prestige was at stake. Mharule,
(1) P.H.Gulliver, ”A history of the Songea Ngoni”, TNR, 
n.4l, (1955), P . 22. —
(2) As will be noted below, Mpambalioto's son allied with 
the Germans after 1897 and became a powerful Sultan.
This may well have made him unpopular, see Chapter Six, 
section I.
(3) P.H.Gulliver, Mn Administrative Survey of the Ngoni and 
Ndendeuli of Songea District, typescript, UDSM, p.ii 
recognizes this himself.
according to Ngoni law and tradition, had become the
'father* of the people in being nkosi andjElt was a boost
to his prestige to have his 'children' west of the lake 
(1 )
rbturn to him. Their distribution throughout the 
kingdom would then manifest this prestige to all.
To some extent, both explanations are correct.
The presence of numerous wantwana at the capital and 
throughout the kingdom helped both the prestige and the 
power of the nkosi. This seems to have been because it 
gave the nkosi the allegiance of *'■ more important 
members of Njelu society than that enjoyed by other 
leaders.
In addition to Mkuzo, the wantwana who returned from 
west of the lake included Mgendera, who lived near Songea*s; 
Fusi, who set himself up in the west by the Mhangasi River, 
then near Luyangweni, and who apparently achieved pre­
eminence over the settlement of Namlcwawa Mligo and Mtakati 
Maseko(2); Zamchaya, who lived with Mharule; and Mkulayedwa 
and his son, Mtazama, who moved in with Putire(3). The 
return of Mkulayedwa is interesting, for he apparently did 
not consult Mharule before going to join Futire(^). Moreover, 
his return would have helped to strengthen the influence of 
the non-ruling Mapipu branch of the royal family.
Little information was obtained on the effectiveness 
of these representatives, though what was obtained suggests
(1) Ebner ;to Redmond, interview 18.10.1971; Ebner, Revised 
History. p.6 8 .
(2) Ebner to Redmond, interviews 17-21.10.1971; Ebner,
History, pp.120-1.
(3) Ebner to Redmond, interviews 17-21,10.1971.
(4) Ibid.
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that it was slight. At least this is so for Mcuzo 
who, though a better administrator than Chombera, only 
really seems to have consolidated his xoower during the 
colonial period.(1) A second example, that of Mgendera, 
further suggests limited influence. Mgendera appears to 
have had no influence on Songea and to have spent his time 
trying to establish his own sphere of influence.(2 )
The increasing numbers of wantwana in Njelu were 
eventually to have a far greater impact on the nkosi1s 
succession and on the way in which his power would be 
divided than they appear to have had on increasing’ 
either his prestige or his power.
On other rungs of administration were various other 
officials. At the national level, there were two important 
officials we should mention. One was the religious 
leader, Chikuse Nanguru, then, after his death, his son, 
Kapungu. The powers of this leader have already been 
described.(3) A second official was the nduna ya nkosi. 
Mharule had a man named Nahwayira occupying this office. 
According to Ebner, among the known duties of this 
official were representing the nkosi, as he did when 
travelling west of the lake to persuade the hkosi 1 s brothers 
to return, and settling major disputes, as when he persuaded 
Putire not to leave Njelu after the latter disputed with 
Mharule. (A) Administration at the village level xtras carried
(1) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.3*K
(2) Ebner, Texte XvoirTlm pp.6^-6' shoitfs one example of this 
independent state-building by Mgendera.
(3) See above, Chapter Two, p.§4 •
{k) Ebner, Itevised History, pp.68-9; History, p. 121.
out by alumuzana. Their duties have already been described.(1) '
Their numbers appear to, have increased considerably during these, 
years, as the major settlements acquired more ..and more satellite 
villages. , .
The informal ?house? network of the nkosi existed during,; . <
these years. :Xt is not known exactly how many 'houses* there 
were at all times after-1880. The only information on numbers? 
is provided by Prince, who -said that in 1894-, nkosi Mlamilo, had 
three: his mother, Nalino, at Songea's; the deceased Mharule*s 
wife at Magagura's; and his wife, Nyassere at Mpambalioto's and 
Chikuse's.(2) These women appear to have enjoyed considerable 
influence and seem to have been very helpful to the nkosi as 
political intermediaries;
Within the administrative network, the .powers of the nkosi 
were theoretically considerable. For instance, judicially, he 
alone could pass the dxath penalty, This'was..apparently because 
the loss of a man was seen as a loss for the whole nation, 
financially, he received a part of all spoils and, as guardian 
of the nation's cattle herds,, was one of the wealthiest individuals 
in the state, finally, in general administration, he determined 
most national policies as, for example, foreign relations. In 
actuality,' his powers were not so considerable. As segmentation 
increased, so did the, manduna*s authority. and they assumed some powers
(1) See above, Chapter Twor, p.Ai, -
(2) Prince, op cit, p.219.
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hitherto reserved for the nkosi. For instance,
Mpambalioto took for himself the power to pass the 
death penalty on his subjects.(1) Again, Songea began 
deciding some aspects of national politics, such as 
admitting Europeans without concern for the nkosi's 
decision to exclude them.(2 ) While the decentralization 
pushed by the military manduna and some factions of the 
ruling clan was the major characteristic of Njelu political
life during the 1 88 0s, it was not to be the most important
characteristic of political life in the 1890s. This honour 
liras to be held by dissension within the royal family which 
resulted from the bitterly disputed succession which 
followed nkosi Mharule*s death in 1889* The dispute was 
to intensify decentralization, and to create a problem 
where none had been openly evident before as segmentation 
turned to fission.
It is possible that the military decentralization 
of the 1880s played some part in causing the succession 
crisis. This would be so if one accepts that nkosi 
Mharule brought back his long-absent rehtives from west 
of Lake Nyasa in order to bolster his position vis-a-vis 
that of the military manduna. If this was his plan, it
failed, for the returnees and the resident members of the
royal family soon started fighting amongst themselves.
The succession dispute arose when two factions of the 
Gama clan disputed the nkosiship. One represented
(1) J.H&fliger, "Land und Leute von Ungoni", Missbl.. 
1 9 0 1 , n.l, pp.1 5 8-9 *
(2 ) See below pp. no-i.
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Zamchaya(l), a second son of Gwaserapasi, who had 
held the nkosiship for a short while in the late 
1850s before fleeing west of the lake* The other 
claimant was Mlamilo, a younger brother of Mharule, 
and one of those who had not fled west of the lake 
in the Io5 0s/l860s ,(2 )
It is not clear who supported which faction,
.Prince, who visited Ungoni in 189^, offers some clues, (3) 
His main informant was Pusi, another of the family of 
Zulu who had returned from west of the lake. .Fusi 
appears to have been a supporter of Zamchaya, an 
alliance strongly suggested by his testimony to Prince.
A second clue comes from the names of those who opposed 
the leadership of Zamchaya1s group a decade later. Two 
opponents were Chabruma, a son of Hawai, and Putire.(A) 
Both these men were part of Zulu’s family which had not 
fled to the western side of the lake in the 1 85 0s/1 8 6 0s. 
Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that Mlamilo xvas 
supported in this crisis by the brancli of the r,oyal 
family which had not fled from the Maseko in the late 
1850s or early 1860s, while Zamchaya received the 
backing of the branch that fled, then returned in the 
1 8 6 0s .
The position of the military manduna is less clear.
I'U—■— . h-i-.it.....— —-*-**"*-"-*murn 111 infy=iTi*n— iwtmrrm rm<wi tutiui ;iiii i if *rn t1 ~ it~.ui iwii>nmni|urn,mr»n,■»wrTir-*~-•
(1) Also spelt Ghem Ohaya.
(2) According to Gulliver, UA History", p.21, Mlamilo, 
like Hawai, was from a junior branch of the Gama 
family.
(3) Prince, op cit.
( M  mmr/6/6 8/3 /1 .
The most powerful, nduna Songea, may have remained 
neutral. Prince suggests this when writing that 
Songea was becoming very independent and was even 
considering himself subservient to no one, Xn 1 8 9 7,
Songea was identified with Mlamilo(l),while eight 
years later he offered support to the ruling Zamchaya 
faotion(2). Thus, his willingness to identify with 
both factions and his independence in the 1 8 9 0s both 
suggest lack of enthusiasm for either candidate.
Nothing is known of the position of lesser military 
manduna. However, some suggestions can be made.
Military leaders, Mpambaliotofs family in particular, 
are known to have/sat on councils which selected later 
mankosi (3) . ancj/it is probable that they sat on the 
one which determined the 1889 succession. The council 
selected Mlamilo in the end, so it appears that some 
military manduna favoured Mlamilo with whom they had 
fought for many years, over the newcomer, Zamchaya.(^)
The only other interested parties were the coastal 
people^and the Arabs, They were divided in their 
support. Rashid bin Masoud, a powerful and successful 
Arab trader in Njelu in 1889(5), supported Mlamilo, A 
major competitor of his, the Swahili, ICitunu, is known 
to have later supported the Zamchaya group,
(1) See below, pp. .
(2) See below, Chapter Five, p. crv«». .
(3) See below, Chapter Bight, pp. ^3.
(if) Prince, op cit, p.218 states that all manduna had to 
approve the successor, and so suggests this.
(5) A,Adams, Ml Dlenste des Kreuzes, (St, Ottilien, I8 9 9 ), 
p.122 praises him; other German writers said much the 
same •
One possible issue in the succession struggle 
was the conflict over the legitimacy of 'brother1 
over 'son1. It is not certain, however, how important 
the issue was in 1889« According to two references, it 
seems to have been important. Spiss wrote in 1904 that 
Mlamilo became nkosi because 'customary right' was for 
the next eldest broMier to succeed,(1) while Prince, 
who was much more involved in^ fche same issue went so 
far as to say that Mlamilo was the next entitled because 
that branch of the Ngoni accept succession by brother.(2) 
Neither author provides furhter information on the sources 
of their information or on the possibility of of their 
having been conflict over this. What is most interesting 
about the laws of succession stated by these authors is 
that the Njelu Ngoni could have so fully adopted a 
variation on their kinsmens' succession principles 
within so short a while after separate settlement.
Yet how accurate and correct were Prince and Spiss 
when accepting that the 'brother' was more eligible than 
the 'son'? It is possible that both were told the 
brother was the more eligible because he was the one, 
in fact, who succeeded and in the turmoil which followed 
establishing this principle of 'brother' before 'son' may 
have been an important way of justifying their retention 
of power. Doubts are supported by the fact that Zamchaya 
could present such a formidable application though being 
quite young, inexperienced and only resident among the
(1) C.Spiss, "Kingoni und Kisutu", MSOS, 1904, p.3.
(2 ) Prince, op cit, 217-8.
1^3
Njelu Ngoni for a few years. It seems highly likely 
that his bid was a strong one because of his blood: 
he was the son of Zulu's eldest son. The brothers of 
the eldest son - I-Iawai and Mharule - could possibly 
be seen as Regents who guided the kingdom for an 
unusually long time had Zamchaya been given the nkosi- 
shlp.
Two issues must be seen as having been equally 
important to, if not more important than, that of 
'brother' versus 'son*. 3Sh&>first is that of legitimacy. 
Theoretically, Zamchaya was the most eligible heir in 
the main line established by Zulu through his wife, 
Nyassere. Prince noted that this was in Zamchaya*s 
favour.(1) However, in fact, the qualifications for 
eligibility had changed. It appears that the branch 
of Zulu's family which remained on the east side of 
Lake Nyasa when the others fled and which then assumed 
the leadership, felt that Gwaserapasi group, by fleeing, 
had relinquished its right to the nkosiship as regards 
both Gwaserapasi and his successors. It seems reasonable 
to expect the branch which remained east of Lake Nyasa 
and which built up Njelu to wish to retian control over 
the kingdom. The second issue is that of suitability.
Here neither had perfect qualifications, Mlamilo was a 
sickly man who would be unable to rule well, while 
Zamchaya was young, apparently only twenty-two years old, 
inexperienced, troublesome in assemblies and indeoorous,(2 )
(1) Prince, op cit, p.218.
(2) Ibid.
It is not clear how much emphasis can be placed on 
suitability. According to Kuper, who studied the 
Swazi - from whom the Njelu claim their origins - 
nin systems governed by the hereditary principle, 
character is a subordinate factor”.(1) However, Read, 
who studied another migrant society preferred the 
opposite and held that suitability liras afvery important 
issue.(2) Because it was an issue stressed to Prince, 
it seems to have been somewhat important in the I889 
succession.
In the end,the council selected Mlamilo to be 
nkosi. Zamchaya reacted bitterly to his failure. He 
and his supporters refused to acknowledge the suzerainty 
to Mlamilo. Instead, he appears to have made himself an 
nkosi, and established his capital at Mbinga-Litenga.(3) 
Zamchaya did not go to war to gain the throne, possibly 
because his faction, comprising only recent arrivals in 
the district, were not as strong as the Mlamilo faction. 
Nor did he lead his group away from Njelu in fission, 
possibly because he hoped to eventually gain the kingdom 
by staying within it.
The succession crisis, besides creating two mankosi 
within the Njelu kingdom, also helped to increase the 
independence of the military manduna. If the hereditary 
rulers could not agree among themselves about who was to 
rule, then the military leaders could do much as they
(1) H.Kuper, An African Aristocracy. (London, 19^7), OUP, 
P.1 0 3 .
(2) M.Read, The Ngoni of Nyasaland, (London, 1970), 2nd.ed 
Cass, p ■,
( 3) Ebner, Revised History, P.7&; Leader, "Reise”, p.102 
ref erreH“”Fo Zainchaya as" Mharule's successor; Fdlleborn 
op cit, 13^ 137 said he did as he liked.
pleased. Prince indicated this in 1894 when stating 
that it was because of internal dissension that nduna 
Songea began dropping his title nduna and opting for 
signs of independent leadership.(1) Spiss agreed 
with the same in 1904, when writing that the internal 
dissension in Njelu gave opportunities for *sutu leaders1 
(sic) such as Songea and Mpambalioto to gain sufficient 
prosperity and authority for them to threaten to surpass 
their captors in power.(2) Gulliver is not correct when 
stating that the nkosi and royal family sought to keep 
power from the military manduna - they gave it to them 
through their inability to resolve family differences,(3 )
The troubles brought by the I889 succession issue 
in Njelu were exacerbated in 189-4 when Mlamilo sought 
to resign his nkosiship. Little information was found 
on the reasons for this. It seems that poor health was 
one. Those who lid supported him then apparently now 
gavejtheir support to Chabruma, the son of Hawai (nkosi 
from around 1864 until 1874).(4) Zamchaya opposed him 
again. However, the candidates and their supporters
were unable to reach any compromise and so Mharule
©
decided to retain the nkosiship. Filil^born stated, £#.0m his 
1897 visit, that he had not been earnest in his abdication.(5) 
Mlamilo was nkosi in 1897 when Lt.Engelhardt entered Njelu.(6 )
(1) Prince, op cit, p.218.
(2) Spiss, op cit, p.3.
(3) Gulliver, UA History11, pp.24-5; see Chapter Two,pp.107-9.
(4) Prince, op cit, p.2 1 7 . He states Chabruma was eligible.
(j5) Ftflleborn, op cit, p. 137.
(6 ) See beloxir, pp. iSD-,
i, pn ii'jij'Wfrgp* ■ ,,,
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The continuous crisis of leadership in Njelu had 
its effects. The group led by Zamchaya now considered 
itself independent of Mlamilo. Secondly, various 
manduna now began acting very much on their own. For 
example, Songea, by 1897» was beholding to no one(l), 
while Mpambalioto was acting as an independent leader 
as well(2). Military life was highly segmented and 
the kingdom lacked overall policies and general direction 
throughout the important decade of the 1890s, Dissension 
and internal independence then, were the components of 
Njelu political liSejin 1894 when Prince described political 
life as being one of anarchy.(3) His statement was an 
exaggeration. The people were still obedient to their 
leaders and the leaders could, if the situation demanded, 
co-operate with each other,(4) Still, it was indicative 
of a complex political life.
Much less is known about the military and 
administrative history of the Mshope kingdom from 
around 1883 until 1897 than can be ascertained about 
Njelu. There are at least three reasons for this. First, 
Mshope was more isolated than Njelu so few Europeans 
visited it during the 1 8 8 0s and 1 8 9 0s, hence leaving 
much less data fpom which a history can be reconstructed. 
Secondly, Mshope was smaller than Njelu in siz^fand 
population, factors which seism to have facilitated a
wmrriim nmr—nrw11 ■ ■ h hmhitm wir—itj h mua—wmMPWfcmwixi'j
(1) Prince, op cit, p.2 1 9 .
(2) Ebner, History, p.131•
(3) Prince, op cit, pp.217-20; Adams, Dienste, p.120; 
for comments on the improbability of fission, see 
Kuper, op cit, pp.110-1.
(4) As they were to when the Germans entered in I8 9 7, 
for which see below, section IV.
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a simpler style of political life thanjthat which 
existed in Njelu during these years. Finally, as 
far as we know, Mshope experienced little trouble 
during these years. The difficult and damaging 
succession crisis of 18?8-1883 had resolved
considerable tension within the kingdom. Any tension 
that remained appears to have been carefully controlled 
by Chabruma.
Despite lack of data however, it is possible to
discern a general pattern of military and administrative
development in Mshope during these years. This pattern
is the continuance!’ of a strongly centralist state, a
very different pattern from the on© dominant in Njelu
during the same period. There are various reasons for
this pattern. First, there was no succession crisis
during these years to upset the balance which had been
established by Chabruma when he expelled Mpepp and fought
s
and defeated Palangu in the crisis which lasted from 1878 
until the mid-l880s. Secondly, nkosi Chabruma successfully 
managed to pursue a polio)' of political centralism. He 
wanted to avoid any further rivalries in the royal 
family and to keep the state prepared for fresh hostilities 
with the Hehe. Both could be done by keeping a firm 
control over Mshope. This he did because he was intelligent, 
determined, and^ f ear some enough - his nickname was ‘the 
Thunderer1(1) - to control his people and prevent anyone 
from opposing him.(2) Finally, a tendency towards
(1) A.M.Nest in the Songea Annual Report 1922, TNA/1733/22.
(2) He was to show how well he could control opposition in 
the Maji Maji rebellion, see below Chapter Five, sec,IV.
mpolitical centralism seems to have already existed 
within the society. Chipeta seems to have ruled his 
people with a tight rein and, presumably, his son saw 
the advantage of doing the same himself•
The fact of centralized rule was shown in the 
direction and organization of the military as well as 
in the allocation of powers in the administration. The 
direction of military life seems to have been very much 
Chabx'uma's perrogative. Though the^evi&ence for this is 
sparse, it appears that Chabruma planned and directed 
the execution of most campaigns. An indication of this 
is given by an Ndendeule tradition which describes how 
some 'sutu1 in eastern Mshope participated in six 
campaigns against the Ngindo, in each of which they 
were led by a different general(l), presumably appointed 
by the nkosi. Only two Mshope manduna are known to have 
conducted independent military campaigns. But these two, 
Palangu and Sakamaganga, were exceptional anyway. Palangu 
appears to have been in a special position after the 
resolution of the succession dispute, while Sakamaganga 
was a Bena ally, not an Ngoni subject, of Chabrumafs.
Yet even in the case of these two, it was Chabruma who 
was often considered the mastermind behind their actions. 
For example, in 189^ when the Mshope raided Kilwa, an 
action credited by traditions to Palangu(2), it was
(1) TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.B,
(2) lhlilleborn, p. 136; DKB, v.V, n.ll, 1.5.189^.
Chabruma who was blamed and had to suffer the
consequences.(1) Again, in the late 1890s, when
Sakamaganga attacked Kiwanga, who was, by then,
(2 )
allied with the G-ermans , Chabruma again received 
some criticism. Chabruma!s success in keeping all 
his subjects under his control was to be shown most 
forcefully in the Maji Maji rebellion of 1905#
The organization of the army was similar to that 
in Njelu. There were both age regiments and area 
units. But here, age regiments seem to have remained 
proportinately stronger than in Njelu. A list of 
Mshope age regiments, given by Chabruma?s grandson(3), 
is larger than a comparable one which emphasises Njelu(^). 
Again, it is known that new regiments were formed as late 
as 1905 in Mshope(5), while the same is not confirmed for 
Njelu. Finally, as Mshope was more oentralized than 
Hjelu, it would seem logical that its rulers placed 
greater emphasis on age regiments where control remained 
at the capital than on area units where it was dissipated. 
A second organizational distinction between Njelu and 
Mshope seems to have been with regard to the ties between 
area units and the nkosi. In Njelu, the nkosi Aherns to 
have had very little control over area units. However, 
in Mshope, according to the above|noted KTdendeule tradition, 
his influence seems to have been considerable if he was 
able to order different manduna to lead the same group in 
various campaigns•
(1) See below, section IV.
(2 ) M .Hartmann, Missbl., 189 8 , n.2, p.28.
(3) See above, Chapter Two, p. 3 99,
(U-) Ibid.
(5) A.H.Pike to Redmond, interviews 13#9#1971* 2 2 .9 ,1 9 7 1.
The numbers of military settlements in Mshope are 
not known precisely. This is due to the limited data 
presently available on the kingdom. A German missionary,
M.Hartmann, passing through the kingdom in I8 9 7 , noted 
only one large complex. He wrote that for three hours 
before reaching Chabrumafs capital of Usangila, he passed 
1 ,5 0 0  huts, while in the capital itself there were some 
four hundred.(l) Because he travelled north to south, he 
could not have seen the Ndendeule and Ngindo satellite 
villages in the east and the Bena and Pangwa ones in 
the west. Settlements in these two regions outside 
the capital appear to have been governed by the appointees 
of the nkosi. with the exception of Palangufs. No royal 
family or military nduna, besides Palangu, .is remembered 
as having been the effective leader of either area.
Palangu was credited with leadership of an area. Adams 
went so far as to identify he and Chabruma as rulers of 
the northern kingdom,(2) Various leaders who are 
identified in traditions, particularly that of the 
Ndendeule collected in the 1 93 0s, appear to have all 
been local Ndendeule nolhbles under Chabruma *s control. (3) 
The absence of military settlements in Mshope provides 
a considerable contrast with the ever increasing numbers 
of those in Njelu during the same period.
Renowned military manduna in Mshope, such as Chilembo, 
appear to have lived at or near the capital and to have
(1) M.Hartmann, Missbl., I8 9 8 , n.2 , p.2 9 ; Ebner, Revised 
History, pp.82-3*.
(2) Adams, DiensVe, p.123.
(3) TNA/1557SBB7 v . 2 ,  p.B. names at least five; see 
copy at RH, s.5 8 5 .
handled military units at the direction of the nkosi 
rather than having their own units and living 
independently, (1) This seems not to have been because 
they were of lower calibre than men like Songea or 
Putire. Rather they appear to have lacked the time, 
freedom of action and areas of expansion needed to 
enable them to emerge as successful independent leaders.
(General administrative structures appear to have 
been the same in Mshope as they were in Ujelu, though 
the powers held by the different rungs of administration 
and by individuals within these appear to have been 
different. The immediate advisers of the nkosi were the 
same here as in Njelu. There was a religious leader, whose 
name was King’anda, who "guided the people and gave them 
the necessary confidence when they undertook major wars".(2 ) 
nduna ya nkosi, whose name was not learned, presumably 
handled many of the everyday matters of administration. 
Finally, an advisory council,comprising the nkosi *s 
relatives and senior military manduna, assisted the 
nkosi in the making of decisions. Very little information 
was obtained on its deliberations and it is not known 
how oftdn it met or how important it was. If Gulliver 
is correct in stating that Chabruma wished to increase 
the power of his military manduna in relation to that of 
the royal family(3), then Chabruma may have preferred 
seeking advice from only a part of the council, that is, 
the military men, or made limited use of it. One action
(1) Gulliver, "A History", p.2^; TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.B.
(2) O.B.Mapunda and G.P.Mpangara, The Maji Maji War in
a . HWMNtwi ni'iuti.i m.iwan iHTnmnmiw iwn—n
Ungonx, (Bar es Salaam, 19 6 9 ), EAPH,p,10.
(3) Gulliver, "A History", 13.25*
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suggests this. In 189^» Chabruma established.
favourable contact with the Germans only to have this
disrupted by Palangu. As such contact could not have
been made without the advice or support of senior
leaders in Mshope, it appears that Chabruma was
selective in seeking advice and omitted his brother 
(1 )Palangu for one. However, a later action, that of 
the decision-making building up to the Maji Maji 
rebellion, involved members/of the royal family.
To administer the various parts of his kingdom,
Chabruma appears to have made no use of the administrative 
manduna, other than possibly the compromised one withiiiiiiiiw r fn m iiiiim in iiiiiii i i '
Palangu. No reference to any other was found. However, 
he does seem to have used alumuzana. It appears that 
these men were often local leaders who were made responsible 
to the nkosi. This seems to have been the case in north­
east Mshope. The fact that an nkosi would be more removed 
than an nduna, seem to have allowed the alumuzana to 
acquire greater power in Mshope than their counterparts 
did in Njelu. This powes? -seems to have increased
in the 1 8 9 0s in the north-east as the 1 sutu* moved 
further east and the nkosi remained in the central 
region.(2) When the Germans took over in I 8 9 8, they 
considered the peoples in north-east Mshope to be 
independent of the rest of Mshope because it was so 
cut off from it.
(1) This is discussed further below, pp. 174-5.
(2) According to Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, 
p.13, Chabruma planned to move east to Mbunga Hill 
as his people were doing, but a full brother died in 
the process of removal. He tobk this as a bad augury, 
so returned to Nanungu River, then Magingo.
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The informal network of 'houses 1 was used in the 
administration. It is not known exactly what the role 
of the women in it were, as there were no powerful 
manduna to be watched. They may well have been 
authorities in their own right. An Ndendeule tradition 
which noted that the 'sutu1 in at least one area were 
responsible to a female member of Chabruma1s household(1) 
suggests this. Moreover, in 1898, when the Germans 
arrived, two female representatives - Mhomakilo and 
Namabengo - were identified as leaders of sections and 
indeed, recognized hy the Germans as such.(2) Thus, 
it is possible, though irregular in terms of traditional 
Ngoni structures, that Chabruma used his 'houses1 as 
an important part of his administration.
The end result of the different policies pursued 
in the evolving of political life in the two kingdoms 
was the formation of two quite different states by 
1897* Thus, Mshope was united, while Njelu was on the 
verge of splitting, though Njelu was expanding faster and 
over a much t/ider area than Mshope. The people in Mshope 
were identified with the nkosi and his policies, rather 
than with a kingdom, as was the case in Njelu.
There appears to have been little contact between 
the two kingdoms during these years. The Njelu kingdom 
moved s teadilyyfeouthwards, while Mshope pushed ^Little 
towards the east. The land between the two kingdoms 
was virtually uninhabited. There appear to have been
(1) TNA/1 5 5/DBB, v.2, p.B, the Ndendeule of Mabukusera's 
and Hangahanga's were of the house of Nakiwa binti 
Makolewa.
(2) MMR/6/68/^/3/10, I.N.Pusi and H.Ndunya say this liras 
done because the Ngoni did not wish to introduce a 
male leader to the Germans.
k€§
few political contacts. Each kingdom conducted 
its own military campaigns and followed its distinctive 
administrative policies. Some economic contacts are 
known to have existed. According to Prince, these 
were not of a friendly nature. He stated that some 
ivory was stolen in disputed land between the two 
kingdoms and that ill-feeling which resulted from 
it seemed likely to lead to a war between the two 
powers.(1) It did not, however, and in 1897 both 
kingdoms were still on good terms, though isolated, 
with each other. The intensive contaot with the 
Germans seemed, by that time, to be initiating some 
change. Adams, for one, noted in 1898 that there were 
new settlements springing up between the two kingdoms 
as efforts were being made to improve contacts.(2 )
The societies over whioh the royal families and their 
associated were evolving more complex and
distinctive political structures continued to
expand and change during these years• More and more 
captives joined an inoreasongly varied 'sutu* population 
which gradually adopted differing attitudes towards 
its leadership. We now turn to a study of )this 
emergence•
III
The varying ways of integrating captives which 
the Ngoni had followed before I8 7 8, continued to be the 
basis for state-building after that date. Only now,
(1) Prince, op cit.218.
the ways had more complex effects as the numbers being 
integrated became ever larger* Many neighbouring peoples 
agreed to pay tribute. Their numbers included the Matengo, 
the lyasa, the Yao(1), the Mkkua, the Bena and the Pangwa. When 
a community submitted, its members were sometimes relocated for 
the convenience of the Ngoni. Por instance, when the Yao chief, 
Chiteji, submitted, a number of his people were moved to a new/ 
area with better soil, called Pamanda.(2) Johnson, who passed 
a few of these relocated;villages in 1882 commented: "we, came to 
small villages of, subject peoples that had been established as if 
by miniature Babylonian conquerors, here a Gindo village, there a 
Yao village, peopled/by natives from these tribes."(3) Usually 
communities which submitted sent hostages to Ungoni as a guarantee 
6f submission.) Thus, when some given to nduna Songea escaped,
Songea considered submission ended and prepared to attack that town.(5) 
Villages in submission were ruled- either by an Ngoni-appointed 
foreigner or by a local chief who was trained by the Ngoni for the 
position. An example; of a. chief trained by the Ngoni was the JNfyasa 
leader, Mpoma. He had been brought to, Ungoni when young and was 
brought up as an Ngoni. He learned to speak fluent Chingoni, to 
sing Zulu songs and to dress and arm like the Ngoni.(6) When 
he reached adulthood, the Ngoni sent him back to his region,
(1) Mast are noted above in section I; for Yao, see also C.A.Smythies,
A Journey from Nhtope on the Upper Shire to Newala &n the Ifcviama, 
Tzanzibar ,“T 8'&57I
(2) Smythies, A Journey from Zanzibar, ,p.15«
(3) W.P.Johnson, Jy African Jteminiscnnces, 1875-1895, (london, 1924), p.94
(4) W.P,dohnson, OA, v*TUn.573TiWrp774.
(5) USPG, A1.V, Box B, Smythies report of visit to Songea’s, n.d., 
(app*7»l886); Porter,: Memorials, p*80.
(6) Prince, op cit, p.220; lieder, "Beise", p.98, on Nyasa imitative 
behavior.
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Luhagare as an Ngoni representative, A second example
of an Ngoni representative was noted among tlie Donde
of southern Njelu by the UMCA missionary, Smythies:
"in such cases <£of subject incorporation into the Ngoni 
kingdom) one sees a stout, well-to-do man, evidently living 
on the fat of the land, dressed like a Magwangwara, who 
struts about and gives himself airs, but he is usually 
a Mdonde, or one of some other subject tribe who has been 
trained by them. " (1 )
The Ngoni-appointed administrators appear to have been 
quite impressive men at times. For example, the Nyasa 
captive, Komawantu, was frequently praised by Johnson 
for his astuteness, fairness and intelligence.(2 )
The people in tribute settlements were required to 
supply the Ngoni with various tribute-goods, Usually 
the goods demanded were those available from local 
resources, For example, the Makua were required to 
give a portion of the salt they processed,(3) The UMCA 
missionaries, who had access to European goods, were 
required to give cloth. The Yao chief, Matola, had to 
give goats, cloth and other goods.(4) Many villages 
around Ungoni gave food. Two examples have been noted 
above• A third was noted by a UMCA missionary in 
south-west Njelui
"When we stopped at midday ffoeyond the Mkulamazi 
River) we found one of Sonjela*s (Songea fs]} headmen, 
whom we had seen with him, collecting food from the 
people, principally mshanga, a grain grown here very 
largely, from which they make pombe, a great deal of 
which is consumed at Sonjela*s."(5)
(1) USPG, A 1 .V, Box.B, Smythies, A Journey from 
Zanzibar, p«l6 .
(2) See below, p.^e. Johnson, Nyasa, pp. 111-2.
(3) Lieder, "Reise", p.118; Porter, Memorials, pp.44,128.
(4) Farler, CA, v.XIV, n.l6l, 1 8 9 6, p.83.
(5) C.A.Smythies, A Journey from Zanzibar to Lake Nyasa 
in the year 1887, (Zanzibar, n.dVTi”-UMCA, p.25; Ebner, 
in his History and Revised History has underemphasi&ed 
the number and importance of these satellite villages. 
There were many and they were important. Komba, op cit, 
p . 6 called this system of tribute settlements "indirect 
Rule '.
.I**!
The food was. carried by porters who went along with the 
Ngoni or otherwise by the villagers themselves. The amount 
of food taken appears to have been considerable, at least if ,y 
the comment by a 'true Ngoni’ to Johnson was accurate: "We, like- 
you (missitmariesl. do not cultivate the ground but ’take’ the 
food from other people”,(1)
The many people who gave tribute were under varying degrees 
of subjugation. At one end were those such as the Nyasa who meekly 
followed/Ngoni authority and adopted many of their customs. At the 
other end were groups such as the Yao under Matola who asserted 
their independence at times and maintained uncertain relations with 
the Ngoni, For example, on one occasion Matola moved his town to a 
new location then built an internal water supply and even considered 
buying a camion to protect himself, only to merit the comment from 
nduna Songea: ’’Very well.then, if Matola thinks he can fight me, I’ll 
certainly give him the opportunity”.(2)
In return for!receiving tribute, the Ngoni protected their 
subjects and ceased their raids upon them. For instance, Inl891, 
they assisted the Makua of Meto who were beigg troubled by the 
Nindi(Mazitu). (3) Again, in 1893? they attacked some Yao and 
Swahili traders who were ransacking the Masasi area for food. A 
UMCA missionary who visited the battleground wrote: ”We saw a 
terrible sight. Some (Yao and Swahili) were groaning and dying, some were 
crying with pain caused by the bullets and spears of the, Angoni from 
Songea who had come to the aid of the people from Masasi”.(4)
(1) W.P.Johnson, Nyasa: The Great Water, (Oxford; 1922). p.18.
(2) C.Maples, CA, v.VI, 3.1B89, p.36; CA, v.IV,n.^8^12.T886,p.l8o.
(3) Smythies, CA, v.IX, 1891, p.132.
Kilekwa, Slave Boy to Priest, (London, 1937), p,30.
. : ibo
Although the Ngoni were willing to accept a tribute-
offering status from various peoples while allowing them
to remain in their homelands, they usually preferred to bring
those they subjugated back to Ungoni with them to increase
their numbers and enhance their powers. Accordingly, large
numbers were brought baok.(l) pie constant increase in the
population led to changes in the methods of integrating them.
These changes were the effect of the ever diminishing percentage
v of 'true Ngoni' in relation to the 'sutu'. Some captives
continued to be integrated into Ngoni communities and became very
Ngoni in life and outlook. Johnson knew one well:
"Komawantu was carried off with the other captives (from Msumba 
along the lakeshorej... He was taken to:Songela's village and 
there trained as a warrior. He tells of how he was drilled and 
taught to despise and mock at any man who ran away or had wounds 
behind. ,'If you, can see men, they can be smitten' was a maxim 
he learned...Komawantu rose in life and became a man of some 
position. He was employed as a warrior up north and was 
wounded in the stomach; 'but I killed two of their men', he adds, 
later on" he was Sent to collect the small tribute from the lake 
villages of Chisanga and the neighbourhood, from which he had 
himself come."(2)
Yet increasingly, the 'sutu* came to live by themselves in satellite 
villages, only visited by the Ngoni when tribute of one sort or 
another was demanded. One such village was Amakita's in south-west 
Njelu. In 189 ,^ it was estimated to contain over 1,000 huts.(3) In 
these villages, many 'sutu$ found it possible to retain their., 
identity for the most part, while still fulfilling the 
role of 'sutu'. One group which maintained its identity 
was the Ndendeule of north-east Mshope. The Germans
(1) It is difficult to know exactly how big the Ngoni population was 
in 1897. German statistics around the turn of the century appear to
be unreliable. A 190*f estimate, noted: in FUllebom, op eit, and Kbner, 
History, pp.136-7, stated that there were 3^,000 Ngoni that year. 
However, other estimates are higher. One source stated that there 
were some 50,0000in jfehope alone, while another gave the district 
population (of which Ungoni was one-third to one-half) as 175,000 to 
200,000. It is unlikely that the population of Ungoni was less than 
**0,000 by 1897 and it could well have been a half again.
(2) Johnson, Nyasa, p.111-2. (3) XdedBr, "Beise", p.99. , V
considered them sufficiently independent in 189? to 
merit separate recognition.(1) Prince doubted the 
'Ngoniness1 of some of these 'sutu* and commented on the 
dubitable transformation made by "putting a lion * s skin 
on a hyena". (2)
The life of the ’sutuT in Ungoni varied according 
to how closely integrated they were. For example, some 
’sutu * boys watched cattle and goats and trained to 
fight while others did little. Some men trained to be 
warriors, while others merely offered their labour as 
porters or farmhands when needed. Some women married 
'true Ngoni' or well-assiminalted 'sutu1 and lived in 
their households, while others married somewhat independent 
'sutu' and only provided occasional work to their masters,(3) 
In many ways, the life of the 'sutu' compared 
favourably with that of the 'true Ngoni '. These ways - 
the sharing of a culture and way of life and many of the
benefits which went with it - have been mentioned above in
Chapter Two and heed not foe reiterated.
Yet the disparity between 'sutu' and 'true Ngoni' 
probably became more accentuated during these years as 
the kingdoms grew in size and wealth, and as new contacts, 
such as that with coastal peoples, brought new opportunities. 
For example, the distinction in economic status seems to 
have been accentuated as new goods entered the society.
The 'sutu* were not allowed to wear certain types of beads,
■wri'Tn*w*ri<mirirTiTrf-iiflnririyrifrwtrir~n,iTB-ni-icrrwi.it m*' ini.mrnini—*mirfnimmnwin n wi—rmiwnmr-Trwi  ..  >i n—im-ntm utr li IiiTi inimt-nri in mi 1—nrui"! n frm r~r r mu rwirnitiji.Hi..i._LiiMi.i).Lj|iMii
(1) See below, Chapter Four, section I.
(2) Prince, op cit, p.220.
(3) Some of these duties are described in the Ndendeule 
history, TNA/I55/SDB, v.2, p.B.
t m
fin© feathers and skins, cloth of certain colours, or 
materials from certain animals• Those who did could be 
accused of boasting and *living above their status’ and 
be killed,(1) Again, when trade with coastal peoples 
expanded, it was apparently the ’true Ngoni’ who had 
the best possibilities for trade. They seem to have had 
a monopoly on the trade in ivory, while that is slaves 
could not damage them though it could those ’sutu* who 
were sold,(2) In social life, as numbers of ’sutu* in 
the societies increased and contact between them and the 
leaders lessened, alienation seems to have increased.
This was expressed in various ways* from the resentment 
of a ’sutu’ girl who had to marry a ’true Ngoni* to the 
distaste held by ’sutu* of the sometimes abrupt behavior 
of their ’true Ngoni* masters.(3)
It was probably the distinctions between the ’true
Ngoni* and the ’sutu’ that led European visitors to Ungoni
to portray the lives of subjects as poor and hard. For
example, the missionary Johannes H^fliger wrote in 1901:
MThe lot of the captured slave was rather hard. First of 
all, he had his ear pierced, or simply had an ear lobe 
cut off, that they C true Ngoni and leading 'sutu '} might 
know him to be a slave...In the plundering expeditions, 
they (slaves} had to carry the booty, to cook, above all, 
to be servants. In addition to this, theyjhad to do all 
the field work while the ¥angoni went celebratihg every 
other day.(4)
The ’sutu’ continued to have an impact on Ngoni life 
and culture. Aspects of the Ngoni economy underwent some
(1) Ebner to Redmond, interviews, 18-21,10.1971; Revised 
History, pp.83-4, 92~3 i J.Hafliger, "Land und Leute 
von Ungoni", Missbl., v.V, 1901, 14-7, 43-8.
(2) See below, the section on the slave trade, section IV,
(3) Ebner to Redmond, interviews 18-21,10.1971; Revised 
History, pp.83-4, 92-3
(4) Hcifliger, "Land", pp. 14-7, 43-8.
change because of the presence of the ‘sutu*. For 
example, the importance of the cattle economy appears 
to have declined as an ever-increasing percentage of 
the Ngoni population comprised peoples who knew little, 
if anything, about cattle. Social life continued changing.
The language of the immigrants continued to decline in 
use. Johnson was given the impression it was a minority 
language when commenting on the Ngoni reaction to two 
missionaries who spoke Zulu (Chingoni) to them: Cthey 
werej much edified...though they admitted that only two 
or three of them understood it; many more of them, however, 
recognized it as the lingo of their masters"(1 )• In addition 
to the ICisutu which emerged in its place, there emerged 
a T^iiety of local languages. For example, the missionary 
Maples found that nduna Songea had so many Yao adherents 
by the late 1 8 8 0s , that their language would be the most 
useful one for proselytism in his area.(2) The dress of 
the people changed in ways. For example, Johnson saw 
people wearing clay mouldings round the head when he 
visited in the 1 8 8 0s (3 )» though byftthe end of the century 
they seem not to have been worn any longer.
One final note on the integrating of captives into 
the two kingdoms. The more diffused political structure
(1) Johnson, Reminiscences, p •1^3.
(2) CA. v.VI,“n.63, 3.1888, p.37; Spiss in Missbl., 3.1899, 
p.81 comments on the many dialects spoken; 'for further 
information on language change see Spiss, Kingoni; for 
information on the languages, see Ebner, "Stammessprachen 
und Glaubensverkdndigung in der Di&zese Songea", in
F.Renner, Per Fflnfarmige Leuchter, (St.Ottilien, 1971), v.
(3) Johnson, Reminiscences. pT95» Porter,"Magwangwara", p.
227 mentioned Zulu hair rings.
in Njelu appears to have allowed a more thorough
integration than could the centralism in Mshope* This
though
is indicated by the fact that^there were never many more 
'true Ngoni1 in Njelu than thei'e were in Mshope, by 1900 
the former kingdom had a considerably larger portion of 
people that considered its&lf Ngoni than did Mshope.(1)
Two reasons for this can be^Ldentified. One has been 
mentioned earlier. Semi-independent manduna in NjeluwuwwWTiaiLMi Bmmww v
foand it more in their interest to build up loyal factions 
among the 'sutu1 than did the more closely controlled 
manduna in Mshope. Secondly, the Njelu Ngoni had more 
lands to raid than did Mshope and consequently contained 
peoples of more ethnic origins. This appears/to have 
facilitated integration. Where individuals of many ethnic 
origins lived together they tended to find a common identity 
as 'sutu'. Where on the other hand, people of ent ethnic 
origin lived together, it was probably that origin father 
than a new 'sutu* status that they would identify with.
The present day composition of Njelu kingdom and the 
distinction of the Ndendeule and Matengo areas, where 
one was diverse and the other homogeneous, shows this.
On the whole, the Ngoni kingdoms^! southern East 
Africa proved remarkably successful in integrating peoples 
and thereby sustaining their existence• (2) Yet there
(1) The distinctive identity of the large Ndendeule 
population in Mshope has been a major reason for this.
(2) The feat is all the more impressive when one considers 
the variety of peoples integrated. The General African 
Census, 1957» Tribal Analysis, Fart 1, lists twenty- 
five tribal groups with more than one hundred members 
in Songea district. These include such groups as the 
Sulcuma and Pirabwe.
were some people who could not- be integrated, either because -■ 
they, had no wish to. be !Ngoni', or because- they themselves 
wished to dominate* With these peoples, the Ngoni had to reach 
some compromise* As has been shown, they reached a compromise 
with the Hehe in. the early l880s. iNow they were to reach one- 
with two now groups, the coastal traders, and the. European .. 
missionaries* But-a third group, the European military powerj 
was to force the Ngoni to compromise then to bring a radical change 
to the political structure of Ngoni society*
Prince was told in 189/f that the Ngoni made their first 
contact,; with. the Arabs in 1878,. when the former met the latter 
. hunting elephants south of the,Ruvuma.(l) As this was-at the 
time of the first Hebei war; after which the Ngoni moved 
southwards^ away from the Hhhe, the date is-a likely one.* No 
contact between the Ngoni ahd Arabs: or other coastal peoples is 
known before this date and as the Ngoni stayed in the west and 
were unfriendly to outsiders, contact seems to have,been unlikely*
iReiations with coastal peoples developed in a- piecemeal 
manner after 1878* 3he Njelu iNgoni were highlyrrecepb'ivey 'In 
1882, nduna Songea was carrying. on; involyedv.’trade- with the coast (2) 
while in later years* European visitors .noticed Arabs and Swahilis 
in most parts of Njelu* 0) Why Njelu was. receptive is hot clearly 
known. The economic advantages of trade is the,most obvious and. 
probably most likely reason. The "internal political situation may
(1) Prinpe , op cit , .p*217v a del ailed study of coastal trade w.rh 
Ungohi, '1878-1897 has been done by the author and is available 
as an unpublished paper*
may have been a second reason. Njelu manduna tended to act 
somewhat: independently and it is possible that once a few, : 
such as :Songea, established a profitable contact with coasfal. 
traders, others saw it to their advantage;-to do likewise for •
political and .economic reasons. During the *1880s, nkosi Mbarule ;
abolflhed TWe tariff- on incoming caravans.(1) In 1889, the first 
coastal settlement was established in Njelu, this at Mangua by. 
the Arab, Rashid bin ffesoud* A few years later, he built a second 
at Kikole. Then Litunu, a Swahili trader, established one at 
Mitomondo* A fourth, was set up at Ruanda by; the Mttgafca1' RLverV(2)'.'- T/'l 
While Njelu ,was establishing extensive contacts with the 
coastal traders, Mshope was being more reticent. It was more 
isolated than Njelu so established contact somewhat later than the 
latter. Furthermore, under the more centralized political structure 
in Mshope, nkosi Chabruma appears to have been able to control 
contact to his benefit. This is suggested-by the fact that his 
main political rival, nduna Palangu- attacked, a caravan in '1891,' an 
indication of his lack of direct, beneficial contact with the coast..(3) 
No settlements were established in Mshope by coastal peoples.
The coastal peoples had various effects on Ngoni society# 
Politically, they came to play :a role dLri the sectarian political 
life of Njelu, a role made more complex by divisions among the
(2) p.1.6^  Porter, "Magwahgwara"; W.C.Porter: Biography, anon., (London, 
n.d.), p.15*
(3) p.164- eg. USPG, A1.VT, misc.letters, 1299-1^23, G.H.Swinny to 
Penney, 27.9.1886. y  - - ,
(1) Fttlleborn, op city p.136; Ebner, History, p.15^: Prince. 00 cib. : 
pp.217, 220. :  ’
(2) Ebner, History, pp.120f 13^-5.
(3 ) TNA/155/iSDB, v. 2, p • 12h, Palangu * s life as. to Id by Naso rp • ■
the newcomers themselves. Rashid, the1 most influential
of all the coast people in Ungoni,.was an Arab-and a member of tli#
' Shia' sect while Litunuhis majof rival, was a Swahili and ; 
a member of the 'Sunni' sect.(1) Rashid appears to have become 
friendly with nduna Songea(2), an action which may have cost \ 
him his close ties with Mharule, who allied with Litunu. Rashid; 
also became friendly with Mlamilo, while litunu became a close®* 
ally of the Zamchaya faction. The Rashid/Litunu conflict may 
have reflected a conflict between Mharule and Songea. It certainly 
did reflect the conflict which was®to emerge in the late 1890s? -
between Mlamilo's group and Zamchaya's people. In. the 1889 
succession, Rashid came out strongly in support of Mlamilo, 
possibly for economic reasons. His persuasive character and 
economic power wnre to convince visiting Europeans that Mlarailo's 
rival, Zamchaya was unsuitable for. the nkosiship. Zamchaya himself5 
retaliated by leading an anti-Arab campaign in Njelu during the 
1890s, (3) This appears to haver,had little effect. In l89*f,
Rashid's mediation in-support of Mlamilo was to convince d visiting 
German army that Mlamilo was the legitimate* nkosi of Njelu.- Rashid1' 
himself was honoured with the status of Geman Consul in Ungoni.(4) 
Rashid's involvement in Njelu external politics during the 1890s 
was to foster very friendly contacts between the Ngoni and British 
missionaries and also,. of much greater importance, was to ’persuade 
the Njelu to be friendly with visiting German forces in 1894, 1895,
(1) Ebner to Redmond, interview 18.10.197.1.
^  W*Q»Forter; A Biography, n .15 .
(3) Prince, op cit. . .
W  FUlleborn, op cit, p. 136 states that Governor von Scheie appointed
Rashid akida^ or representative*
b • H£
and 1897(1) , a reaction which was to be to their ultimate
disadvantage#
In economic life, coastal peoples, introduced new means of 
economic livelihood through fostering the trade in slaves, ivory 
and rubber# Manifestations of these means included the emergence 
of an Ngoni trading group(2) and the reorientation of aspects of 
military policy, particularly raiding which became oriented towards 
slave-catching*(3) They changed economic values through the goods 
introduced into the society through,, apparently, fostering the 
replacement of cattle by goods such as cloth as a major indicator 
of economic1 wealth within society# These changes, moreover, had 
greater effect on some sectors of the society than on others. 
Specifically, they increased the distinctions between the 'true 
Ngoni' who controlled this economic life and the 'sutu', who 
participated in it in minor ways*
In intellectual and religious life, the coastal peoples made 
the Ngoni aware of an entirely new approach to life, one which 
was very complex, powerful and successful.
In all, the Arab and Swahili presence offered an instructive 
force for change in Ngoni society, one .which helped to prepare the 
way for,that to be brought by the Europeans,(4) It helped to 
prepare on the economic and cultural level what, the internal
(1) Mlamilo's contacts with the European missionaries are well 
noted in Johnson, Reminiscences; FUlleborn, op cit, p.130; 
Smythies, GA, v.IX, (189.1), p.132.
(2) USPG, A1.VI, misc.letters, II6O-I998, G.H.Swinny to Penney,
15*5*1886 notes one.case of entrepreneurship•
.(3) Gulliver, "A histoi#", p.2 ;^ FUlleborn, op cit, p.118.
(*f) FUlleborn, op cit, p.130.
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political situation was to•facilitate on the political 
level - the,takeover of Ungoni by the Germans.
V
The first contact between the Ngoni and Europeans in Bast 
Africa came only after the establishment of the station of the 
Universities Mission to Central Africa at Masasi in 1876. The 
first missionary to visit . Ungoni was W,P.Johnson who journeyed 
here in early 1882. His establishment of contact was soon 
followed by an attack on Masasi conducted by two of nduna Songea's 
lieutentants. The attack indicates that the Ngoni initially 
looked upon the missionaries as a military foe, whose strength 
they were determined to assess.(1) The easy defeat of the 
missionaries, described above, and their subsequent willingness 
to accept a tributary status marked them out as minor powers 
militarily.(2)
Still, missionaries had potential in other way^ jknd these made 
them worthwhile bontacts. first, the missioisries had some economic 
value. They were benefactors, in that. they could give goods, 
particularly salt and cloth to those with whom they were friendly* 
In addition, thy could be useful as traders. For example, Songea 
was willing to use the missionaries as middlemen between the Makua 
salt producers and himself(3) or, on another occasion, as brokers 
m  helping him to find a beautiful, white wife.(^ f) The Ngoni,
(1) Porter, Memorials, p.5k. *
(2) This was disillusioning to subject groups who hoped the 
missionaries could be allies, eg. J.C.Yarborough, The Diary
, 2l £ jfoafrjgg. jfan. in Central Africa. (London, n.d.)TT-93.
(3) Porter, Memorials, p.102; "Magwangwara", p.272.
(4) J&ples, Journals, p.1^5.
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according to Prince, had developed a trade with the 
UMJA missionaries by 189^ •0) Second, and more important, 
was the European's spiritual power. This the Ngoni could not 
afford to dismiss. They were aware of the strarvge power, right 
from the earliest contact of 1882, When Johnson visited Songea 
that spring he wrote that uthe usual way of speaking of me 
amongst the Gwangwara on this trip was as makoka, ie, some 
kind of spirit"(2). ’ Shortly afterwards, when attacking Masasi, 
the Ngoni stated they wished to be friends with the Europeans 
who, they said, could not be killed,(3), When the missionaries 
began expanding their areas of operation and entered upon the 
lands near Ungoni, a decision had to be made by the Ngoni on 
the way of dealing with this religious power. Influencing the 
Njelu and Mshope in coming to a decision was advice from Mbelwa's 
Ngoni west of the lake. The Mbelwa Ngoni had found their contacts 
with the Scottish missionaries working in their lands a destructive 
one because of medicine practiced against them, and they warned 
the Njelu and Mshope not to admit any missionaries. The Mshope 
had little difficulty in discarding missionaries as they were 
isolated and had no contact with the TM3A. They appear to have 
made no steps to, change this while the missionaries, for their part, 
appear to have been too concerned with the Njelu kingdom to think 
much of the one further north. In Njelu, the reaction to the 
missionaries was more complex, Nkosi Mharule appears to have 
wanted to avoid missionaries and for some years refused to allow
(1) Prince, op cit, p,219.
(2) Johnson, Berninisoences, P. 97.
(3) Porter, Memorials. p.24.
any to visit him. One missionary was told that he feared 
he xvould die if he saw the missionaries, (1) However, he .. 
gradually changed his mind and, in 1886, informed the 
missionary G.H.Swinny* that he had decided to no longer "hide 
himself from the eyes of the white men".(2) One reason for 
his change appears to have been political. Though he refused 
to see any before 1886, nduna Songea did not and, from 1882 
onwards, Johnson, Porter and Smythies visited him, Smythies 
believed that he could not see Mharule in his visit of 1886 
because Songea wished to monopolize any benefit resulting from 
contact(3), though another missionary was told by Chisoma, a Yao 
chief subject to the Ngoni that this was not true and that they 
were not rivals(*0. If Smythies were correct, Mharule may have 
decided rt was necessary for him to allow visits if lesser 
officials did. Secondly, he may- have allowed them in because 
he felt he could control them better by admitting them. In any 
case, the missionaries-had little impact. He authorized them to 
build a school in Ungoni but they were unable to find anyone to 
staff it and had to abandon such plans. (3) The Berliner 1 mission 
also tried to establish a station there, in 1893, but their attempt 
came to naught,(6) Though the Ngoni had been willing to accept 
missionaries in their land, they disapproved of contact between their 
subjects and the missionaries. As a result, mission efforts to
(1) Smythies, A Journey to Lake Nyasa, p.37.
(2) G.H.SwinnyT CA, v.V, n.33, 3.1887, p;73.
(3) USPG, A1.V, Box B, letters 170-3^8, report on visit to Songea's, 
n.d. (probably 7.1886) this view was also held by Maples, in
' S b  V*vl» n.63, 3*1888, and Johnson, in Campbell, op cit, p.67, 
W  USPG, A1.VI, Box 1, C.A.postscript, Charles Janson, 8.3.1886.
(3) USPG, A1*V, n.33.
(6) Chief Merer© of the Bena may have dissuaded the Ngoni, see 
Wright, op cit, pp.A6t7, 67-8 on Merere's attitudes.
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expand their influencethroughout the lakeshore"were 
severely restricted during the 1880s and 1890s by the 
fear subject a n d  tribute-paying peoples had of allowing 
a regular mission presence,(1)
While the religious, economic and military challenges 
offered by one type of European were not to; prove much of 
a threat to the Ngoni, those offered by a second type were to.
This type was the German colonial power and the first contact 
by the Ngoni with it was to be a military one which was to 
have considerable effect.
The very'earliest German, activity in East Africa affected 
the Ngoni, This activity was the annexation of the coast and 
the towns with whose inhabitants the Ngoni traded. However, 
though the coastal peoples rebelled against the German action, the 
Ngoni remained neutral(2), presumably because they considered 
their interests were not sufficiently affected to justify action. 
Soon however, more .involving contact followed. After defeating, 
the coastal peoples, the Germans began moving inland. Their 
presence attracted the interest of peoples.living in the lands 
which the Ngoni raided and by the early 1890s some were going to 
the Germans for militaay assistance. One such-one was the Ngindo 
leader, Mpinga from Barikiwa, to'the north-east of Mshope. He 
requested assistance and the Germans happily sent a garrison to 
his area and there built a fort and made him their akida,(3)
(1) G.H.Swinny, CA, v* IV, n.^6, 10.1886; USPG, A1.VI, Box 1 C.A. 
postscript Charles;danjon, entry 8.3.1886* .
(2) Their distant kinsmen, the-Mbunga, participated. ,5 ,
(3) M.Hartmann, mssbl., 1898, n.2, p.57l Adams^ p-jenste,: p.1^f.
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In the early 1890s, Yao and Makua living in the flfesasi area 
asked the Germans to mediate between.them and the Nindl 
(Mazitu), which they did.(1) Then, the Bena leader, Klwanga, 
living to the north of Mshope, went to Dar es Salaam and there 
concluded a defence agreement with the Germans,(2) - The contacts
beirn, made by various raided and tribute-paying peoples do not * 
appear to have seriously bothered the Ngoni. In 189 ,^ some 
Ngoni expressed some concern^about the German presence at the 
north end of Lake Nyasa though they told him that they considered 
the Germans trivial foes.(3) . They appear to have felt that as 
long as they remained neutral and did not bother the Germans, there 
was little to worry about.(4) This longing for neutrality, 
possibly tested at the time of the coastal rebellion Kad also bac-^  
tested when the Arabs went to war against the Scottish Lakes 
Company in 1887. The Arabs apparently asked for Ngoni assistance, 
only to have it refused. (3) A further test of neutrality came 
after. 1890 when the Hehe, who went to war against the Germans 
after abortive peace negotiations, asked the Ngoni to join them 
in expelling this new enemy. (6) . The Ngoni refused, presumably 
because they wished to remain neutral - possibly with Rashid's 
advice, but also because they could hot forget the legacy of 
fear and hatred which dominated their relations with the Hehe.(7) 
The Hehe-German wars were to have considerable cumulative effept 
on the Ngoni, both in controlling the Germansdesire to take Ungoni
(1) C.A.Smythies, CA, v.X, 1892, p.57,
(2) M.Hartmann, Missbl., 1898, n.2 , p.27.
(3) Prince, op cit, p.221.
(4) Ibid.
(3) W.P. Johnson, CA,. v.VI, n.67, 7.1888, p.95.
(6) W.Arning, "Lie Wahehe", J&dS, 1896, pp.233-46, 1897, pp.46-60; 
Ebner, History, p.105.
(7) Ebner, History, pp.105-6.
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and in  making the Ngoni^ hware o f the powers o f th is  new 
enemy. ^
While the Hehe were fighting the Germans, the Ngoni made 
their first peaceful overtures. In 1894, the Mshope nkosi,
Chabruma, sent a peace delegation to Kilwa to negotiate a treaty 
similar to the one which Kiwanga had arranged.(1) There appear 
to have been three reasons for this move.,. First, Chabruma must have been 
aware of the Hehe reverses and. possibly thought that it would be 
to his advantage to ally with the winning side. Secondly, he 
probably, knew of the benefits Kiwanga had gained from his treaty.
Finally, he had been recommended to negotiate by Lt.von Wissman, 
who headed the German post at Alt Langenburg.(2)
Chabruma apparently hoped to negotiate an agreement whereby . 
the Mshope Ngoni would retain their valuable raiding-grounds 
by the Rufiji while not bothering the Germans, (3) Had such 
an agreement been possible, Chabruma would have been In a good 
position. The Hehe enemy to the north, was weakened, and with 
an alliance formed with the only other power they might have to 
face, the military, political and economic power of the Ngoni 
of Mshope would be assured. However, the hopes for such an 
alliance were to prove futile from the beginning. For one 
thing, there is little likelihood that the Germans would have 
agreed to an alliance in which they were equals rather than -
(1) FUlleborn, op cit, p.138; DKB, 1893, p.452; 1894, p.110;
Ebner, History, p.153.'
(2) Ibid.; Ebner,- History, p.225.
(3) Prince, op cit, p.221-2.
superiors. But more immediately important, the Mshope . 
made a mistake. While the peace-delegation was in Kilwa, 
an Mshop.e plundering expedition attacked a number of villages 
in the hinterland of Kilwa, The expedition, according to 
some historians and traditions(1) was conducted by Palangu, 
unknown to Chabruma. This seems reasonable, as Chabruma hardly would 
have risked the loss of a desired treaty with the Germans by / 
annoying them with such an attack on their villages. Ghabruma, 
moreover, may have been conducting negotiations without Palangu*s 
knowledge. In any' case, the German governor, von Scheie, cared 
little about who led the raid. Convinced that he had been 
betrayed, he jailed the delegation, then rerouted a planned 
expedition against the Hehe through Ungoni, Ghabruma decided 
not to offer resistance to the. expedition. Von,Scheie entered . f 
his capital and conducted a military display to show the Ngoni 
what they could expect if they bothered the Germans again. He 
confiscated booty of cattle, then moved on,(2) He appears to 
have neither demanded the surrender of those who had conducted 
the expedition nor the submission of the Ngoni, probably because 
he feared pushing the Ngoni.into war, a development which would 
have seriously complicated German military plans, in much of their 
new colony.
(1) DKB, v.V, n.11, 1.5,189 .^ states that Mhoinalcilo conducted, the 
raid. Mhomakilo was Palangu*s military name; PHllebom, op cit, 
p. 138 agrees.; TM/155/SDB, v,2„ p,12*f, Palangu*s life as toid 
by Naeoro. also .agrees; Ebner, History. p.158. states;that 
Ghabruma permitted the raid.
v.V, n.,11, 1,3,189 ,^ p.227-8, !'Bericht fiber die. Expedition 
des Gouverneurs von Deutsch-Ostafrika in daasGebiet des Kufxji 
und manga, am l^assaoee und in das Hinterland von lindi"; . 
Ettlleborn, op ext, p.138; Prxnce,' op ext, pp,22^—2, ■
Chabruma's unsuccessful bid made him extremely wary 
of establishing any further contact with the Germans. His 
careful reaction to the expedition, for reasons not known, * 
had preserved his state and he determined to ensure his 
independence by controlling the military activities of his 
people and keeping away from-the expanding German presence.(1)
The lesson learned by the Mshope was slow to be. heeded 
in Njelu,. which next had its own adverse contact with the 
Germans. One rbason for this was the complex political 
situation. Because the-leadership was divided between two 
factions of/ the royal family, and.because various manduna 
acted (g.uite independently, it. was not possible to establish 
a common, policy towards the Germans, Rather different groups 
acted in their own ways.; The first manifestation of this-came 
shortly after the von Scheie expedition when a German-soldier,
It,Tom von Price asked(permission to visit Njelu. tdamilo was 
imwilling. to see the Gemians and refused him permission. This 
then led his rival, Zamchaya, to invite him, and in the spring 
of 189 ,^ Prince was in western Njelu,(2) Hewas a very perceptive 
ajad intelligent; man who soon analyzed many of the complexities 
of Njelu society. He concluded, in an interesting and informative 
study(3), that ..the kingdom was in a state of anarchy and very 
weak, and would be ripe.;,for takeover at any time. It is very 
likely that Prince,' s study paved the way for the ..annexation 
which was to follow. ■
(1) As shpwn below,- Chapter Pour, section II.
(2) Prince, op bit, p.212; Prince, Gegen Araber und V/ahehe, (Berlin, 
19.1*0 , p.266, he suggested that Zamchaya make a treaty with 
the. Germans, but the latter did nothing about it.
(3) Prince, "Geschichte",
Zamchaya's receptiveness towards Europeans did not 
last long. In 1893,, one' of his lieutentants met and killed 
the UMCA missionary, G.W.Atlay, when the-former was returning 
from an expedition south of the Ruvuma, According to W.P.
Johnson, who had fairly close contact with the Ngoni through 
Rashid, thought the killing had been a revenge by the Ngoni 
for the German interruption of their slave trade and for the 
growing German presence along the lakeshore which was severely 
restricting Ngoni military policies in that region.(1) Adverse. 
British reaction forced the Germans to revenge the killing and 
Baron von Eltz with seven officers and a large Sudanese force 
marched down into Ungoni.(2) The Njelu Ngoni did not resist, 
apparently because Rashid's;recommendations of moderation 
prevailed upon KLamilo. Mlamilo's neutrality could also have
j W<v5 t-ilio
been due to the fact that^  Zamchaya's Ngoni A were,in trouble.
Finally, the Njelu Ngoni probably remembered and appreciated 
the light retribution which had resulted from the Mshope ,
moderation in l89*r. Von Elts visited Zamchaya and demanded the 
immediate surrender of Aflay's murderers. HLeven men were 
identified as the guilty/party, and Zamchaya surrendered these.
They were then taken off. No compensation is recorded as
having been paid.(3) Again the Germans had reacted very lightly,-
possibly because they felt no further lesson was needed by the Ngoni.
(1) J.S.Wimbush,-CA, v.XIV, 1896, p.*f; Ebner, History, pp.141-2;
Hine, op cit, p.lM; J.P.Farler,' CA, v.XIV, 1896, p.86,
(2) W.P.Johnson to H.Waller, I8w3.l89^ih .CA, v.XIV, 1896,. p.HA.
(3) Ibid; CA, v.XIV, 1896, p.86;-Ebner, History, pp.1^1-2.
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It was now the turn for the Njelu Ngoni under nkosi 
Mlamilo and nduna Songea to have adverse contact-with the 
Germans, After the Germans had taken over the coast,, both 
these leaders had cut down the numbers of their expeditions 
to the east. (1) However, it was ^ difficult to stop entirely - 
the activities that had'been so profitable there for over 
a decade, and determined young warriors Continued to move 
off in military expeditions. So, the lands in.the east and 
the tiermans at the coast frequently came into hostile' contact 
with the Ngoni. Aside from-the raids mentioned above, there 
were three large expeditions which cumulatively provoked the 
Germans a third time.. In 189 ,^ an Ngoni army marched into 
the lands south of tfesasi to plunder the ffefiti. In the course 
of the expedition, .they troubled a German mission expedition 
under M.Hartmann. The missionary, who had to pay a ransom to 
escape, wrote a graphic report on the terror of the Ngoni.(2)
A year later, another force, this time under nduna: Mgendera, 
entered the east to attack the Taoahd trouble much of the v 
Lindi hinterland, (3) Then in 1896, a large army plundered the 
Ruvuma and the hinterland of lindi and Mkindani. Mary villages 
were burnt and a considerable number of captives-taken. The 
German Governor,.Herr Liebert, visitediindi to inspeck the .
TJ 1 .
damage. e decided that the time had come to bring the Ngoni 
under submission and ordered Lt, von Engelhardt to lead the
(l)FUlleborn, op cit, p.138.
(H) Ebner, History, pp.13 -^9.
(3) HSfliger, land, pp. noted the attack and wrpte that they 
might be the victims next.
8th Company into Ungoni and conquer it. (1) He may have 
condoned the takeover only now rather than in previous 
years because the Hehe threat was all but over and forces 
could be spared for new ventures.
The expedition reached Ungoni in July 1897. No military 
resistance was offered by the Njelu Ngoni, according to one 
source, because they feared the Germans(2) but, according to 
others, because they consulted both the spirits of their 
ancestors and the trader i&shid, and both advocated peaceful 
contact.(3) The Ngoni may also have expected the German force 
to leave Ungoni after exacting some tribute as the two. 
previous forces had done.
After marching through part,of Ungoni, the force stopped 
by the Mfaranyaki River, near Songeafs, and there built a fort.(4) 
Upon its completion, Lt. Engelhardt invited the Njelu leaders 
to a conference. Possibly anticipating little more than a heated 
discussion prior to the arranging of compensation, a number of 
important leaders accepted the invitation. Mapunda and Mpangara 
quote a description of.subsequent developments given by an 
eye-witness:
"Before the Ngoni elders were invited into the new boma (fort), 
first the ^ermans made a demonstration to show the effectiveness 
andstrength of their firearms...After this the leaders were 
invited into the wooden boma...The assigned group of Ngoni
(1) DKB, v.VIII,,n*21, 23*10*1897* "Expedition der s. Kompagnie... 
von Idndi und Mikindani"; MfLleborn, op cit, pp. 138-9. . He 
accompanied the expedition; Ebner, History, pp. 136-7.
(2) J.P.Earler, UA, v.XIV, 1896, n.161, p.66.
(3) MMR/6/68/ V 1 notes they consulted religious leaders; MM^/6/68/ 
V 1 also.notes talk of resistance; Itllleborn, op cit.
(%) Mfost of the following discussion based on sources as fn.1.
leaders agreed to enter the boma* Their entrance was 
made according to "rank#:. Nkosi Mlamira Gama'went in .first.
Then came Nduna Songea Mbano, followed in succession-by 
Ndunas Ngendela Gaina, .Kap.ungu, and Futire Gama.. The^war - 
generals came last. As soon as they were.;';all in the boma •
they found- themselves arrested and chained in wooden ~ 
fetters. The Nkosi and the four Ndunas were seized first.
When the war generals attempted.to escape by jumping over 
the wooden fence,, the Germans opened firo and five of the 
generals;were shot dead. The victims'-of- the massacre 
included Chakoma Mbano,. Chapwanya, Mtiwuiay Mahengu, and 
Tawula. nO)
In the discussion which followed, the leaders^ere asked to1 
ascede to. three demands: to cease their raids;- to return 
the captives who had been taken in the 1896 raid; and, most 
difficult of all, to submit,to the Germans. They refused 
to do so initially and were confined; to the fort. After a 
while, faced with no alternative, they acquiesced.
After handling a complaint made against, a lieutentant 
of nduna ~ Mgendera1 s by .heirs to a caravan leader whom he had 
killed by executing the lieutentant, Lt.Engeihardt left 
Njelu to engage the Hehe. He left a permanent, occupying 
force at the boma under Lt. von Kleist. On ■■his way north, 
he passed through Chabruma's captial but did;not seek the 
latter *s submission.; Chabruma offered Engelhardt assistance 
against the Hehe and though the latter welcomed it,, none- 
materialized.
It is not known whether or not Zamchaya and his allies 
acknowledged and accepted Mlarailo's submission or.whether they 
were put down separately. One source mentions that Ngoni in 
western Ungoni continued raiding for a year before a Gernan
(1) Mapunda and Mpangara, Majitrt&ji, pp.11-2.
force stopped them(1), but this may refer to Chabruma, against 
whom an expedition is known to have been sent, rather than 
Zamchaya, about whom nothing is heard,
Chabruma and the Mshope Ngoni remained independent, u n t il 
1898, In  th a t year, one .of Chabruma’s m ilita ry  manduna, Chilembo(2) 
conducted a border ra id  on,some N jelu  v illa g e s . The offended 
group complained to the Germans and von K le is t sent an expedition  
in to  Mshope, executed Chilembo, and demanded and received the 
submission o f the Mshope Ngoni.
So, in 1898, some thirty-five years after they had ousted the 
M&seko Ngoni and begun setting up their own military states, the 
Njelu and Mshope Ngoni became integrated Into a much larger 
military state. But all was not yet over for. the Ngoni military 
kingdoms. The Germans had won the first match relatively easily, . 
In the process, they had left the two kingdoms intact and, as the 
Maseko had learnt in the 1860s, this was a mistake. The Ngoni 
tolerated only eight years of submission before they, once again, 
took the offensive.
(1) G.Meinecke, Die Deutsche Kolonien in Wort und Bild, (Leigzig, 
n.d.), p.59*
(2) He was known as Manjorp to some; VMR/6/68/k-/3/'\k has a full 
. description of the Mshope submission,., given by L.Meyo, a
Kalanga,
/
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A Hough New ‘ World, 1893-1905 
I
Submission was the first reluctant, but inevitable, 
acknoxtfledgement of the advent of a new world. But it 
liras only a beginning. The^entire military and 
administrative structures and organization of Ngoni 
society, as well as their institutions and way of life, 
were now to undergo considerable change. The reaction 
by the Ngoni to these changes was to be a complex one 
which fully brought out the differing political and 
class levels in Ngoni society. The first aspect of 
life in the two kingdoms to be affected by German takeover 
was military life. It was radically changed to the evident 
dismay of amny sectors of the Ngoni community• By agreeing 
to stop their raiding and plundering of neighbours, the 
Ngoni relinquished control over the vast region which had 
fallen under their military sway. This lost empire 
contained all those people whose only bond with the Ngnni 
had been subjugation based on fear of military retaliation. 
Once this threat was removed, these people saw no reason 
to continue their disadvantageous tribute-paying relation­
ship with the Ngoni. So they ended it. Their numbers 
were many and included the Yao under Chiteji in Portuguese 
East Africa, the Yao of Mataka in the same country, the 
Makua in the newly-formed Lindi district, and the Manda 
by Lake Nyasa.
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The Germans assisted the process of cutting the 
Ngoni off from their tribute-paying lands by establishing 
boundaries* The rands to the east; of Ungoni were formed 
into mre districts of Miicindani, bind! and Kilwa. bands 
to the north became part of the district os innga, while 
those in the north-west and west joined Langenburg district. 
All the lands south of the Ruvuma River became part of 
Portuguese East Africa. After cutting the Ngoni off 
from the! raiding lands, the Germans then separated 
integral parts of the kingdom which they considered to 
be isolated or distinct from the remainder of the 
kingdom. For instance, Mgende, a large region in 
north-east Mshope, was joined to Iringa(l), while parts 
of north-west Mshope were joined to Iringa and Langenburg, 
The Nyasa litoral became part of Langenburg, When this 
change was made, nkosi Miamilo was forced to call back 
some Ngoni he had sent there to set up an administrative 
post.(2) The remaining parts of the two kingdoms were 
now joined into a district called Songea, after the name 
of Njelu*s famous nduna; presumably to his satisfaction 
and probably to his surprise.(3)
Loss of contact with, and control over, raiding and 
tribute-paying areas represented a considerable economic 
setback for the Ngoni, Plundering had been a mainstay of
(1) P.H.Gulliver, An Administrative Survey of the Ngoni
and Ndendeuli of Songea .District, typescript, UDSM,p,24.
(2) 211* v^rrp^3?. " ■
(3) T.von Prince, nGeschichte der Magwangaara nach 
Brz^hlung des Arabers Rashid bin Mas stud und des 
Pussi" MadS, v.VXI, (189^-), n.3; Gegen Araber und 
V/ahehe« (Berlin, 19li) , Mittlersohn. p.26l said, of 
his 189^ visit, that the capital of Njelu itfas Songea.
The Germans who earned the district may have retained 
his mistake.
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their economic life, and the adaptations which now 
had to be made to the closure of the regular influx 
of captives and goods were difficult ones. Within 
Ngoni society, it was the ftrue Ngoni1 that had to make 
the greatest adaptation. Their economic loss was 
particularly great in that they were the ones who had 
benefited most from raiding* They had become accustomed 
to having a steady influx of captives to till their fields 
and perform myriad other tasks. The loss of status and 
power was also considerable. The 'true Ngoni* largely 
controlled economic wealth within the society through 
receiving and dispersing the proceeds of war. They now 
lost this. The 'sutu' also suffered as a result of the 
military changes. Those who had been well integratedr
into Ngoni society and had benefited from their state's 
military power lost the captives and goods they stood to 
obtain through war. They lost as well any status which 
had been associated with their identity as Ngoni. Those 
who had not been integrated into Ngoni society appear to 
have lost little. On the whole, the disadvantages of 
German takeover were not as severe for the 'sutu* as 
they were for the 'true Ngoni'.
Social and other changes accompanied the ending of 
raiding. first, there appears to have been some decline 
in military proficiency, due to the absence of need to 
make and train in weapons and to be proficient in war. 
Secondly, there was a general transition in society 
from a military to an agricultural life. This surprised 
and impressed the Germans who often praised the apparent
... . '. • ' ' ■ s ’ 184-
ease with which the Ngbni'settled down to a diligent and 
hard-working agricultural life.(1) This was a considerable 
change for those who had done Tittle more than pursue a 
military life once(2), as well as for those who had benefited 
little from military life and were now given an opportunity to . 
concentrate on independent food production* . .
A further, and probably the most severe, of the changes 
brought to military life by the Germans was the need to pay rather 
than receive tribute# This tribute was a tax of three rupees 
to be paid on each hut(3), as well as taxes on various other 
things such as rifles, and beer* The Germans appreciated that -
the tax was. a tribute to then as conquerors (A*) , as were the 
Ngoni to# for the ’true Ngoni', particularly those who had 
been important leaders, taxation was a severe economic and 
political setbacks Economically, they lost the tribute in 
labour, food and goods which had been received from subjects 
before 1897 and which'had made them well off. to the Germans who 
demanded it for themsilves* Moreover, they now had to pay a . 
tribute themselves* Bolitically.^  they lost much status as"they 
now became the same as: those who had once paid .tribute to them.
What must have been very; galling about the change was that it 
had been meekly conceded* ' • *
(1) M. Hartmann, Missbl., 1898, n.2, p*30; DKB, v.XVlil, n.15, 1. 7. ■ 
1907, "Ackerbau und. Viehsucht in Ungoni", pp*&32, 637; DGAZ,
5.7.1902. ' .
(2) F.PUlleborn, Das Deutsche jjyassa und Ruvuma Gebiet, (Berlin, 
1906), p*1 stated slaves did the. field work in 1897.
(3) DOAZ, v*IV, 1^*6.1902. ~ ,•
(4) RKA, 2A n*2 5ix AaKAl GR 28 Bd.2 Hauser und Huttensteuer in DOA, 
1902-^, General von Gotzen, Report on Taxation. I am grateful-to
G.C.K.Gwassa of the History Department of the HDSM for allowing me 
to read- his microfilm, copies of this, and other RKA manuscripts.
"  - "  • i8i
For the 'sutu1, taxation was primarily an economic burden.
It seems unlikely that many had suffered,the psychological loss 
of prestige which their leaders had. Most had paid rather than received 
tribute before 1897, so whether payment was made to the Germans or 
Ngoni leaders must have made little difference. The economic 
burden of taxation was considerable in that the 'sutu' usually 
lacked oh had in short supply the goods that were demanded by 
the Germans, initially peo pie were allowed to pay in kind 
(grain, goats), cash, labour, or natural resources^ such as rubber 
a nd>beeswax. Most offer&d their labour. For example, in 1899» 
the first year in which taxes were collected, cash payments . 
amounted to rps.1,651* payments in kind to rps, 706. and payments 
through the offering of labour to rps.21,209(1). This meant that 
some 7*273(2) people.gave free labour to the Europeans, As this 
quantity of labour was not always heeded, the Gemrans increasingly 
demanded payments in kind o^cash. To meet the demand, more and 
more people had to accept the economic livelihoods, being introduced 
and fostered by the Germans.' This acceptance, which was considerable, 
judging from the increase in cash payments from rps, 1,651 in 1899 to 
38,0^5 in 1903(3)» had further repercussions, discussed below./ 
Taxation was,to be remembered by the 'sutu' as the greatest 
burden imposed by the Germans on them.(^ f) They resented having to 
give free labour, to go collecting rubber and beeswax, and to sell 
grain and goats. , If any.single issue-united the-'sutu' against the 
Germans, it was probably taxation and the difficulties caused by it.
(1) DKB* v.XII, n.11, 1.6.1901, pp.389“90, DOA Bezirkd&mter und 
Stationenim Berichtsjahre 1899/1900, Songea,
(2) An estimated number based on an individual's tax.being 3 rps.
DKB* v.XVI, 1905, n.11, 1,6.1905, p.351.
W  As shown in most traditions in the Mm/6/68/,.. series.
mThe Germans, though knowing African fee!ing(1), saw it in . 
a different light.- for example, Booth wrote in 190^ that 
the obligation to pay taxes drove the people, out of their 
indolence and Iazindss.(2)
While the most thorough changes made by the Germans were 
those.made in military life,"it was those made in administrative 
life which manifested Ngoni disillusion with German rule most. 
poignantly and which eventually brought rebellion.
The first administrative change made by the Germans after 
submission was a realignment of the power _structure in the Ngoni 
kingdoms. The pre-1897 structure 0f nkosi - wantwana/manduna/ 
royal 'houses1 - alumuzana was now considerably modified. Replacing 
the nkosi at the top was the German representative in the district, 
called the Station Chief till 1905, then, after civilian rule was 
introduced, the District.Officer (Bezirksamtmann). Assisting him 
were a few administrators and a military force whose numbers varied , 
between fifty and one hundred.(3) Below him came,' not the nkosi, 
but rather a.representative of all the leaders. This representative 
was nduna Songea, probably the most powerful individual in Ungoni 
in 1897* little information was found on this appointment so little
(1) H.Wehrmeister, Vor Deni Sturm, has notes on resentment of taxation 
quoted in I.G.Kozak, Two Rebellions in German East Africa: Their 
Study in Microcosm, MA, Howard U., I9S&, ,p. 137*..
(2) J.Booth in R.fuchs, "Die Wirtschaftliche.Erkundung einer Sttdbahn", 
Beihefte Tropenflanzer, v.VI, (1905), p,2(&.
(3) In 1903 there were tbcms officers, three 2nd.Lts., and 100-men,in 
the detachment-,, D0A3/v.V, n.49, 5.12.1903. ■
can be said about it, Songea seems to have been 
preferred to a representative of the ruling royal 
families because of bis military position and status. 
Possibly ho was more receptive than other leaders - 
if Prince's comments are to be credited with any 
accuracy,(l) According to one tradition, Songea was 
appointed as an assistant in administrative affairs(2 ) 
and handled all matters that the leaders wished to see 
the Germans about. His position does not appear to 
have given him financial and judicial superiority 
over the mankosi. Below Songea were placed the mankosi 
and other officials from a number of other levels of 
administration. These levels included: the wantwana, 
such as Pusi Gama; the military manduna. such as 
Mpambalioto; the administrative manduna, such as Mkuzo; 
headmen of the more important subject villages; and various 
independents, including local traders and foreigners. The 
more important appear to have become Sultans or akidas while 
the others were relegated to a lower level of recognition. 
The process of selection, if any existed, is not known. 
Indeed, the allocation of the names themselves was not 
noted on any official documents. It merely occurs in 
references to various leaders. Below the Sultans and 
akidas were appointed Jumbes. This class of leader 
appears not to have existed prior to 1 8 3 7, despite some 
claims to the contrary.(3) The Jumbes appear to have been 
made the main administrative class by the Germans, though
(1) Prince, "Geschichte", p. XR.
(2) MMR/6/68/4/3/13; Ebner to Redmond, interviews 17-21,10.
1971 agrees.
(3) J.Komba, God and Man, XdiD, Pontifical University of the
Propagation of the faith, (Rome), 1959, pp.21-2.
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again, the only indications of this come not from 
official document's but, rather, from references to 
their use in German administrative and other files.
The Jumbes were selected from among alumuzana and local 
subject chiefs as well as from the categories noted 
above*from whom Sultans were selected.
After the structure was changed, the allocation 
of power within each was also modified. The St&tion 
Chief assumed most of the powers which had formerly 
been held by the two mankosi. lie had the final say 
on the district level on all administrative policies.
This meant that he decided everything from deciding who 
would be allowed to hunt ivory to approving the selection 
of the Jumbe of an area. In the financial realm, he handled 
the budget for the district, which included,among other1 
things, collecting then reallocating the tribute, or 
taxes, received from the people. In the judicial realm, 
he had the final say in the allocation of judicial 
responsibility and kept for himself the role of arbitrator 
in criminal cases. Powers which he did not hold were 
held by his superiors.
The representative, Songea, had considerable 
administrative powers, though apparently lacked financial 
and judicial responsibilities. He was made superior to 
all other leaders in Ungoni. However, the powers he had 
in this respect were considerably below those which he had 
formerly exercised over his followers. for example, he 
had the power to report judicial complaints but lacked 
the authority to give sentences - such as the death
penalty which he could have given before 1897*(1)
Again, in finance, he may have had to ensure that 
others paid their taxes. But these taxes did not go 
to him. Because the powers Songea enjoyed were less 
than those he had exercised over his people before 
1897 and, though more than those he had formerly 
exercised over other leaders, still not for his benefit, 
other leaders appear not to have been jealous of his 
exercise of power. This is indicated by the fact that 
he seems to have been a close ally of both mankosi (now 
unofficial titles) in 1905» something quite unlikely 
had he felt superior to them or they, angered by him.(2) 
The mankosi and lesser officials who were now 
classified as Sultans or akidas now appear to have had 
roughly the same powers and responsibilities as each 
other and, apparently, as the Jumbes. Those who had 
recognized followers appear to have retained control 
over them. Uhere it seems to have been felt that some 
followers should not be under a leader*s control, these 
were removed, for example, Chabruma Tawete lost control 
over Liwale and Likuyu, both of which were now placed 
under the control of aliens, who became akidas.(3)
Putire Gama lost control over parts of Umatengo, which 
were now placed under Amakita, a former subject chief 
who now became a Sultan.(^) Songea Mbano lost control 
over that part of southern Hjelu which he controlled.
(1) MMR/6/68/A/3/13 t B.M.Mpangala1s tradition.
(2) The alliance in rebellion is shown below in 
Chapter five, section X,
(3) According to TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.B, the akida, Yusufu 
Kirobo replaced Ghabruma s murdered military nduna, 
Manjoro (Chilembo) at Liwale. However, F.H.Gulliver, 
"A History of the Songea Hgoniu, TNR, n.^1, 1955, p.2^ 
states that he hedded Likuyu.
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The Yao who lived there were placed under the control 
of their own local leaders who, at least after 1 9 0 5, 
were Is:nown as Sultans, (l) Zamchaya Gama lost control 
over the Nyasa region, which was placed under the control 
of alien akidas,(2 )
Xn administering for the German government over 
the followers they were allowed to keep or were given 
anew, the Sultans and akidas had to follow certain 
guidelines. In administration, all were required to 
submit day-to-day reports to the German boma(3) and to 
attend general meetings(A). They had to pass on orders 
from the boma and see that they were obeyed. They 
collected men for labour. Those who given the responsibility, 
saw that taxes were paid.(5) They were required to show 
friendliness to Europeans, a willingness to co-operate 
in the changes that were being made and a readiness to 
perform a number of duties they cared little for.(6 ) In
(A) p . 256 PA, Kigonsera Chronicle, 11.8.1905* 1 wish to
thank John Iliffe for allowing me to see the/notes 
he has taken on the Benedictine Chronicles at the 
Peramiho Archives,
(1) These Sultans were, in the later years of German 
rule: Mariumba at Mitomoni; Isa at Msawi&i; Halifa 
at Matimbuka; and Mkupeni at Sawasawa, see TNA/155/
SUB, v.4, p.218.
(2) His control during the 1890s is described above, Chapter 
Three, p. , while his loss of it is suggested in
the general removal of Hgoni representatives from the 
region, suggested on p,2A8 .
(3) PKB, v.IX, n. 12, 15.6 .1898, p.3^9, MBericht iHber die 
Reise des Hauptmanns von Kleist in Bezirk Songea”;
PKB, v.XII, n.ll, 1.6.1901; TNA/1733/1920 Annual 
Reports, Songea, I9 1 9/2 0 .
W  PKB, v.XV, n .18, I.9 .I90A, p.5 6 5 .
(5) Mot all had this responsibility, M.Wright, German 
Missions in Tanganyika, 1891-19*frf. (Oxford, 19717,
OUP, pp.7 5 -8 writes that tax collections in north­
west Songea in 1903 were a serious grievance of the 
people and that the Berliner missionaries complained 
of it to the government. The taxes were collected by 
askari (soldiers) and the missionaries wanted the 
chiefs to do it.
(6 )
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justice, they were now restricted to handling civil 
cases under traditional law. Moreover, decisions 
could be appealed if either claimant wished.(1)
TheGumbos appear to have been alioted much the 
same responsibility as the Sultans and akidas. They 
appear to have been responsible for handling court cases 
at the local, often village, level, for seeing that taxes 
were paid* for collecting labour and, generally, for 
ensuring law and order. There were eighty-four Jumbes 
in Songea district by 190^(2), a considerably larger 
number than appear to have been Sultans, suggesting 
that the Germans appreciated and made much use of this 
level of administration.
The ways in which power was allocated among the various 
levels of administration, involved a considerable loss 
of power for much of the Ngoni leadership. The mankosi 
probably lost the most. Before 1897, they controlled 
their kingdoms. After 1897, they officially did not.
Their subordinate officl&l^were no longer responsible to 
them. The Station Chief made his demands and the officials 
had to respond to these. The mankosi surrendered their 
administrative powers over their kingdoms. For example,
(6) One leader who had little interest in the duties
demanded of him was Fusi Gama. For comments on his 
attitudes and the results of these, see C.Spiss,
Missbl.. Peramiho Chronicle, 3.1901; Ebner, History 
of the V/angoni. (Peramiho, 1959), mission press, pp.158-9 
for general statements on the duties of chiefs under 
German rule see R.Cornevin in L.I-I.Gann & P.Dnigan, eds., 
Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960, (Cambridge, 1969),CUI% 
P.A12,
iJK* V -XII» n.ll, 1.6.1901, pp.389-90; J.Listoivel,
'fko Making of Tanganyika, (London, 1 9 6 5), Chatto & Windus 
p.51 incorrectly claims there was no legal security in 
the country.
(2) X3KB, v.XV, n.18, 1 .9 .1 90^, p.5 6 5 .
they no longer could decide who could enter the 
kingdom or how people could act when in it. This 
had its effects. for example, in 1 9 0 3, a- zealous 
Benedictine missionarj^ decided to burn the N g 1 anda 
ya Nasele, or Mahoka Hut, where the I\f jelu nkosi 
prayed to his ancestors. The nkesi complained to 
the Station Chief and the latter fined th© missionaries 
rps.15 and ordered them to pay the nkosi rps.3. Though 
given official satisfaction, the nkosi had been badly 
humbled by being unable to revenge this desecration and 
insult the way he would have done before German takeover.(1) 
His only recourse was to withdraw his support from the 
missions.
Judicially, the mankosi no longer had complete powers. 
They could no longer handle criminal cases, while in civil 
cases, such as marriage violations, they could only give 
limited punishment. This led to considerable resentment.
For example, the Mshope nkosi once sentenced one of his 
subjects, named Mgayi, to death after the latter had 
committed adultery with one of his wives. Mgayi escaped 
and fled to the boma where he told the Station Chief of 
his sentence. The Station Chief summoned Chabruma to the 
boma then, because Chabruma had no proof of th© deed, 
reprimanded and fined him.(2 )
(1) Komba, op cit, pp.13-4; TNA/G9/6 , Albinus to Govt., 
n . 68 of 15.2.190A, The missionaries put up a strong 
complaint against the fining and the matter ended up 
in Berlin. In this letter, Albinus justifies his 
action. He denies ordering the payment and states that 
the missionaries had agreed to make it. He states that 
he does not even believe the Hut had been burnt in the 
first place, and see Govt, to Bishop Spiss, n.1x930
of 2 1 .3 .190^; Missbl., v.VIII, n.3, PP.33-3•
(2 ) MMR/6/68/^/3/^, tradition and evidence of M.Nchamo; 
and see analysis ny Mapunda and Mpangara, Mj(411/6/68/^/1.
Financially, the mankosi lost their effective 
control over the society. Theoretically, before 1897, 
they had controlled All plundering expeditions and 
received their share of the proceeds; they controlled 
th© greatest wealth in the society, having the most 
folloitfers - and consequently, labour reserve, the 
largest cattle herds, and the biggest fields; and they 
controlled trading.(1) Wow, much of this was taken 
away. When warfare ended, they lost the revenue it 
produced. They relinquished exclusive control over 
their followers, who now had to respond to German demands. 
They no longer had the power to approve the entry of 
traders. Their trade goods became the property of 
either tlm.4Mmmna.ns, as with ivory (2), or of the ’sutu*, 
or|anyone ®lse who wanted it, as with rubber and beeswax. 
The mankosi were cut off from their traditional sources 
of wealth and excluded from the net* ones, described below, 
which the Germansjwere bringing in.
Xn all, the mankosi were very adversely affected by 
the imposition of German rule. Indeed, their decline 
after German entry was probably greater than that of any 
other individuals or g'roup within Ugoni society. Their 
fall from power and wealth was a long and hard one which, 
by 1 9 0 5, seemed nowhere near ending.
(1) This control has been described in detail in the 
previous two chapters, which see.
(2) The German colonial authorities passed a law restrietin 
much of the hunting of elephants to professional 
hunters. It is not known how closely this decree was 
followed in Songea. R,W.Beaohey, "The East African 
ivory trade in the nineteenth century", JAB, v.VIXI, 
(I9 6 7 ), n.2 , p . 285 states that the professional hunters 
were required one tusk of every pair to the district 
station.
The manduna and other categories of leaders 
who had become Sultans or akidas suffered to varying 
degrees. Those who had the greatest powers before 
1897 lost the most, those who had least, gained.
For example, in administration manduna like Songea 
lost control over peoples who had formerly been under 
them.(l) In justice, the same leaders suffered, Songea 
is remembered as having become quite bitter at being 
unable to prevent others from interfering with his 
wives,(2) Mpambalioto could no longer act as authoritatively 
with his followers as he had before 1 8 9 7*(3 ) In finance, 
the senior manduna lost almost as much as the mankosi 
with regard to plunder from raids, use of subject labour* 
and benefits from trading. The manduna and other leaders 
who gained in sriart^ s and power appear to have been few 
in number. In administration, they included leaders such 
as Amakita in Umatengo, who was raided from being a- 
subject leader of the Ngoni, and Jusufu Kirobo, a foreigner 
xtfho seemsrto have risen from nothing to being a quite 
powerful akida. In justice and finance, it included the 
few who stood to benefit from the German presence. One 
among these appears to have been a son of Mpambalioto's, 
who became an interpreter. (Ik), The Jumbes aj^pear to have
(1) In addition to losing part of the south, Songea lost 
the western part of his region, whihh was taken over 
by the liwali appointed at the boma. This man was a 
certain Hassani in 1902, see PA, Kigonsera Chronicle, 
26.5.1902.
(2 ) MMR/6/68/^.3.13, tradition and evidence of B.M.Mpangala,
(3) J.H&fliger, "Land und Leute von Ungoni", Missbl., 1901, 
n . l ,  p p . 6 - 8 ,  n .3, P P . 65-8 ,
W
M.Read, "Tradition and prestige among the Ngoni", Africa, 
v.IX, (1 9 3 6), n.^, p.^79 notes a parallel in Maseko 
Ngoni sooiety:"instead of one big chief in the country, 
many small ones were noitf recognised who dared to give 
themselves airs because they knew the Ngoni could not 
compel allegiance to their Paramount (nkosi)."
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gained power on the whole, particularly where;they had “been 
alumuzana or.less before 1897*
' ■ II ..
. A number of .changes,how took place within the structurally 
reorganised Ngoni society. These, which gradually affected most 
spheres of life, accentuated the transition brought by German 
rule. Generally they were less favourable to the 'true Ngoni* 
than to the 'sutu!. ■ One of the major adaptations to- German rule 
was.made in labour, its availablity and use. The numbers of 
workers increased as many who had only been warriors before joined 
the labour pool to obtain, money for goods and taxes. The people 
making use of.thds labour became more varied as Ngoni leaders and 
traders were.supplemented by German government officials, missionaries 
and additional traders. They wanted labour for new uses, such as 
the building of permanent houses and other buildings, the construction 
and repair of roads and1 for skilled work as;cooks, messengers and 
clerks. Occupations engaged in before -1.897 also came into 
increased demand. . For example there was close to a fivefold 
increase in the. demand ,Tor porters between 1899 and 1903,(1).
..Among the,effects of the changes in labour availability and 
use was a decline in the numbers of, people ready to work for the 
leaders of the Ngoni. This decline was accentuated by the' 
apparent abolition of the obligation on 'sutu' to give free labour 
to fheir masters.(2) A second effect was a modification in the
(1) Shown in caravan statistics in Fuchs, op cit, pp.227-8.
(2) At least such is the impression given by a reference to the end 
of 'sutu' use as. 'unpaid servants' in MB/S/S/I /69, tradition 
and evidence of Kawahili.
Ii
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in the function1 of labour,. While before 1897, people had 
offered labour as a form of identification with their fellows 
or masters, after 1897, it was usually offered in return for 
money. This moriey was kept by those who performed the work -unless 
they were slaves.(1) . This change in the function of labour was 
one aspect of the change from a barter to a cash economy. The 
changes in labour offered greater variety of: occupation and 
increased independence of action to many of its ’sutu’ participants. 
Admittedly the Germans had compelled them to adopt new occupations. 
However, once the.benefits of these were appreciated, the need 
for force appears to have given way to a general willingness to 
work. At least,, this is the; impression given, in German reports 
on Ngoni labourers, many of which, were extremely favourable and 
praising.(2)
Ih agriculture only a. few aspects of activity underwent 
change, in resources of agriculture, a few new food and cash 
crops were introduced. One cash crop-, cotton, is of note. It. 
was introduced into the Nyasa area in 1903. after that area had 
been identified as favourable for the crop by the Colonial '
Economic Committee. (3) l&periments that year were successful •>. ' ■
so, in 1904, a larger area'was brought. Into production. After 
a second good crop, greater schemes’'were planned for 1905,
However, by 1905, the number of Africans participating was 
small and, unlike further east,'where cotton-growing became
(1) That slaves were not paid is suggested by their being allocated
a separate status in references such as Hendle, Missbl,,1902,p. 87
(2) C.Spiss, Missbl.:, 1898', p.103; TNA/G8/130, Lt.ITank to' Govt., 
n.534 of 18.8.1900. \ -
(3) Booth in Fuchs, op cit,. p.275; BKB, v.XV, n.10, 1.5.1904, p . 296 
and v.XIV,-n.23, 1*12*1903, p. 639 ;' G. von Gdtzen, Deutsch-Ost-r 
Afrlka im Aufstands-1905-06, (Berlin, 1909), p.81" •
a major source of discontent, in Songea it had not 
developed sufficiently to attrac-^ much attention.(1)
Methods of cultivation underwent a few changes. One 
was in the methods used by those who grew cotton. However, 
as this did not affect the cultivation of. other crops, it 
was of minor importance* -Another Was in the methods; demanded 
at plantations.,, There were very few plantations in Songea-by 
1905 and the methods of cultivation they required must have 
had little direct or indirect effect on the people. This was 
not expected to remain the case. Songea had been recognized 
very early on as a very favourable region for European 
settlement.(2) As it was distant from the coast and lacked 
suitable communications - the tsetse fly made the horse 
impractical and bulky produce could not be exported economically 
by porterage - the .Germans decided to build a railway from 
Kilwa to Lake Nyasa going through Songea. In 1903, a 
hydrographical and geological survey .was conducted;to determine 
the physical feasibility of a railway.(3) This was followed 
by an economic survey undertaken to determine whether or 
not the proposed railway in the south could be financially
(1:) It is not. mentioned as one of the causes of the Maji Maji 
rebellion of I905 in Songea. Indeed, the areas where it 
was introduced remained loyal to the iermans. There is . 
a common belief that there was no cotton grown in.the 
district,, see MME^6/68/V3/10.
(2) Fuchs, op cit, pp.259-60; Fdlleborn, op cit, pp.
G.Lieder, "2ur Kenntis der Karawenwege im sUdlichen Thiele 
des ostafrikanischen Schutzgebietes", MadS, v.VTI, (1894), 
n.4, p.272. ----
(3) F.Tornau in Bericht, p*128.
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solvent*(l) Both surveys answered in the affirmative, 
so in 1$>0 5 » a surveying team went south to plan the 
route.(2) Until the railway was completed, few settlers 
were willing to move into Songea, In 1899t th© German 
trade, R,Peter, started a small coffee and rubber 
plantation in Songea. Neither crop appears to have 
become productive by 1 9 0 5*(9 ) In 1902, a second settler, 
the Englishman John Booth, applied for land to set up 
a large plantation in the district. I-Ie envisaged making 
use of the surplus of local labour. To finance his scheme, 
ha applied for financial assistance from the government. 
This he failed to receive. The government was apparently 
too poor to support schemes such as his.(^) In 190^, he 
satisfied himself with establishing a small, twelve- 
hectare plantation of cotton,(5) By I90j>, according to 
one reference, he had a plantation scheme going with a 
local chief.(6)
The distribution of labour in agriculture did change 
to some extent. The availablity of free and captive labour 
for agricultural work declined as raiding stopped and 
alternative occupations offered themselves to the people. 
This appears to have reduced the annual output of food from 
the fields of the mankosi and manduna. It may also have 
affected the size and output of individual !sutu’ holdings. 
In all, the major effect of thejbhanges in agricultural 
production appear to have been a decline in the food 
produced for local consumption as fewer people were growing 
food which now tended, in addition, to be so'ld(7) as well
(1) Fuchs, op cit.
(2) TNA/G12/7^, P.Holzmann & Cie Baubureau DSM to Govt., 
3.1.1907 andfollowing letters.
2,6$
as consumed internally, This decline affected the 
leaders of Ngoni society more than it did the mass of 
the people*(1 )
A third change within the society after 1897 came 
in trade as the goods handled increased in variety and 
as the sector participating in trade increased. The 
pre-1 8 9 7 trade in slaves, ivory and rubber.'" gave way 
after 1897 to one in ivory, beeswax and rubber. Few 
statistics were found on thesamounts traded, but those 
which were indicate that the trade increased considerably 
in total volume and va3,ue, primarily due to the increased 
export of rubber and the newly established export of 
beeswax. The only available statistics on the 
trade are a series of references for 1905 in which the 
volume of ivory exported amounted to 253 lbs.(2). But 
these appear to be quite incomplete or else not representative 
as tax returns for shot and ammunition indicate that the
(3) p.263 DIvB, n.16, 15.8.1907, "ftTachweisung i!iber die 
in DOA vorhandenen Privat-Pflanzungen und deren 
ungefcihren Stand am 1 .**.I905 ,r» pp. 813-21, esp. p. 813; 
Peter apparently continued to devote much of his time 
to trading,
(A) p.268 TNA/GrB/20, John Booth to Govt., 26.6.1902; lst.Lt. 
Albinus to Govt., 11.381 of 28.6.1902.
(5) p.268 DKB, v.XVIII, 11.I6 , 15.8.1907, "Naohweisung. .
(6) p . 268
(7) G.Spiss, Missbl.. I8 9 8, p.106 notes that the Ngoni 
were selling all kinds of food,
(1) Writing in I9 0 7, the DO Richter noted that the Sultans
did not have enough slaves to produce sufficient food 
for themselves and their follower's so they laid claim 
to a natural period of work by their subjects., 33KB, 
v.XVIII, n.13, 1*7.1907, "Ackerbau und Viehsucht in 
Ungoni", p.6 3 2, 6 3 7.
(2) As found in the report on compensation due to losses
in Maji Maji, which is in files TNA/G8/130 and G3/77.
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trade was of considerable importance.(1) Rubber became 
an established export crop from north, and north-east Songea(2) 
as early as 3899, when its.exploitation was,. described as having 
reached "a remarkable and promising boom".(3) Very few 
statistics are available on the amounts of rubber exported, 
though one from Mshope indicated that the trade was considerable.
(Eh the first half of that year, some 15,000 kgs. were exported.(^) 
Beeswax was plentiful throughout Songea, owing to the favourable 
habitation conditions of the district(5) and, once it had come 
into demand, people could readily supply it. Few statistics, 
again, are available on the amounts handled. Some of 1905 
suggest that it may have been Songea*s most important export 
crop* In that year, four coast-bound caravans owned by Jaffer 
Somji, a leading trader in the district, exported goods worth 
rps.2,876.89 of which rps.1,71^.6^ was in wax, while two caravans 
belonging to R.Peter, contained exclusively.wax, to the value 
of rps.1,100.39.(6)
The important thing about the change in the variety of 
crops produced and sold was that it brought about the participation 
of a new sector of the population, for wheras- the leaders 
controlled the slave and ivoiy(7) trade, it was largely the ’sutu*
(1) See statistics in TNA/gV'1'13, H.Richter to Govt., 10.1.1905.
(2) Booth in Fuchs, op cit, p.273.
(3) D.Warburg in DKB, v.X, n.10, 15.5.1899, p.338.
M  a.10, 15.5.1899, "Kautschuk in BOA", pp.337-9.
(5) Miombo vegetation is favourable to bees.
(6) TM/G8/I30 and G3/77, relevant lists.
(7) They had hunters in their employ. Some later participated 
in Ifeji Maji.
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who benefited from the rubber and wax trade. Accordingly, 
people who, before 1897, gained little from trade, now 
stood to benefit'substantially. One group who appear to 
have were the Ng&ndo of north-east Mshope, whom one missionary 
described as possessing much cloth from their sale of rubber.(1)
The final major change for the.Ngoni came in religion.
For, although the ancestors of the ’true Ngoni’ and the various 
dieties;of the ’sutu’ retianed their central.importance for the 
vast majority of the population^ a new religion, the Christianity 
of.the Europeans, began making inroads into the country. The 
first missionaries to settle in Songea were the Reman Catholic 
Benedictines of St.Ottilien, a mission order established in the 
late nineteenth century.(2) In 1897, M.Hartmann made a jousmey 
through Ungoni to look for a suitable site. The following year,
: after a second exploratory visit by Alfons Adams, two missionaries, 
Cassian Spiss and Brother.Laurenti, entered Songea to establish ' 
the first.mission there.(3 )
The mission made little impact on the Ngoni during its first 
years, for the people saw little reason to change from their own 
faiths.(4) Indeed, the community resorted to buying slave
(1) G.A,Adams, Im Dfenste .des Kreuzes, (St.Ottilien, 1899), p.132.
(2) For details on their history, see F.Renner, Der Ftlnfarmige
LeUchter, (St.Ottilien, 1971), 2 vols.;; F.Szczypior, Die
Sozialwirtschaft von St.Ottilien f Ur auswartige MLssionen in
apas.tolischen Vikariat.. .1888 bis: .1920, PhD, Julius-
Maximilians U. ,^ (witr'zburg7, "T923. I am. grateful to Lorne
Larson for showing me his copy of this thesis; R.Rios,
Benedictines of Today, (Stanbrook, 19^6), pp.233-6; MLssbl.,------
(3) Missbl., 1898, p.93; 1897, p.307; Ebner, History, PP.163-^*, 
2 W D K B ,  v.X, n.5, 1.3*1899, p.173.
ik) The missionaries were well aware of the difficulties in 
converting the people, see F.Leuthner, Missbl., Peramiho 
Chronicle, v.IX, 190 ,^ n.11 , p.168/
children in order to form, the nucleus of its Christian.: 
community.(1) Gradually it inculcated its.ideas into a 
number of people and, by 1905i had, established a firm basis 
for future expansion with 472 Christians and .536 Catechumens. (2)
But the numbers were less important than it seemed for, of 
the total, very few were men of any importance, indeed,; only 
one minor leader, the Jurnbe Mchotahad accepted baptism by 
1905.(5) Without support from a higher level of authority, 
Christianity had little chance of making inroads.(4)
However, the missionaries did have greater success in education, 
through which a future generation could be brought in large 
numbers to accept European beliefs. Ey 1904, there were ten-schools 
having 562 pupils ,in Songea(5) The educational inroads were 
important in at least two ways, llrst, schools were established 
in or near the villages of leading; men in Ngoni society, --By 1904, 
.both the Njelu and the Mshope mankosi as well as manduna such as 
Mpambalioto iiad schools.(6) Secondly, the students, though 
comprising ..mainly former slaves and 'sutu1 children, also 
included a number of children of leaders. Chabruma Tawete»'s 
son, Dominikus Missoro, and sons of Mputa Gama and Putire 
Gama, were among these.(7) . These children were later to become 
important leaders and were to foster the mission presence in 
the district. Supplementing the mdsion schools, was one run
(1) C.Spiss, Mssbl., Peramiho Chronicle, 3.1901.
W  Hissbl., v.IX, (1905), n.10, p.146.
(5) Missbl., V.vm. (1903) . n.7>.- u.^4- .
(4) G,J.Iiesegang, Beltrdge zur Geschichte des ' Keiches der Nguni
•;; ■ m  sddllchen I^cambique,'l^20--1b95, Phb ,• Koln IT.," p ~ 3  writes
that among the Gaza Nguni people did not join the Church
possibly out., of fear of the leaders. This may have been a 
- factor in'Songea, particularly after the Mahoka Hut burning.
(5) Missbl., y.IX, (1905), p.146. . ..
(6) itLssbl., 5.1902, p.71; 1904, p.50, 168. (7) MMV6/68/4/1. .
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by the government at the boma. Among the pupils at this 
school we; e Mwanawalifa, a son of nduna Songea and, according 
to some traditions, Usangila, a son of Mharule Gama and the
heir apparent in Njelu.(1)
The missions and government were preparing the way for 
change in. the next generation* Some signs of this change were 
manifesting themselves .by 1905* Two students had gone to 
Dar es Salaam to study in 1902,(2) a former official of nkosi 
Mputa had foresaken the leader in favour of the missions(3)j 
while various pupils showed scorn for traditional beliefs when 
helping to destroy the Mahoka Hut«? But these were still 
the exceptionss in 1905 and change lay ahead. (*jS)
The total impact of the fernan presence then, was one of 
variable change in the institutions and organization of Ngoni 
society. Some,such as the military life of the people, 
underwent considerable change. Others, such as the religious 
life, were affected very little. The.varying changes had a 
greater impact on some sectors of the society than on others.
For example, traditional political leaders were far more 
affected than the average ’sutu’ farmer. This varying change 
soon.had a considerable impact and it is to the buildup of 
this that we now turn.
XII
Though the Cumulative reaction to change was varied 
two major trends can be discerned: one by the 'true Ngoni’ 
and another by the 'sutu'. It should be noted that the
(1) MME^/6/68/4/1; see also Chapter 5, section II.
(2) C.Spiss, Missbl., Peramiho Chronicle. 1,1902, p.7.
(3) Pafiki Yangu, v.VI, n.3 , 3,1915.
(4) For another view, see John Iliffe in I.N.Kimambo & A.J.Temu, 
-A History of Tanzania, (Dar es Salaam, 1969) , p.130.
distinction was not a totally exclusive one referring 
to whether the Ngoni immigrated into East Africa or were 
captured there. Some 'sutu1 were well integrated into 
Ngoni society and thought and acted like the 'true Ngoni'. 
However, a broad distinction between the two groups can 
be made. Each is studied separately.
An initial reaction of the 'true Ngoni1, xoarticularly 
those at senior levels of administration, appears to have 
been one of uncertainty. They had surrendered control 
over their society to a powerful newcomer* It seemed that 
they then wondered what effects this action would have. 
This wondering was shown in the expressing of interest 
in the stranger and in a willingness to co-operate with 
his plans. Evidence of this, with regard to the German 
administration, is found in the offering of assistance 
in the building of the boma and, once administration 
began, in acquiesence to the demands made by the Station 
Ghief. An example of acquiesence was the apparent 
willingness to make regular visits’ to the boma to discuss 
local problems with the German officer there.(1) It 
should be noted that the possibility of having force 
applied against one must also have played an important 
role in stimulating compliance. Another indication of 
receptiveness, appears to have been the willingness to 
accept advice. Major von Natzmer itfrote that in 1899 b© 
was able to arrange a peace between the two hostile 
leaders, Chabruma and Palangu.(2 )
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Missionaries also experienced this interest.
For example, in 1897, when Maurus Hartmann visited 
Mshope, nkosj Chabruma, who was still independent, 
and who preferred to remain isolated from the Eurox>eans, 
refused to see him. On the other hand, the politically- 
troubled Njelu was more open and he had a favourable 
reception from its leaders.(1) A year later, when 
Alfons Adams made his visit, Chabruma, who by 110w accej^ted 
the inevitability of European contact, welcomed the 
visitor.(2) Once the missionaries were established in 
the district, the leaders continued to be friendly with 
them and a number of leading men in Ungoni allowed 
schools to be built in their areas.(3 )
The oxsenness shown to the missionaries appears to 
have been due to a number of factors. On© was the 
military. The Ngoni had just been Subjugated by the 
Germans and xorobably were interested in learning more 
about them. (if-) What better way than through these 
missionaries who professed friendship and offered to 
help the people? Xn this context, it is not clear 
whether the Ngoni looked upon the missionaries as
(1) Hartmann, Missbl.„ I8 9 8, n.2, p.30.
(2 ) Adams, Plena te, pp.124, 126.
(3) There are numerous instances of the leaders giving 
assistance. For example, Chabruma sent them presents 
when they came to his town in I899 to build a mission 
and then ordered hundreds of men and women to assist 
in the building of the hut, see C.Spiss, Missbl., 
Peramiho Chronicle, 4,1899» p.119*
(4) This seems to have been quite evident in the 
attentiveness Chabruma gave to Alfons Adams when the 
latter visited his capital in 1899» see Adams, 
Pienste, pp. 124-6.
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religious specialists or another part of the German 
military establishment. It seems they saw them as 
religious specialists. Missionaries, such as Adams, 
certainly sought to give this impression. Secondly, 
the Ngoni seem to have seen the missionaries as pawns 
in the internal political situation. This seems to 
have been the case in Njelu, where the recently- 
appointed nkosi (an unofficial title then), Mputa, 
sought to confirm his status among his divided peopfLe, 
Mputa*s opponents identified more with the government(1) 
so may have played this off against the missionaries. 
Thar^Imay have been a similar sort of situation in 
Mshope, where Chabruma sought to monopolize the 
missionaries to the exclusion of his rival Palangu.
But no data was found to suggest this and it appears 
that Palangu was not sufficiently strong to present 
the challenge that the dissident group in Njelu offered 
to its leaders. Thirdly, the people appear to have 
welcomed the missionaries for the material benefits 
they brought.(2) This would, initially, have been in 
the form of tribute given to leaders for the right to 
build schools among things. Later, it would have been 
the money received for labour and the selling of food.
(1) As evidenced by their actions during the rebellion
in I9 0 5 , these described below, Chapter Five, section
II,
(2) This was shown in the willingness to woi'k for them, 
see Missbl., Peramiho Chronicle, A.1899, p.1 1 9 , and 
to sell produce to them, Kigonsera Chronicle,
2 .1 9 0 2, p.^7 .
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Fourthly, according to Komfoa, Mputa knew of the 
educational system being set up west of the lake 
and wanted one himself.(1) Why he should have wanted 
one is not e*plumed Finally, there may have been a 
fear of missionaries, yet a realization that they could 
do only limited harm if carefully controlled. On the 
other hand, the missionaries seem to have used their 
identification with the boma to compel the leaders to 
accept them.(2 )
While the Ngoni felt uncei'tainty about the Germans, 
their interest in them appears to have been counteracted 
by lack of interest. This is suggested by the continuing 
preoccupation with internal polltical.life, which, to the 
Ngoni leadership, was more important than the new forces 
in their midst. The most important manifestation of 
this preoccupation xvras in the 1893 succession in Njelu, 
following the death of Mlamilo Gama. Though very little 
information was found on this succession, it seems that, 
once again, the dissension between the Mlamilo and the 
Zamchaya groups troubled the kingdom. The Mlamilo 
group appears to have supported Usangila, the senior 
son of Mharule while Zamchaya's supporters put forth 
Mputa, the elder brother of Zamchaya who had returned 
from west of the lake for this succession.(3) Mputa 
was older than Zamchaya, he was an experienced fighter 
and appears to have been a very confident man. There
(1) Komfoa, op cit, p.
(2 ) As suggested by Adams, DxehBte,
(3) Ebner, History, p.130.
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does not appear to have been any formal selection.
Rather Mputa seems to have assumed a de facto leader­
ship over the society. .Ebner suggests that people
recognized he was not the more eligible but could do 
little about it.(l) It is not clear whom the military 
manduna supported, though it seems they xvere xvilling to 
accept Mputa. This is indicated by their support for 
him in the 19^5 rebellion, a support not given by the 
faction xvhich failed in their bid for leadership. (2 ) 
Moreover, it seems reasonable that military men, xvho had 
no aspirations to the nkosiship themselves would have 
found it in their interest to support the candidate 
xvith the greater military proficiency. This candidate 
xvas Mputa. Members of the group supporting Usangila, 
who included Chabruma Gama and Putire(3)» appear to have 
become alienated from Mputa after 1o98(^), and internal 
rivalries in Njelu apxoear to have remained a searious 
problem into 1905. The German authorities tended to 
be somewhat withdrawn from the whole struggle. Their 
reaction to the strife that xvas going on was to abolish 
the nkosiship in Njelu. Spiss justified this action:, 
when xvriting that there xvas so much trouble betxveen 
royal factions as to xvho xvas X3retender and xvho shoult 
succeed that civil xvar xvould have resulted had not the 
Germans abolished the title of nkosl.(5)
(1) Ebner to Redmond, interviexvs , 18-21,10 • 1971; Ebner, 
.History, p.1 5 8 .
(2) As shoxvn beloxv, Chapter Five, section IX.
(3) MMR/6/6S/3/I, analysis 'by T.V/.Turuka,
(^) MMR/6/68/3/3/l, evidence and tradition of Laurenti Fusi.
(5) Spiss, Kingoni. p.3.
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It is useful here to comment on Gulliver's 
claim that the advent of German domination 'was 
keeping the Njelu kingdom together at a time when it 
was dangerously weakened in unity by the independence 
of the leading ndunas" .(1) Gulliver in incorrect in 
this claim. First, the main cause of disunity before 
I897 w a s  the rivalry within the royal family, not the 
independence of manduna. This rivalry xvas not resolved 
by the introduction of colonial rule. Rather it was 
intensified. The German decision to abolish the 
nkosiship involved ignoring, rather than attempting to 
resolve, the problem. The friction xvas stronger than ever 
by 1905* as xvill be shown beloxv.(2) Again, German 
administrative policies appear to have been much likelier 
to foster the independence of manduna than to control it. 
These policies included the appointment of nduna Songea 
as their leading Ngoni subordinate official and the reducing 
of the poxvers of the nkosi to the level of those of the 
manduna. If the kingdom xvas not further xveakened in 
unity after 18971 it xvas because some leaders, particularly 
the military manduna, appear to have worked for unity by 
supporting Mputa.
A second manifestation of lack of interest in the 
nexv German rule xvas the unofficial continuance of some 
aspects of traditional life. The continuance xvas 
unofficial in that the Germans did not recognize it.
(1) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey. p.1 7 .
(2) See beloxv, Chapter Five, section II#
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An example of such continuance was in aspects of the 
structure of power. Though the Station Chief had 
become the ultimate authority in the district, the 
nkosi in each kingdom continued to be recognized for 
what he was. This was shown most forcefully in Likuyu, 
where people who had been given independence from nkosi 
Chabruma in 1897 nonetheless followed him in 1905» 
rather than an aklda who appears to have given them 
greater independence.(1) A second example of continuance, 
also within the structure of traditional power, was the 
retention of influence within Ngoni society by the 
women in the nkosi 's 'houses1. F$llebom praised these 
women in Njelu in 1897: "These women behaved like true
princesses; they acted freely and openly towards us, and 
in their charm, they were noble and wonderful; they were as 
courteous and energetic as the best of men, whom they also 
seemed to excel in intelligence,"(2) Adams praised their 
counterparts in Mshope in much the same way a year later.(3 ) 
The fluctuating interest shown by the leaders appears 
to have begun giving way to a fir er response after a 
few years of colonial rule. The German rulers demanded 
attention by their deeds, and the leaders and people had 
to come to terms with these. The reactions of the leaders 
were varied. Some pursued a policy of comparative 
neutrality and isolation for a while. Chabruma Tawete 
was one of these. Gulliver describes his activities:
(1) See below, Chapter Five, section IZI.
(2 ) F^lleborn, op cit, p.1^7 .
(3) Adams, D i e n s t e , p . 126 .
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" Ch <0  was far more truculent C^han Mputa]) and had
several brushes itfith the German officers at Songea
boma...in the tradition of the high autocracy of the
Mshope Nkosi (haD was ^ar loss ready to give way to
the white man’1, (1) But for some, isolation proved to
be an unsuccessful approach. Fusi Gama appears to have
tried it, but after being repeatedly summoned to the
boma to answer for his apparent uncooperative attitudes,
he han|ed himself*(2) There were a number who, outwardly,
were friendly to the Germans. for instance, Songea seemed
very co-operative in fulfilling the new duties demanded
of him. Mpambalioto was another who was friendly to the
missionaries, allowing them to build a school in his
area. One missionary seemed to look upon him with
disguised respect when writing, in 1 9 0 1:
"The Wangoni live under chiefs... whose children they 
are. They settle all quarrels and eiT^oy great prestige... 
Above the chiefs are the Sultans, to whom greater 
(deference]) is given.. .Sometimes these chiefs and 
Sultans rule very tyranically. One, for instance, 
whom X personally know, is Pambalioto, that is to 
say, "the f ire-bringer ". • . when he is angry with 
someone, he simply sets the person’s house 011 fire 
without allowing the person to step outside it."(3 )
Yet, while friendly, most of these leaders I’etained
their traditional attitudes, as, for example, Mpambalioto
in 1906
who was^ to scorn Christianity and praise the old military 
society with its belief s. ? r, A f e w  established close 
relations with the Europeans. For instance, Mputa 
became very friendly with the Benedictines, who visited
(1) Gulliver, An Adminis trative Survey , p.17*
(2) C.Spiss, Missbl., Peramiho Chronicle, 3*1901; Ebner, 
His tory, pp. 1.58-9.
(3) ftSfliger, "Land", pp.6-8 , 65-8; see also Adams, 
Dienste, p.128.
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him quite regularly. Indeed, he even attended 
religious services at times. (1) Ihitire Gama also 
became very friendly with the missionaries and, by 
1 9 0 5» appears to have been accepting their ideas, 
advice and attitudes.(2) Finally, there are indications 
that members of the XJsangila faction identified somewhat 
with the German government.(3)
Gradually attitudes hardened one way or the other.
On one side was assembled the overwhelming majority of 
the leadei's, who were strongly opposed to the intruders.
For instance, Chabruma Tawete seems to have accepted that 
it was not possible to remain neutral if he wished to 
retain as much of his power as possible, and, from time 
to time, he came into conflict iirith the Germans. The 
most renowned instance, noted above, was when he was 
take to task for passing the death-penalty on a 
follower. (ij>) Again, Mputa learnt that friendship was 
not alnrays beneficial and, when the missionaries 
interfered with his religious beliefs through burning 
the Mahoka Hut, he stopped all contact with them. There 
were many general grievances to upset the leaders. They 
saw power and influence slipping from their hands,as they 
no longer controlled political life. They felt the ignomny 
of subjects 1 of theirs rising to positions of responsibility 
in the missions and government and showing an impertinence
(1) He attended the official opening of the mission at
Peramiho, see Spiss, Missbl., Peramiho Chronicle, 1899*
p.1 0 2 .
(2) As will be shown below, Chapter Five, section XI.
(3) Ibid; MMR/6/6 8/3/l, analysis of T.W.Turuka.
(^) See above,
and, worse,,acquiring a power and prestige which they 
would never have had without German "backing. They saw 
others becoming’great on their legacy* They esqoerienced 
a declining economic power, because of labour shortages 
and the closing of their sources of revenue. They knew 
they were being forced to accept missions, even if they 
did not want them. They suffered the Indignity of coastal 
peoples* taking their women. They begrudged paying taxes. 
So, they longed for a return to the past.(1)
In that small element which apparently saw some 
advantage in thenGerman presence, there appears to have 
been a gradual acceptance of the new order. Probably 
the most important individual in this group was Putire 
Gama, who became notably receptive to the Christian 
influence. As a factor motivating this receptiveness 
one cannot dismiss his generally independent frame of 
mind.(2) The only other important individuals to 
acquiesce in the german presence appears to have been 
a few of Usangila,s supporters, who may have seen political 
advantage in their actions. As their acquiesence is closely 
tied in with the Maji Maji rebellion, it is discussed in 
detail in the relevant chapter. Finally, the youth in 
mission and government schools appear to have begun to 
accept that there were advantages to the German presence 
and to learn how to operate under it. The youth, however,
(1) The preceding paragraph is a summary of the changes 
discussed above in section I.
(2) See above,. Chapter 3, p# ^ 1.
were a very unimportant force before 190.5.
As the general reactions of the leadership 
appeared to harden, frustration seemed to set in.
The leaders, while disliking the Germans, found 
themselves quite powerless to affect much change.
If they were too blatant in ignoring the Germans, they 
suffered inevitable reprisals. For example, as late 
as I9 0I, punitive expeditions were being conducted 
against chiefs who had r'efused to come to the boma for 
conferences.(1) As the reference to these expeditions 
offers 110 details whatsoever, it is not possible to 
say any more-about them. This is unfortunate, as it 
would foe very useful to know against whom they were 
undertaken and, consequently, what influence they had 
on the Maji Maji wars. A few people talked of military 
reaction, but they had to be careful. For instance, on 
one occasion, a rumour had spread to Songea that the 
Africans along the coast had rebelled. ¥hen the Station 
Chief learnt of the rumour he, determined to suppress 
any possibility, detained a number of people whom he 
suspected of spreading the rumour. One of these was 
Laurenti Fusi, who later wrote that they were put in 
chains and that he was freed only because the Benedictines 
pleaded his case,(2 ) On one occasion, a chief did rebel. 
Though he was not Ngoni, his action and the German 
x'eaction to it, must have made it clear to Ngoni leaders
(1) DKB, v.XII, n.ll, 1.6.1901,
(2 ) MMR/6/6 8/2/3/l.
how futile such action was. The chief was Mandawa, 
a Matengo leader. In 1901, he had. welcomed the 
missionaries into his area, only to find that, a 
year later, the Germans were there demanding taxes.
He I'eacted strongly to this by burning the school 
and refusing to pay taxes. The Germans sent an 
expedition into his area, which they burned and looted, 
and took him off to the coast as a captive.(1) The 
other chiefs were patient. They appear to have bean 
becoming more dissatisfied, but knew that, since the 
Germans were the stronger power, little could be done.(2) 
The Germans, themselves, appear to have seen that the 
era of Ngoni autocratic rule was coming to an end. For 
instance, .John Booth wrote in 1905 that, with the death 
of the leaders at the time, the centralized political 
structure of Ngoni society would come to an end.(3)
His comment was soon to be shown to be premature, as 
the Ngoni leaders were to seize, in 1905» &n opportunity 
to preserve their leadership,
While it is reasonable to accept that the ’true 
Ngoni1 were, on the whole, very dissatisfied with German 
entry, the same cannot easily be said of the ‘sutu1, or 
mass of the people. Indeed, contrary to a current 
emphasis in Tanzanian historiography on this issue, not 
all local people appear to have been dissatisfied with
(1) Kigonsera Chronicle: 9.9.I9OI; 1.3.1902; 2.3 .1902; 
3.3.1902; h.3.1902; 8.3.1902; 18.3.1902; 30.3.1902.
These are in the PA,
(2) R.A,Austen, Northwest Tanzania under German and British 
Rude, (London, 196^ 7*7 Yale UP, p.38 wrote of the German 
inability "to communicate to the local Africans anything 
more than the immediate superiority of European 
military force."
(3) Booth, "Die Nachkommen", p.197.
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the German occupation at this time. The coming of the 
Germans brought many changes to the lives of the ’sutu1. 
The ending of raiding and plundering had adversely 
affected many ’sutu’, as it had the 'true Ngoni'. Many 
had gained fame, and some wealth, from raids and 
participation in the military state. But not all.
Indeed, there were a good many subjects within the 
state who benefited little from Ngoni military society.
To these, their life had been a disadvantageous one 
in which they sustained the state by their tribute of 
goods and men, in return for which, they received little. 
To such people, the German arrival was not a wholly bad 
thing* Tor instance, it seems quite lilcely that the 
Matengo in south-west Njelu appreciated having their 
own leaders and not having to pay taxes to the Ngoni, 
Again, the Ndendeule of north-east Mshope appear to 
have appreciated the change. One wrote: "We the 
Wahamba QVandendeule] somehow Appreciated a number of 
the German rules because they directly opposed the Ngoni 
rules, especially of using us as unpaid servants".(1)
Moreover, in many aspects of German-controlled life, 
there were greater opportunities and more rights for 
subjects than there hkd been before. Many found they 
could participate more in administration, especially in 
matters such as the selection of Jumbes.(2) They may 
have had foreign leaders above them, but they had always
(1) IMii/R/S/l/ 69 , tradition of Kawahili .
(2) Ibid,
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had this, for the 'true Ngoni' too.were foreign
to them. In economic life, many found new opportunities
under the Germans. Individuals could go to the coast
to earn money, then return, keeping it.(l) If the}'
were asked to xoerform free labour, it was something
they had done earlier, anjnmy, for their leaders. Those
groups who, formerly, gave part of their produce to the
'true Ngoni', could now keep it. Tor peoples such
as the Matengo, it seems reasonable to suspect that
this was a considerable improvement on life before 1 8 9 7.(2 }
Moreover, with the new crops onjwhich the Germans were
experimenting, they would eventually benefit. In trade,
they participated more. The main reason was their
freedom to collect and sell, independently, rubber and
beeswax which were being demanded by Indian and Arab
traders.(3) In the judicial realm, while there were
few changes on the lowest lekel of justice, there were
many, generally beneficial, on the higher levels. The
main change was that now the Germans, rather than the
'true Ngoni' handled criminal cases, at which they appear
now
to have been accepted^as equals with their former masters.
The above is not meant to imply that there were 
no grievances: there were some. The 'sutu' found the 
German soldiers difficult to appreciate, particularly 
in their roughness and their readiness to take local 
women, (ij-) They resented the high-handed attitudes of
(1) Money appears to have been given individually no%. 
wheras before 1897 it was given to the leaders.
(2 ) Particularly if full credence is given to the quote, p.132.
(3) As discussed above, p.2 7 0, especially fn.^.
( M  TNA/155/SDB, v ,2, p.B; The MMR/6/6 8 ... series have other 
instances of complaint.
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the Germans. In one case, some Ndendeule refused to 
relocate their villages to a more accessible area 
after being directed to do so by the Germans. As 
a result, they had their villages burnt down and were 
forcibly relocated.(1) They resented taxation and, 
occasionally, as in Mandawa1s case, rebelled against 
it. Some resented being told what to do by outsiders.{2) 
Finally, they lost the prestige of being associated 
with the 'true Ngoni' once these, as everyone else, 
became subjects of the Germans.
But, all in all, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
the 'sutu' were in two minds over German entry. "Various 
traditions and contemporary records indicate this. For 
example, though a number of traditions collected by 
students of the University of Bax' es Salaam confirmed 
that many 'sutu' disliked the German presence, others 
indicate that they were satisfied with it. One researcher 
commented on the feelings of the i>eople n© collected 
evidence from; "The Wandendeule 'liked' the Germans 
relajgfcive to the Ngoni. After all the rules were not 
strictly executed; for instance, a person who could rum-* 
from the clerks who were collecting taxes was not chased,"(3 )
(1) TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.B; Gulliver, An Administrative 
Survey, p . 89 names them as the Jumbeates of Ilonga, 
Mpigamiti, and Tuliani in Likuyu.
(2) As, for example, in forced labour. For one case of 
this, see Missbl. , Peramiho Chronicle, if-,1899, p .1 1 9  
which notes soldiers building a bridge with Ngoni 
they had collected.
(9) MMR/R/S/I/6 9 .
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Contemporary records also reflected some contentment,
For instance, Adams wrote in 1899 that the Nyasa were 
pleased with German arrival.(1) Again, the government 
at Songea announced in 190^ that the people willingly 
held meetings from time tor.time to meet government 
officials.(2) Finally, the actions of various 
important and lowly individuals in accepting and working 
with the Germans showed some willingness to change the 
old order.
Thus, by I9 0 5 , the Ngoni had reacted in a complex 
manner to the rough new world of German domination.
The 'true Ngoni' included many malcontents, though a 
few found German rule to their advantage, while the 
'sutu', though probably as dissatisfied as ever with
their lot, were a little less unhappy than they had been
before 1 8 9 7. It was into this complex society that 
Kinjala came in the summer of I905 to bring the news 
that God would be on the side of the Ngoni if they
were to go to war against the Germans.
(1) Adams, Dienste. p.1 2 9.
 ^ n »l8 » 1 .9 .190^, p.5 6 5 •
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Chapter 5
Maji Maji and the Rejection of Subjugation
I
By 1905 many Germans were comingsto the conclusion 
that the Ngoni had made a peaceful transition from their 
former, military life to the peaceful life of agricultural 
pursuit now being imposed on them. One German writer noted 
that these formerly much-feared people were now stripped 
of spirit. He added, showing some foresight: "if this 
is not all a deception, Ungoni is on the way to a 
flourishing economic future"(l). The colonial government 
itself felt sufficiently confident to act as if a new 
era was beginning. In 1905* it formally changed the 
offioial status of Songea from that of a district run by 
the military to one run by civilians*(2) A District 
Officer (Bezirksamtmann) replaced the Station Chief.
The military garrison was reduced. The new District 
Officer cautioned his superiors against reduoing the 
military presence at Songea lest the people there see 
this as a sign of German weakness.(3) If such happened, 
they might exploit it as such. However, confidence was 
in the air so though the oaution was noted, it was 
disregarded.
(1) John Booth, "Die Naohkommen der Sulukaffern (Wangoni) 
in Deutsch Ostafrika", Globus. lxxxviii, (1905), p.197.
(2) TNA/GV112, Foreign Office, Berlin to Govt., DSM, KA46ifr5 
of 8.^.1905; I.G.Kozak, Two Rebellions in German East 
Afrioa T^heir Study in Microcosm. MA, Howard University, 
19^8 , p. 86 incorrectly states that the ohange^was made
in 1904,
(3) G.vonGfJtzen, Deutsch-Ost-Afrika im Aufstand. 1 9 0 5-0 6. 
(Berlin, 1909)V~P#50 states that there were 68 men in 
the Songea polioo force at the outbreak of rebellion.
Any optimism for the future, however, was to 
be short-lived. By the summer of 1905* trouble had 
arisen in Songea*s neighbouring district of Kilwa,
There the pressures of increased government control, 
of forced cotton production, of taxation, and of 
uncertainty over the future had led to a powerful 
religious revival which soon took on political over­
tones, The revival was manifested by the spread of 
the beliefs of a respected prophet, or mganga.
Kinjikitile Ngwale, among the Ngindo and Matumbi,(l) 
Kinjikitile offered the people a medicine of sacred 
water, or maji, which, when taken, would release them 
from the restrictions of existing beliefs and superstitions 
by giving them a new and freer life,(2) News of his 
medioine had been spreading since 1904 and, by 1 9 0 5, 
large numbers of people were coming to his residence at 
Ngalanga to partake of the maji. They were told to 
administeijfthis medicine to their bodies and to observe 
certain rituals and rules. In return, they would receive 
its benefits, one of which was immunity from bullets.
Those who took the maji were, thus, to be able to expel 
the Germans,
By July 1905» some Matumbi, anxious at the continuing 
delay in the struggle to oust the Germans, began uprooting
(1) He was also known as Bokero,
(2) TNA/16/37/29, B*ll, "The Maji Maji Rebellion in Liwale 
District", draft copy, (henceforth, Sail, "Maji Maji"); 
W,0*Henderson, "German East Africa, 1884-1918", in
V.Harlow et al, eds,, History of East Africa. v,2, 
(Oxford, 1 9 6 5); John Iliffe, Tanganyika under German 
Rule 1905-1912. (Cambridge, 19^9/; A detailed study 
of Maji Maji will be forthcoming shortly from G.C.K. 
Gwassa who is presently completing research on such 
for his PhD from the University of Dar es Salaam,
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ootton plants at Nandote* Shortly afterwards, they 
forced their local akida. or area representative, to 
flee for his life* On 15 August, a neighbouring people, 
the Ngindo, attacked and destroyed the boma at Liwale*
By this time, the news of an uprising appears to 
have reached Songea, for tension was in the air* In 
mid-August, John Booth cabled a warning to the Governor 
that the Ngoni seemed to be on the verge of rebellion*(1) 
The tension was soon heightened by more omnious develop­
ments* A detachment from Songea boma, under Sargeant 
Thiede, which had gone to assist the German forces at 
Li wale, was attacked and annihilated en^ route* (2)
After Liwale boma was overrun, rebellion spread 
quickly amongst the peoples of southern German East 
Africa* Prophets moved east, north and west to bring 
to others the promise of the maji* Their sucoess in 
spreading the word is described by John Iliffe:
"Within a fortnight (of late July}, nearly all the 
peoples surronding the Rufiji valley, from Kilosa 
to Liwale, were in revolt* Missionaries, Arabs,
Indians, akidas, askari, and all who had contact 
with the government were threatened. By the end 
of August the Ngindo had taken the movement into 
two further regions, southwards into the Lukuledi 
Valley, where the mission stations were destroyed, 
and westwards into the Kilombero Valley and the 
surronding highlands* On 30 August 3,000 Mbunga 
and Pogoro launched a desperate assault on the 
strongly fortified military station at Mahenge, 
attempting to seize the machine-guns bodily from 
their operators* They were repulsed with terrible 
casualties*"(3)
(1) Gotzen, op cit, p.81*
(2) Ibid., p.9 5 .
(3) Iliffe, Tanganyika, p.19^ see also John Iliffe, 
"The organization of the Maji Ma^i Rebellion", 
JAH, v.VIII, (1967), n*3.
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Ey thejtime of the onslaught on the boma at Mahenge, the, maji
had been brought to Songea by a prophet named Omari Kinjala.
Kinjala has been remembered as a powerful and moving man
with a mission in life* One who saw him described him thus:
"..•a young man who was always clothed in a white loin cloth 
that was kept together by. a white girdle. He was the type 
of man who would not easily communicate with the common 
people, claiming that he had been sent by God and further 
alleging that God himself would come after him."(1)
Kinjala made contact with Mkomanilo, a relative-of Chabruma*s
and friend of Palangu’s, and after telling her of the maji,
she brought him to see Chabruma.
According to one tradition(2), Chabruma had heard of the
massacre of the Songea detachment. Moreover, he seems to have
known of the ma.ji. Accordingly, he was attentive to what Kinjala
had.to say. While one author claims he readily accepted the ma.ji(3)?
others say he doubted. His son, Dominikus MLssoro, writes:
"(He} consulted a diviner, {whose] divination confirmed Mkomanilo. 
Chabruma then went .to Mgendi to make closer enquiries and .sent 
Palangu^s brother Kapungu to Ngarambe Hill, the local headquarters 
of the aji Maji cult where it was stated that the spirits of 
their grandfathers would be visible and the God of the Sea (water] 
would be consulted. Kapungu returned and affirmed that the 
departed spirits supported the proposed rising."^)
Chabruma also' tested the medicine, first oh a dog, then on his
recalcitrant subject, %ayi, and though it failed in both cases(5)., .
he decided to take it. While some traditions say he was pressured
into doing so by his manduna, it is likely that he; accepted freely.
(1) Mapunda & f^angara, Ifeji Maji, p.15; Ebner,- History, p.168.
(2) MKR/6/68/V3/1 ^ , tradition of L.Moyo, a Kalanga living with nduna 
Songea in 1905. A grown.man at the time, his evidence is probably
the finest of all that collected on Songea in the MMR project.
(3) Gulliver, Ah Administrative Survey, p. 15. ;
(4-) Mapunda & Mpangara, A j i  Maji7' p.15; Dominikus' fled Songea in 1905 
■ with the missionaries, see PA, St.Scholastika Chronicle, 8.9.1905.
(5) MMR/6/68/^/3/7 , tradition of K.K.Haule, a participant in rebellion..
(6) MMR/6/68/V3/2; 0.Guise-Williams to Pedmond, .interview, 30.9.1971,
: he was told Palangu persuaded Chabruma to fight. '
Headquarters for the administering of the maji 
were set up at Uwerekwa, near Chabruma's capital, 
while secondary- ablution centres were set up at Likuyu, 
Luwegu, Namtumbo and Kitanda*(l) The intricate 
ceremonies associated with the taking of the maji 
were carried out at all centres* Mapunda and Mpangara 
describe the ceremony and some prescriptions which went 
with the taking of the maji;
"The maji was not in fact literally 1drunk1 as the 
word itself implies* Instead a leaf or preferably 
a feather was used to sprinkle the medicine on each 
warrior*s forehead, chest, knees, feet, elbows and 
back*•.Besides the maji itself, the medioine men gave 
the people a long list of prescriptions which they 
had to believe, observe and adhere to. Among many 
other things, it was said that every old medicine 
should be burned; every red goat, red pigeon, and 
hen should be killed but be left without being eaten; 
people should not wash; if anyone saw a snake he had 
to sprinkle flour on the spot where the snake had 
been seen passing; women gathering beans should trill; 
people should not eat cassava; when fighting the 
Ngoni warrior should always look forwards and shout 
the words *Masi, Masi*; greetings should be in the 
form of *Saidi, Saidi' Hongo, Hongo! Boma, Boma*; 
every soldier should tie little sticks of millet 
on his forehead* All those who had drunk the maji 
shoudl not eat simsim or pigeon peas* Under no 
circumstances should a soldier who had drunk the 
maji come into sexual contact with his wife. The 
first German soldiers or servants caught by the 
Ngoni must be killed by hacking the backs of their 
necks with a knife* The Maji Maji soldiers had to 
believe a monkey from the coast would jump on the 
roofs of the European houses, pour oil on them and 
burn them, and that after the war had started two 
spirits (vimulungu){2 ) of both sexes would join on 
the side of the Ngoni to accelerate the defeat of 
the Germans."(3)
(1) MMR/6/68/Jf/l, analysis by Mapunda and Mpangara*
(2) for further comments on vimulungu, see Ibid and 
J.Komba, God and Man* PhD, Pontifical University 
of the Propagation of the Faith, (Rome), 1959# 
P*7.
(3) Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji Maji. p.18; see also, 
PA, Kigonsera Chronicle, II.9 .I9 0 5 .
A number of the Mshope Ngoni were apparently 
reluctant to accept the medicine.(1) However, the 
powerful Chabruma tolerated little dissension and, 
apparently only one leader later denied having participated. 
This leader was Namabengo, a female nduna. whose participation 
is unlikely to have been demanded anyway. The *sutuf 
acquiesced rather than face Chabruma*s anger. "You 
could not object to what Chabruma had accepted", one 
commented.(2) Shortly after he had decided to take the 
maji and rebel against the Germans, Chabruma sent word 
to Mputa informing him of the powerful medicine he had 
and asking him to join in the war. Mputa was interested 
and went to Uwerekwa to take the maji. As the supply of 
water possessed by Kinjala was limited, a local river, 
the Chitaka, was blessed and its water used. This river 
was later called "Maji ya Mputa".(3) When Mputa returned 
to Njelu, he had the water distributed to his manduna.
Instead of meetifig in one place, the manduna seem to 
have taken the maji in their own areas.(^)
Acceptance of the maji in Njelu was more mixed than 
it had been in Mshope. Mputa lacked the power and 
authority of Chabruma and was unable to impose his will 
on all his people. A number of leaders refused to accept 
majj. The reasons for rejection were varied. Probably
(1) As suggested in their behavior during the rebellion, 
see heiow section III and fn.2, this page.
(2) flapoftda arxcl Mpangara. Maji Maji, p. 18.
(3) JiDnor, History, p.170 WCTeSrtfTat Kinjala came to 
Njelu to administer the water to Mputa. Some versions 
state that nduna Songea received the maji before Mputa, 
eg, see Iliffe, "Organization", p.511; MMR/6/68/Jf/3/l6.
(k) MMR/6/68/4/3/1&* L.Moyo states that Chabruma, Mputa and 
Songea all took the medicine at their headquarters.
"There was no formal meetingfor consultation between 
the three heads"; Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji Maji. p.19.
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the most important was the political dissension which 
had rent the kingdom for some twenty years. It was 
this which led Chabruma Gama, Putire Gama and Usangila 
Gama, all opponents of Mputa, to abstain.(1) A second 
reason appears to have been mission influence, which 
is noted to have been a second influence working on 
Putire.(2) An odd leader may have been compromised.
An example was, apparently, Kazibure, a son of Mpambalioto, 
who acted as interpreter for the Germans and was later 
appointed Sultan.(3) Finally, a fow were in no position 
to participate. People in this category included the 
youth in mission and government schools. The 'sutu*, 
here as in Mshope, generally had little choice. If 
their leaders took the maji. they came under heavy 
pressure to do likewise. Doubts as to the efficacy of the 
water were expressed in Njelu as they had been in Mshope. 
For instance, nduna Songea sought the advice of a 
religious leader, was told defeat was imminent, and 
entered the war saying ’’let us ’drink* the maji maji 
medicine so that we may all perish11. (**)
Prospects of success, first weakened by the failure 
of the Ngoni to unite, were then further harmed by the 
Ngoni failure to persuade neighbouring peoples to join 
them. The reasons for this are not too hard to find.
One was fear of the Ngoni. Some neighbours, such as
(1) Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji Maji. pp.13-9.
(2) Ibid, p.1 9 .
(3) TNA/155/SDB, v.**, p.87.
(**) Iliffe, ’’Organization”, p . 5 H t Kozak, op cit, p.89
writes that Fr.Leuthner wrote in the Feramiho Chronicle 
on 29.8.1905 of the Njelu: ’’the chiefs realize that 
they are not able to join the war because their own 
people refuse to join* The news of many deaths of the 
Ngindo and the measures undertaken by Songea have 
frightened off the people. Now the ohiefs are seeking 
friendly terms with the government.”
250
the Nyasa and Ruvnma Yao, had, been attacked and subjugated 
by the Ngoni in previous years and, though they disliked the 
Germans, they appear •to have had a still greater fear of the 
Ngoni. Indeed, both peoples apparently offered some support 
to the Germans,(1) A second reason for non-alliance was 
awareness of German might. This seems to have inspired Matengo 
neutrality.(2) The Matengo had suffered German repression in 
1900 ind may not have wanted the same again. Awareness of German 
might certainly induced the Hehe not to join Chabruma. They had 
been badly shattered by the 1,89*1 -8 war and were, anyway, occupied 
by the Germans shortly after rebellion began.(3) They appear, 
also, to have held some emnity towards Chabruma Tawete who had 
refused to ally with them in the 1890s, Emnity seems also to have 
been an important reason for the neutrality of the Mpepo Ngoni, 
Mpepo and Chabruma had once fought for the nkosiship of Mshope / 
and, presumably, the legacy of bitterness was not forgotten.'
Mpepo, moreover, tried the maji and found that it failed. (4*) 
Possibly it was emnity which persuaded the Yao chief, Mataka, 
not to respond to Songea*s reported request for assistance.(5.) 
During the 1880s and 1890s, there had been long and bitter
(1) KKA, "Politische Zustande in D0A,T, Johannes Report, notes/ 
Ruvuma Yao support;. PA, Kigohsera Chronicle, 29.91905, notes 
the Nyasa being friendly to Germans.
(2) MLssbl., 19.0.5/6, n.6, p.87-91 states they remained neutral;
PA, Kigonsera Chronicle, 7.9.1905, states that under intense 
Ngoni pressure, neutrality was giving way to participation.
(3> MMR/6/680/3, tradition of Albert Tawete, Mshope nkosi, 1954-62,
(4*) Mapunda & Mpangara, "Maji Maji, p.24*.
(5) ibid., p.24* quote Gtftzen, op cit, p.161 noting the letter. They 
doubt its validity there / though in I-M^ /6/68/4/1 they accept it. 
As the Ngoni had a long-standing contact with Mataka and indeed, 
sought refuge with.him after Mhji Maji,. the authenticity of the 
letter deserves to be tentatively accepted.
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fighting between Mataka. and his father and the Njelu Ngoni 
of Mharule, Miamilo and Songea. Fourthly,. rejection of 
alliance could have, been due to-identification With the 
Germans as was the case, with the Arabf. Rashid bin Masoud.
Rashid, probably the most powerful man in Songea in 1903, 
was of crucial importance.(1) He had many well-trained, and -armed 
retainers and his support could have ensured an early Ngoni 
success. But Rashid had been identified with the Germans since 
1814 2^), knew their strength and presumably had few doubts that 
any rebellion would be smashed. So he rejected the Ngoni request 
for alliance. Finally, rejection of alliance was due to the 
internal political situation in the kingdoms of some allies.
For example, Merere, Chabruma*s one-time ally., seems to have 
wanted to join the rebellion but was outvoted by powerful.tribal 
elders who saw no sense in rebellion.(3) The Germans ensured his 
neutrality by virtually keeping him a prisoner throughout the rebellion. 
Of all the neighbours approached, only the.Bena'under Ngozi Ngozi, 
Mbeyera's son, agreed to'join the Ngoni in rebellion. In the end, 
with little support from their neighbours, but'with determination and 
some confidence in themselves, the majority of the leaders of the 
Ngoni led their followers into rebellion.
II
Why did the Ngoni rebel?
The earliest answers came from the German colonial rulers. In 
late 1903, Graf von Gtftzen, the Governor of German East Africa gave 
the Foreign Office in Berlin thirteen explanations for the rebellion,
(1) Gdtzen, op cit, pp.101, 103, '110-3; TNA/G3/77, ^jor Johannes to 
Commander-in-Chief, Kais. Schutztruppe, i3.10.1907.
(R) See above, p.166.
(3) MMR/3/68/1 /3/8, tradition of M.M.Merere.
including among them taxation, reaction to ootton 
growing, communal work and land alienation*(1) In 
1 9 0 9* be published what is the only major contemporary 
German account of the rebellion*(2) In it, he suggested 
that the major reasons for rebellion had been the 
superstitious nature of the people along with the 
running down, but not complete destruction, of their 
previous military power,(3) Another analysis was suggested 
by a committee appointed by the foreign Office to look 
into the causes of rebellion and to recommend changes.
One committee member was John Booth* He considered 
rebellion to have been the result both of an attempt 
by Ngoni leaders to regain their power and of a spreading 
of the maji*(4)
A second group to offer their views were the 
Benedictine missionaries. In a report of late I9 0 6, 
one of their converts described the hopes that the 
recipients of the maji had of expelling the Europeans 
from their country,(5 ) A more ‘official* Benedictine
(1) RKA, "Unruhen in Deutsch Ostafrika", 1ANZ AzKAlGBX5,
13d*3, G*vor&tftzen to foreign Offioe, 9^09 of 
10,11,1905* The writer had very limited use of the 
records of the RKA, so cannot offer a full explanation 
of the official German analysis of Maji Maji immediately 
following it. However , it is not necessary for the 
re-interpretation given below,
(2) Gtftzen, op cit.
(3) Ibid.
(^ ) RKA, "Hilfeleistung und Anlage der Unruhen in 
Deutsch Ostafrika", KA1GR15, Bd.l, 1ANZ, #7.2 8,
Colonial Eoonomic Committee to foreign Office,
23.111966.
(5) PA, Kigonsera Chronicles, 2 1 ,9 ,1 9 0 6, 2 5 ,8.1 9 0 5.
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report on the rebellion was given by the Bishop 
of Bar es Salaam: he suggested that the cause for 
rebellion had been political rather than religious*
He termed the riding a nationalist endeavour,and 
compared it to the struggle of the people of Tirol in 1809 
and the Germans in 1813*(1) The Tiroleans had been 
joined to Bavaria by Napolean in 1806 but bitterly 
resented the subjugation and, in 1309» a peasants' 
array had risen and joined with Austrian forces which, 
in that year, unsuccessfully challenged Napolean*(2)
The German struggle of 1813 was that of the popular 
Prussian-organized war against Napolean in 1813* whioh 
suoceeded in freeing Germany from the invader.(3)
Until the 1950s, most subsequent studies of the 
rebellion were composed by British colonial officials 
who usually saw the rebellion as an expression of 
grievances against unjust German rule.(^) That by 
R.M.Bell on Liwale district is one of the most revealing* 
After analyzing many oral traditions, Bell concluded 
that the Maji Maji rebellion had been a "national war 
of independence - a fanatical and desparate fight for 
freedom”(5)•
(1) PA, '’Die Benediktinermission in der Aufstand in 
Deutsch Ostafr&ka vom Jahre 1905 oder Stellungs- 
nahme der Benediktinermission zur Denkschrift 
#ber die Ursachen des Aufstandes in Deutsches 
Ostafrika und Anderes”, unsigned and undated 
manuscript, unmarked blue file* I am grateful 
to John Iliffe for showing me his copy of this 
document*
(2 ) A.Ramm, Germany 1789*1919. A Political History. 
(London,19^7)7 Methuen, pp790-l.
(3) Ibid*, pp.90-101.
(4) Various references in TNA/I5 5/SDB... and TDB*
(5) BSillJMaji Maji".
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In the 1950s, further work on the Ngoni was 
published by sociologists, missionaries and converts*
The first of these were by the government sociologist,
P.H.Gulliver. In 195**» he wrote that Maji Maji had 
been a purely political effort which had used the 
mail for specific ends;
"•"it seems clear that the Rebellion was primarily a 
military one in the Ngoni warlike tradition and in an 
attempt to regain the old mastery by this tribe of 
soldiers and marauders* It cannot be said that there 
was a really unified Maji Maji movement, or that the 
Ngoni allied themselves with the Ngindo and others - 
these other tribes were thoroughly despised by the 
arrogant Ngoni who had plundered them so easily for 
so long* The Ngoni merely seized the opportunity 
afforded by the ^magical * ’water* to rise against the 
white man and to resume their independence and their 
old way of life and war.H(l)
Gulliver oommented on other effects of German rule, 
such as Chabruma^Tawete *s loss of followers(2 ), but 
gave limited attention to the economic oauses of rebellion' 
In 1959* the missionary, Ebner, published his major 
History of the Wangoni. In it, he argued that the main 
reason for rebellion had been the desire for independence: 
"They hoped to regain their independence by this war and 
to re-establish their former glory and greatness. The 
main reason for the participation of the Wangoni in the 
Majimaji war was a revival of Ngoni nationalism,,.(3)
He identified a few other particular oauses as well, one 
being the burning of the Mahoka Hut. (if)
(1) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.16.
(2) Ibid., p.17.
(3) Ebner, History. p*l67*
(if) Ibid.
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Later in the same year, an African priest from the 
district, J.Komba, wrote a thesis on religion among the 
Ngoni in which he reiterated Ebnert
"The proud Ngoni, once the sole masters of the land, 
could not bear the humiliation of having masters 
over them* The medicine-men, who went about at this 
time advertising their newly discovered medicine which 
would turn bullets into water (maji), offered a welcome 
opportunity to the bellicose Ngoni to rise against their 
European masters."(1)
Thus, of the pre-196l interpretations of Ngoni participation 
in Maji Maji, Nationalism* has figured prominently as 
the main reason for rebellion* This nationalism has 
bee® seen as the struggle of the leaders by Booth, while 
for most others, it has been that of the more general 
"Ngoni** The emphasis on nationalism has varied from 
being very limited, as with British reports, to quite 
explicit, as with the official Benedictine report* Other 
causes mentioned have been general grievances against 
unjust rule, superstition, violation of religious 
beliefs and eoonomic deprivation.
Since 1961, some important new contributions have 
been made. In 196?, John Xliffe synthesised existing 
interpretations of the Maji Maji rebellion as a composite 
phenomenon that "originated in peasant grievances, was then 
sanctified and extended by prophetic religion, and finally 
crumbled as crisis compelled reliance on fundamental 
loyalties of kin and tribe". (2) In M s  view, by the
(1 ) Komba, op cit, p.1 3 .
(2) Iliffe, "Organization", j and see Mapunda and
Mpangara*s analysis of this in MMR/6/68/4/1* PP.10-11.
time the maji had reached Songea, rebellion had 
entered its tribal phase* Without citing other 
causes for the rebellion, Iliffe suggests that the 
maji made an impaot on the Ngoni:
". • *not * • .as a revolutionary and self-legitimizing 
creed*..(But seemingly, itj replaced the ceremony 
led by Chikusi which normally preceded Ngoni warfare. 
Apparently the Ngoni saw the maji not as a prophetic 
anti-scorcery medicine, as had the Vidunda, but as 
a new and uniquely powerful war medioine, superseding 
Chikusi*s normal ministrations. This interpretation 
suggests the basically tribal nature of the Ngoni 
rebellion - perhaps more accurately described as a 
delayed resistance - whose organization and leadership 
drew on a functioning military system. What is 
significant about the impact of the maji is that 
during the Lumecha ceremony(l) it provided a means 
for the reunification of the Ngoni people whose last 
concerted action had taken place in 1 8 8 2,"(2 )
Elsewhere, Iliffe also suggests that the rebellion
was an attempt to re-unite societies that were breaking
up.(3)
Since Iliffe wrote on Ngoni participation in the 
M&jH Maji rebellion, student researchers(4), supervised 
by Iliffe himself, have discovered that the causes of 
Ngoni participation were more complex than those he 
has offered* The students learned that there were a 
few major general complaints, along with various 
particular ones, that underlay the support for rebellion. 
The general ones included resentment of the forced labour 
that people had to provide for the building of the new 
Songea boma around 1900; disillusion with taxation and
(1) This is described below, pp.
(2) Iliffe, "Organization", p.511; 1 or a reapprisal of this 
view, see Mapunda and Mpangara, MMR/6/6 8/if/l, p. 10;
see also M.G.Gillebrand, "The Maji Maji Uprising in 
German East Africa, I9 0 5-I9 0 7", MA African History 
seminar paper, SOAS, I970/7I.
(3) Iliffe in Kimambo and Temu, op oit, p.130-1.
(*0 From the University of Dar es Salaam. They were 
working on an extensive research project on Maji 
Maji being undertaken by the History Department.
Their collected papers comprise the MMR...series.
the demands it made on food and other soaroe resources; 
the general dissatisfaction with the cruelty of the 
German regime* Individual causes included resentment 
at the taking of wives and disillusion with the ending 
of the old system of justice. They also found that the 
Ngoni responded to rebellion in a variety of ways,
A seleotion of the data thus accumulated was 
analyzed by two of the researchers, 0,B.Mapunda and
G,P,Mpangara and published in 1969 as a researoh paper
Thi=. v/ojt
entitled Mgji Maji In Ungoni, They wrote that rebellion
A vV"*“
resulted from: taxation, unpaid labour, the decline of 
Ngoni political power, and the dislocation of traditional 
oulture and eoonomy. They doubted the importance of the 
maji perjse, and felt that political considerations were 
primary. The maji, however, made revolt feasible by 
providing security and unity with others. They noted the 
internal disunity in Njelu and the varied reaction to 
the maji, but the tone of the paper is one of people 
fighting together to oust a common enemy.
Thus, all interpretations of the oauses and course 
of Maji Maji have made it clear that the Ngoni rebelled 
for a variety of political, economic and social reasons 
and that the struggle fought was a common and united one 
for definite aims.
Any further discussion on Ngoni participation in 
Maji Maji must start from the work of John Iliffe and the 
researches that his writings have inspired on the subject. 
In light of these researches, particularly Iliffefs 
seminal article on "the Organization of the Maji Maji
Rebellion1’, the suggestion itausfebe made that the 
subject is now ripe for some re-examination. An 
assumption common to Mapunda and Mpangara and many 
^ previous researchers is that the Ngoni were a single 
group. This is a diffioult proposition to sustain 
in the light of actual Ngoni participation in 
hostilities, let alone earlier Ngoni history. Another 
common assumption is that rebellions are explained by 
the grievances of the insurgants rather than the 
maladministration of the regime rebelled against.
This also is a difficult proposition to sustain in 
the light of the rebellions against colonial overrule, 
but it pervades the more detailed work of Mapunda and 
Mpangara as well as the suggestive article of Iliffe 
himself. Then again, the course of the rebellion 
itself needs dose attention as a factor influencing 
Ngoni participation in it.
Insofar as any single theme has emerged from the 
present study it is that Ngoni participation in the 
Maji Maji rebellion is primarily explicable in terms 
of social distance between ^utu* and ’true Ngoni1• 
This distinction makes more sense of the evidence 
colleoted by Mapunda and Mpangara along with German 
arohival materials examined by the present writer. 
However in itself, this does notbtake us very far. 
What must also be considered is the very fluid nature 
of Ngoni politics, as has been shown in previous 
chapters, along with the German military reaction 
to the rebellion In Songea and elsewhere as further
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determinants of Ngoni participation in resistance*
Further research may suggest further modification 
to this view, but on present evidence this three-part 
theme seems to do justice to the behavior of the 
colonial regime in this matter as well as to the 
'mass * grievances of the Ngoni* It also explains why 
not all the Ngoni fought*
In considering this interpretation, it must first 
be noted that the distinction between *sutu* and 'true 
Ngoni' is not rigid, as some 'sutu' felt and acted 
much the same as the 'true Ngoni*« But as is shown 
n in previous chapters, two main groups did exist, and 
two main reaotions in rebellion can be discerned*
It has been frequently said that all members of 
Ngoni society suffered more or less equally by the 
advent of German administration* For instance,
British writers talked of general grievances, while 
Mapunda and Mpangara stressed the common grievance 
of the people* However, as has been shown in Chapter 
Four, the ruling elite of 1897 Ngoni society, suffered 
a considerably greater loss of power than did the 
mass of the people.
In political life(l), the 'true Ngoni* lost 
administrative and military leadership of society; they 
relinquished judioial independence; they were increasingly 
excluded from the financial centres of power; and they 
had to assume numerous humiliating burdens* The 'sutu',
(1) The following two paragraphs are a resume of Chapter 
Four*
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on the other hand, never had administrative or 
military control over their society - indeed, now 
some had a greater say in local politics through 
changes such as their being granted the right to 
elect their own Jumbest where formerly they had been 
exclusively dependant on the *true Ngoni1 for justice, 
now they had options, such&as in appeals; and they 
improved their financial standing vis-a-vis the 
•true Ngoni1. They had things to be dissatisfied 
about. They had relinquished much of their former 
superiority they had over neighbours; they suffered 
undesirable cultural changes; and they had to follow 
some unpleasant administrative practices. But on the 
whole, German administration had been much less 
destructive to their lives than to those of the *true 
Ngoni1.
Much the same story could be told for Ngoni 
economic life. The •true Ngoni1 had, before 1 8 9 7, 
benefited the most from raiding; had controlled trade 
and other economic enterprises; had benefited from the 
labour of their subjects; and always had a satisfying 
inflow of captives. Under German administration they 
lost these privileges. In their plaoe, came taxation 
and numerous other indignities. The •sutu1 also had 
to pay taxes. But now, unlike before, they had means 
for aoquiring wealth. In^some cases, such as among the 
Ngindo of north-east Mshope, the Improvement seems to 
have been considerable. They had to do forced labour, 
but this had boen demanded before German arrival anyway.
M b
On the whole, many *sutu* appear to have been little 
worse off than before* Various traditions lend some 
support to this* One Ndendeule noted th^t taxation 
was not suoh a burden, for the people could always 
hide from the tax collector and little would happen*(1 ) 
Elsewhere, a student researcher wrote that, though work 
was hard, people were at least now paid for their 
labour*(2) They did have resentments* The forced 
building of the new boma appears to have been one 
particularly notable one(3 ), while taxation was 
another(^)* But an independent Ngoni State would not 
have improved the lot of most by much*
This may explain the various references which 
state clearly that it was the Ngoni leadership which 
wanted independence* Booth suggested this in 1906*
An Ndendeule clan elder who said that Falangu pressured 
Chabruma to join because he wanted to regain his 
kingdom(5)» has indicated the same recently* Again, 
a *true Ngoni* recently informed a researcher that:
(1) MMR/R/S/l/6 9/lb, tradition of H.Mangunyuka*
(2) MMR/R/S/l/69/2b, tradition of Mzee Kawalika, a 
German servant*
(3) Many traditions mention this: for detailed ones, see 
MMR/6/68/4/3/13* tradition of B.K.Mpangala, ten 
years oldat the time of the rebellion, a resident
of Songea*s town; MiR/6/68/k/3/lbf tradition of 
L.Moyo*
(4) See most traditions in the MMR/6/6 8**.series•
(5) MMR/6/68/i*/3/2, tradition of M.Ngonyani, ten years 
old at the time of the rebellion, present head of 
a large clan*
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"The main reason why the Ngoni leaders accepted 
the'maji maji* movement was that they wanted to 
get rid of the German domination and thus reprieve 
their former political position* Before the 
coming of the Germans, the Ngoni leaders had been 
enjoying a great deal of power and authority and 
the privileges of power such as getting a lot of 
animals and human captives• But under German 
rule all thqse privileges were abolished and their 
soverign power suppressed,"(1 )
Very important also is the fact that no indications 
or references have been found to indicate that the 
'sutu* felt they would gain political power by the 
ousting of the Germans. Indeed if anything, the 
opposite is the case. Thus, one researcher from 
the Ndendeule area of Naratumbo, began his analysis 
by saying""...in the Namtumbo area...we see indigenous 
people participating in a war to fight the regime which 
they *liked'"(2). Another researcher, who analyzed 
traditions of people from western Njelu had to admit 
that "it is clear that many people did not much like 
Ngoni rule"(3).
Consequently, it seems reasonable to state that 
while most Ngoni, 'true* and 'sutu', founc^nuch to 
complain about in German administration, there seems 
little reason to believe that the 'sutu* would have 
rebelled had they had complete freedom of choice at 
the time. One element of support for this comes from 
the action before rebellion of numerous peoples living 
on the periphery of Ungoni, who had become independent
(1 ) MMR/6/68/^/3/l**, trdditlon and evidence of L.Moyo, 
a 'true Ngoni', Kalanga resident of nduna Songea*s 
town, and a grown man at the time of rebellion.
(2) MMR/R/S/l/6 9 , analysis of S.S.Musilawe*
(3) MMR/6/68/6/l, analysis of X.A.Mhagama.
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of Ngoni control after German arrival. Most of 
these, such as the Ruvuma Yao, the Nyasa and the 
Matengo, refused to participate.(1) If the 'sutu' 
within the Ungoni of 1905 participated it was because 
they had no choice. Numerous traditions confirm this. 
One 'sutu1 from western Njelu who joined said that 
"no one dared to refuse taking the water because that 
would have meant the risk of his own life".(2 )
Mapunda and Mpangara give a few instances of the use 
of force to have the 'sutu' participate.(3) Gwassa 
and Iliffe have a quote showing the pressure used on 
Christian converts:
"When I (Yusufu Sihaba, a Christian teacher] saw that 
it was not safe for me out in the open, I slept in the 
hut of an Ngoni whohad not yet taken the medicine... 
friends of mine...urged me to (take the medioine]... 
'if you go there (to the administering centre],* they 
said, 'no harm will come to you. If you do not, you 
will be killed. But you need not go yourself; we will 
bring you medioine."(4)
But the success of the rebellion depended on more than 
just making everyone participate. To have people 
participate in war is one thing. To have them fight 
with determination against an enemy known to be more 
powerful is another. Here, the maji was of crucial 
importance. People who had little to gain but much to 
lose in a war had to be convinced that victory was 
inevitable. The maji apparently convinced them of 
this. Why it could or did is not clear, possibly
(1) See above, pp. zrq-30.
(2) MMR/6/68/2/3/2, j^raaition andevMence of M.Luoga, 
a participant in the rebellion.
(3) Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji Maji. pp.18-9; contemporary 
reference on reluctance to fight has been noted above, 
p.3 0 1, fn.if, that reference also notes that some of 
Mputa's people were holding back and that "Songea.•• 
started this business (of pushing rebellion]".
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because any explanation lies more in the realm of 
faith than that of reason. Until more is known of 
the importance of religion to the ^utu* and other 
peoples of southern German East Africa, it will be 
difficult to know why a fearful people acted the 
way they did.(l) After they took the maji, the people 
were reborn. Fear gave way to strength and a reluctance 
to fight to a determination to oust the Germans and to 
push others to help do the same. One participant 
stated that the maji imparted a new fighting spirit 
to the people.(2 )
Some facts suggest that the leaders in Ungoni society 
saw the maji as a weapon on :;their side in persuading 
the people to participate well in rebellion. A few 
leaders who made their people aocept it appear to have 
doubted it themselves. Chabruma Tawete had seen it 
fail; Songea Mbano recognized that his participation 
would only lead to his destruction; Putire Gama is 
said to have scorned it; and Fusi Gama is said to have 
claimed that it was useless.(3) Moreover, though most
(*0 p.316 G.C.KGwassa and John Iliffe, Records of the
Maji Maji Rising. Part 1, (Dar es Salaam, 19^7), EAPH, 
p.2 0 , taken from C.Wehrmeister, Vor dem Sturm. (St. 
Ottilien, 1 9 0 6), p.186.
(1) A few forthcoming works may provide the answer.
These include G.C.K.Gwassa*s PhD thesis on the 
Maji Maji rebellion as well as his article, ’’The 
role of religious and other traditional beliefs 
during the Maji Maji war 1905-7”. in I.N.Kimarabo
and T.O.Ranger, eds.t The Historical Study of
African Religion. (London, forthcoming); and T.O.
•{sr'^ Vxtnv.LVt.q usock£ev\ ^vvtaraohovi o f  d k c is t iCL v\ l1 l| ujiflv A fr ic a ^ .
(2 ) MMR/6/68/2/3/2, tradition and evidenoe of M.Luoga.
(3) Referents . for the first three are noted above, pp.
1; Fusi *s is noted in MMR/6/6 8/2 /3/I, his 
evidence.
leaders took the maji. they made sure they observed 
traditional and trusted pre-war rituals, such as 
consulting advisers and having war dances at the 
same time* Again, the odd informant suggests that 
indoctrination was an aim* One stated that the leaders 
kept the local origins of the maji a secret for the 
people would not have believed in its powers other­
wise*^) Finally, the frequent re-issue of the maji 
after defeats in battle, and the adding of new 
prescriptions with its issue(2 ), showed a determination 
to keep the people believing and determined to fight* 
Once faith in the medicine went, as the 'sutu1 
suffered military setbacks, and saw the Germans taking 
their food, dispersing their families and killing their 
friends, then most people ceased to fight* Everyone 
began to realize that they had been tricked - by the 
medicine men who introduced the maji* After belief 
in the maji had gone, the only way the leaders could 
get their people to fight was through the use of force 
or through offering them benefit* The only leader to 
have notable success in using force was Chabruma, the 
most feared leader in Ungoni in $905 and, apparently, 
the one most determined to reject Ngoni rule completely* 
The Njelu military nduna. Masese Mbano, appears to have 
offered his followers the benefit of raiding once again, 
though onoe the possibility of this ended, his force 
seems to have broke up*
(1) MMR/6/68/3/l, analysis of T.W.Turuka*
(2) See below, pp. iss*.-
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Thus, wheras it is reasonable to postulate that 
the Maji Maji rebellion in most parts of German East 
Africa was a general rebellion, in Songea it was an 
llite-inspired and -pushed struggle which gained mass 
support for reasons of loyalty, obedience and religious 
fervour rather than for reasons of rejection of German 
oppression or benefit that independence could bring*
Secondly, it is implied in various writings, such 
as those of Mapunda and Mpangara and Iliffe, that the 
Ngoni were united in their struggle against the 
Germans*(1) However the history of Ngoni society as 
well as the sequence of events during the rebellion 
indicate that, for the most part, the rebellion 
manifested the fluid nature of Ngoni society by being 
a localized event* It seems reasonable to state that 
the Ngoni did seek a strong and complete internal 
alliance* If the Hehe had required this in 1878-81, 
then obviously, the more powerful Germans required it 
even more. Indeed, there are numerous indications 
that unity was sought* One was in Chabruma's sending 
the maji to Njelu and in Mputa's seeking the support 
of all his manduna* A second one was in the Lumecha 
battle* A third was when three leading Njelu manduna 
united for the onslaught on Rashid's town of Kikole* 
But there is strong evidence to support the contention 
that these alliances either fit within traditional
(1) Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji Maji, in their coverage 
of the war as a common struggle of different stages; 
Iliffe, "Organization”, p.511 in showing the unity 
of the Lumecha battle*
military patterns or were doubtful ooouranoes at 
best* As regards the spreading of the maji, the 
Njelu and Mshope kingdoms were doing nothing exceptional 
in passing the maji to each other* They had oontacts 
with each other and over an issue as important as 
ousting the Germans, co-operation was only to be expected* 
Again, in the Lumecha battle, there is evidenoe to indicate 
that the Njelu participation was limited at best* The 
German historians, including the forces which fought 
there, Ebner, and some Ndendeule who participated, say 
that it was Chabruma*s forces which were defeated*(1)
A few traditions do claim that Mputa*s forces were at 
Lumecha*(2) Yet the fa&t that his forces wer# 
sufficiently prepared to fight three further battles 
against the Germans shortly afterwards while Chabruma 
took some time to reorganize, indicates that if Mputa 
was at Lumecha, it was not with all his forces* Also, 
there is a conspicuous absence of any mention of the 
participation of either Songea's or Mpambalioto *s forces 
at Lumecha* Finally, traditions from Kapungefs people 
indicate that they were not there*(3) Then, in the 
Kikole battle, the unity of the three manduna followed
(1) Ebner, History, p.178; G#tzen, op cit, p*12*f; 
MMR/R/S7l7557lb, H.Mangunyuka notes that the 
Ndendeule fought alone; MMR/R/s/l/69/2b, Kawaliwa, 
a servant of the Germans, said that the Njelu 
never showed up.
(2) Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji Maji. p.2bi MMR/6/68/2/3/2, 
analysis of T.W.Turuka; MMR/6/&8/8/3/2, A.Haule*
(3) MMR/6/68/l/3/^, evidenceand tradition of 2.Kapungu, 
nduna of Mkurumusi from the German colonial period 
until Tanganyikan independence* He notes fighting 
in only two battles:^ both in western Njelu*
ttaditional patterns as all three had, before 1 8 9 7, 
considerable interest in the Arabs under attaok and 
all three regarded the area as partially within their 
spheres of influence*
Along with the above, there are numerous other
1^1 j <d-iL
indications^was as; divided as it long had been while 
Mshope was as united as ever* The odd tradition 
mentions that dissent did exist among the Njelu 
leadership* One elder stated that Mputa did not 
participate with other generals because he "feared 
that if he succeeded in defeating the Germans with 
the help of some other Ngoni generals they would share 
his reign.**this was the general feeling of most of 
the Ngoni leaders of the time”*(1) Again, the 
execution of the rebellion accentuated the basically 
local nature of action. Thus, the maji was administered 
in Njelu at the headquarters of the various manduna.
Had the leaders been closely united in this important 
campaign, it seems reasonable to suppose that they 
would have preferred a common administering session, if only 
for the therapeutic effect on the warriors. But in their 
pre-1 8 9 7 raids they had acted independently, and they 
did so here. Thirdly, the battles in Njelu appear to 
have reflected local interests: Songea seems to have been 
concerned with attacking the Arab Rashid and, apparently, 
with isolating the German boma; Mputa gave particular 
attention to the missionaries who had humbled him and 
to Rashid who had betrayed him; Kapungu showed an
(1) MMR/6/68/l/3/^, tradition of Luambano, whose father 
participated.
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interest in all foreign presence in his area.(l) 
Furthermore the surrender of the leaders appears 
to have been done somewhat piecemeal and, apparently, as 
a result of local pressures and despair at local 
initiative. But probably the most conclusive sign 
of the inability of the Njelu leadership to transcend 
pre-1 8 9 7 dissension was the refusal of Mputa*s opponents 
to go to war, Usangila Gama, Chabruma Gama and Putire 
Gama, and possibly others, did not take the maji,
Indeed, the former two were in the boma during the 
rebellion, A few traditions have explained that 
Usangila was studying there(2). But study does not 
seem to have been his only motive, as one analysis 
indicates:
"Usangira did not drink the me4i°3-ne because he was 
attending school at the time; he had taken refuge 
at the b*ma earlier during his quarrel with Mputa 
on the succession issue; there he attended the 
school; Mputa had planned to assassinate Usangira."(3)
The tradition, given by a son of Usangila, who heard
it from his mother, receives support from other
Traditions which oonfirm that Mputa, indeed, did have
negative designs towards the dissident faction. One
student wrote that Mputa was not worried by the
dissidents, beoause he hoped the rebellion would
suoceed and planned to smash them afterwards,(4)
(1) Tor Songea and Mputa, see below section III, 
for Kapungu, see MMR/6/6 8/8/3/2 , 6/68/8/1.
(2) That they were in the fort is mentioned in
PA, Kigonsera Chronicle, 31.8.1905; that he was 
studying is mentioned by MMR/6/68/4/3/16.
(3) MMR/6/68/if/3/l6, tradition of S.Usangila, a son 
of Usangila.
(4) MMR/6/6 8/3/I, analysis by T.W.Turuka.
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Ha also notes that the rivalry between the factions 
of the Njelu royal family was stronger in 1905 than 
it had been in 1 8 9 7. A final historical note on 
dissidents: factions among the Ngoni royal families 
had shown before, for example, the Chabruma-Mpepo 
conflict of the 1830s, and would show again(l), that 
if they were not able to gain anything from an Ngoni 
political structure, then they would not be restrained 
from rejeoting and indeed, destroying that structure.
Xt seems unlikely that the Maji Maji dissidents felt 
differently. By their political moves in 1905* they 
were to ensure firm oontrol for themselves in I9 O8 .
As far as the Mshope state is concerned, it had 
long been well-organized and united^and where some 
division appears to have existed, as between Chabruma 
and Palangu, it was overcome by an apparent agreement 
on common policy for mutual benefit. The course of 
the rebellion there completely followed pre-1 8 9 7  
military patterns in that society.
In conclusion, it seems that Maji Maji was the 
complex produot of the existing political structure 
in the two Ngoni kingdoms, and not the product of a 
struggle that transcended the old political struoture 
to form a uniquely new one. The following presentation 
of the rebellion brings out this interpretation.
(1) Xn the 1952-** succession dispute between the 
Chabruma and Palangu families in Mshope, for 
which, see Chapter Eight, section XIX.
1 1 1
The first action in the Maji Maji rebellion in 
Ungoni occurred in Mshope, where the Ngoni, apparently 
under Palangu, attacked and murdered a liwale, a few 
clerks and some sei’vants who were collecting taxes. (1 )
The District Officer, Richter(2), when learning of the 
killings, assembled a force of 31 askari and 25 irregulars, 
whose ranks included some of Rashidls men, and marched 
into Mshope to punish Chabruma, As the force reached 
Uwerekwa, on 3.9.1305* it was attacked by the Ngoni under 
Chabruma. (3) The battle proved a disaster' for the Ngoni 
who, although numbering some 500 to 600 men, were unable 
to overcome the superior fire poitfer of the Overmans.
Richter suffered some six casualties, while the Ngoni 
lost some 200 men.
By now rebellion was breaking out throughout the 
district and all foreigners were fleeing for their 
lives. The most notable of these were the traders 
who, in August 1905* were scattered throughout the district 
buying and selling goods. Many fled towards the boma 
upon learning of the outbreak of war, A number, however, 
failed to make it. According to a German report on 
economic losses in Maji Maji, many caravans were lobted
(1) PA, Kigonsera Chronicle, 2.9.1905; MMR/6/6 8/A/3/A,
(2) He was known as Bwana Yomba Yomba, apparently 
because of his height, see MMR/R/S/l/6 9/lb.
(3) A.H.Pike informed the writer that he had been told 
that Chabruma named the impi battalion he formed 
to attack Richter, 1 the witnesses 1, as a mark of 
revenge against the District Officer who earlier 
rejected his case against Mgayi (see p.ll^ H)) because 
he, Chabruma, had lacked witnesses, interview
13.9.1971.
while the following traders were killed: 1 at 
Mgende; 1 at Mbarangandu; 2 in Uraatengo; X at 
Matogoro; 1 at Hanga Hanga's; and 1 at Chabruma 
Hanga*s.(l) John Booth*s farm by the Jjuhira* River 
was destroyed. (2 )
The Njelu Ngoni launched the next major attack.
Their target was Rashid*s main town of Kikole* But 
they also met more than expected. When Rashid had 
decided to support the Germans rather than those Ngoni 
who were rebelling, he realized that the Ngoni would 
attack him in revenge. So he called together his 
followers, relates Mzee bin Ramazani(3)t one of them, 
and they moved into Kikole where;; they prepared for 
onslaught. Strong fortifications were built, food and 
water was brought in, and military preparations were 
finalized. They were ready when the Njelu Ngoni 
forces of Mputa, Songea and Kapungu attacked. Rashid 
repulsed this attack. The Ngoni later tried again to 
storm the town, but without success&and throughout the 
rebellion Rashid remained a major thorn in the side of 
the Ngoni, The German commander who eventually led 
the resistance to the Ngoni, Major Johannes, was to 
remark that it was only because of Rashid*s aotion in 
diverting considerable Ngoni attention that the boma 
at Songea managed to hold out as long as it did.(4)
(1) TNA/G8/130 and <33/77* traders1 losses lists.
(2) H.Meyer, Pas Deutsche Kolonialreich. v.l Deutsch- 
Ostafrika u. Kameroun, (Leipzig, I9 0 9 ), p.178.
(3) Mzee bin Ramazani, letter, DOAZ, 12.1.1907.
(**) TNA/G3/77* Staff Major Johannes to Commander-in-Chief, 
Kais. Schutztruppe, 13*10,1907.
Soon after the first unsuccessful attack on Kikole, 
Mputa and Mpambalioto attacked Peramiho. The Benedictines 
there had known from the end of August that the Ngoni 
were preparing for war(l), and, by the early days of 
Sepatember, everyone was in fear. On September if, the 
missionaries decided to flee to Lake Nyasa.(2) One 
European refused to go. He was Fransiskus Leuthner, 
the man responsible for burning the Mahoka Hut(3). 
probably the first man who should have left for the 
Lake. On 9 September, Peramiho was taken and Leuthner 
and nine African Christians who had remained behind with 
him were captured. Peramiho was then burned down. A 
few traditions note that Mputa rejoiced in its destruction 
as revenge for the burning of his religious centre in 
1903. (k) Within a f ew days, Leuthner was dead. Shortly 
after this, the mission station of Kigonsera was 
attacked. On 11 September, a group of Ngoni warriors 
visited the mission only to be repelled by the missionaries 
who were still there.(5) Realizing that these warriors 
were only the vanguard, the missionaries decided to 
abandon the station. A few days later, the mission 
was destroyed.(6 )
(1) PA, St.Scholastika Chronicle, 26.8.1905*
(2) Ibid., 8.9.1905.
(3) See above, Chapter Four, p.260.
(k) Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji Maji. p.22; Iliffe in
Kiraambo and Temu, op cit, p.130, suggests that the aotions^f 
Ngoni leaders ■*- against the missions and their 
converts is evidence of an "attempt to re-unite societies 
which were beginning to break up". This appears to 
give greater credit to the influence of the missions 
than was the case•
(5) FA, Kigonsera Chronicle, II.9 .I9 0 5.
(6 ) PA, Kigonsera Chronicle, 15.9.1905, 11.12.1 9 0 5.
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(i)
By this time, Songea*s forces appear to have
begun blockading the boma, After the Uwerekwa battle,
Richter had returned to the boma and, deciding that
he had insufficient foroes to take any further
offensive, blockaded himself there to maintain a German
presence until reinforcements coulL arrive from outside
the district. His askari made occasional forays into
settlements around the boma in search of food. Twice, on
18 then on 27 September, these plundering detachments
(2)were attacked by the forces around the boma. However, 
no major attack was launched on the boma during this 
period.
By the end of September, the Germans had begun 
to gain control over the military situation in German 
East Africa. The tensions among the population in 
Bar es Salaam had subsided after the containment of 
nearby rebels(3 ), national assistance had been sought 
from Berlin, colonial Defence Forces had been assembled 
and prepared for action, and a few upcountry units had 
sucoeeded in calming potentially explosive situations. 
German units from New Langenburg and Iringa were moving 
into southern German East Africa from the west while 
a powerful force under Major Johannes was pushing in from 
the east.
As the Germans were mobilizing, the Ngoni were
(1) No confirmation was found that it was Songea*s forces 
which encircled the boma during September. However 
he was the nduna who controlled this area, and after 
the Germans took the offensive, they made some brutal 
attacks on his village, see PRO/CO/6 9 1/2 9 , DPO to 
Secretary, 2 1 ,2 ,1 9 1 9, evidence from German askari.
(2) Gdtzen, op cit, pp.121-2.
(3) V/.O.Henderson in V.Harlow, op cit, p.lkO noted that 
rebel fires had been seen burning from Dar es Salaam.
under Chabruma were making final preparations for 
a massive attack on the boma at Songea, After his 
defeat at Uwerekwa, Chabruma had occupied himself in 
reorganizing his demoralized forces. He directed 
that a second administering session be held and, this 
time, had the added assistance of a second prophet, 
called Selemani. The two prophets decided that the 
earlier defeat had been due to non-observance of 
prescriptions, and the explaining and observance of these 
were improved. Along with the administering of the 
ma.ii. there appears to have been considerable military 
preparation and recourse to traditional pre-war rituals, 
Chabruma sent word to all peoples in his kingdom, telling 
them to take the medicine and to mobilize for the attack 
on the boma. By mid-October, a large army of Ndendeule 
from Likuyu had readied themselves and had marched to 
Namabengo, en route to the boma, to wait for further 
instructions. There they were joined by other Ndendeule 
and Ngindo. Shortly afterwards, Chabruma entered Lumecha 
with his forces, and bid the others to join him. There, 
the massed force of some 5 ,0 0 0 men, including 200 with 
guns, continued their preparations while awaiting the 
arrival of an Njelu army.(l)
While the Ngoni prepared to attack the boma, some 
German forces were entering Songea district from the 
west and north. On 28 September, Lt,Klinghardt left 
Langenburg for Songea with a detachment of 50 men. In
(1 ) Mapunda and Mpangara.Maji Maji, pp. 2 3-1+; numerous 
traditions in the MMR/6/6 8...series.
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early October, Captain Nigmann began moving south­
east from Iringa. He relieved the Mahenge boma from 
the Pogoro-Ngindo onslaught, then moved down into 
Ungoni. He passed through Usangira (Old Gumbiro), 
where he olaimed to have found some mission materials, 
then continued south to relieve Songea boma.(l)
When the combined forces of Klinghardt and Nigmann 
arrived at Songea, they learnt of the impending Ngoni 
attack. Rather than wait for it, they took the offensive. 
On the night of 21-22 October, the German forces came 
upon the unsuspecting Ngoni warriors. The encounter 
was later described by the colonial Governor, General 
von G#tzen:
"The attackers had the unexpected good fortune to 
approaoh within 700 metres of the enemy completely 
unnoticed. Captain Nfgmann took advantage of the 
enemy's carelessness and had the two machine guns 
open rapid fire from a small hill near the road.
The effect was astonishing. Taken totally by 
surprise, the enemy fled from the camp in all 
directions without thought of defence••.Neither 
the Iringa company nor Klinghardt*s detachment was 
even brought into action in this unexpectedly 
easy victory."(2 )
The defeat at Lumecha was a heavy blow to the Mshope*
The Ndendeule returned to the north-east in dissaray 
and, on the whole, endedttheir participation in the 
rebellion.(3) Chabruma returned to the north: however, 
he had no intention of giving up.
(1) RKA, "8th Company Field Notes”, in "Politische 
Zustande in Deutsch Ostafrika"; Gfltzen, op cit,
p.1 1 9.
(2) Giitzen, op cit, pp.12^-5; quoted in Mapunda and 
Mpangara, Maji Maji, p.23.
(3) Ndendeule traditions, such as MMR/R/s/l/69... series 
note that the battle at Namabengo (Lumecha) was
the only battle in which they took part.
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The German forces pursued the Mshope northwards 
till reaching Usangira, which they burned, Nigmann 
then returned north, while Klinghardt returned to 
the Songea boma,(l) Shortly after reaching the boma, 
Klinghardt took his force, together with some irregulars(2), 
and went westwards to attack Mputa and to establish a 
military base at biganga to ensure communications with 
the lake, Mputa learnt of Klinghardtfs approach and, 
on 8 November, he ambushed them by the Lundusi River,
But once again, superior weapons told the story and, 
after a fierce battle, the Ngoni were forced to retreat 
in disarray, Klinghardt pursued them as far as Mputa*s 
capital of Maposeni,where a second battle was fought.
The Ngoni were, once ag&in, forced to flee. The Germans 
then split up their forcesy with a part establishing a 
base at Liganga and the remainder moving on to the lake.
They appear to have misjudged the extent of resistance 
the Ngoni of western Njelu could put up, for their 
defences slackened. This was to be to their disadvantage.
On 16 November, the Ngoni ambushed the detachment 
that was returning to the lake. Caught totally unaware^, 
the detachment, led by Lt.d.h.Schultz, suffered a severe 
reverse. Sohultp was wounded and a South African volunteer, 
Herr Potgeider, killed. The detachment succeeded in 
fighting off the Ngoni, then pushed on th safety at the 
lake. Two days later, the detachment which had set up
(1)
(2) His force consisted ofi 2 officers, 2 2nd.Lts.,
2 volunteers, 59 askari, 18 irregulars, see GBtzen, 
op cit, p.142, The next few paragraphs are based on 
G8tz;en, op cit, pp.142-4,
a base at Liganga was attacked* Gtftzen described 
the battle;
”COn 17-18 November} the camp was suddently and 
violently attacked from all sides and inundated 
with poison and burning arrows* The troops who, 
besides Klinghardt, had only one other European, 
Sgt.Rtffer, nonetheless kept calm. They 
succeeded in repelling this onslaught with great 
loss to the enemy* 11 (1 )
The outside world learnt of these attacks in the 
colourful and exaggerated articles written on them 
by the Songea trade R.Peter for the Usambara P§st 
and which were printed in various German papers* 
Writing on an undated attack, which appears to have 
been either the 3 September or 16 November one, he 
said; "We were totally surprised and outnumbered by 
the masses of the enemy and came into hand-to-hand 
combat with him* Fourteen dead, nine wounded, and 
twenty missing was our loss that day”,(2) After 
the battle of 17-18 November, Klinghardt received 
word that a second attack was imminent and so on 20 
November _ preempted^ , t by leading a force
against the Ngoni and routing them*
The November battles were the last of the first 
violent phase of the war. The Ngoni had shown their 
determination and resolve to oust the Germans in some 
damaging and destructive battles* However, they had 
not accomplished much* The Germans were still in the 
district and now were being strengthened. Now, with
(1) Gtitzen, op cit, p,!^.
(2) Usambara Post, n.27, 12*5.1906 and 2 7 ,7 .1 9 0 6. These
are noted in Kozak, op cit, p.91*
the arrival of Major Johannes in Songea on 23 
November, the tone of the war changed. The Germans 
took the offensive and a slow, brutal repression was 
to begin*
Major Johannes had been sent to Songea to smash 
the rebellion and to destroy the Ngoni military state 
once and for all. His first move was to initiate a 
general offensive against the Ngoni forces. To do 
this, he divided Songea into two regions, east and 
west, with a boundary line running north-south between 
the upper course of the Rutukira River and the Lumecha 
River. He directed the 13th Field Company to set up 
headquarters at Likuyu in the eastern half and the 
8th Field Company to establish themselves at Mkwera 
in the western half. The Langenburg police force under 
Lt.Klinghardt returned to the lake, while the Songea 
police force remained at the Songea boma. The two 
army companies were then directed to send out strong 
patrols throughout their areas of jurisdiction with 
the aim of finding and smashing all Ngoni resistance•(1) 
As the Ngoni had now apparently decided against 
engaging in open battles against the Germans, however, 
the task of finding and destroying the enemy became a 
difficult one. Accordingly, to prevent the warriors 
from continuing resistance while hiding among the 
people and, at the same time, to destroy the Ngoni 
military state, Johannes decided to break their will
(1) TNA/G3/77# Major Johannes to Commander-in-Chief, 
Kaiserliche Schutztruppe, (13.10.1908); RKA, 
"Politische Zustande in Deutsoh Ostafrika"; PKB, 
issues of 1906 and 1907 contained the reports of 
Major Johannes.
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to resist as well as that of the people by denying 
all of them all food* Accordingly, he directed his troops 
to confiscate all fo&d supplies, to prevent the growing 
of any new crops, and to destroy all villages. The 
Ngoni would then have the choice of surrendering or 
of seeing themselves and their women and children 
starve. Xn any case, the starving people would 
inevitably leave the district and thereby deny the 
fighters the support they needed* Major Johannes 
found the timing of the rebellion superb for the 
carrying out of this policys November to January were 
the months of planting and cultivation. With the 
Ngoni prevented from doing either, a severe famine 
was inevitable•(1 )
Ruga ruga, or volunteers, who had been enlisted 
to assist the police force in the early days of 
rebellion(2 ), now offered their help to the army.
They comprised traders, particularly a number of 
Rashid’s men, a few Europeans, and various Africans 
from Songea and neighbouring districts *(3) Some 
overzealous groups mobilized independently and travelled 
throughout the district burning, looting and killing*
Some of the more vicious, such as the European 
Knallmeyer, were so destructive that they had to be 
recalled by the military.(4) Many found their activities
(1) RKA, ”8th Company Field Notes”, in ’’Politische 
Zustande in Deutsche Ostafrika”,
(2) Giitzen, op cit, pp. 121-2 has notes on the ruga ruga,
(3) MMR/6/68/^/3/^, tradition of M*Nchamo says that 
the Hehe and Sudanese soldiers playdd an important 
role in repression. They ’’confiscated and destroyed 
every food item they could possibly find”.
(*f) lst.JLt.Albinus, in Tikuyu recalled him, see PA, 
Kigonsera Chronicle, 10.11*1905*
profitable* For instance, Sangu soldiers returned 
northwards from the campaign with a good many women*(1)
At the end of the rebellion, the Gerraasn thanked the 
ruga ruga for the important r6le they had played in 
putting down the uprising.
From November 1905 until the end of January 1 9 0 6, there 
were few military encounters in Njelu between the Ngoni 
and the Germans* Kigonsera appears to have been raided 
in December(2), and a deserted town of Rashid's was burned 
down. Otherwise, the main actors were the German forces, 
which were burhing villages, taking food and killing 
any unfortunate man caught.
As food disappeared and villages were razed, people 
began dispersing and the desire to continue the rebellion 
dissipated. Increasingly, the leaders came to accept that 
the rebellion had failed and that the Germans were in the 
district to stay* Finally, possibly under some pressure 
from their people and, very likely, under the realization 
that further resistance was futile and would only bring 
more senseless suffering and death to their people, a 
number of senior leaders began surrendering. By the 
end of December, among those who had given themselves 
up were Songea, Mpambalioto, Putire, Chabruma Mpitimbi, 
Kapungu and Magagura*(3)• By the end of January, more 
had surrendered, while a few others, such as Mputa, had
(1) MMR/7/6 8...series, various traditions.
(2) Mapundaand Mpangara, Maji Maji. p.2 5 j Ehner, History, 
p.180. Mapunda and Mpangara identify this as a period 
of guerilla warfare, though there does not appear to 
have been much activity. It may have been more a 
period of laying low,
(3) Ebner, History; G#tzen, op cit; RKA, "Politische 
Zustande in Deutsoh Ostafrika; Reports of Major 
Johannes in DKB. various issues 1906, 1 9 0 7.
ibeen captured.(1) The confined leaders, who numbered 
forty-eight by February(2), were then brought to trial 
and all were sentenced to death.(3) In succeeding 
months, more were captured and hanged. 0j| 20 March, 
fifteen were hanged, while on 12 April, seventeen went 
to the gallows.(*0 Many others were taken to the coast 
and to plantations in north-east German East Africa 
to serve periods of forced labour.(5) The three sessions 
of mass hangings and the deportations decimated the small 
numbers of 'true Ngoni' and 'sutu* Slite, and broke the 
back of the rebellion in Njelu.
Isolated resistance lingered on for a while in 
Njelu, as a few minor leaders who escapv ed capture 
continued to figh^ -. The most important of these was 
Masese Mbano who in early 1906 led a few thousand 
followers southwards into Portuguese East Africa. Once 
settled in Mataka's land, he made an allaince with a 
number of elephant hunters and continued the rebellion.
In March 1 9 0 6, he crossed the Ruvuma River and attacked 
the Ruvuma Yao in revenge for their failure to participate 
in the rebellion. By this time, Major Johannes was 
concentrating his army in Mshope and north-west Songea 
district, and was angered by the need to slow down his 
plans by sending a detachment south to guard the border.
(1) He was caught by one of Rashid's men.
(2) PA, Kigonsera Chronicle, 27.2.1906; Gwassaand Iliffe, 
Records. pp.25-6 .
(3) Ibid., the account is fascinating, particularly in the 
militant defiance offered right up to their deaths by 
leaders such as Mpambalioto.
(if) MMR/6/68/3/l, analysis by T.W.Turuka, he has the months 
wrong though;
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He requested permission to invade Portuguese East 
Africa and destroy Masese*s town. However, the 
government in Berlin appears to have been unwilling 
to raise the matter with Portugal for, by August 1906, 
no reply had come to his request.(1) However, by this 
time the region appears to have quieted down.
The Mshope kingdom was to prove much more intractable 
than Njelu. The punitive raids and destruction under­
taken by the German army from November I905 until 
January 1906 had had as much impact here as in Njelu.
By the end of January, many groups in central, eastern and 
north-eastern Mshope appear to have been ready for 
surrender* But they could not do it, for Chabruma had 
forbid it and any who defied him were severely punished. 
For example. Major Johannes was informed in mid-January 
by some Ngoni that six respected leaders who had attempted 
to surrender had been hanged by Chabruma, With the firm 
power that Chabruma held over his people, the Germans 
decided that isolated, unofficial surrender was
(5) P.335 Gwassa and Iliffe, Records, quote TNA/lXl/F/,. 
20/l, Governor von Gotzen ’Befehl an die Truppen- 
fflhrer1, 11.11.1905-whioh dictated part of the terms 
of surrenders "Major Sultans and other influential 
tribal leaders who declare the submission of the 
native communities they rule are to be required to 
provide contingents of several hundred men for 
punitive and compulsory labour for the government 
on the coast. The punitive labour will last three 
to six months for each contingent." The decree also 
required those who surrendered to pay a tax of three 
rupees and to surrender all their bows, arrows, and 
spears, see also, MMR/6/68/1/3/3.
(1) RKA, 1ANZ S.Blx, AcKAlGR15* Bd.2, "Unruhen in
Deutsch Ostafrika, 1905"* Gotzen to Foreign Office, 
n.lQ^QJf of 2 8 .7 .1 9 0 6, Letters were sent till July 
but no reply seems to have come.
meaningless for, if Chabruma entered a subjugated 
area, its inhabitants would rise again through fear 
of their nkosi. Johannes accordingly decided to 
oontinue repression until Chabruma was captured, and 
so rejected pleas for peace throughout 1 9 0 6.(1 )
By the beginning of February 1 9 0 6, Johannes 
had decided that Njelu was sufficiently pacified to 
permit him to move the major part of his army north.
The 8th Field Company was thus re-directed to take 
over pacification in Chabruma*s area, Upangwa and 
Ubena, while part of the 13th Field Company remained 
at Songea boma and the remainder moved to the north­
east to subdue that area a M  Mbarangandu. A chain of 
nine military posts was then set up throughout Ubena 
and Mshope. Military patrols intensified 1search and 
destroy* missions throughout this region.
At this time, the Germans listed the men whom they 
knew to be the remaining leaders of the rebellion. The
*'~i c
list compriseds Chabruma Hanga, Palangu, Ngozi Ngoni (the 
Bena leader), some Muslims led by the elephant hunter 
Kopa Kopa, and Chabruma with his subordinate generals 
Simtanga, Sanynama, Manjoro, Mansiwia, Ngungungu, Himba 
Himba, Manyamakuru, Mgumba and Mfunda,(2)
Chabruma, the main combatant, moved throughout Mshope, 
planning offensive actions and attacking those German
(1) RKA, ”8th Company Field Notes”, In ”Politische 
Zustande in Deutsche Ostafrika”; Report of Major 
Johannes in DOAZ. v.VIII, n.*f6 , I7 .ll.i9 0 6.
(2 ) Ibid.
patrols which unknowingly ventured too dose to 
his camp. In late January, Major Johannes received 
a report that Chabruma had massed his followers on 
the upper oourse of the Rutukira River and was 
preparing to attack the Germans at the military posts 
of Gumbiro and Mkekenuri. The Major dispatched a 
force, under Lt.Lindeiner, to attack him but they 
found nothing* Chabruma had retired north to his old 
capital at Old Gumbiro* Some time later, a patrol of 
fifteen men, on their way to the Ruhuhu, ventured too 
olose to his camp and were attacked. After this 
encounter, Chabruma moved eastwards. Then on 15 
February, a second patrol from the Kitanda military 
post found his headquarters and were attacked, losing 
two men. Chabruma decided to move on again. This 
time he went north-westwards. He planned to meet up 
with the Bena and join them in a major attack oh the 
Germans. Major Johannes learned of this plan and 
decided to follow him. He directed his forces to 
encircle a large area in Upangwa and himself went 
with the army in this powerful bid to entrap Chabruma.
Meanwhile,., the central and eastern regions of 
Mshope had become fairly quiet. Though Major Johannes 
complained that the ”daily harassing by numerous scouts 
marches and encampments of patrols sent to destroy 
surronding villages have had little effect on the 
enemy”(l), he felt confident enough to order the
(1) RKA, n8th Company Field Notes”, in "Politisohe
Zustande in Deutsch Ostafrika”; Reports by Major
Johannes in DKB. 1906 and 1907# This entire
section is based on these reports.
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abandonment of the Nyamiumbo military post in the 
confidence that Luwegu district had been pacified. His 
confidence was ill-founded. Palangu and his men had 
not followed Chabruma to the north-west and, in mid- 
March one of his elephant-hunters, Magewa, mobilized 
the people of Luwegu into renewing the fighting. The 
Germans had to quickly reoccupy Nyamtumbo. 2nd.Lt. 
Rohde led a detachment against Magewa and forced his 
people to disperse. Xn the meanwhile, Palangu had 
mobilized the peoples of Mgende, Mbarangandu and 
Mjenje and was troubling the region north of the 
Hajimahuhu and Likuyu military posts. By 23 March, 
he had assembled 300 warriors near Kitanda and was 
preparing to attack it. Major Johannes was forced to 
delay the campaign against Chabruma in order to send 
the 13th Field Company back to the south-east to 
repulse Palangu. The 13th Field Company was assisted 
by 1,200 Sangu warriors of Chief Merere(l) in this 
expedition. The Germans and their allies surprised 
and dispersed Palangu*s forces before they could attack 
Kitanda.
Shortly afterwards, the attack against Chabruma 
was resumed by Major Johannes. But the delay appears 
to have been costly, for the Germans were unable to 
trap Chabruma, who was, by then, returning eastwards 
to join Palangu. Major/johannes attempted to stop this 
union by sending a foroe under lst.Lt. Hudemann against
(1) MMR/6/68/1/3/3, has notes on the Bena coming to Ungoni.
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Chabruma. ^he two forces met on 10-11 April* The 
battle was inconclusive and Chabruma pushed north­
east to the upper side of the Luwegu* Palangu 
apparently remained in Mgende for a while before 
removing to Luwegu to join him. In the Luwegu area, 
Chabruma hid for two months, while the angry and 
frustrated Major Johannes began the wholesale 
devastation of the region in a determined effort to 
uncover him. Massive reprisals were taken out against 
the people of Mgende, ahd, by mid-1906, these wretched 
people were in a complete state of despair and hopeless- 
ness* Starving and homeless, large numbers were 
surrendering to the German forces and giving and selling 
their wives and children to anyone who could offer them 
food. As the German army closed in on him, Chabruma 
moved towards Magefa. Then, on 27 May, a German 
detachment under Lt.Blumenthal, ventured too olose to 
the Chabruma headquarters and a violent battle ensued* 
The German force beat off the Ngoni who suffered heavy 
losses* The German report, which gave no indication 
of German losses, noted that **36 warriors had been 
killed, 35 captured and **31 women and ohildren taken 
from the Ngoni side* Then, on 25 June, another German 
foroe, under Lt* von Lindeiner, met Chabruma, with some 
800 to 900 people near Ligombe* In the ensuing battle, 
Chabruma was apparently wounded* The Ngoni lost many 
men and much food and cattle, but Chabruma and others 
esoaped* A number of Chabruma*s dispersed followers, 
failing to find their leader, surrendered to the Germans
On 11 July, the Germans proudly announced, one 
of Chabruma*s sons surrendered* Among other leaders 
captured were Soni, Mkomerangani, Pangatschuma and 
Kimindi,
Although faced with final defeat, Chabruma 
nonetheless defied Major Johannes a final time by 
eluding the entrapment which the latter had intended 
for him* With his diminished following, the great 
leader and his powerful ally, Palangu, moved down 
into Portuguese East Africa, where they sought and were 
granted refuge with the Yao leader, Mataka*(l)
Repression lingered on in parts of the north 
for a while* The last leader to be captured was the 
Bena, Ngozi Ngozi, who was taken in late 1907*(2) But, 
with the flight of Chabruma, the Mshope Ngoni acknowledged 
a crushing military defeat* With the Mshope defeat, the 
formerly powerful Ngoni military society lay in ruins*
All the Ngoni leaders were either dead or living in
2j\ci
exile, save the ones who had not fought, the people
were in the depths of despair as famine reigned throughout
the land* This was to be a long and bitter famine and 
which
cne^those who survived tt would not forget*
(1) RKA, 1ANZ, S.Blx, Az.KAlGR15, Bd*l, #726, "Denkschrift 
iSber Verlauf des Aufstanden in Deutsch Ostafrika, 
31.8*1906", has a full account of the German 
campaign in north-east Mshope against Chabruma,
(2) TNA/Gb/ll**, District Officer Keudel to Govt.,
1**.I.I9 0 9. The cost of the expedition against 
Ngozi Ngozi was rps.1179,60; and see DOAR. II, 
n*8l, 1 6.1 0.1 9 0 9*
IV
After the cessation of hostilities and the surrender 
or flight of the Ngoni leadership and the destruction 
of their forces, the Germans continued the repression 
they had been meting out. They had been angered by 
the rebellion, their unawareness and lack of preparation 
to face it(l) and the disruption it h&d caused and they 
were apparently determined to take revenge. They had 
also been wary of the powerful Ngoni and somewhat 
uneasy over their effortless conquest in 1897-8, So 
they determined, as Gulliver wrote: "once and for all 
to demonstrate their own strength and to prevent an# 
further chanoes of a rebellion,1, (2) Major Johannes 
had made this clear when justifying why he was continuing 
the repression so long by saying that in his view the 
maji had strengthened the resolve of the Ngoni and that 
unless this was completely smashed there would, again, 
be trouble in the future. So throughout 1906 he allowed 
the army, police and ruga ruga to continue confiscating 
food crops, to prevent cultivation and to burn villages. 
An Englishman, J.Sutherland, who participated in the 
repression later admitted to the British that the 
carnage had sickened him,(3 )
The effect on the Ngoni was traumatic. What was 
probably the most severe famine which the people had
(1) The fear that the Europeans had of the Ngoni in 
August and September I905 is graphically portrayed 
in*the Kigonsera Chronicle of these months, see PA,
(2) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.17*
(3) PRO/CO6 9I/2 9, 8717, P.139* evidence of J.Sutherland,
2*7.2
ever known now came upon them, a famine whose 
impaot was to parallel, if not surpass, that of 
the losses of military defeat. In later years, 
people were to refer to time in terms of years 
after the famine(l) and, right up to the present, 
it has remained probably the most poignant legacy 
of colonial rule. The people of Songea remember 
never having suffered more completely and unjustly 
than during the tragic period from late 1905 until 
mid 1907.
By mid-1 9 0 6 large sections of Ungoni lay barren 
and deserted as the starving Ngoni were dispersing 
from the region in search of food. Much of Mshope, 
which had been thoroughly devastated, was empty* The 
once populous lands around the Songea boma were now 
almost completely deserted* Throughout the land, 
villages had disappeared as peoples died or dispersed.(2) 
One missionary gave some indication of the extent of 
change when describing the town of Mandawa, whioh
before I905 bad been a flourishing town of some 2,000
people: !10nce there was an activity and a noise very 
much like a small European city: from the distance one 
heard the drums and the playing of the children - now
all is desolate and silent,"(3)
(1) L.Deppe, Mit Lettow Vorbeck durch Afrika, (Berlin, 
I9i9)i p. 102; TNA/l7 3 3 7 1 2:81*, Annual Report Songea, 
1925.
(2) Tr.Trossman, Missbl». v.XIV, n,10, p.1^9; Dernberg, 
"Berichte", Nov.1907, RK 92V99 in Iliffe, 
Tanganyika. p.151.
(3) Br.Laurentius, Missbl,, v.XI, n.10, p.lU-8,
i m
Some Ngoni fled to the north-west(1), but this 
area, which itself had been severely devastated during 
the rebellion, could provide only limited respite. More 
went to the north-east and east, to lands which had 
escaped the worst tragedies. Once settled here, many 
were never to return to Songea.(2) Still others, who 
constituted by far the largest percentage of the total, 
went south and west. Benedictine missionaries wrote 
that thousands, both from Njelu and Mshope, had gone 
south to Portuguese East Africa, where they could be 
completely free of the difficult and burdening German 
might. Along with leaders who had been actively involved 
in rebellion had gone many who, having barely participated, 
yet feared the general persecution.(3) Xn the west, 
Umatengo and the Lake Nyasa region became havens of 
refuge, (if) Both areas had remained largely neutral in 
the war and had been spared the ravages of repression. 
Moreover, in both places, the harvest of 1906 had been 
good(5) and, consequently, the possibility of survival 
was good.
In the new-found homes in neighbouring lands, 
however, food was not readily available. Those who could 
afford it, paid for what they needed. But even this was 
hard, as those with surpluses had raided their prices in 
response to the shortages. For example, in Umatengo, one
(1) Gulliver, ”A History”, p.2 5 .
(2) Ebner, History. p.l3*f states that Nindi and Mbewele 
stayed in Ligera country.
(3) Ibid., p.183.
(*f) Br.Laurentius, Missbl.. v.XII, n.Jf, p.52*
(5) Br.Livinius, Missbl.. v.XII, n.5, P.6 7 .
load of mtama which before the war had cost J rupee, now 
sold for 6.(1) Those^ho lacked mone^either.fended for 
themselves or accepted servitude. Servitude was a humiliating 
act for people who had once dominated their neighbours, but 
little could be done for starving people had no bargaining 
position.(2)
The pressures of the Ngoni influx into; neighbouring lands 
began to have its effect on food supplies, which were in scarce 
supply by late 1|o6, By early 190? there was a severe shortage 
of food in the. lands west ;of Ungoni.(3 )
Not all people left Uhgoni in 1906. Many preferred to eke 
out their existence in their .homeland than to risk starvation in 
strange lands.. For these people life was very hard during 1906. 
People lived on grass, flowers and what roots they could find.(4) 
The more fortunate ones-found caterpillar nests and rats. One 
missionary wrote that Germans pigs had a better diet than the 
poor starving Ngoni.(3)
The famine in Ungoni had various effects. One was a rise
in lawlessness, commented on by a missionary: "A panic is spreading
among the people, and plundering and robbery is the daily order.
For many it is a struggle for survival, for other pandering became
inevitable".(6) Mere devastating was the spread of disease,
particularly smallpox, of which, the Governor, von Gdtzen, wrote:
"A great many of the natives who survived the fighting 
and the famine succumbed to various diseases because 
their physical condition had deteriorated so much...There 
was an epidemic of worm diseases...Badly nourished mothers 
had no milk for their babies so that in some districts 
the infant mortality rate reached alarming
(1) Br. Laurentius, Missbl*-, v. XI, n. 8 , p. 1 k8,
(2) Ibid., v.XII, n.5, pp.66-7 notes enslavement of Christians.
(3) Br.Livinius, Missbl., v.XI, n*7,' p.97; v.XI, n. 1 0 ,p. 1 8^ .1
(V) Fr.Trossman, Missbl., v.XI,n.8,p.114; J.Siliaba, Missbl.,v.XI.p. 98
(5) Ibid, (6 ) Missbl.,-v.XI, n.10, p,1^3. .
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heights. In short in the early months of this 
year (1 9 0 7) the disaffected districts presented 
an indescribably tragic scene."(1 )
When the missionaries returned to Songea, they
tried to help the people by giving them food and
offering them work.(2) In response to this, hundreds
of people moved to the vicinity of Peramiho and Kigonsera.
Possibly equally important, they began to pressure the
colonial government to stop the repression and, by 
September 1 9 0 6, were speaking out against the continuing, 
utterly unnecessary victimization.(3) One result of 
this appears to have been the explusion of a missionary 
from the district. But, more hopeful, by the Autumn 
the government, too, was providing food, usually in 
return for one hour*s work a day.(^)
The difficulties of the famine were intensified 
when planting began in 1 9 0 6, for very few people had seeds. 
A missionary, travelling through Songea in late 1 9 0 6, 
reported that in many places he enoountered people 
crying for seeds so that they could survive.(5) The 
missionaries provided a lot to the people as did the 
government. One missionary described the scene when 
seed was distributed:
n0n the 1 5th of December came the long-awaited rain,
and the people flocked to the mission to fetch seed 
to plant, Bach one received 2 -3  litres of corn and 
within a short time some 5 0 -6 0 loads were distributed. 
Unfortunately not all that was distributed was painted 
and some ended up inside starving stomachs.”(6)
Complicating the shortage of seed as an obstacle to
planting was a shortage of hoes, many of which
(1) Gfltzen, op cit, pp.233-^.
(2) Missbl., v.XII, n.6 , p.70.
(3) PA, Kigonsera Chronicle, 2 1 ,9 .1 9 0 6; copied in Mapunda 
and Mpangara, Maji Mail, p.26.
(*0 TNA/gViI**, Keudel to Govt, 1 0 5 6 0 /0 7 of 28.8.1907;
Missbl., v.XII, n.5, P.70.
(5) Missbl.. v.XII, n.6, p.136.
had been lost during the rebellion*(1 )
Still, famine was slow to end* The rains came 
late and were poor, so, in many areas, 1907 was 
another hungry year*(2) The numbers of people 
flocking to the mission stations increased, as did 
those leaving the district* The missionaries reported 
that everywhere people were destitute*
But the tide was slowly turning* People in a 
few areas managed to produce sufficient food for their 
needs in 1907* Por example, around the Likwambi and the 
Luhira Rivers, people have harvested good corn orops, 
while in many parts of the west, rice had grown well.
By late 1907, the missionaries could report that the 
famine had come to an end in the vioinity of the mission 
stations* In parts of the east and north, however, it 
only ended after the 1 9 0 7 -0 8 harvesting season*(3 )
The rebellion and its aftermath had taken a terrible 
toll in life in Ungoni* The exact number of those who 
died is not known* No accurate statistics exist on the 
population of Ungoni before M&ji Maji* One official 
(statistic said there were 36,000 in Ungoni and 75,000 
I in the entire district(4), while another, though giving 
/ no numbers for Ungoni, said there were 150,000 to 180,000 
in the district{5)* The missionary H^fliger said there 
were 60,000 in Ungoni(6 ), a number whioh would approximate 
that in the second statistic* After Maji Maji, the
(6 ) Fr.Trossman, Missbl.. v.XI, n*10, p.145*(p*3^9)
(1) D0AZ, v.3, n.33, 2 7 . Br.Laurantius,
"Landwirtschaft aus Ungoni".
(2) Pr.Trossman, Missbl*. v.XI, n*8, p.115 wrote that 
many people believed the hanging of a rainmaker during 
the rebellion and the absence of any effective successor 
was the reason for the famine*
(3) TNA/Gl/6 , Annual Report 1908 Songea, p.11 stated that 
that year's harvest was the first good one after the 
famine•
{4} Ffllleborn, op cit, p.1 3 2, quoting Jahresbericht, 1903/4*
(5) Booth in ^dohs, op cit, p.264.
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population in Ungoni was estimated as 20,000 by 
H&fliger, who appears to have been the one expelled 
from the district for his condemnation of the German 
repression(l), between 20 and 30,000 by the District 
Officer(2) It appears that up to half the Ngoni 
population died in and after Maji Maji, this half 
numbering anything between 5»000(3) and 3 0 ,0 0 0,
By late 1907» People were returning to Ungoni*
They had been severely chastened and were now ready 
to aocept subjugation by the Germans * The Ngoni 
leadership which had been decimated was to be replaced 
by a new one, onejmore accommadating than its predecessor, 
yet one still as legitimate as ever* With its followers, 
this new leadership was to rebuild the Ngoni kingdoms 
out of the ruins of the Maji Maji rebellion*
(6) p.350 Kozak, op cit, p.10^, quoting HSfliger,
(1) Ibid,
(2) Ibid., p*105*
(3) This is the number that Fr.Trossman had estimated 
had died of starvation in Ungoni by early 1907> 
Missbl.. v.XI, n.ll, p.l6l. This number is quoted 
by £bncr, History, and Mapunda and Mpangara, Maji 
Maji, p.27------ —
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Chapter 6
The Transition to Administrative Control, 1907-1925
I
The severity of the repression of the Maji Maji 
rebellion in German East Africa and of the contemporary 
Herero rebellion in So^uth-West Africa had had a 
considerable impact on political life in Germany,
Strong criticism of the government*s handling of the 
colonies brought on a national election, in the wake 
of which, administration in the colonies underwent many 
changes* The most important of these changes for German 
East Afrioa was the appointment of a new Governor,
Albrecht Freiherr von Rechenburg, under whose 
administration, writes one historian of this era, "the 
minimal aims of early colonial rule gave way to a 
purposive colonial policy"(l), In Songea, the new 
policy meant a number of modifications in aspects of 
local administration*
Among the most important changes on the district 
level was the devolution of greater freedom to District 
Officers in the running of their districts* Local officials 
were given the power to make many day-to-day decisions 
without having to refer to the central administration in 
Dar es Salaam* This enabled them, among other things, 
to remedy local grievances before they developed too 
far and, generally, ensured a more efficient administration.
(1) John Iliffe, Tanganyika under German Rule 1905-1912, 
(Cambridge, 1909} > CUP, pTSTTT
Secondly, district administrators appear to 
have been an improvement on their pre-rebellion 
counterparts* One authority praised this improvement 
with reference to another district in the territory: 
"Perhaps the greatest achievement of German colonial 
rule in the last decade before World War 1 was the 
production of field administrators capable of managing 
local politioal, economic, and social development on an 
independent and responsible basisu*(l) Evidence that 
Songea had some good administrators is found in the 
actions of various District Offioers who served there 
after 1907* Among the more noteworthy of these officials 
was Herr Keudel, who appears to have given consistent 
support to the Ngoni against people who sought to 
denigrate or exploit them, as, for example, when he 
condemned a small group of local settlers who sought 
to restrict Ngoni labour migration, so that they might 
obtain cheap local labour.(2)
A further improvement in administration appears 
to have come in the formation of a district advisory 
council (Bezirksratssitzung).(3) No mention was found 
of the district having had such a council before 1905 
and, indeed, the only references to it found at all were 
notes on meetings held in 1907 and 1908.(4) In 1908,
(1) R.A.Austen, Northwest Tanzania under German and 
British Rule. (London, 1 9 6 8), Yale UP.
(2) MDA, 131 ohm file, Blohm to DO, o.XI.287 of 11.1.1912 
and c.II, 323 of 6.3.1912, whioh is partially refuted
by earlier complaints of shortages, as in DOAZ. v.XI 
n.35, 5.5.1909.
(3) TNA/G4/114, Bezirksratssitzung, 2 2.ll.i907 and 
30.11.1908.
(4) Ibid.
the council's membership comprised members of the 
government's district staff, a missionary and a 
trader. They appear to have advised the District 
Officer and appraised his actions.
A fourth change appears to have been the 
transfer of some duties formerly carried out by 
the Sultans and Jumbes to olerks and other officials 
hired by the government. These duties, according to 
one reference, were the collecting of taxes and the 
carrying out of messenger work.(l) Little data was 
found on the numbers of these clerks or the amount of 
responsibility they acquired. Both seems to have been 
limited. For example, the five of 190** increased to 
eight by 1909(2), and they appear to have merely assisted 
the local leaders in collecting taxes.
While changing aspects of its administration in 
the above ways, the German colonial government retained 
the basic political structure of pre-1905 society. The 
reasons for this are numerous and complex. First of all, 
the Germans appear to have wanted a leadership which 
would be acceptable to the people. Consequently, 
legitimacy of leadership was of some importance, a 
reality which had, undoubtedly, become quite clear 
to the Germans in Maji Maji, when they saw the power- 
lessness of their imposed akidas and other leaders in 
contrast to the continuing strong power of the Ngoni
(1) TNA/155/SDB, v.^, p.12.
(2) 1901H DKB, v.XVI, n.ll, 1.6.1905; 1909: TNA/Glt/ll^, 
Financial Statement, 1909» notes, p.108.
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leaders. Moreover, men who had traditional standing 
in the community could be more effective than those 
who did not. As the men itfith highest standing in 
Ungoni were from the same families which had led before 
1905* the Germans decided to continue having them.(1)
Secondly, those families, although the same ones which 
had brought about rebellion, were acceptable to the Germans 
because their members now available were those who had 
either remained neutral during Maji Maji or supported 
the Germans. Moreover, in many vacant Sultanates, it 
was possible to select amenable, young members of the 
royal families. For example, when they were available, 
youths who had been educated were appointed. In this 
way, Mwanawalifa Tawete succeeded Chabruma at Gumbiro, 
and Msawani Songea Mbano succeeded Songea at Mkwera.(2) 
Aocording to a British official, Songea himself had 
nominated Msawani to the Germans.(3) In some other 
areas, those sons'of participants who themselves had 
remained neutral or had supported the Germans were 
selected. Kazibure Soko, who replaced his father 
Mpambalioto, was one of these. The few Sultanates 
which had been under akidas continued to be governed 
by these. For example, Rashid continued to have 
jurisdiction over Kikole, while the akida of Likuyu, 
who had been killed in the rebellion, was replaoed by 
another akida* In at least one area, royal family
(1) DOAR, v.III, n.llj-, 19*2,1910; see also B.Ebner, 
History of the Wangoni, p.183.
(2) O.B.Mapunda and G.F.Mpangara, The Maji Maji Wafe^lis-n 
in Ungoni. (Bar es Salaam, 1969TT P ^ 9 . — — —
(3) TNA/SBC/13^8^, DO to PC, 97/135 of 29.12.1930.
leadership was replaced by a local 'sutu1 leadership.
This area was Mbunga which, before 1 9 0 5, had been under 
Palangu Tawete. After I9 0 5 , it was split and one half 
was given to a ’son1 of Palangu, while the other half nrent 
to an Ndendeule, named Msolinjonga.(1)
Thirdly, the Germans i^etained existing leadership 
for economic reasons. After Maji Maji, the whole of 
southern East Africa was relegated to a position of 
economic backwardness and stagnation, a reversion quite 
the opposite of what one might have expected from Rechenburg" 
supposed belief that another rebellion would be presented 
by economic advance.(2) The reasons for this changed 
policy included disillusion with the region which had shown 
itself capable of rejecting attempts at development.*, the 
availability of only limited finance and the more fruitful 
use that could be made of this in other regions; and the 
fact that the region was on the periphery of the colony.
The first important manifestation of this change in policy 
was the cancelling of the proposed southern railway,(3) 
Stagnation was an inevitable result of this cancellation, 
for without any means of exporting her produce, Songea 
could not hope to develop her agricultural potential.
Since the Germans had no economic motives for staying 
in Songea, the only reason for retaining it in the colony
(1) B,B.Dudbridge papers, (R.H.), History of Palango as told 
by Palango; Mapunda and Mpangara, Ma j^i Maji, p. 29 
incorrectly state that it was Mkomelangani. He was
one who surrendered in Maji Maji, apparently, see above,
p . > 1 0  .
(2) Iliffe, Tanganyika, p.5^.
(3) TNA/GI2/7R , article in Her Tag, n .2 7 , 16.1,1 9 0 7; 
this file has other material on the southern railway.
The schemeof a southern railway was officially post­
poned raMier than delayed, and alternative plans for 
one were published after I9 0 7,
must have been political. A peaceful administration 
which, as shown above, could be expected by supporting 
the traditional administrative structure, was the 
cheapest way of achieving this end.
Although they recognized the value of retaining 
the existing political structure, the Germans still 
had to be very careful to prevent another rebellion. 
Accordingly, they appear to have diluted the powers 
of the Ngoni leaders and increased their control over 
them while allowing them sufficient power to be considered 
leaders; by their people. The result was a preserving 
of the struoture of Ngoni society by a gradual decline 
in the powers of the elite dominating it.
One way the Germans achieved their aim was by 
lessening the number of followers, and hence influence, 
each Sultan had by increasing the numbers of Sultans. 
Iliffe goes so far as to say that Sultanates were 
abolished in Mshope. However, this appears to be a 
mistake for there were some there after 1 9 0 7, for 
example, the Sultaness Namabengo.(1) Examples of the 
dilution of Sultanates include Palangufs, which was 
divided into two, and Ohabruma’s former central area, 
which now became at least two Sultanatesi Gumbiro and 
Njuga(2). In Njelu, it is not known if many new 
Sultanates were set up. One was at Ndirima for the 
successor to Mputa, Usangila.(3)
(1) She persuaded the Germans that she had remained 
neutral during Maji Maji and accordingly, continued 
to rule into the 1920s, see TNA/155/S0B, v.2 , p.A; 
Iliffe, Tanganyika. p.151 also notes that akidas were 
abolished, but this also is incorrect, see PRO/CO69I/ 
2 9, 8917, evidence of Shausi Ali, akida of Luwegu 
after 1 9 0 7.
(2) MMR/6768/^/3/10 and TNA/155/SDB, v.2f p.A has
ass
Secondly, the powers of the mankosi were 
conclusively removed, as neither were now recognized*
They, along with the other manduna who were recognized 
as Sultans appear to have held power as the Germans 
wished them to. Thus it appears that the most powerful 
of the Ngoni ilite after 1905 might have been sons of 
military leaders rather than members of the royal 
families. This is suggested by a German tradition which 
states that Msawani Songea Mbano and Kazibure Soko 
were very important and tyrannical Sultans after 1905*(1) 
The loss of official power was made worse by the 
loss of traditional military power, A strong basis 
to the power of the Ngoni leadership had been, before 
1 9 0 5, their control over a functioning military syatem. 
After Maji Maji, this was no longer in existence. This 
brought many changes, such as the ending of the formation 
of age regiments(2) and the complete stopping of military 
exercises(3)• Gulliver went so far as to claim that 
because the Ngoni leaders lost their military basis 
to power, the legitimacy of their rule had come to an 
end.(4) Gulliver *s claim, however, appears to be far­
fetched, Admittedly, the leaders did lose much of their 
authority. However, they were as able as leaders in other 
African military societies to change the basis of their 
authority from a military to an administrative one. As
(2) p.357 oontd, notes on Namabengo and the Njuga Sultanate,
(3) TNA/155/SDB, v,4, p.1 2. (p.357)
(1) PRO/CO6 9 1/2 9, 8 9 1 7» p.140 evidence of Songea Africans,
(2) Ebner, History, notes the last being formed by 1905.
(3) All weapons were confiscated, see above, p.337*
(4) P.H.Gulliver, An Administrative Survey of the Ngoni 
and Ndendeuli of Songea District. typescript UDSM,
1 9 5 4, p.114-5.
the political leadership of other such societies, for 
example, the Swazi(l), is considered legitimate, despite 
the transition, so ought the political leadership in Songea 
to be considered legitimate. This was certainly the view 
held by the people of Songea who now began to glorify the 
Ngoni past(2) and, as part of it, to give support to the 
families which had formerly led them in military glory.
The Germans appear to have reduced the powers of 
the Sultans in many aspects of the administration they 
were called upon to participate in. Lack of data on the 
details of administration makes it impossible to give 
examples of this decline. That it happened, however, 
is suggested by a report of 1911 which noted: "The influence 
of the old tribal chiefs was very great in time of war. The 
rising destroyed their power and the influence of the new 
chief is trifling",(3) But dilution of power had its 
limits, as there was no point in recognizing chiefs if 
they were to be given no power, and it appears that in 
many aspects of administration, they continued to play an 
important role. Among other administrative duties, they 
represented their people to the Germans, whom they had to 
keep informed of goings-on in their areas(4); they called 
up labour when it was needed(5 ); and they had an important
(1) Ebner, History, p.221, quoting Schapera, The Bantu- 
Speaking Tribes of Soujthern Africa, (Cape Town, 1953),p.84.
(2) Gulliver, An Adtninistrative Survey, pp. 114-5*
(3) A Handbook of German East Africa, (London, 1916), Admiralty, 
I.D.1055, HMSO, "(henceforth HGEA), p.6l.
(4) TNA/I733/I, Annual Report Songea, 1919/2 0 , notes that the 
Sultcms continued to inform them of day-to-day events as 
they hadj&one with the Germans.
(5) PRO/CO6 9I/2 9 * 8917, p.l44 evidence of Nasoro bin Litunu, 
free work was done yearly on the roads, bridges, etc., 
the headmen were responsible for providing the labour.
say in education, since schools which were to be established 
in their areas had to be approved by them.(1)
In the judicial sphere, they retained much the same powers 
in civil cases which had been alloted them before 1905* These 
included hearing cases of adultery and assault and the passing 
of sentences of whipping and/or finis, while graver offenses, 
such as murder and larceny were handled by the Germans. (2)
Many leaders may have had less influence than their predecessors 
due to their youth, but this was only a temporary condition. In 
the financial sphere, they still had a role to play in tax 
collecting if the limited increase in numbers of clerks, after 
1905 is any indication.(3)
There are indications that the Germans tried to support the 
authority of the leaders. For example, in one case of general 
administration, when a Jumbe complained that missionaries had 
established a school in his village against his wishes, the 
District Officer visited the village and partially wrecked the 
school, thereby shaming the missionaries who, some people gleefully 
assumed, were about to be expelled from the district.(4) Another 
time, in a matter involving judicial authority, a European 
resident took an African to a lower court to complain of his 
disrespect, only to receive no sympathy and little satisfaction.
He complained that he had been treated in a shameless manner, 
but the Dis'trict Officer appears to have upheld the decision of 
the leader hearing the case.(3)
(1) TNA/G9/8, H.Kaiser to DO, 4.9.1912, et seq.
(2) DH)/C069'i/29, 091?, p.141 evidence of Shausi Ali, akida of Luwegu,
(3) TNA/G1 /6, Songea Annual Report 1908, has notes on tax change.
(4) Source as fn.1.
(5) M)A, Blohm file 1912, Blohm $0 Govt., 31.3.1912.
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In addition.to supporting the leadersthe government
seems to have sought to restrict the decline in their :
traditional powers. They did so in Mahenge(1) by allowing
Sultans to claim free labour and though no confirmation of
a similar permission being given in Songea was found, it is
known they were receiving free labour by the time the, British
entered.A second manifestation of support was the attempt by
one District Officer to persuade Sultans, and Jumbes to acquire
cattle herds to replace ones which had been lost or stolen during
Maji Maji. Though an economic move, it was nonetheless done
through the leaders, whose prestige it would have boosted.(2)
Here some mention must be made of John Iliffe's statements
that, after-Maji Maji, the ndunate. system in Mshope was destroyed;
the 'old Ngoni way of life ended'f the territorial organization of
political authority weakened; and the administration depended on
clerks and leaders who had become agents of the district office; and,
finally, that 11 the local compromise betweeen the German authorities
and a functioning tribal system collapsed under the pressures of
revolt1*. (3 ) It'has been shown above that much of this is debatable.
The ndunate system in Mshope, made a Sultanate one before 1905,
appears to have been weakened rather than destroyed, as there were
some
Sultans in Mshope in 1916. Again, while^ aspects of 'the old life* 
did end, others, such as administration, did not. Thirdly, the 
Germans continued to depend on members of the traditional ruling 
families. The considerable powers that men such as Kazibure 
Soko and Ali Songea Mbano retained, indicate this(4) as does the
(1) M D A / 2 / 4 ,  Von Grawert to Ifakara mission, 18.6.1914, ;I am 
grateful to Lorne Larson for this information.
(2) DOAR,v.lII, n.14, 19.2.1910. •
(3) Iliffe, Tanganyika, p.132.
(4) This power is noted in the evidence collected in PR0/C0691/29, 8917.
limited importance apparently given to clerks. Nor 
can it easily be accepted that these leaders were *ageftts 
of the district office1. They may have been educated or 
trained by, or allied with the Germans before Maji Maji, 
and may have co-operated with them after it, but it is 
unlikely that they were merely agents. Certainly the 
British were never to consider men like Ifsangila Gama and 
Putire Gama as such.(l) Finally, it can be suggested that 
there had not been a compromise between the Ngoni leaders 
and the Germans before 1^95. but rather, only a forced 
acceptance of German military dominance. After the Maji 
Maji rebellion and th# crushing of the Ngoni military 
system, the ruling families did compromise with the Germans, 
presumably because they knew it was essential to their 
maintenance of influence and power within Ngohi society,
Ngoni leaders appear to have accepted the duties imposed 
upon them, at least according to various reports which 
indicate that administration functioned well during these 
years* For instance, one report of 1906 suggested that 
leaders handled their duties in/tax collection well when 
it complained of the poor collections made in areas whioh 
were not under royal family control.(2) Moreover, available 
reports on the district make no mention of difficulty in 
administration, something which presumably would have been 
mentioned had there been any. That the leaders wished to 
retain their powers is suggested in various ways. One was
(1) As shown below, this chapter, section III and Chapter 
Seven.
(2) TNA/G4/114, Memorandum on 1907 budget, 14,11.1906, clerks 
were hired in areas where Jumbes were found to be 
unreliable.
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their efforts to preserve their control over their 
people* One way in which this was done was in their 
demand, in 1 9 0 7, that their subjects give them a specified 
amount of free labour each year* This demand had been 
made because the Sultans lost slaves in the rebellion and 
were now short of labour*(1 ) Xt was economic but showed 
their concern with preserving authority over their people. 
Their slaves could become free through paying between ten 
and twenty goats.(2) Secondly, the leaders continued to 
show considerable interest in their status, even over 
positions which the Germans had officially abolished.
Tor example, around 1910 Palangu Tawete, probably the 
most senior of the Ngoni leaders to survive Maji Maji, 
returned from Portuguese East Africa to claim the nkosi- 
ship following Chabruma*s death in exile* However, his 
bid was resisted. Senior elders from among Chabruma's 
supporters also returned to the district and, after 
implicating Palangu in Ghabruma*s death, led a successful 
fight against his bid.(3) Palangu appears to have then 
tried to re-assert his control over Mbunga* He failed 
in this as well, either because the Germans or the people 
of the region would not accept him. He had to content 
himself with being a Jumbe over a number of villages in 
the Kitanda area, (if)
(1 ) DKB, v.XVIII, n.13, 1.7.1907.
<2 ) v.XVIII, n.15, 15.7.1907. H.a.d.Richter, "Reohts-
gewohnheiten der Wangoni”.
(3) MMR/6/68/if/l, analysis by Mapunda and Mpangara; TNA/ 
155/SDB, v.2 , p.B.
(if) TNA/155/SDB. v.2, p.B.
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A second probable occasion for a struggle arose 
in Mshope in 1915* following the death of Mwanawalifa,(1) 
Though extremely little information was found on this 
succession, it appears that Mwanawalifa*s son was 
opposed in his bid by the dead nkosi fs brother, Likotiko. 
Likotiko won, presumably because he was older and more 
experienced. Palangu Tawete does not appear to have 
contested this succession for reasons unknown. Pie and 
Likotiko appear to have had amiable relations with each 
other, at least for a while when the British entered.(2)
The 'sutu* appear to have acquiesced in the preservation 
of an autocratic leadership strictly controlled by the 
Germans, One reason for this appears to have been a desire 
to preserve some sign of their military past which was now 
gone forever. This desire was strengthened by the fact 
that, following Maji Maji, the distinction between 'true 
Ngoni* and *sutuf, with all its negative connotations, 
appears to have gradually ended. It is referred to for a 
while in various reports which talk of 'slaves* and the 
Sultans(3). But Maji Maji had brought the death of many 
of the adult 'true Ngoni* and those remaining were, within 
a generation to become sufficiently integrated through 
marriage and common customs into the *sutu* population 
that the two classes became one, known only as 'Ngoni1.
This was reflected in ways such as the change of the name 
of 'Kisutu ' to 'New Kingoni ' (If), and in the adoption of
(1) Rafiki Yangu. v.VI, n.2, 2,1915 stated that he died at 
the beginning Of the year; and see TDB, v.^ f, p.226,
(2) TNA/155/SDB, v .2, p.125* Palangu's life as told by 
D.M.M,Tawete.
(3) PIGBA;
(if) Ebner, Hisrory of the Wangoni; Revised Edition. (Peramiho, 
1968), typescript, S0A, p.118,
z m
the paying of bridepriee by the 'sutu*.(l) With the 
gradual ending of distinction, everyone became relatively 
equal under the German colonial rulers and there may have 
been a tendency to remember the best of the old order, 
and to personify it in the persons of the members of the 
royal families. Moreover, there appears to have been 
a tradition of loyalty which carried on after the rebellion* 
Gulliver claims this was a reason for the continuing 
acceptance of the royal families*(2) Contemporary reports 
suggest how this loyalty was shown when talking about 
Slaves1 who continued giving their masters a portion of 
their earnings, free labour and beer.(3) Kuper, in her 
study of a similar society, offers some reasons for this 
type of ioyaltyj
nIn a society where noble birth is accepted as synonymous 
with leadership, there is little possibility of 
innovations being introduced by commoners. Few societies 
give much scope to individual ability; in most, people 
are trained to the duties and privileges of a rank ordained 
by birth, sex or age* The more stable a society, the less 
desire and usually the less opportunity there seems to be 
to break loose from these restrictions. Free competition 
for the highest positions is often a sign of disintegration 
of an established order.”(if)
Thirdly, economic realities may have fostered continuity. 
There were few ways of earning money within the district 
and so people had to turn to labour migration, an activity
(1) H.Kuper, An&frican Aristocracy. (London, 19^7), OUP, p.113 
also describes how the distinction between Ngoni and Suthu 
was obliterated through marriage.
(2) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey. pp.114-5.
(3) DKB, v.XVIII, n.lif, 15.7.1907, H.a.d.Richter, ”Rechts- 
gewohnheiten der Wangoni”.
(4) Kuper, op cit, p,7i see also, M.Read, ”Tradltion and 
prestige among the Ngoni”, Africa, v.IX, &L9 3 6), n.4, 
p.467, commenting on tradition supporting rank.
which they willingly accepted(l), after it had been 
forced on them in the aftermath of rebellion(2). Labour 
migration appears to have done the same thing for the 
Ngoni of Songea district that Van Velsen has shown it 
to have done for the Tonga of Nyasaland; it increased the 
desire to preserve the traditional life at home,(3) Finally, 
royal families were accepted by the or general
population, because the latter had no choice in the 
matter. The German administration decided to promote 
their rule, and the people merely had to acquiesce.
However, the Germans did take care top see that the people 
were not too mistreated. For example, they are recorded 
as having curtailed the legal powers of Sultans when 
it was found that many were abusing their right to administer 
corporal punishment in cases of ddultery and assault, (if) 
Again, they acted to protect the financial right of the 
people through, for example, taking up the case of some 
African workers who complained about non-payment for work 
against the plhnter, Emil Blohm.(5)
Only one section of the Ngoni population appears 
to have taken steps towards establishing a separate identity 
during these years* This section comprised the Ndendeule 
of north-east Mshope who, after 1905, appear to have begun 
developing a separate consciousness. By 19^0, some were 
distinguishing themselves from the Ngoni.(6) Most were
(1)Fr.Trossman, Missbl.. v.XIV, n.10, p.150 states that 
cash replaced cows as dowry. Cash was earned through 
migration. T.O,Ranger doubts that such freedom of action 
is possible when claiming that "the migrant labourer, for 
example, can be seen as little more a voluntary agent than 
the slave", in I.N.Kimambo and A.J.Temu, A History of 
Tanzania. (Bar es Salaam, 1 9 6 9)* EAFH, p,l6l,
(2)As noted above, Chapter Five, p.
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adopting Islam , thereby fu rth e r d istingu ish ing  themselves from 
the Ngoni who were a t th is  time turning to C h ris tia n ity ,
While apparently remaining satisfied on the political 
level and generally frustrated on the economic level, the 
people now began changing their social attitudes, The most 
noticeable manifestation of this change was the acceptance of ■ 
Christianity, an acceptance possibly related to the destructive 
effect of Maji Maji on traditional beliefs. The numbers of 
Christians rose from 400 in 1906 to 1,860 in 191^  at Peramiho and 
from 130 in 1907 to 629 in 191^  at Kigonsera.(1) The spread of 
education paralleled that of Christianty as schools and pupils 
sjt Peramiho increased from 1 and 70 respectively- in 1907 to 41 
and 2,637 in 191; and from 2 and 102 respectively at Kigonsera 
in 1907 to 14 and 2,123 in 1913*(2) The growth of Christianity 
and. European education was to make the mission a future centre 
of power in the district. Until 191^ , its main value was 
providing an alternative to the Ngoni past on social and cultural 
levels.
In all, the German period was one in which the ‘true Ngoni* 
military control over Ngoni society was destroyed, then replaced 
by an administrative control whibh, though new and kept weak by 
the Germans, provided something through which the 'true Ngoni'
(3) p,292 J.Van Velsen, "Labour migration as a positive factor in 
the continuity of Tonga tribal society", in A.Southall 8c D.
Sojcia:i. Change in Madera Africa, (London, 1961), I am 
grateful to Michael Twaddle for bringing my attention to the article. 
(*f) p*292 PKO/CO69I/29» 8917? p.1^ 0 evidence of Songea Africans.
(5) P.292 MDA/Blohm file 1912, DO Songea to Sec.Scheffer,8.1.1912,et seq.
(6) p.292 B.Suter, CA, v.XXVIII, n.336, 12.1910.
-^--ssbl>* XI, 3, p.68; XII, 7, p.7; XVIII, 9, pp.72-3-
(2)' Ibid.
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could maintain their power. It was a period when the royal 
families and their associates were at their lowest in terras 
of the amount of power exercised over Ngoni society. Still, 
the same families were in power. In their ability to preserve
their status, the royal families and their associates seem to
come, more than any other group or individual in Ngoni society, 
-into the category John Iliffe has termed of the ’age of 
improvement’• They had responded to German education and
religion, and had been willing to change the basis to their
power. By doing so when some members of their families were 
sacrificing themselves to preserve the old order, they showed 
remarkable willingness to change to improve themselves in 
their societies. Shortly, they were to be asked to change 
again. In the German power to which they were accommadating
themselves, became involved with other European nations in a 
struggle for world power. From this struggle was to emerge a 
new and much better future for the royal families and their 
associates,
II
Shortly after the war began in Europe, East Africa became a 
theatre of operations, as both Germans and British in East Africa 
decided to support their home causes. Because the British forces 
were stronger than the German ones, most of the war was fought in 
German East Africa. Till 1916, Songea district remained quiet and 
isolated, disturbed only by occasional actions along the lake.(1)
(1) General von Lettow-Vorbeck, Reminiscences of East Africa, 
(london, n.d,) 2nd.ed., p.83. "" —
Not that it was an unimportant area. Rather the British 
wanted to bring Portugal into the war on their side and so 
left Songea free for it. to conquer.(1) However, Portugal 
was not interested and in late 1 9 1 after the Germans had 
consolidated themselves in this region, the British had to 
move in to remove them. The German forces had left Songea 
boma lightly defended to release forces for action elsewhere 
so in September 1916, when the Rhodesia Native Regiment 
attacked the boma, it took it without difficulty.(2) The 
Germans had retreated into Mshope and the lands to,its north­
east and from these areas made three unsuccessful attacks 
on the boma during October and November 1916* In early 1917». 
the German western command at ffeihenge decided to evacuate, and 
five companies under Major Kraut moved through Songea en route to 
Portuguese East Africa* Though plundering the peoples of western 
a^nd southern Songea, they avoided an all-out battle against the 
British.(3) In late 1918, General von Lettow-Vorbeck led the 
entire army up from Portuguese East Africa through Songea and 
around the north end of Lake Nyasa. Though it once again 
plundered where it could, it fought no major battles.against , 
the British. >
During thenar, the Ngoni supported.both sides politically 
and economically - though not always willingly - -as each held 
power In the district. Hie Germans demanded political acquiescence 
and economic support. Political acquiescence appears to have been
(1) PR0/W0/93/333^» entries 2 . 6 . 1916, 3 .8 . 1916. 3 . 9.1916 in dias^ r 
of Brigadier-General E.Northey. ’■
(2) Ibid., entries 26.8.1916, 3.9.19167 1^ ,9.1916.
(3) Ibid., relevant, entries; Lettow-Vorbeck, op cit; L.Deppe, Hit 
Lettow-Vorbeck Duroh Afrika, (Berlin, 1919),
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readily given as it increased the- powers of Ngoni leaders., 
by: giving them a firmer control over their sociaty.
Restrictions on many of their powers appear to have lessened 
as the administration became preoccupied with the military 
effort. For instance, It seems that fulfillment of the 
requirement that local affairs should be frequently reported 
to the boma was demanded less often as less attention could 
be paid to these affairs. Moreover, the handling of court 
cases must have come increasingly under the control of local 
leaders as German officials could not spare time for these.
Finally, leaders were probably given increased powers over 
their people to permit them to meet the increased economic 
-demands made on the people by the Germans.
The economic support demanded by the Germans was for labour 
and food. As regards labour, the ^ ermans wanted soldiers and. 
porters. Some time before 191^ » the Ngoni had begun entering 
the army for by that time they appear to have largely replaced 
the Sudanese(1). They were highly regarded by the Germans(2) 
and a good number must have been demanded. No statistics oh 
numbers were found other than a reference to the existence of 
a Wangoni Company*(3) A few Ngoni, mainly mission aid government 
school-leavers, were conscripted.(if) Among the German soldiers 
were a few few future leaders, notably Dominikus Missoro Tawete.
The response to the demand for porters appears also to have been
(1) C.Hordern, Military Operations^ Fast Africa, (London, 19VI),v.1,p.378.
(2) Ibid.,- p*37o; Deppe,’ op cit, p.77; HGEA, pp.202 209.
(3) Each company-^ had 160 soldiers in 191 ,^ though later it was raised to 200. 
(if) MDA/KA-M, Kwiro, lists of soldiers stationed in tfehenge requiring
references prior to marriage.
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quite high. The Ngoni were quite renowned for. this work, 
were generally very willing to undertake it and must have 
appreciated the financial returns it brought them. Again, 
no statistics on numbers were found. Lettow-Vorbeck became 
dependant on them and was to express keen disappointment when 
they deserted his army in the 1918 march through Songea district.(1)
The demands for food were very great, particularly after 
the German army was pushed to the southern part of the colony 
and Songea*s supplies became critically important. Statistics 
available on German purchases in 1916 showed that everything 
which could possibly be obtained was bought/as far more was 
purchased than had been bought for export in 1914.(2) The 
people appear to have sold willingly as prices were fair(3)
However, when the Germans began plundering food in early 1917» 
the people started forcibly resisting them.(4) The food 
purchases in the autumn of 1916 and the military plundering 
of early 1917 led to food shortages in the district in 1917*
The British, when they entered in 1916 wanted political 
stability and some economic support. In terms of political. 
response, Ngoni leaders appear to have given a guardedly 
neutral response at first, as least as indicated by the rather 
small number of senior leaders listed in British reports as 
early supporters, : This was presumably because many leaders 
had received their positions as a result of their activities 
in the Mhji Maji rebellion or because they had been German 
trained.and they must have felt it to their advantage to
(1) Lettow-Vorbeck, op cit, Preface and p.303.
(2) MDA/Blohm file 1916, Blohm to Schulz,24.10.1916: to Graweft,18,9.1916
(3) Ibid.
(4) Lettow-Vorbeck, op cit; Deppe, op cit.
remain strictly neutral or even pro-German. Only two
senior leaders are known to have become pro-British
fairly early. They were likotiko .Tawete and Palangu Tawete. (1)
One important reason for their support of the British appears 
to have been their anger at the Germans' plundering for food, in 
late 1916 and early 19,171 which affected, their lands particularly 
hard* 1 "' *
Gradually, however, this attitude began to change. 'Reasons 
for the change appear to have been a growing awareness,by the 
leaders of the Ngoni that the British were there.to stay and, 
apparently, conscious, effox-ts by the British to foster, stable 
political rule in the district. The British were aware of the 
centralised political structure among the Ngoni in Songea district 
from, among other things, their familiarity with their own Ngoni 
states in .Nyasaland, the reports of .their Nyasaland Ngoni soldiers 
who were stationed in Songea and other intelligence reports. It 
appears the British sought the Ngoni leaders and vested in them 
the political authority needed to run the distx'ict. The .Ngoni 
leaders were not entirely passive in this respect. They, 
apparently, Identified themselves with the British and convinced 
them that they were the only legitimate leaders within the 
society. Their general acceptability to the people and the 
natural role of leadership they assumed within the society 
seem likely to have helped to assure the British that they were 
the legitimate leaders. The British were themselves interested 
In supporting the elite, for they were uncertain about the
(1) TNA./133/SBB, v.2, p. 125 Palangu’s life as told by Dominikus 
MLssoro Tawete,
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future status of German East Africa and were interested 
mainly In maintaining law and order and some semblance of 
colonial authority- until something definite was known.
From late 1916 until 1918, the leaders of the Ngoni 
appear to have regained much of their pre-1905 control 
over the people. They were lightly supervised during this 
period and often assumed almost complete responsibility 
over their followers. Thi^ ras reflected, for example, in 
courts,- where they appear to have become the final arbiters;
In finance, where they were the only ones receiving tribute 
from the people, taxation by the Europeans having ended; and 
In general administration, where they became quite independent 
in deciding the affairs of their people.
When the British started actively supporting the leaders, 
their control wa extended to a few areas whose people had 
been removed from their jurisdiction by the Germans. Of these . 
areas, north-east Mshope was the most important. In 1918,
Palangu Tawete convinced the British that he was the rightful 
leader of Mbunga, a large part of this region and managed to 
persuade the newly-appointed District Political Officer (later 
District Officer)(1) forcibly to install him as leader, despite
r
the bitter opposition of the Ndendeule of this area who had 
been given control by the Germans after Maji Maji. Palangu 
appears to have received the support of Likotiko (2), a support 
which, if true, was one of the vexy rare instances of co-operation 
between these two important branches of the Tawete ruling family.
(1) In the 1940s this wascha nged to District Commissioner. However, 
for convenience sake, District Officer will be used.
(2) TNA/135/SDB, v.2, p.123, Palangu's life as told by D.M.M.Tawete.
Palangu replaced the Ndendeule leader and the ’son' of his 
who had taken over after 19^ 3* thereby reuniting the Mbunga 
Sultanate. The Ndendeule reacted strongly to the ending of 
their separate administration. A number of Jumbes refused 
to co-operate with Palangu, and the District Political Officer, 
Turnbull, visited the area, deposed some of the more truculent 
Jumbes and installed more compliant ones in their place.(T)
Still refusing to acquiesce, a large group of Ndendeule left 
the district and moved to Mahenge.(2) But Palangu, the most, 
senior veteran leader of Msg*! ffeji still alive, had succeeded 
in putting himself back in power.
The economic support demanded by the British during the 
war was limited. As regards labour, they had no need for 
soldiers, though they did accept specialized support, such 
as intelligence and guide work.(3) They did need men for 
porterage and recruited a great number.. The people were 
willing to co-operate to some extent but the demands v/ere 
so great that by the end of the war there were widespread 
rumours circulating that those accepting work as porters came 
to no good end.(k) The British had little need of food but, 
to prevent the Germans from getting any, they bought large 
quantities.(3) This led to serious food shortages in the 
district in 1918, They did want cattle and began forcible 
buying of all available stock.(6).,' To preserve their cattle,
(1) TM/135/SDB, file C, p.2; v.2, p. 125, Palangu1 s life as 
.told by D.M.M.Tawete.
(2) Ibid.''
(3) TN4/155/SDB, files A, C name some who'helped the British.
(4) TM/155/SDB, file A, sheet series 12, Higgins tour report,
23.. 11 * 1925; PB0/W0/95/533^, Northey diaries, entry' 31.12.1916. 
: (5 ) PKO/WO/95/533^,• Northey diaries, entries 29. 9 . 1916, 1. 2 . 1917.
(6 ) TNA/SEC/1733/1, Annual Report Songea 1919/20.
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which were being rapidly depleted in numbers, owners moved 
them to libena, out of the reach of-the military, (1)
In all, by 1918, the British were well established in 
the district, the people were slowly recovering from the 
disruptions of war, and the leaders had succeeded in reversing 
their low power status. Soon the leaders were to go further,
III
Once the Great Powers decided that the former German East 
Africa would become a mandate territory of the newly-formed 
League of Nations which Britain was to administer until its 
inhabitants were ready for independence(2), the administration 
of the territory, now known as Tanganyika Territory, took a 
firmer grip and assumed some direction. One of the first t 
administrative steps taken to have effect on the district 
level was the delineation of internal administrative units.
In Songea district, few schangesKwere made to the boundaries 
. delineated by the Germans, Songea town remained the 
administrative centre, while Lipumba and Milo remained sub­
centres until 1922, when the latter was abolished and the former 
abandoned in favour of Lipumba.(3) Within the district, six 
subdivisions were set up: Njelu, with apparently sixteen 
Sultanates; Mshope with six(^ ); IJbena, with five; Matengo, with 
. two? the -^ ake Shore, with three; and the Ruvuma Yao, with four. (3)
(1) TNA/SEC/1733/1, Annual Report, Songea 1919/20.
(2) Details in Smith in P.Gifford and l.R.Louis, Britain and Germany 
in Africa, (London, 19^ 7), p.281;. W.R.Louis, Britain and Germany's 
lost Colonies, 1914-1919, (Oxford* 1967). ■
(3) TM7siKi7lT733/3, Annual Report, Songea 1922,
(4) Excluding Ubena and Upangwa.
(3) As fn.3; the Ruvuma Yao subdivisions appear to have been part of 
Njelu.
Within each Sultanate * there were Jumbeates and villages 
under: wanyapara, which was the name now given to the alumuzana,
The'sizes of these units varied considerably. Akidates had 
between 1,000 and 4,000 registered taxpayers, Sultanates, 
between.50 and 500 and Jumbeates, between 15 and 200.(1)
Ey 1921, the wartime policy of retaining, with as few 
changes as possible, the German-appointed leadership gave way 
to a policy of selection aimed at producing an efficient administration 
with qualified African leaders where possible.(2) The basis of 
the new policy was the supporting of a centralized political 
administration. This move marked a break from the patterns 
of,political life prevalent under German rule in which a weak 
a utocratic leadership was fostered. The Ngoni royal families 
a^ jid their associates, who had worked hard to retain their 
power during the previous fifteen years, were now to find 
power given readily to them. During the next four years, 
district representatives of the colonial government occupied 
themselves with the consolidation of autocratic rule among the 
Ngoni,
Among the first moves to be made in improving efficiency 
was the reduction of the numbers of leaders at all levels 
of administration. Accordingly, some of the Sultanates were
(1) TNA/SEC/1733/3, Annual Report, Songea 1922.
(2) This is shown in notes on leaders found in TNA/155/SDB, 
file A, eg, sheet series 10 on Sultan Usangi-la; O.Guise- 
Williams to Redmond, interview 30,9.1971, stated'that;
District fficers had considerable powers and freedom
to administer as they wished. They could hire and fire ■ 
chiefs at their discretion, this being done generally 
according to how they worked.
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eliminated, A District Offioer, justifying the action, 
wrote in 1 9 2 2:
MA few of the Sultanates in point of numbers of adherents 
are quite unworthy of the dignity of administrative 
entity, while subdivisions into Jumbeates are frequently 
too minute* Some of these junior authorities are nothing 
more than small village heads and this does not appear 
to be in the best interests of the administration of the 
areas*"(1 )
Size was not the only criterion for reduction in numbers 
of administrative entities at various levels. The competence 
of leaders was another. Of changes in the numbers of 
Sultanates, Njelu had its numbers reduced from sixteen 
to twelve, while Mshopefs was reduced from six to four.(2) 
Among those to be affected in Njelu was the Sultanate of 
Kikole, which had once been led by Rashid and appears to 
have been under another Arab after the war. In Mshope,
Njuga was joined to Likuyu(3)» while Gumbiro and Mahanje 
were amalgamated, (if)
On a lower level of administration, many Jumbeates 
were amalgamated. Some of the ones abolished were extremely 
small and hardly viable. For example, Jumbe Mirambo, one of 
Sultan Likotiko's men, had under him his son, one mnyapara 
and one follower,(5 ) Incomplete data makes it impossible 
to be exact about how many Jumbeates were abolished. The 
few figures available suggest that a good number were. For 
example, in 1922 eight Jumbeates were abolished or had their
(1) TNA/l733/3» Annual Report, Songea 1 9 2 2.
(2 ) TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.A; v.4, p.13.
(3) Ibid.; TNA/1.55/SDB, file C, sheet 4. Njuga was led by
Sultaness Namabengo. The British considered her
incompetent and replaced herewith Kangasimba, a Thonga 
of the Nkuna clan, see Ebner, History, p.23.
(U-) TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.A; v,i*, pp.E, 13.
(5) As fn.l.
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'Jumbes' replaced* (1) The anomoly.of the * Sultan*s men1 
was also tackled but not fully resolved* The ‘Sultan's 
men* comprised those, people who paid allegiance directly 
to the (unofficial) rikosi, no matter where they lived, rather 
thant^ °aShnduna* This complicated administration for the 
British who wanted all people to be responsible to the Sultans 
(manduna) within whose area they lived. The nkosi was 
reluctant to forego the allegiance of these men,.however, and 
though a report of 1923 suggests that he had agreed to abolish 
the category(2), it continues to be recognized after that year* 
After consolidating the size of Sultanates and Jumbeates, 
the colonial administration then intervened to change the 
leadership in some. Because it had become committed to supporting 
the traditional leaderhip in African societies,(3) it generally 
supported these where they held power. It tended to be 
stricter for other leaders. For both tapiditional leaders 
and recently appointed ones it adopted criteria and gave full 
support to leaders who had these. These criteria included 
willingness to obey, receptiveness to change and competence.
Those lacking full support could be removed. Only one 
traditional leader was replaced. This was Sultaness Namabengo 
who was removed in 1924 because she was inefficient. She was 
replacec^ by a certain Kangasimba who, according to one 
official, was popular in the area,(4) The British
(1) Tm/SFC/1733/13, Annual Report, Songea 1923,
(2) Ibid. -
(3) .ggffprt on ggngaigrika Territory, (London. 19211.
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colonial administration used the occasion of the change 
of leaders to demote Njuga from the status of a Sultanate 
to that of a Jumbeate, an action which caused Kangasimba 
considerable anger and bitterness.
In one instance, the oolonial administrators were 
able to interfere upon the ascesion to power of a Sultan 
from a traditional ruling military clan in order to demote 
the 'Sultan*. This was at Mgazini, where a member of the 
Gama royal family, Mperembe, replaced the grandson of 
Mpambalioto Soko who was to take over the Sultanate.
Gulliver was later to Use this instance of the takeover by 
the royal family of a Sultanate controlled by a military 
clan as an example of the illegitimate assumption of power 
by the royal family in Njelu.(l) However, as the Soko 
family were later to be on good terms with the Gama family(2), 
their removal from power may have been inspired by the 
British rather than by the Ngoni. Certainly it fitted in 
with the administration*s policy of handing power over to 
the royal family and of amalgamating small units. If there 
had been any interference from the Gama family in favour 
of the takeover of the Soko Sultanate, it may have been 
because of the role played by Mpambalioto's son, Kazibure, 
who became Sultan after 1905. He was a German ally who had 
become very powerful during his reign, a fact that may have 
angered the royal family. Moreover, as an ally of the 
Germans, he may have curried little favour with the British.
(1) Gulliver, An Adminis trative Survey, p.20-,5,
(2) In the 1949-50 succession, they played an important 
role, see Chapter Eight, section X3EJ! They did, however, 
protest the change, and some were sent to prison, see 
Gulliver, An Adminis trative Survey, p.2S,
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Where traditional leaders were in power and could not 
be removed without forcing the government to act against 
its stated plans, colonial offioials had to content 
themselves with futile complaints about the quality of 
various Sultans.(1)
In dealing with Jumbes. the government had considerable 
freedom of action, for though many men selected for these 
positions had traditional justification and legitimacy, 
their rank was low enough to permit some manipulation. 
Consequently, a number that were found to be unsatisfactory 
were dismissed, while others were reprimanded or disciplined. 
Few statistics were found which referred to the numbers 
affected. One report of 1922 notes that three were fined 
and two publicly reprimanded(2), so interference seems to 
have been reasonably frequent.
Though the British colonial administration were anxious 
to return power to the traditional ruling group in Ngoni 
society, it did not do so to its logical conclusion by 
officially recognizing the nkosi, or chief, of each kingdom. 
Colonial officialsjknew that these positions existed and were 
recognized by the people.(3) However, they were not especially 
enamoured by the two men, Usangila Gama and Likotiko Tawete, 
who held these posts in the two kingdoms and consequently 
saw little justification for acknowledging their status
(1) For example, TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.126 has the comment on 
Palangu taken from a 1921 report: ’’Sultan Palangu... 
drunken and useless... reprimanded constantly for 
neglect of duty.”
(2) TNA/1733/3, Annual Report, Songea 1 9 2 2.
(3) TNA/155/SDB, file A,1Sheet 10, has; "There is no doubt 
he (Usangila) is the father of the Zuru group. All 
look up to him and like him.”; see also, TNA/l733/l5t 
Annual Report, Songea I9 2 3.
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possibly increasing their powers.(1) Perhaps they 
felt that the leadership which had so recently been 
returned a considerable amount of the status it held 
before 1897» might become too independent if every 
aspect of this position of power was recognized.
The duties and powers alloted by the colonial 
authorities to the leaders were in many ways similar 
to those they had had under the Germans, The leaders 
varied in their response to these duties and powers.
In general administration^ the Sultans and Jumbes were 
required to represent the government before their people 
and vice versa. They passed on the orders they received(2). 
They were required to hold occasional meetings with their 
Jufnb$iS. at which they were to discuss local problems and 
resolve these as well as to be informed of the problems 
and concerns of the people.(3) Prom 1922 onwards, general 
barazas were held at Songea boma twice a year. Many Sultans 
continued the practice, aoquired under German rule, of sending 
in information on their areas. The I9I9/2O report noted that 
"hardly a day passes but at least two short notes are 
received from some portion of the district".(4)
The Sultans appear to have been conscientious in 
performing some of their duties. Por example, they appear 
to have been quite prompt in providing labour when it was 
needed, either by local government officials for road work 
or porterage or by private recruiters for the sisal
(1) TNA/155/SDB, v.i*, p.^6, states that until 1926, 
Usangila was recognized as "scarcely primus inter 
pares".
(2) TNA/1733/3, Annual Report, Songea 1 9 2 2.
(3) TNA/1733/15» Annual Report, Songea 1923*
(**■) TNA/1 7 3 3/l, Annual Report, Songea 1 9 1 9/2 0 .
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plantations. 1^ the case of.private recruiters, incentive
was oftdn provided through, the offer'of money or .gifts. (1)
H o w  ever, in other duties, the leaders were not very helpful
to the administration. One example was in agricultural
innovation. In 192*f, when the District Officer was trying
to promote use of the plough by demonstrating one to various
Sultans, he met with little positive response and despaired:
’’They were not moved to emulation, and (were) only passively 
interested. It was understood that they would not raise 
any serious objection if the government ploughed their lands 
for: them yearly. Otherwise, our fathers and our fathers’ 
fathers have used a jembe (hoe3 - why alter?”(2)
The district report for that year noted that the Native Tribal 
Authorities, as the leaders \irere called, were lethargic.(3)
The financial duties of the Sultans were largely confined 
to the collection of taxes and court fees. Regarding taxation, 
the Sultans had to ensure that all,, their men paid hut-and-poll 
tax. This was done through supervising Jumbes, who in turn 
supervised wanyapara, who collected the money. In return for 
their work, the Sultans received a monthly salary, the Jumbes 
received a rebate of three percent of the amount collected(*f), 
while the wanyapara received nothing.
The judicial responsibilities of the Sultans comprised 
holding courts. Until 1923 these were unconstituted in that they 
were held without written judgment.(3) After that date, they were 
made to record the particulars of each case and to' note the 
judgment. In the courts the Sultans were advised by two or more
(1) This became quite important in the late 1920s.
(2) TM/SEC/1733/9 *71, Annual Report, Songea 992^ -. -
(3) Ibid.
(4) TNA/SKJ/1733/3} Annual Report, Songea 1920/1, expenditure list.
(5) TM/SBC/1733/13, Annual Report, Songea 1923.
Jumbes. . InitialOy, local officialsfound that Sultans 
tended to submit difficult cases to the boma for conside.ratiOn . 
rather than■risk alienating an offended party.(1) However, 
this was stopped by decisions to hear only appeals.(2 )
Constituted courts', were run at Songea town, Lipumba and, until 
1921, MLlo , by European, administrators ,V while an Arab was made ^ i 
Idwali at Songea town and given authority over a second class 
; court!. (3) Shortly afterwards, the four akidas in the district, 
of which one, that at Likuyu, was in Ungoni, were also alioted. 
constituted courts. -.'.3 / V---
The administration gave general support to the leaders . 
in ways other than the allocation of powers and responsibilities. 
For example, they tried to boost their status. One official 
wrote how the leaders nare-.encouraged to build themselves 
larger, houses, and to ;plant a flag, staff before it,
Stensilled boards with.the name, of the chief upon it are 
provided to all who.:, ask for it. Lime for washing the house. 
can also be provided”. (4-J Tinally, they.'supported the ' / 
leaders against challenges to their authority,.-as described 
.below. .
(.1) TNA/SIX3/1733/15 , Annual Report , Songea <‘1923.: , : "
(2) Ibid. ■
(3) TNA/SEC/1733/1, Annual Report, Songea 1919/20. The 
. Liwali was reported to command the ’’respect of all
, Sultans” along with: having'”much influence with the ; :
Mbhammedan population at Songea”. , ; /
:(*)■) TM/SEC/1733/li: Annual Eeport, Songea 1923.
The leaders appreciated and willingly accepted the 
political rights and responsibilities which they had 
been given by the British administration. They handled 
some duties well - such as listening to orders, managing 
courts, and collecting taxes - while ignoring others - 
such as assisting in occasional development schemes. In 
return for what co-operation they gave, the Sultans regained 
positions of considerable authority over the people. They 
benefited in prestige and power and gradually recovered 
their economic pre-eminence over Ngoni society. They 
received free labour, earned revenue rebates and received 
food and other goods for their services(l). Xtfhen the 
right to demand free labour was removed in 192^(2 ), they 
received increased rebates in replacement.
The people varied in their reaction. Some were 
distinctively unreceptive. Probably the first dissenting 
group had been the Ndendeule. However, after their 
failure in I9IS/1 9  to preserve their independence, they 
quieted down for a while. A second dissenting group was 
the Yao living in Kikole. These Yao had long been part 
of the trading community in the district and had considered 
themselves quite distinct from the Ngoni. Before I8 9 7, 
they had been under Rashid, and after 1897» remained under 
him, then his successor. When the British abolished this 
distinction, and placed the Yao of Kikole under an Ngoni 
Sultan and demanded that they observe the same practices 
towards that Sultan as did the Ngoni - these including the 
giving of free labour - the Yao reacted strongly. They
(1) TNA/1733/15, Annual Report, Songea I9 2 3 .
(2) The reason for the change nationally is described 
cuttingly by R.A,Austen, Northwest Tanzania under German 
and British Rule, (London, 1 9 6 8), YAle UP, p.l^O.
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bitterly resented what was, to all effects, a conscious 
attempt by the British to retribalize a people who had 
become quite removed from their tribal background and 
environment. They were vociferous in their dissent, A 
report of 1922 noted that they were troublesome and 
"expected more favourable treatment compared with the 
Wangoni".(l) Xn 1 9 2 3, some of them submitted a list of 
grievances. But the British had no intention of allowing 
an independent group of Africans living in an area that 
was being rejuvenated as a tribal entity* Consequently, 
they dealt harshly with the Yao. The grievances were 
summarized cursorily by the District Offioer:"l)they 
considered themselves free from the Angoni tribal service 
of one day's cultivation for Sultan; 2),3)»*0» trivial and 
insubstantial affa£rs"(2), The Yao were told to follow 
the local custom or leave the district. Those who had 
complained then acquiesced, but only after burning the 
house of the Jumbe appointed over them.(3) Though no 
reference to negative reaction by other groups was found, it 
is possible that the Matengo also dissented. They certainly 
were to voice their dissent shortly.
Tor the majority of the Ngoni population, the return 
of the autocratic rule of the royal families appears to 
have been acceptable. They had known little else, many seemed 
satisfied with the status quo(4), and most had recourse to 
the British authorities if their leaders were found to be
(1) TNA/155/SDB, vA, p.D; TNA/1733/2, Annual Report, Songea 
1920/1. The above paragraph is based on these sources.
(2) TNA/155/SDB, vA, p.D,
(3) Ibid.
(^) As suggested in p.307, fn.3.
(1)
unsatisfactory. They appear to have appreciated aspects
of the administration given them. Tor example, on their
attitude to the legal system, one District Officer wrote:
"...they respect the conduct of their cases. They are 
impressed with the fact that both sides have the right 
of hearing and more so because the evidence is written 
down. They feel, however, that the oourse of justice 
is slow, They profess to rejoice that the era of stripes 
is passed, but they cannot understand why their opponent 
should be let off with a trifling fine, or imprisonment, 
particularly in adultery cases. It is a lasting wonder 
to them why the women should not be equally punished 
with the men in such cases. Also why, what is so obvious 
to them that it needs no proof (eg.that a man is a 
wizard), should be set aside for lack of witnesses(2)
Tinally, they may have been content because they tended
to be isolated and little disturbed by the leaders.
Autocratic rule became important during these years 
because, in addition to having official and some popular 
support, it lacked any important opposition. There were 
no powerful economic groups within the district. Trade 
was in the hahds of the Indians who remained outside 
politics, while no either economic activity was able to 
emerge in this isolated and backward district. The only 
important economic activity at all was labour migration(3) 
and this, as noted above, tended to reinforce rather than 
threaten, traditional society.
There was a powerful social group in the district. 
This was the mission. However, by 1926 they were still 
only recovering from the setbacks of the war. In 1922, 
Swiss Benedictines were permitted to enter Songea to take
(1) Sultan Likotiko appears to have been disliked by a 
number of his people, see TNA/155/SDB, file C, notes 
on Sultan Likotiko.
(2) TNA/1733/9i71, Annual Report, Songea, 192 ,^
(3) TNA/1733/12:8^, Annual Report, Songea, 1925; by 192 ,^ 
there were an estimated 6-7,000 men away - some 20^ of 
the male population of the district, see TNA/1733/9:71 
Annual Report, Songea 192 ,^
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over the mission and. educational work begun by the 
German Benedictines before the war. They were followed 
in 1 9 2 5, by the German Benedictines who were permitted 
to return, (1) Once^these were back, European religion and 
education began a firm expansion in the district. The 
missionaries were exultant about the prospects for Ungoni. 
Some saw it as a second Uganda, which could be completely 
Christian within a few decades,(2) One described the 
openness of the people towards religion as a sign of a 
popular movement towards the Ghurch.(3)
But the growth of Christian influence and education 
was not to become much of a threat to the Ngoni leaders. 
Many were themselves Christians, while a number of them 
expressed a genuine interest in allowing the expansion of 
the Christian presence. Statistics available on the 
establishment of schools show where the missionaries went
and which Sultans weri most receptive:
1922 192^
Njelu: Sultan Usangila 9 12
Ali Songea 7 7
Fusi 2 k
Mperembe 3 3
Zamtanga 3 2
Kapungu 1 2
Mhomakilo 1 2
Putire 1 1
Mgendera 2 2
Mtekateka 1 0
Kikole 1 0
Mshope: Sultan Likotiko 9 8
Palangu 5 1
Mkangasimba 1 b
Rashid Salim 1 0
Mhalcambewa 0 1
(1) On entry of the Swiss, see C.Leubusoher, Tanganyika 
Territory: A Study of Eoonomic Policy under Mandate, 
(London,19^ ) ,  OUP, p. 18; SAO, Peramiho Chronicle,
1935* n.3» P.1.5; J.Richter, Tanganyika and its future , 
(London, 193^), WDF, pp.**4-5; J.Listowei, The Making’" 
of Tanganyika. (London, 196$), Chatto & Windus, p T W .
(2) Missbl.« v.XXVI, (1921), n.9 , p.170.
(3) Richter, op oit, pp.^6 , 57*
(4) TNA/I5 5/23/IO, DO to Asst.DO, 723/7/1 2/2 /1  of 30.6.1926.
Those leaders who were not receptive to the advent of 
the Christian influence, tended to be supported by the 
government in their efforts to keep the missionaries out 
of their areas(l), unless most of^ theii^ followers felt 
otherwise(2). By 1925» there were some 8,000 pupils 
in Peramiho parish and 2,728 in ICigonsera parish. (3)
The groundwork for the rise of a large educated class was 
being well laid. By 1926, those who had been educated 
appear to have been concentrating on furthering religion 
and education rather than on engaging in district politics, 
possibly because the district administration was distinctly 
unreceptiv^to political activism and there were few 
career possibilities outside the government and the missions 
to support anyone wishing to enter politics. Moreover, it 
is quite possible that very few had any interest in politics.
By 1925» thus, the two royal families and their associates 
had begun emerging from their rather weak position under 
German rule to reach a position of power and status. Moreover, 
this was only a beginning. Greater days lay ahead for them 
under the system of Indirect Rule which was now to follow.
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Following the appointment of Sit Donald Cameron as 
Governor of Tanganyika'^  in ,1925'1 the colonial administration 
of that territory formally implemented.the policy of Indirect" 
Ruie, which it ha^d favoured.since the early 1920s. While 
Indirect Bile fascinated many in the Colonial Service after 
its successful implementation in Northern Nigeria and seemed 
‘a good, inexpensive political system to implement ina poor 
Colony such as Tanganyika, it Could rarely live up to its 
"expectations. First of all, the ground.cn• which"it could1 
develop was not present, even in embryonic form, in the •.> 
political structures of most of the;societies in Tanganyika. 
These ,societies lacked the centralized,structures which were . 
desired for Indirect 'Rule. Secondly,, in those, societies 
which did haye centralized structures,.the policies of 
Indirect Rule' were oriented towards consolidating these rather 
tj(ien;ideveloping .the' 'political consciousness' of the : 'African :
; native1' as Cameron wished. (1)' Because- Indirect Rule could; . 
generally not live up to its expectations, it was to be of . ' ' 
considerable benefit to leaders'of societies,.such as the. two ; 
Ngoni kingdoms, which had centralized political structures..
(1) Quoted in, B.T.G.Chidzero, Tanganyika and International 
Trusteeship, (London, 1961), p.1l8".
This was because such leaders were to be granted the full 
recognition of their status, something which had been 
denied many since German colonial entry.
The implementation of Indirect Rule on the district level 
involved the consolidation of effective political units* In 
Songea, four were recognized and given support: Njelu,Mshope, 
Matengo and Ityasa. Other political entities in the district, 
being-considered-too small or uninfluential to merit recognition, . 
were joined into the four major units or placed in neighbouring 
districts. The Ngoni kingdoms absorbed three entities: Njelu 
took the Ruvuma Yao, while Mshope took the Ndendeule region of 
likuyu and part of the-Bena area.
Within the two Ngoni political units, the political structure 
which had been recognized for practical purposes since 1922 was 
given formal recognition aid its leaders, their traditional ties. 
The Chief, or nkosi of each kingdom was recognized. In Njelu, 
this nkosi was Usangila Zulu Gama. In Mshope, acknowledgement 
was more complicated as likotiko, the unofficial nkosi since .1915? 
died in 1925* His title was contested by two candidates: Palangu, 
the veteran leader of Maji Maji, and M&poli, a son of Mwanawalifa, 
the unofficial nkosi from 1906. until 1915. Although Palangu was 
easily the mord senior applicant, having been eligible in 1.878, 
his election was not wanted by many in Mshope who believed, 
whether true or not, that he had been responsible for Chabruma's 
death in Portuguese East Africa following, tfeji flfeji and disliked 
him because of it.(1) Consequently, Mapoli was selected. Palangu 
protested about the choice and began stirring up opposition to
(1) See above, p.289.
Mapoli.- This led the colonial governmi nt to intervene 
and give Mapoli only provisional recognition. Permanent 
recognition, would only be given a year later conditional. . 
to his being an:efficient ruler, Mapoli proved unsatisfactoiy 
to the government and was denied permanent appointment. , 
Accordingly, the Mshope looked around for another 
candidate* . An excellent replacement was,foundVin'Dpminikus 
Missoro, a son.of Ghabruma,,who.had been.educated by the 
Benedictines, then served in the German army and,-after;
British takeover^,in the British forces. At the time of his . 
nomination, he was serving in north-east Tanganyika, When: . 
offered the nkosiship, he agreed to .accept it.(1) He was very 
acceptable to the colonial administration(2), though to the 
unsuccessful candidate, Palangu, he was an usurper,(3)
Subsequent political rivalries between the two men were to 
be intense. Dominikus Missoro Mbonani Tawete was to rule
■ until 1952 and Hsagjpla Zulu Gama until 19^ 1 • ’ These two men 
were, thus, to lead their, people through, most of the years of 
Indirect Rule and, as we shavJLl see, through the finest years 
of the administrative rule of the- royal families during the 
colonial period. • \ V - :.r\
Below the mankosi were the manduna who were selected1from" 
among the Sultans., A few'Sultans who;had small numbers of
■ adherents were amalgamated into larger ones.' Thus, the twelve
(1) TNA/155/SDB, file C, notes on Paramount ;Chief, Mbonani group, -
(2) TM/155/SDB, v.2, p.126. .: : . .1 - . . ; :
(5) TNA/155/2VV'1» confidential report by ’ B. J.Dudbridge,' 17.3.1938
on relations between Palangu and.Missoro. Palangu'looked: upon 
Missoro as mtoto wake . (his child) and so expected respect from 
1 him.
Sultanates in Njelu were reduced to eight as the four Yao 
Sultanates were amalgamated into the Federation of Ruvuma 
Headmen and Usangila relinquished.jurisdiction over a 
particular group on being elected nkosi. The four Sultanates 
in Mshope were reduced to three" as Msindo was joined to, 
apparently, likuyu. (1) When■ delineating- ndunates., the 
administration tried, to set up boundaries for- each. However, 
it was unable to do this because the Ngoni leaders, particularly 
in Njelu, were firmly opposed to them and refused to co-operate 
in their implementation.(2)' Their reasons were understandable.
As far as they were concerned, the power of a leader depended 
on the number of his adherents,.and no one.wished to surrender 
■ any no matter where they lived. This would have been necessary 
were boundaries established. Jfore important, adherentsjwho 
liyed distant from/their leader would have to be replaced by 
people living near him who lacked the historic;ties of allegiance 
which followers had. This would have led to the emergence of 
government-supported rather than indigenous-supported ■ ■
leadership. Moreover, it would put a leader, in a vulnerable 
position should many people emigrate to other,ndunates. The 
problem of implementing internal boundaries was to arise again 
later and, throughout British, colonial rule, was to remain one 
of the most persistent grievances of administrators in Songea.
■Below the manduna were the Jumbes. When Indirect Rule 
was established, the numbers of jumbes were reduced considerably.
(1) P.H.Gulliver, An Administrative Survey of.the Ngoni ahd: 
Ndendeuli of. Songea 'District,* Tl95^ )Y P.25; within Gumbiro, 
the leading JumbeSimanawas called nduna by the nkosi^  
though this status was hot recognized by the British, see
. TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.7^ .
(2) TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p.G.
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as' smaller ones were amalgamated into larger units. For 
example, the number on Mbunga was reduced from eleven to 
seven, while those in likuyu dropped from seventeen to eleven.(1) 
These amalgamations helped to standardize the number of 
taxpayers in each Jumbeate. The average, in the sample year 
of 1934j was 329, with variations from 9?6‘for one in 
Mkurumusi to 198 for one in Mgazini.(2) A second result of 
amalgamation, probably unforeseen by the British, was the 
weakening of the authority of the Jumbe over the people he led.
This happened when Jumbes were appointed over people whom they 
had no traditional right to lead, for.these gave little respect 
and obedience to merely nominal leaders. After the initial 
selection of Jumbes, the government appears to have remained 
generally neutral with regard to the appointment and support 
of Jumbes. According to one District Officer, Jumbes were 
selected by senior Ngoni leaders in consultation with the 
people, a happening about which the government knew little,(3)
When selecting Jumbes, senior leaders appear to have preferred 
ones who were supported by their people, as these would be the 
easiest and most efficient to rule through. Thus, in the 
largely Ndendeule-populated ndunate of likuyu, nine of the 
: eleven Jumbes in 1926'were Ndendeule,(4) while in the mixed 
•true Ngoni'-well assimilated 'sutu' ndunates, such as Ndiriraa, 
five out of six were Swazi.(5) At times the Ngoni tried to 
install their own Jumbes over distinct, separate groups. One
(1) TNA/155/SDB, file C, sheets 2,3,C.
(2) TNA/155/10/6, DO handing over notes, 222/114 of 15,5.1934.
(3) 0.Guise-Williams to Redmond, interview, 23.11.1971.
(4) TNA/155/SDB, v .2, p.74.
(5) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, pp.72, 116, 192.
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example was when nkosi Usangila installed an Ngoni Jumbe over 
;, .some Ruvuma:(Yao. Their hostile reaction, described below, may 
have discouraged its further practice, as no other instances of 
its■being done were found. Below the Jumbes were the wanyapara.
These do not appear to have been affected much by the implementation 
of Indirect, Rule as their- level ofadministration was too low to 
be of interest to the ...colonial administration.
. ■ • II ' , .
The reaction to the implementation.of Indirect Rule varied.
The leadership and, in particular, the royal families, welcomed 
it .as it was a boost to their prestige to be recognized once 
again for the leaders they. were. However, because they believed 
their status-in Ngoni society to be something natural and 
unquestioned, they probably did not feel any’ overwhelming gratitude 
to the British for recognizing it. .
The leaders appear to . have worked-to consolidate their 
power once'given it. One way in which, this was done was by 
supporting each other. Two- important manifestations of this 
support are known. The first, lasting much of the 1930s, 
occurred after the District Officer, W;C;Morgans dismissed two 
manduna, Zamtanga Gama and Laurenti Pusi Gama, the first for 
petty peculation and the latter for participating in the 'Ngoja1., 
witchcraft movement which swept through the district in 1929-30.(1)
Both men received strong support from their.fellow leaders and. 
their followers and, in the mid-1930s, the two were reinstated., 
Zamtanga1a return was appreciated as his temporary successor had. 
lacked influence, and backing(2),. while Pusi's return did "much to 
; consolidate the area,V. (3) , The second instance, discussed below was the
(1) TNA/SEC/19^ -15r PCAR fehenge, 1930; /13^, PC to ChSec, 1/C16 of.
.^6.1930; /11679, POAR Idndi,: 193^ .
(2) TNA/SEC/13796, ActPC to ChSec, 1/11V221 of 12.6.1933. '
(3) TNA/SBC/11.679» PCAR Idndi, 193.V
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resistance given by the Njelu leadership to the 
transfer of Liganga Ndunate to Umatengo in 1931* and the 
successful attempt after that to establish a new Ndunate 
of Liganga for Putire, the royal family member who lost 
the first one.(l) The appointment of Sakamaganga as 
nduna of Likuyu by the nkosi of Mshope appears to have 
been a means of rewarding him for alliance, as his family 
had no connection with Likuyu in the late nineteenth 
century. However, the Ngoni leaders were not always 
successful in support of their fellows. For example, 
in 1937 the colonial administration wanted to form a new 
Ndunate to facilitate the handling of the increased court 
work in the area of Songea town following the abolition 
of Federation.(2) Nasoro Songea Mbano, the nduna of the
Ndunate around the town bitterly opposed the establishment
of the new Ndunate since some of his land would have to
be relinquished. However, the administration wanted its
establishment and the nkosi had to concur. He may have 
been ameliorated by the knowledge that he would select 
the new nkosi. The Ndunate established was Mfaranyaki(3) 
and the nduna appointed over it was a brother of Usangila, 
named Korofindo.
A second way of consolidating power was through 
opposing non-Ngoni leaders. When Indirect Rule was 
established, only one of these was allowed to retain 
power. He was the akida of Likuyu, Rashid Salim. The
(1) TNA/155/SDB, v.J*, p.1 0 2; file C, notes on Putire;
Kigonsera Chrbnicle, 1 9 2 7, n.^, p.17.
(2) TNA/155/SDB, v.^f p.182} and see below, pp#$'5b-2.
(3) Gulliver, An Adminis trative Survey, p.6 .^
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leaders of the Ngoni had protested at his retention
when Indirect Rule was established, but had been
unable to obtain his removal, because he was popular
with the administration.(1) This did not mollify
them and they continued to press for his removal.
A major opportunity appears to have arisen in 1929*
when Morgans first entered the district. Shortly
after his arrival, he had to deal with one of the
periodic benevolent witchcraft movements which swept
the district, this one called the Ngoja movement.(2)
The British colonial administration feared movements
such as this as being possibly subversive(3)* and acted
to suppress it. This gave the leaders their chance to
remove Rashid, They, in a fairly common and acknowledged
practice(4), Advised’ the relatively uninformed newoomer
and implicated Rashid in the movement. The District
Officer who at first believed that Rashid was in it "with
some ulterior motive, possibly to get evidence against
(5)
these people(spreading the movement)", nonetheless believed
the Ngoni and had Rashid removed from office and imprisoned.
When the Ngoni proceeded to implicate Rashid in charges 
(6)
of corruption, the gullible official complied and brought 
him to trial at which he was found guilty of misappropriation 
of funds and fined. Suggestions were later made that
(1) TNA/SEC/l3484, PC to ChSeo, 6 9 4 /8 of 25.4.1930.
(2) TNA/SEC/18682, PCAR, Native Affairs, 1st draft. The 
cult was spread by agents living in Liwale.
(3) TNA/155/l75. PC to DO, 132/6 of 1,3.1930; and Order 
under Section 8 of NAO, 18/1926, passed 7 ,1 2 .1 9 2 9,
(&) TNA/155/37> DO to PC, 5/5/2 /2  of 6.4.1929.
(J*) TNA/SEC/l3484, Rashid to Governor, 14.6.1930; 155/SDB,
(it) raA/SE0A3796, PC to ChSeo, 37/8/53 of 1 8 .1 2 .1 9 3 4.
witnesses for the prosecution had perjured themselves.
The leaders continued to rouse support against Rashid
and had the duped official calling for his removal from
the district and for the complete elimination of any
trace of his presence, particularly through the take-over
of his coffee farm.(l)
By this time, Rashid had contacted the Governor
and presented his case. This led to a severe criticism
of the District Official by the provincial administration.
The Provincial Commissioner wrote to the Chief Secretary 
a
and denuded an inquiry:
"l regret to inform you that I havejformed the impression 
after full consideration of all the facts that the 
procedure adopted by the District Officer in this case 
has been hasty and most unwise, and X shall be grateful 
to learn if you will allow me to give him full 
opportunity of removing that impression at an inquiry 
to be held on the spot at the earliest possible moment,"(2)
This inquiry was duly held, and the District Officer was
reprieved for the time. His act of removing Rashid was
upheld, but his demand for the expulsion of Rashid from
the district was refused.
After Rashid's removal, Likuyu was taken over by
Sakamaganga, a cousin of Missoro's, The replacement of
Rashid by a member of the Tawete ruling family was
probably one of the most important achievements of the
ruling families of the Ngoni in their consolidation of
control during Indirect Rule, It marked the all but
(1) TNA/SEC/13^8^, PC to ChSec, 6 9 ^ /2 5 of ^.7*1930
(2) Ibid,, and see PC to DO, 69^/23 of ^,7,1930.
o>
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complete takeover by the rpyai families and their associates 
of the political structure in the two kingdoms, The only 
area that remained outside their immMmi/fce control was * 
southern Njelu, but this does not appear to have mattered 
much,
While willing to consolidate power, the leaders appear 
to have been somewhat ambivalent about assuming the responsibilities 
it brought them. These responsibilities fell into three categories: 
financial, judicial and general administrative. In finance, the 
leaders were responsible for collecting taxes, then for supervising 
the spending of part of these through their participation in the 
Native Treasuries, As regards collecting, the senior leaders did 
little* The manduna generally merely called the wanyapara to 
bring their followers to the villages of the manduna where tax 
clerks collected the money. Colonial officials placed constant 
pressure on them to ensure that all followers paid taxes and 
reductions in revenue from one year to the next could result 
in the re'duction of a leader's salary, or other punishment. (1) 
Officials furthermore sought to register all taxpayers by 
replacing the traditional system of allegiance to men by an 
allegiance to land. This remained as distasteful^ fco Ngoni 
leaders throughout these years as it had before 1925 and they 
refused to have anything to do with it. On one occasion, a 
District Officer ignored their feelings and forcibly introduced 
internal boundaries dividing ndunates. This increased the 
number of taxpayers(2), but so alienated the Ngoni^ Leaders from 
the administration that the latter decided to rescind the 
legislation and return to the old method of tax identification,(3)
(1) Eg.TNA/155/SDB, v-A, pp. 0,55*
(2) m/155/SDB, v.2, p.C,
(3) TNA/SSC/20zf76 , PC to ChSec, 49 A/15 of 30.11.1931.
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Little again was done by leaders in deciding how to spend 
the money allocated to them to use through the Native Treasuries, 
There were two reasons for this. First, the amount of money 
available to the Native Treasuries■rarely met more than what was . 
needed for the recurrent expenditures accruing to them, these 
being the paying of the Native Administration and the handling 
of projects in medicine and sanitation, education, agricultural 
work, road and bridge building and repairing,(1) So there was 
little to have an interest in. Secondly, the budget had to be 
approved by the District Officer who, himself, was'responsible 
to senior officials,(2) Thus, he had a close interest in.the 
budget and often drew it up himself, only bothering to seek 
comments and approval from the leaders.(3) The leaders could 
make suggestions and these were sometimes carried out. For 
example, the leaders wanted and gained the improvement of the 
Songea-Njombe road to permit bus and lorry transport for labour 
migrants,(4) But this was the exception and throughout these 
years, the leaders, having little responsibility and minute 
funds, showed little or no interest in the workings of the 
. Native Treasuries,
The judicial responsibilities of the leaders comprised 
operating a more complex legal system than that available before
(1) As shown in Statements of the Native Treasuries, eg. 193?: 
TNA/155/64, Native Treasury Approved Estimates, pp.44-7.
(2) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.256; one instance when a request was 
refused is TNA/64/7, DO to PC, 64/14 of 1.1.1936.
(3) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.32, the NT was controlled by the NT 
agent at the district dffice.•
(4) A.H.Pike to Kedmond, interview 13*9*1971? on road suggestions, 
see TNA/155/53/6/I.
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1925. The manduna were given 'B1 courts whiqh'handled 
civil cases, such as marriage and adultery(.1), in which 
they could issue fines and/or imprisonment for up to one 
month. The mankosi- and, for a short while during its ■ 
lifetime, the Federation, had ’A 1 courts which heard appeals 
from the 'B* courts and handled minor criminal cases. They 
were empowered to impose heavier fines than the *Bf courts' 
and to give sentences of imprisonment for rip to three months.
The mankosi and manduna welcomed the increased authority,they 
were given through the courts for it helped to consolidate 
their power over the people.(2) They were willing to do the 
court work demanded bf.them and the administration seemed 
satisfied with the operation of the legal system. One District 
Officer, when appraising the efficiency of the leaders, wrote 
that some manduna confined their activities mainly to court work.(3) 
The administrative responsibilities included receiving and 
passing on orders from the district office(4) and holding regular 
mass meetings to. keep themselves informed of what was going on 
in their areas. In 1927, these meetings were held once a month.(5) 
Every so often, general district meetings were held to which all 
leaders were invited. The leaders seemed willing to attend and hold 
meetings as demanded, though they must have felt little need to do' 
so as their court work must have made them aware of all they had 
to know. They were reluctant to represent the administration
(1) Many leaders wanted this1 to be decs$Lred a criminal issue as 
it was an extremely, important social issue,see TNA/155/175.
(2) Various colonial officials commented that the increased 
jurisdiction of the courts reversed the declining power of
the leaders, eg. TNA/SEC/10900, PC to ChSec, 663/65/4 of 24.9.27
(3) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.G; PCAR 1932, p,-37*
(4) This had been a general responsibility since 1918.
(5) ICLgonsera Chronicle, 1927, n.4, p.16.
"330
too closely, and local officials were frequently dissatisfied 
with the way in which instructions were carried out. This 
dissatisfaction was to lead colonial officials to relegate 
much of the administrative work done by the chiefs to the 
secretary of the federation, once this body was formed.
To some extent, the leaders were required to innovate.
New economic, social and educatonal policies were formulated 
from time to time by the administration and the leaders were 
pressed to see that, these were adopted. Their response to pressure 
varies according to their attitudes towards change. As the 
mankosi were the most important forces for or against change, 
their attitudes are noteworthy. The nkosi of Njelu, Usangila 
2ulu Gama, a conservative man with a firm belief in preserving 
traditional aspects of Ngoni society, was unwilling to support 
every new idea proposed by local officials. So, such issues as 
internal boundaries, marriage regulations, new farming methods and 
the growing of famine crops were considefed by him but not forced 
on the people.(1) Recommendations which he felt to be useful, 
such as orders regulating the annual burning of fields, restricting 
the export of foodcrops in times of district shortage, reporting 
the arrival of locusts, restricting game traps and forbidding 
fishing with poison, were implemented.(2) However, his general 
attitude of reluctance to innovate led him to be cajoled, pushed, 
persuaded and complained about by eveay District Officer who 
worked In Dongea during his rule.
Contrary in many ways-, to Usangila was nkosi Dominikus Missoro 
Mbonani Tawete of Mshope. A young and progressive man who had fewer
(1) Shown in reports on these and other issues, see relevant files 
in TNA/155**•series.
(2) See TNA/155/14/1 for the circulars on these.
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List.A
Ndunates and Manduna, 1926-1939
Njelu
Maposeni nkosi Usangila (1906-^1)
Mgazini nduna Mperembe (1906-29) - Bv/anambuzi (1929-3*0 “
Boniface Mperembe (193*L-*•?)
Mkwera nduna.Aii Songea (1906-29) - Leonard (1929) -
Nasoro Songea (1929-***)
Marra nduna Mhomakilo (1920-50)
Liganga nduna Putire (18..-1931) (abolished 1931, -
reconstituted 1938)
Majimahuhu nduna Mzamara (1907-20) - Yusuf Mgendera (1920-*..)
• Mkurumusi . nduna Gwazayo KapungU (1906-AA)
Mpitimbi ..nduna Zamtanga (1906-30) -Uledi (1930-5) ™ Zamtanga
, (1935-W
Council. Halifa
of Ruvuma Mbaraka
Headmen Bwana Ali (1926-50) - Mwenyiheri bin Kitesi
. ;  ■ ' , (1930-...) .
Hfaranyaki nd.una KorofdndcT (1937r-lt;1) '
9Msh6pe ' : - s-• ' ■
Gumbiro. nkosi Domihikus Missoro(1926-52) .
Mbunga nduna Palangu (1918-3,0) - Safi ^alangu (1930) -
Tokamshenzi bin Mbaru 8e Mfaume bin 
Toyimone (1930-1) - Saidi Palangu (1931" 
v - " "  35) “ Palangu (1933-38) - Saidi Palangu
(1938-53)
Likuyu.. akida Eashld Salim (1921-30) - nduna Sakamaganga
. \ (1930-50) ■ v ;.
Kalian je jumbes (1935-39) - Mapoli (1939--->)
sources: Gulliver, An Administrative Survey; Ebner, History*
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had so bitterly resented Palangu*s takeover in 19^8 by 
supporting them under him.(1)
But the attempt to: end forever the challenge of the Palangu 
family did not work. An angry and bitter Palangu went to Par es 
Salaam to see the Governor. He met the Chief Secretary, apparently,, 
and gave him a statement, part of which read: f,I wish to know 
why I have lost my,country? X am the rightful chief and I wish 
that another son of mine named Saidi should take the place of 
Safi. I now. appeal to the-'government to assist-me in this 
request."(2) The Chief Secretary did help him. Palangu was 
restored to his position of power in Mbunga. Palangu then handed 
overvthe ndunaship to his son, Saidi/J. Four years later, after 
complaining that his son was not giving him the respect which was 
his due, Palangu. took over the ndunaship of Mbunga again.(3)
Four years later, another dispute arose between Palangu 
and Chabruma. This concerned the Ndunate of Idkuyu* In 1930, 
after expelling Rashid from his akidate there, the nkosi had 
installed his cousin, Sakamaganga, as nduna of Iikuyu.; Eight 
years after that, Palangu submitted a protest claiming that 
Likuyu was part of his country and that the nkosi had had no 
right to appoint Sakamaganga there. He demanded that. Sakamaganga 
be removed and his son Saidi be installed in his place. He 
threatened to take the case to the Governor if his demands were 
not met. Both the district and provincial administrations 
became involved in this dispute. Officials asked Palangu why
(1) A.H.Pike to Redmond, interview 26.1.1972. He states that 
MLssoro would not have tolerated the Ndendeule becoming - 
independent of him.
(2) TNA/SEC/13*^84-, ChSec to PC, 13^/239 of 17.6.1931.
(3) TNA/153/SDB, v.2, p.126.
he had waited eight years before, making his protest and . 
were told that he had been shamed by the torture affair . 
of 1930-1 and allowed time for it to be forgotten. ~ The 
administration rejected his claim, 'it decided that the 
nkosi was responsible for selecting manduna and,: moreover,' 
that Sakamaganga was a very good leader who did not deserve, 
deposition. (1) ; \ ,v V : : "
/ At least one difficulty over an ndunashipoccurred in 
Njelu in addition to the two of Zamtanga Gama and Laurenti '• •
Fusi Gama, mentioned above.' This was over the :Mkwera Ndunate, 
ruled:by the military Mbano family. Hie problem this time : 
was over the selection of a desired successor to All Songea 
who died in 1929* The senior leaders wanted Masese, the , 
eldest grandson of Songea, to succeed. However, he was in 
Dar es Salaam at the time and seemed to be enjoying himself 
too much to be interested in returning to village life, for 
when offered the post, he declined it. The leaders bad to 
settle for Leonard, a younger grandson, who was better 
educated and somewhat - out of accord with most leaders.(2)
He; became secretary of the Federation shortly after election,, 
in which post he was. to have very poor relations with the 
leaders, as will be shown below.
Signs of the continuing importance of traditional 
■political structures,such as the nkosi's,.’houses*, - helped show 
how,fully the traditional structures had reemerged. On the 
'houses’, one District Officer wrote that nkosi Usangila had, 
many wives who "naturally act as intelligence agents. Their 
position commands considerable respect".(3).
(1) TNA/153/24/1/1, series of letters. . .
(2) TNA/SEC/13A8A, ActChSec to PC, 13*^ 8A/3 of 26.9.I929 et sod;
TNA/155/SDB, v.A, p.l6zl-.
(3) TNA/133/SDB, v.A, p.A8.
Though the leaders -were .pleased with the implementation of V 
Indirect. Rule, not all their followers werev A few groups 
■strongly opposed its implementation, generally because they 
considered themselves separate from the Ngoni and-resented the 
control which Indirect' Rule gave its leaders over. them. 
Occasionally their protests;achieved the desired result. High, 
ori tiie list of dissenters were ;the Matengo of Liganga, Though 
the separate subdivision of Umatengo ' M d  been set up in 1923? 
it did not comprise all the fetengo. The-northeastern Matengo, ' 
who had, prior, to 1897, been settled in; country dominated by 
the Ngoni of western Njelu, became part of the Ndunate of 
. Liganga in- Njelu., .This .Ndunate, according to a 1929 report, 
contained 700 k&tengo and 2*f9..Ngoni(1 ) and the former, who 
were in the majority, protested strongly over their relegation 
to Njelu and not Umatengo and over the, appointment of the 
Gama,royal family member, Putire, over them.' Putire's family 
had controlled this region for decades. To strengthen their 
demands that Liganga be joined to Umatengo, the Matengo began 
a campaign of passive resistance by not paying taxes. This' 
was a very effective form of protest" against the colonial 
administration and soon led to an inquiry. This recommended 
the transfer of liganga to Umatengo and a change of its name 
to Iipumba, yet the retention of Putire as - nduna. (2) The Gama 
royal family and the families of ruling military clans bitterly
(1)TNA/l55/37, DO to PC, 710/2/22 of 3.5.1929.
(2) TNA/155/37? DO to PC, 710/2/22 of 3.5.1929; /155/SDB, 
v file C., ;notes on Putire.
criticised'the government decision and a strong delegation 
visited.the District Officer to demand.that the Ndunate be 
returned to Njelu. However, the administration, which 
presumably was primarily interested in mollifying the Matengo 
for tax purposes, refused to ascede to the Ngoni demand.
Instead, the delegation \iras dismissed, in reports to superiors, 
as "ranting and raving" troublemakers.(1)
The settling of the Liganga dispute to the dissatisfaction 
of all concerned insured that the problem festered. The 
Matengo':continued to see the overlordship of putire as a sign 
■of the detested Ngoni control over them, and they pressed the 
administration to replace Putire with one of their own people 
as nduna. In 1931? after much pressure, Putire was removed 
.from the ndunaship and replaced by a traditional religious, 
clan leader of the Matengo, Gabriel. The Ngoni leaders were 
very unhappy about this action but again, protests had no effect. 
Putire returned to Njelu and became a minor leader at Ndirima, 
while retaining his title of nduna.(2) When he left LLpumba, 
a number of his followers, presumably most of the Ngoni, left 
with him. In the late 1930s, the Ngoni leaders succeeded in 
having a new Ndunate, called Liganga, established and made ' 
Putire a functioning nduna once again.
A second group to protest Ngoni control was the Ndendeule 
from Mbunga. In 1932, a group of Ndendeule, . led by Kazipiga 
and Jfesudi bin Teuka, lodged a formal protest against Palangufs 
control over them. little was learned about these two men.
..They were either quite intelligent men in their own right'or
(1). TNA/155/SDB, v.A, p . 102; KLgonsera Chronicle, n.*f, 192?, p . 17
(2) TNA/155/SDB, v . A ,  p . 102.
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,: had good contacts, for their- claim was a quite sophisticated 
one. They may have been moved to action by the brief ? •
,experience, in 193^ 1 of having Ndendeule leaders in Mbunga,.•;
before Palangu reasserted his control, as discussed above.■ ■ ‘
; , .. ; ’ ; ■ ■ . : ■ :■ '-■■ ■ _ .'■■•'.■■■. 'v. p
When field research is .'conducted, more may be learned about 
these men and the background to their action, though a recent 
oral history on Ndendeule politics did disclose some, albeit, very , 
limited data.(1) ■ .
According to the District Officer who handled the protest, 
the Ndendeule had prepared well, They made. reference to the 
’’self-determination principle of Indirect Rule” and asked for 
emancipation from.Ngoni domination. To replace the rule of 
.■.■'Ngoni chiefs; they suggested the appointment of village councils.
The proposed councils were similar to their traditional ones,
.. though they may have seemed radical; or outlandish to colonial 
officials in the 1930s, A general meeting was called to hear 
their demands, ahd they were instructed to.bring their 
. .supporters along. Bearing in mind that the Tawete family had 
considerable, power and prestige in Mshope, the claimants; 
nonetheless, managed to persuade three hundred people to 
■attend. But when the matter was put to the vote, only six 
gave their support. . A few of the participants, interviewed 
some time Ihter, lamented this lack of unity and said that some 
- Ndendeule still wanted to be ruled by the Ngoni.(2) As a 1 
result of the adverse vote, the claim,;which the District 
Officer called ’’fanatical”, was rejected and the claimants
. (1) J.B.M.Newa, The Ndendeule Struggle against Ngoni Feudalism 
and British Imperialism BA dissertation. Political Science 
Dept., UDSM, 1970. . '
(2) Ibid., pp. 19-20, ,
"laughed, out of court" and reproved. (1) They were told 
/that the governnieht had no intention;of removing the chiefs, 
that they must co-operate and that, if they had an adequate 
following, they could gain, off ice O ut only under/the Ngoni.(3) / 
The; Ndendeule-later renewed their claim, but to no\aVaii,- 
Thus, only a few. years after they-had gained firm control 
over this important,- anti-Ngoni area, the.Tawete ruling family ' 
./had; managed in the face of opposition to keep/ the people , 
firmly in check. The Ndendeule. now remained quiet foria coupleV. > 
of decades until.a renewed bid could be made for independence.
. A third group to protest against the control of the,Ngoni 
was the Yao, Arab and other Muslims of Songea: town. A number, 
led; by Yusufu Mwichande, demanded that they be independent of 
nkosi Usangila. They were, bitter because they felt they - *
received unfair treatment from him* ; The unfairness concerned 
Usangila's tendency to ignore Muslim?legal tenets, particularly 
■in cases.involving marriage and infedility. Usangila, apparently 
pressed by the administration, was unwilling to apply the Severe 
punishment which the Muslims-demanded for offenders.' He .had done • 
so before, only to have the District Officer quash the sentence 
as excessive.(3) The District Officer to whom the Muslims < 
brought their. complaint was unrec.eptive. The administration 
was determined to preserve uniform standards among the different 
ethnic groups, so the bid was Rejected. A Provincial Commissioner 
commented:"HiC Excellency? s. attitude .in the. matter is that If'\
(1) Newa,,..op cit, pp. 11-2; TNA/155/SDB, v.2, p;D* /155/10/6f 
..DO handing.over notes, 222/11  ^of 15.5.I93A.
(2) Ibid. ;
(3) TM/133/37, DO to PC, 3/3/2/22 of 6.^.1929. \ /
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alien natives are not contented and happy under the native
authority and courts of the area in which they live they
should go. hack to their own country".(1)
Despite the number who protested about the consolidation
of power by the Ngoni royal families and their associates, it
should be pointed out that these were the ones whose allegiance
to.the Ngoni was doubtful at best. Most of the people in
Njelu and more tha^n half those in Mshope accepted the political
structure. There were several reasons for this continued
acceptance of autocratic royal families some three decades after
their military domination had ended. One was the fact that
the royal families and their associates had been ruling since
t the kingdoms had been established. Because of this they were
seen, according to one District Official who served in Songea
through most of the 1930s, as natural leaders accepted without
question rather than as imposed leaders,(2) Moreover the
overwhelming majority of the population had never known as
complex a political system as the one the Ngoni had, so may
■ have seen the Ngoni leaders as being of a level higher than
that of their traditional political representatives, many of
whom still had authority on the village level. Secondly, the
people had a pride in their leadership and the former power
which it represented and had little wish to change it,
Gulliver was veiy cutting about this attitude:
, "(Most people in UngoniJ had little tradition to be proud 
of or to perpetuate and they were conscious that they were 
noteven real Ngoni. They depended on their masters, the 
chiefs, to lead them as they always had done. When the 
chiefs gave up leadership the people were helpless, bereft
• * *
(1) TNA/153/37, PC to DO, 32D/4/29 of 22.4.1929.
(2) A.S.Stenhouse to Redmond,interview 4-5.10.1971 stated 
_ respect was given to all Swaai.
of iiispination and, example/•/"They,then' discovered that they '/
could increasingly-ignore their chiefs, who hioyw^ . had
little taste forbothering, them. There was no restraint 
against sitting hack, merely making'a hare5living supplemented ./ 
by labour migration."(1) : "
Some comment ,mudt be made here. The leaders did , not. give up
leadership. They merely changed the basis to it. Moreover,
the people looked up to them and if it was only to a limited:
degree, it may have been more because.people were isolated
. and dispersed: than for any! other reason. V " . /
final reason :for the acceptance of the Ngoni leadership ‘
was satisfaction atrkhdwing that misrule could be. protested?-
against and generally remediedii Ibr instance, if.the people /
. found a leader ;iq be• oppressive, they could complain about
him and have;\him /removed. - One instance of this wass with-regard
to Safi Palangu 'whO. was remoVed from power after the .torture
case. Again, if a leader was-incompetent, he':was:not; givenvv.
respect. For example, nduna IHedi, who replaced Zamtanga-■ for
a whiie in Mpitimbi, was unable to hold his;appointment because
he was a "junior member of the family.. , (who lacked sufficient
influence oyer.the people and...the backing of the wazee (elders^".
.Zamtanga, who had been dismissed for mismanagement, had-to be.
reappointed. Furthermore , if leaders were appointed, over people •
. with whom they lacked traditional ties of allegiance, . they were
ignored. This happened to many Jumbes who were..deserted1 by people;.
over ..whom they had been appointed. (3) Again, if a leader fulfilled
his,duties in an unsatisfactory manner, the people could, look for.' .
(1). Gulliver, An Administrative Survey / p.HS^v . ,■
(2) TM/SEC/13796/ ActKbtoiChSec/ 13.6.1931 //^
(3) Eg., TNA/155/SDB, v.^, p.162.
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someone; else; as for example, by attending the court of * ' 1 ;■
another nduna. Then if they felt.a leader was overextending 
his authority, theyr could: apply pressure to restrict him.
; For example, when nkosi MIssoro tried to implement radical V
: changes in the marriage law, the people-.protested and he 
had to back down. s Finally, people could leave the district _ 
if. they fouhd the atmosphere too -restricting.
Various economic and;social activities replaced participation . 
.-in political life. One was tobacco-growing, xnrhich by the mid-193Qs 
had become sufficiently large to support a co-operative movement. 
This movement, failed to generate political activity during these 
years because colonial officials kept a firm control over it. It . 
did/have, economic, and social importance and the: more successful 
grower^became infliiential within the district.' Though this 
sometimes annoyed the government(1), the Ngoni leaders did not 
worry about it as they^maintained .close contacts with the 
movement and treated its more successful members more as _
worthwhile associates than possible competitors,(2) The other 
major economic activity in the district, labour migration, appears . 
to have fostered the support of autocratic, traditional rule 
rather than destroy it. A few reasons for this have, alraady been 
.given. Another included the indirect support given to leaders 
through the. problems emerging from labour migration. The main 
problems concerned marriage, and involved desertion and adultery./ 
The. resolving of these issues kept the courts busy and the leaders, 
through -their control of the courts, were able to preserve a very . 
effective voice over the running of the society. A further way in
. ■( 1) TNA/153/SDB, v.'l, pp.261,-2. • ■ ;
;.%:.(2;)/Ibid.‘;v the author has written ansanalysis „ of the .co-operative 
/movenapht in;Songea which is to be.published shortly,
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which labour migration supported traditional society was . 
throuh fostering tribal identity among migrants, an identity . 
which found one expression in the rise of utani relationships 
between migrants and neighbouring peoples., Utani relationships 
involved contact of a friendly or a scornful nature with 
neighbouring peoples based, to some extent, on historical 
contacts.(1) These helped to foster Ngoni consciousness of-, 
and pride in their illustrious military past ahd must have 
been reflected in tolerance of and support for the tradtional 
leaders.
One important potential alternative to the political control' 
of the royal families and their associates to arise between 1926 
and 1939, and about which, unfortunately, little is known, was the 
challenge of the Catholic Church. During these years, the . 
influence of the Church became considerable as the people turned 
en masse to the religion and education they offered. Mission . 
representatives became an alternative source of authority to 
political leaders one which, according to one official, was . 
more influential among its followers.(2) Still, the Church 
took care to abstain from political activism and to restrict 
itself to the religious and educational matters which interested 
it most. Accordingly, veay little political alternative appears 
to have emerged. Moreover, the leaders of the Ngoni generally 
maintained good relations with the Church(3) presumably because 
they appreciated its influence and the fact that this could be 
used to their benefit.
(1) For more information on utani, see R.R, Moreau, "Joking relationships 
in Tanganyika", Africa, v.XIV, (1944), n7; E.Spiss, "Observations on 
Utani customs among the ngoni of Songea district", TNR, n.16,
1943, PP.49-53. ---
' (2) 0.Guise-Willaims to Redmond, interview 13.9.1971; TNA/155/BDB,v.4,p.117.
(3) A.H.Pike to Redmond, interview, 13.9.1971 notes that Laurenti Fusi 
Gama seemed to use them to his advantage*
’- - V . 3^  ■:
The o n ^ vkno»wn,_vlrnstancex6f -.the -^ Church haying an 
-anti-colonial political effect-on the people, and this  ^*' i?
indirectly, was a complaint by some people,about the lack ,
.. of certain types of education*, This complaint, noted by 
Iliffe(1), offers ;-no .details and it was not possible to 
learn more'of the background .to or the result.of. it.' These 
results, howeverj appear to have been minimal, judging from , I 
;i the lack of: government" increase; in expenditure on education
in the late 1930s. • v.
", ■ ■ > IV .
The final group to have an interest in the new political
' ‘v . '
- administration was the’ colonial government itself* Initially,
; fthe attitudeVwas favourable. •Colonial officials'took-:considerable 
• interest in the- Ngoni autocratic‘state and fostered,the consolidation 
of the powers of the leadersThey were.intolerant to the wishes 
of minority groups such as tlieYao and Ndendeule who did not want 
to be integrated into the Ngoni states. They sought to, increase 
th^status and prestige of leaders that they might stand out from’; 
the rest of the population and be readily identifiable as the 
'elite in the society* Once.; the system went into operation f'  ^ ^
and colonial officials.experienced the results of their efforts, VI. 
attitudes began cha ngingi Officials frequently foundthemselves 
dissatisfied with the -performance of leaders they had supported. ,;
. The po.Wers they, had given; the: royal families arid their associates ... ■ 
did not bring the changes, and .improvements which manyv wanted in
(1) Iliffe in Kimambo and Temu, op cit, p.133.
administrations : In- financial matters* they'’wanted the leaders.'
. to‘ -participate more(.1) ;by taking. a grater, interest in the - 
:way; in which Native Treasuries1 money was spent ., particularly 
,through suggesting expenditures which would be of use to.their 
- people*: More important, they wanted methods of tax co.Xl.ection •
facilitated through the .establishment of tax registers on which 
ipeople:would be. listed according to where they, lived rather 
than, whoV they were under, and. strqngly resented- the leaders1 
refusal to have anything to do with such a scheme. In judicial .. 
mutters, though generally satisfied, they,criticised things 
such as, the carefree attitude by which people could take their 
cases to any nduna and they lamented the unwillingness of *:
leaders to. change traditional laws on issues*such as marriage, 
in;which existing laws seemed imperfect. 3jn general 
administration, they were frequently unhappy at the lack of ; 
interest' shown in schemes introduced from time to time and at 
..the general reluctaynce of leaders to become innovative forces 
in'their societies* ;; ■
In all, there was a general feeling, that Indirect Rule was 
hot operating as well as it might. From time to. time efforts were 
-made; thus;, to. improve it. In some cases,;-District Officers 
took it in their hands to forcibly improve administration. * Probably, 
the.most renowned instance of this was during the period of 
administration of W.C.Morgans.. (A strong-willed, determined and 
.confident man, Morgans was determined to.make leaders undertake 
changes; which were good for their societies. Accordingly,.where 
leaders showed themselves incapable of Or unwilling to, change 
or to work,efficiently,,-he fired; them. • During his -hectic years
: (.1) TM/133/i3DB,: v .*f, p.256. ; ' ' y
of administration, five leaders were dismissed: Zamtangg Gama, 
Laurent! Fusi Gama, Safi Paleyngu Tawete, Rashid Salim and a 
Yao headman* The first two were, subsequently reinstated. He 
tightened up on tax collections by making all plural wives and 
most old men pay taxes - ''a*v action u?Kick was bitterly resented - 
and, more important, forcibly instituted internal boundaries.
He wished to improve the agricultural economy through ensuring 
the end of future shortages and so forced the people to grow 
cassava,.a durable famine crop but one which few wanted in their 
regular diet. His policies so alienated the leaders and people 
in Ungoni that most had. to be undone following his departure.
No other District Officer went as far as Morgans, though various 
ones sought, from time to time, to introduce minor schemes for 
the improvement of administration and'the betterment of the" 
people in their eyes.
A second way in which attempts were made to improve 
administration and one which, in its duration and impact, 
was to prove much more important than.isolated interference in 
aspects of administration, was the formation, In 1929, of the 
Ngoni Federation. The possibility of a Union of the Njelu 
and Mshope kingdoms had been suggested as early as 1925 by 
Cameron(l), then by numerous other officials though it. was 
only in.1929 thaJV it was established. Officials in the 
district questioned the leaders.on the possibility of union 
and learned, incorrectly, that the kingdoms had united in 
pre-colonial days under a person'known as a lipanga in times 
of serious external threat. The lipanga was identified as 
Songea Mbano, making the then contemporary holder, Leonard
(1) D.Cameron,. My Tanganyika Service and Some Nigeria, (London, . 
. v  1939), pp.59-60. ... • -
. Songea Mbanb.(1) They were incorfect insofbr.as all known
historical data, including that noted in.previous chapters,
makes ho mention of sucli. a person. - Nor did Songea ever lead — .
the combined: armies in their known campaigns against the
Maseko and Hehe. Nonetheless, satisfied that they had found .
a legitimate, traditional means to unify:the.kingdoms into one
great state, the1colonial government proclaimed, the birth of
the Federation in 1929- It is not-clear why Ngoni leaders
■acquiesced in the formation of the Federation. It appears
■ they were subjected to considerable pressure,, particularly
as officials admitted the goni preferred secession to unity.(2 )
One official :said the whole thing was one of Morgans1 ideas. C3)
However, though he could have pushed^his through, his successors
were sufflcinetly interested in it and his predecessors sufficiently
anxious to push it to make it more'than one man's scheme.- Possibly,
, the leaders were told, or felt, that it could do little harm and
could even be beneficial by reducing their duties.(*f)
SJhoUgh the Federation was set up as a restricted body, meeting
four times a year to discuss financial and other platters (5) and
which had an 'A' court, it soon took over many of the day-to-day
affairs of district administration. One Official commented:.
,rThe tendency arose for the District Officer to look upon 
the lipanga as the Executive head of the Angoni Federation.
Indirect* administration through the chiefs (Ma-Nkosi) became 
submerged in a more Direct, tho' efficient* method thro * .
. (1) PCAR 1929, Mahenge, p.62; TNA/155/SDB, v.4,p.lt; /SEC/18693,
■r Extract from PCAR 1929/30, Mahenge.. Native Affairs. ;
(2) TDB, v.*f, p.237* /. • .■
(3) A.H.Pike to Redmond, interviews,
( H  fM/155/^33, l^;-t?;:ehiSe6, 119/9 of: a5.1lJ’1929. ■ .
y. -• , ,;v V-;' ■ .y^v: _ /'■' ■ :p-;. 348
;the; salaried, ...Iipahgaj' who gradually tended to issue v2 
directions to the Sub-Chiefs direct. Also1 appeals were 
attracted, to hi's'court ^ ostensibly, relieving the two , .
Vchiefs ofroutine. n(1) P ;
Moreover' Leonard, who appears to;have been efficient, worked . 
hard to consolidate his' position./and, in the course of this, : ' 
became a threat to the leaders he had.been appointed to serve.
In the running, qf the Native Treasufy, he made many of the- . 
decisions on the allocation of money./ In the courts, he dominated 
legal affakirs.(2) In general administration, he began issuing 
.regulations for the running of the’district*(3) finally, within 
a year of his appointment, he began to wearbthe feathebs of the. .
’Ludonga * bird, the symbols of leadership‘in Songea Ngoni society.(4) 
The leaders of the . Ngoni soon became aware of what" they had; 
allowed to happen and began to resent ever having agreed to 
federation in the first,place./ There had never been a federation 
before and each" nkosi questioned the intents of the'other;in this 
union.(5) Their suplciohs and fears were gradually to be realised . 
in the development of a serious boundary dispute,* discussed further 
below. In the meanwhile, they let it be known that they would not 
stand for any diminution of their powers.(6) In 1930, to enforce 
his point, nkosi Usangila began boycotting sessions of the , \
Federation court.(7) • . ■ ‘ :
Worried about the negative fellings which were building up 
towards the Federation,;.yet anxious,to preserve it as:it had, , .
(1) TNA/1 35/SDB, v.4, p.33; TDB, v.4, p.238.
(2); TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.17.
(3) TNA/155/133,' PC’ to ChSec, 133/25 of 17.10.1929; /155/175, ChSec 
to PC, 12964/24 of-29.5.1931.
(4) TNA/155/222, DO handing over notes, 29.5.1933* 7
(5) A.H.Pike to Redmond, interview 13.9.1971 * .-
(6) TNA/155/37* PC’s report on Songea, 7.8.1929; TDB, v.4, p.238.
(?) TDB, v.4, p.238.
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become useful to them, colonial officials took steps to 
remove some of the leaders '- complaints. The Federation 
court lost much of its powers, while those of the mankosi 
.gained increased powers.(1) Leonard was reprimanded for 
exceeding his powers in issuing administrative regulations 
and these were restricted. His salary was then reduced in 
proportion|fco those of the mankosi.(2) In 1934, the lipanga*s 
name, was changed to shangweni, as the altter expressed "the 
functions of the office, which is that of principal secretary- 
to the Ngoni Native Administration".(3) In that dame year, 
maukosi were given Empire medals for the "invaluable 
services rendered" in soundly establishing the Ngoni Native 
Federation.(4)
Despite all the above conciliatory activity, the administration 
retained the Federation which the Ngoni leaders did not want 
■ and so they continued to be unhappy. In 1937, these, leaders 
brought matters to a head by submitting a list of grievances 
condemning the lipanga!s independence, insolence and aggregation 
of hsmbtribal powers, etc., and demanded his dismissal and the 
abolition of the office.(5) The mankosi were aware that if Leonard 
alone were dismissed and the.post not abolished, that they would 
again be challenged and their powers and authority encroached upon.(6) 
Faced with no alternative because, the leaders absolutely refused to 
go back on their demands, the colonial administration abolished
the lipangaship. .
f
Around the same time, the Federation itself came under attack.
(1) TNA/155/133, PC to DO, 112/3 of 15.1.1931.
,(2) See comparison of salaries in RH, O.Guise-Williams Papers, Songea
10.10.1932 and T.NA/155/64, NT Approved Estimates 5 937, PP •44-7•
(3) ICAR 1934, Southern, p.33; PCAR 1933.
(4) PCAR 1935, Southern, p.?3-
(5) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.33.
(6) TNA/SEC/13796, PC to ChSec, 1/114/291 of 5.5.1937.
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The issue was boundaries. The mankosi were unable, to
resolve the delineation of a section of the boundary between
the kingdoms in the late 1920s and throughout the years of
Federation, this problem festered. A 'verbal agreement1 had.
been reached in 1927,,but after its rejection by Usangila a
second conference in 1928 met and resolved a further agreement,
acceptable at the time to both parties. In 19311 apparently.
after pressures from nkosi MLssoro,. new discussions were held
and the boundary once again - returned to the 1927 limits. The .
1931 agreement complicated issues for both mankosi now had
followers in the disputed area. MLssoro had thirty to sixty
there while Usangila had two to three hundred in 1938.(1) In
19,S‘7V nkosi MLssoro complained ■ that some people in the area,
■ which had been given to him in 193 *» were paying their taxes
to Usangila. usangila responded by denouncing the verbal
agreement of 1931* He made it clear that he adhere^ , only to
the xvritten agreement of '*928 and added that, as far as he
was concerned, federation had been the cause of all the boundary
troubles:
"I am convinced that the cause of the trouble of my losing my 
territory is the federation. Consequently, I reject the 
federation with Chief Mbonani and do not wish to have anything 
to do with it. If government does not grant my request I wish 
my representative to speak to the Governor."(2)
.The colonial authorities arranged a meeting to discuss the
boundaries problem and it was decided there to return once
again to the 1928 boundary. Though the contentious boundary
issue had been resolved, it could not save the Federation as
nkosi, Usangila. had no intention of returning to it, ■ Having
(1) Paragraph based on TNA/155/SDB, v.4, pp. 17., 339-6(1.;
(2) Ibid; v.2, p.C; TMA/BFC/1^ 796, Zulu to DO, 13*9*1938 and 
PC to Chaec, 1/150/3y of 7.10.1938.
■" ' ■ .. : r ‘ • ' ;;/ 
no alternative, a reluctant administration .agreed to abolish ■ .v,
a union which had been very helpful to it.(T). A few
.officials wanted the administration to admit.that:Indirect
Rule was a failure and to. replace it by a more direct form ; *
of administration based on clerks; However, they were
• overridden by an administration which was, apparently, 
more interested in preserving a theory than with achieving ■ 
maximum efficiency' of rule. (2)
District officials now had to contend themselves with
operating within the system of Indirect Rule, a rule which
1 the Ngoni leaders and not themselves, wanted. They were to- 1 : :
accept it for another decade, at which time they would againjseek to
modify or replace it. / V
At this point it is useful to comment on Gulliver’s claims :
about,the Ngoni leadership.- Gulliver was very disparaging . .
•about the leadership when writing: ' .
’’(Nothing new emerged after Maji Maji^  and) the introduction of. 
Indirect Rule merely formalized a dying system.•.The basis of /
•’. chiefly power was gradually erp.ded away, the only. thing that;. 
was learnt was the loss of the old discipline, Chiefly dignity, 
authority, pride of status and feelings of superiority dwindled 
- for lack of understandable expression; but whilst a pre-European 
generation of men remained the process was slow and difficult 
to discern. By the early thirties, a new generation was growing 
up-which had not known the ’good old days’ but had lived only ; 
v in a world of frustration and stagnation. There was nothing or 
very little to keep those ;newcomers going, to give them spirit 
and ambition. Indirect Rule delivered authority into hands 
fashioned for . quite a different purpose. Chiefs s were persuaded,
• even harried,, into improving tax collection and speeding up.
. ■ court work; they'accepted ^hi.s as an unfavourable necessity
V  and shirked.’ it -When and where they could. ”(3) t?'; ;
(1) TNA/155/SDB, v.*f, pp. 17,32.
(2). Ibid. ,< v.^ , p.6.
(3) Gulliver, Ah' Administrative Survey,,p.113«
Certainly some: of this is corrects The military basis to 
the rule of the chiefs did come to an end after Maji Maji.
The young generation of the 1930s did live in a world of 
stagnation, finally, chiefs were often harried into doing 
work they were not interested in. However, much, particularly 
the general interpretation, is wrong. For example, though the 
military basis to rule had ended, it had been replaced by an 
administrative one, which became increasingly stronger after 
1903. The 'basis of chiefly poi^ er1 had not been eroded away 
by the 1930s. It was probably stronger than ever due to 
Indirect Rule. Moreover, though feelings of superiority 
may have had fewer means of expression, dignity, authority, 
and pride of status were still very strong and capable of 
expression. Again, the, ypung generation were frustrated by 
the isolation of their homeland not the political system, which 
'appears to have been of little concern according to contemporary 
records. Finally, chiefs may have been harried into doing much 
of the work demanded of'them because they felt this work to be 
trivial, or only to the benefit of the colonial government, or 
to be incompatable with' traditional structures and practices, as 
for example, the cha4 nges demanded in tax collection. Gulliver
r&r
was more an apologist for the changes his contemporaries wanted 
than an accurate analyst of the Ngoni political system of the 1930s.
In conclusion, in 1939, on the verge of a world,war in which 
many Ngoni were to fight, political life in TJngoni continued to be 
the firmly autocratic one which it had been since the 1860s, But 
change was soon to press on it as in the next decade the British 
colonial power was to confront the royal families and their associates 
with political democracy and economic development. This confrontation 
was to be a serious one which was to bring considerable change to one 
of the kingdoms.
Chapter 8
Democracy and Ndendeule Nationalism, 19^ 0-193^
I
As far as the colonial government seems to have been 
concerned, the main issue during most of the years of the 
Second World War was the mobilizing of local resources to 
support the British side, This involved, as far as Songea 
was concerned, the promotion of policies which would guarantee 
African material and psychological support. Consequently, 
the Ngoni leaders were supporters long as they carried out 
the demands made upon them. One aspect of this support was 
respecting the leaders by laying to rest the implementation 
of policies which would adversely effect Indirect Rule and 
those which could alienate leaders, such as 'internal 
boundaries', A second aspect was the supporting.of leaders, 
such as Korofindo Gama, who might have been rejected earlier.
A third aspect was supporting leaders in any conflicts with 
the people. For instance, when some soldiers complained, in 
19^ 3) about the service rendered them by the Native Authorities 
and demanded that the District Officer handle their affairs in 
future(1), the government responded by requiring all family 
matters to be reported to the Native Authorities rather than 
be seht directly to soldiers.(2) This may have been done as
(1) PCAR 19^3.
(2) TNA/155/IA/1.
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much to boost the morale of the soldiers as to support the 
leaders. No other ..overt instances of opposition to the 
leaders during the war was found.
Associations or groups which could have become troublesome 
to the leaders were controlled by the government. Probably the 
most important of these was the co-operative movement. In 19^ 0 
the government held an inquiry into the industry after various 
problems within it had come to a head.(1) These problems 
included the frustration of members of the Department of 
Agriculture at their declining influenced, thin the industry, 
and the clash of personalities of those interested In co-operation. 
The inquiry recommended that the government place the co-operative 
in the hands of a tobacco board dominated by government officials. 
Two growers, one the royal family member, Laurenti Fusi Gama, 
were also on the board, though their influence was to be minimal.
The board and the Department of Agriculture were incompetent in 
managing the industiy and throughout the war years it remained in 
a state of decline. Consequently, tobacco-growers were prevented 
from becoming a political power at the same time that they were' 
losing their economic status. The only important development 
in the tobacco industiy during the war years ‘was the Increased 
production of growers in eastern Dngoni - particularly the 
Ndendeule region - vis-a-vis that of those in other reg5.ons.
This was to have considerable effect following the war.
Teachers and students comprised a second group which ' 
could have provided some challenge to the Ngoni leadership.
However, they were prevented from doing so by the demands of
(1) This paragraph is based on the separate paper, soon to be
published, written by the author on the co-operative movement. 
On the Inquiry, see TNA/133/coop27/I, 19^0 report.
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the war and. particularly by Mieir vulnerability to the draft 
due to the Armed Forces1 preference Ofor educated soldiers#(1)
; Though a few people from among the geheral population had some 
political aspirations, most did not# These appear to have 
been satisfied with their leaders. What concerned them were 
the demands which the war made on their supplies of food 
and their labour, the first referring to the demand for 
district self-sufficiency, the latter to the demand for soldiers 
and plantation workers.(2)
The leaders of the Ngoni appeaa^ bo have responded well to 
the demands made upon them by the colonial government for the 
war effort. They supplied labour for the Armed Forces and the 
sisal plantations when asked to do so. They supported measures 
for agricultural control, passing appropriate laws, and 
prosecuting people itfho disobeyed them(3). They identified 
themselves with the war effort. For instance, nkosi Missoro 
attended military.ceremonies in Nairobi in 19^- and, in 19^ 3* 
went on a six-months’ tour of South-East Asia to visit Ngoni 
and other troops fighting in Burma and Madagascar.(^ f) Finally, 
they saw that taxes were paid regularly and in full. In return, 
they remained in challenged control of Ngoni society in Songea,
(1) TNA/133/10/6, DO handing over notes, 20.7*19^, states that 
only educated' soldiers were being taken.
(2) Various details on these are found in TNA/SEC/19^5? PCAR 
19^ 'lj first draft; PCAR, Southern; 19^ 3; /'155/B^ /1;
PCAR 19^3i Southern.
(3) TNA/133/Group X, Annual Report, n.d., app.19^3 has examples. 
,C^t) TNA/133/10/65 DO handing over notes, 20.7*19^ '-; RH, J.R.
Johnston, PCAR 19^3? P*6.
Some Ngoni leaders responded to the relative 
tranquility of politics by preoccupying themselves 
with internal family disputes. In Njelu, the death, 
in 1941, of the long-reigning nlcosi, Usangila Zulu 
Gama, brought a succession issue which kept the royal 
family and lesser senior officials fully occupied for 
most of the war-years. The colonial administration 
did not lament Usangila*s passing. As far as they 
were concerned, this man who had ruled since 1906 had 
been incompetent and uncooperative in his later years.
One official now wrote:
" (jjsangila^ was much respected by his people, but 
he had reached an age when he was content to leave 
much of his work to the sub-chiefs; he was of an 
uncompromising disposition and it must be admitted 
that the Native Administration of the Ngoni portion 
of the district will be made much more harmonious by 
his death,"(1 )
As this succession was the first one to be decided by 
the leaders in Njelu since 1 8 8 9. it was a major event 
within the kingdom. There were two candidates who 
presented themselves: Mtazama, a nephew of Putire Gama(2), 
and Korofindo, son of the long-deceased nkosi, Mharule 
(1874-1889)• Few details were found on this succession. 
Those that were show that it was an interesting departure 
from previous successions in some ways. Mtazama-*s bid
(1) TNA/SEG/19^15* PCAR 1941, Southern province, first 
draft; I55/SDB, v.4, pp.48-9.
(2) According to on^>ontemporary report, that is, TNA/
155/SDB, v.4, pp.48, 5 2 , Mtazama was of Gwaserapasi *s 
branch of the Gama family; However, the writer mentioned 
this to Ebner in the course of interviews on 17-21.10.
1971» and the latter stated that Mtazama definitely was 
not from this branch, but rather, was from the Putire 
(Mayipu) branch of the Gama family. Ebner *s identification 
is that used here. He was in Songea at the time and is 
well acquainted with various members of the Gama family.
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for the nkosiship was fascinating in that it was 
the first known one to have been made by the Mayipu 
branch of the Gama clan. The nkosiship had always 
been held by members of the Zulu branch and it seems 
quite clear that Mtazama was not eligible in terms 
of blood line to make a bid. He did so, however, 
for two reasons. First, according to Ebner, he was 
•’trying his luck”,(l) He was, according to one 
Provincial Commissioner, the ’’oldest and leading 
nduna"(2),and may have been trying to capitalize on 
the ignorance of colonial officials of Ngoni succession 
laius. Secondly, he may have felt that the criteria for 
succession itfere changing and that matters such as 
competence in administration were more important than 
seniority of descent. As interesting as Mtazama's 
candidacy was his list of supporters. They included 
Kapunga, son of Hawai (186^-187^)* and Zamtanga and 
Kalubeya, sons of Mlamilo (I889-I8 9 9),{3 ) Why they, 
senior members of the ruling Zulu branch of the Gama 
family and sons of former mankosi, supported a candidate 
from a non-ruling branch is not known. One reason may 
be that they resented the control which Mharule *s 
family had over the throne. Another possibility is 
that they saw personal advantage in supporting Mtazama, 
Until field research is done, the complete answer to 
what seems to have been a very interesting succession 
is unlikely to be known.
(1) Ebner to Redmond, interviews 17-21.10.1971.
(2) PCAR 19^2, Southern province, p.if 2.
(3) TNA/155/SDB, v.if, pp.48-9.
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The succession was resolved in favour of Korofindo.
This was probably inevitable as he was from the senior, 
Mharule, branch of the royal family and must have benefited 
from the influence this branch gained during the long 
reign of Usangila.(l) Korofindo appears to have had 
the support of most manduna. The colonial government, 
preoccupied with the war effort, duly approved Korofindo 
although they appear not to have thought too much of him.
"He is not a forceful character and is not strong 
physically1 (2) minuted one British administrator 
disx^aragingly• Internal dissension in Mjelu continued 
after the succession as Mtazama and, apparently, a few 
associates refused to acc£>et Korofindo as the legitimate 
nkosi.(3) As the hkosi was physically weak and unlikely 
to rule for a long time, they schemed in the hope that 
Mtazama would eventually be able to replace him.(4)
However, Korofindo had the advantage of power and used 
it to consolidate his position. Thus, he transferred 
Mtazama from the centrally-located Ndunate of Mgazini 
to the isolated one of Ruanda. Mien Mtazama failed to 
build a residence there, Korofindo sought, but failed, 
to have his ndunaship removed from him. In 194.5, Mtazama 
was appointed nduna over the newly-established, isolated 
Kdunate of Makoro.(5) Then, to let everyone know whom
(1) THA/SBC/l9^15» PCAR Southern province, first draft; 
155/SDB, v.4, pp.If8-9.
(2) TNA/155/SDB, v.4, p.43.
(3) Ibid.
(A) As, for example, by pushing schools of the MCA when
Korofindo was limiting these, see TNA/155/23/7» Korofindo 
Zulu to E.T.Dickson.; PCAR 1944, p.67 notes "Njelu 
Mgoni were much unsettled by bickering between their 
Chief and,..Mtazama".
(5) RH, A.W.Wyatt, Songea 14.11.1944.
he wanted to be his successor, Korofindo nominated Xavier, 
the son o f Usangila, as his deputy,(1 )
Compared with- Njelu, Mshope was quiet during the war 
years: there was no comparable crisis of succession. Towards 
the end of the war, the colonial government began a number 
of changes in its administration of the territory. - These 
initiated a short period of heightened activity after the 
war which markedly contrated with the tranquility of the 
war years.
II
The changes introduced by the territorial administration 
were the most important of all those to affect Songea after 
19^5* If successful, they could have brought considerable 
change to the district. However, almost without exception,
■they were to fail for reasons which will be discussed as 
the changes themselves are described.
The first major change of policy was a plan to replace 
Indirect Buie by more representative government. These were 
to he based on councils whose powers varied in districts from 
full control to merely advisory status.(2) In Songea, the 
plan, known generally as Local Government, came to naught.
The Ngoni leaders had no desire to have their powers diluted, so 
refused to support the plan. As late as 1953? there was nothing 1 
in the. district.
(1) TNA/155/127/IV, PC to DO, 15A9/72 of 2^.11.19^4; PCAR 19^,p.6?.
(2) B.T.G.Chidzero, Tanganyika and International Trusteeship,
(London, 19&1), chTj?; A.J.Temu in Temu and I.N.Kimambo, A 
History of Tanzania, (Dar es Salaam, 1969)? ch.8; J.G.Liebenow, 
Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania: Hie Case 
of the MakondeTTLvanston 1 1971) has a good study of the 
various schemes introduced into Hmakonde after 19^ 5*
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■ . . : A second territorial ■chdngehihvolv’ed ;instil#;:.iraplem'entation >
of :,a-number of schemes'for the economic development, of the x
country./ Though the implications of these schemes were ' ’
• considerable.,- their realization was' to be/less than expected.
, ’One of. the more important, schemes nationally was an educational 
plan aimed at educating-one out of four children to Std.I-IV, then 
in diminishing proportion until Std. IX-XIT which would be given to 
; one out of • every 850 children.(1) To make this possible, the 1 
.government assumed responsibility for paying a large portion 
of the educational bill(2),and■for improving the educational 
.climate'through, for example,'enforcing select- comphlsory ' .
attendance‘ at schools (3)*: ;While commendable nationally.,' the .. 
scheme. Offered kittle" to Songea, a district with.' one of the 
highest percentages of educated people in the: country. Already 
In'■19^ 5? when the ten-year plan was announced, the educational 
standards in Songea had virtually reachedxthe. levels which . 
"other-districts were to reach in 1955»(4) Consequently, few 
1 opportunities were offered to the people. Indeed, the, :J 
".educational plans for hongea were, if anything, destructive.
This-was because, by.1952, the territorial government realized / 
that, it could not afford the committment it had made to.
; African education, so in that year, transferred a large portion 
of the cost;to the’Native treasuries of the districts.(5)
x v (1)"'D3j1AR 19^ 5, App^ A. ' t '
(2) TNA/16/27/20, ActFCr to mshop/. Peramiho,27/20/16 of . 25.8.1945 r'- 
, /155A0/32, PCs conference^  minutes ■ 28,-30*5* 19^ 7.
,. ‘(3:)’ x-TM/S.EC/1 9415, 19^ 7 Compuleorj'- Attendance at Registered School. 
(.4) According to/the. schedule .in TNA/16/21/59 , DEAR 1945, Songea 
. ...V * wa)/: to'have 25 village schools, inM955,; though it already'had
5 A 45-fu 1945;; 5 district "sChooie^ v^ liiile-it-then-had 3, and ,one 
. specialist- school, -hile.w it hadtbwoi- a Teacher ^ raining College 
and a Technical School. . ; X ' V- .
(5) TNA/155/428/1, Memorandum h,3"for Conference,. 1 *.1952.'
The effect -was a devastating one, The Songea Native Treasury' 
suddently had to allocate between thirty and fifty percent Of ' ,r. 
its recurrent expenditure to educational costs(1) and, as a ' 
result,'was forced to cut down severely on all its plans for 
district development*(2) From then on there were strong, 
pressures in the district to restrict education as much as 
possible in order to conserve revenue for other necessary works.
A second major territorial scheme involved the improvement " 
of the agricultural economy through the pushing of cash crops,' 
the introduction of new foodstuffs and improved seed types ' 
and the teaching of new methods of cultivation. Of these, the 
most important in Songea district was the last, which.involved 
.an intensive programme,to end•soil erosion. This was to he done 
through changing the methods of cultivation from slash and burn 
and irregular hoeing to tie-ridging,(3) What the government 
failed to appreciate was that shifting agriculture, which the 
people practiced, was effective in preserving fertility, while . 
tie-ridging would restrict shifting agriculture, thereby 
intensifying the. problem of erosion. The scheme might have 
succeeded nonetheless had not the government made a serious , 
error in failing to explain to the people was was expected of \  
them in the new plan. Because of poor instruction, the.people 
were put under the impression that they were being, made to 
adopt the Matengo 'ngoro1 system of cultivation;which, though 
good for retaining water for the cultivation of steep hills,
(1) TNA/1 yj/lB/'X, DCs'Conference, Memorandum on Education.^
(2) See letters complaining.of this in,TM/155/6^ /6,
(3) For comments on the problem as the Department of Agriculture 
saw it , see DAAR 19^ 8, P*^1; and for some idea .of the 
reaction to tie-ridging, see TNA/155/127/V, particularly 
monthly diaries and reports of the.Agricultural Assistant* , /
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wasvimpractical for their flat lands, since it caused 
them to retain too much water and led to*the flooding of 5 
the crops*(1) Thus,- the people, not wishing to lose1their 
crops and possible suffer a famine as a result, refused to 
adopt the new method of cultivation.
Annoyed that no one wa^obeying its orders to adopt 
tie-ridging, the officials of the Department of Agriculture 
resorted to punishing offenders, which it did on a large ' 
scale. For example, in February 1930, some 1,523 people were 
fined in Ruanda and Ngaka alone. The people angrily wrote 
to the Chief Secretary explaining their objections to the new 
scheme and stating they would have nothing to do with it*(2)
The appeal had little .effect though, for in 1951 fbe Department 
, of Agriculture pressed the scheme with greater determination 
than ever. It mobilized the Agricultural Assistants rnto a : 
sort of police force and sent this throughout the district to 
fine anyone who failed to cultivate with tie-ridges.. A great 
many people were harassed as a result* For example, on one 
occasion an Agricultural Assistant, unable to force some people - 
in likuyu to use tie-ridges, called in the District Officer who, 
after a hostile reception, fined hundreds of people.(3) Manduna 
were.fined along with their people for refusing to co-operate.A)
(1) TNA/16/15A7, vol. Ill, AA safari diary, 2,1951? notes that a 
missionary, informing him of the peoples' anger, also thought
'ngoro' cultivation was being enforced; for further information 
011 territorial policy, see John Iliffe, Agricultural Change in 
Modern Tanganyika, (Dar es Salaam, 1971)',' p.'A'*''
(2) TNA/1'6/37/0, voi,III, Rais wa Songea to PC, ccChSec, 19.2,1950.
(3) TNA/&55/AOR/1/10, AA monthly reports, Feb. and Mar. 1951*
(*f) Ibid.
'The people wrote to the Governor.this time and after a 
series of official exchanges between the central and 
district administrations,'the infamous tie-ridging campaign 
came to an end,
Tlie peoples1 campaign against the government was very- 
beneficial to the leaders, who knew the feelings of the 
people and supported them rather than the government which 
wanted them to assist the implementation. Indeed, according 
to reports from government officials, the leaders played an 
important role in the resistance by ordering the people, not 
to adopt tie-ridging.(1) Only one important leader seems to 
have adopted the government cause for a while. This was 
Laurenti Fusi Gama who adopted it in 1950 as part of an 
effort to ingratiate himself with the government, for reasons 
discussed further below. But his plots failed and in 1951 he 
joined the other leaders and people in opposing it. One 
result of the leaders1 actions appears to have been a firm 
identification of the people with them(2), a happening quite 
different from that in areas such as ’Sukumaljaid, where the 
leaders lost their identification with the people through their 
support of the colonial government in similar, extremely 
unpopular campaigns.(3)
In the sphere of general economic development, the 
territorial government, pushed mineral explorations, offered 
development loans to Africans, and pushed European settlement.
None of these schemes were very beneficial. A considerable amount
(1) TNA/16/15/17, vol.Ill, AA safari diary; /155/A/6/1, Missoro 
to DO, 17.7.1951.
(2) As shown below in the successions, section III.
(3) G.A.Maguire, Towards Uhuru in Tanzania: The Politics of 
Participation, (Cambridge, 1969), analyzes the Sukuma troubles.
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of money was spent. ±n prospecting and vast reserves 
of coal were.found, but these could not be exploited as 
communications were, and remain,' undeveloped,(1) The > 
development loans failed because the district administration, 
after encountering some difficulties in repayment, decided 
that the scheme was more a bother to them than a benefit to 
the Africans, and stopped its application.(2) The scheme for 
settlers, in itself a very dubitable-one in terms of benefit 
to Africans, failed because it had been poorly organized with 
the area selected for settlement being’ most unsuitable, lacking, 
among thingsalmost any communications.(3) .
There were other forces, in addition to the central colonial 
government, which initiated change in Songea after the war. One, 
albeit minor, was the returning soldier. At the end of the war 
there, were fears, ascerbated by the political complaints of 
soldiers during the war, that those returning, over one 
thousand in number(4), would be reluctant to accept.the limited 
political and economic opportunities in Songea,(5) However, fears 
for adverse post-war political activity proved unwarranted, 
apparently because the Ngoni regarded military service as
(1) For further details, see Tanganyika Atlas, (19^ 2), p. 17; ; 
DLM AR 1951, paras. 20,22-5; 1952, paras.19-20; 1953, • 
paras. 15,17; TNA/155/22/8 ; J.F, Harris. Summary of the
Geology of Tanganyika, Pt*4, Economic eology, (Dar es 
Salaam, 1961), p.4'1.”
(2) TNA/155/D3/5 and /155/ VVl; /155/D3/5/II;
(3) TNA/155/L2/EST; /155/1/18/d; /155/1/18/1.
(*f) The exact figures were not found. One report of late I9A5 
noted that 200 had been discharged and another.850 would 
be discharged before November 19 5^, in TNA/155/10/6; DO handing 
over notes, 15.11.19^5; /155/Group X, AR 19^ 5; DLAR 19^6, p.28 
notes that some were still returning in 1946. :
(5) TNA/155/10/32, PO to DOs, 11/229/73 of 23-11.19^5-
' little' difjPeren-bwfromfiabbh^^g^&tiohj,- f-rom\Which they had 
always': returned;to; integrate, sucpessfuliy.:(1.) . :The returned
■ .soldiers • did rmal<:e some economic demands.however.: Many/Wanted 
good. 0 pbs (2 )." though i) ' when ■ nothing was available they made no
•A; .troublew - They yalsoTwdnted/guhs so that theymightheconn, • . >
A'hunterh and; m^e profits from'the game .meat industry (3), 'but 
. ‘these Were, deniec^ them as Weil. A) ‘ , ,v.‘ .... , . //
// A third force for change was the co-operative movement., 
/Alfrillowing » the-' war the/industry was reorganized and given 
/added stimulus by the ;hiring of a number of Europeans and Africans 
;V; who/should have been.capable of running-a very, efficient;/industry 
. . and by the opening up of / the/ English market to . the tobapcp of: :
; tSohgea; However,-'.'the'Bttfopeems.'w and. as, growers.;
Aecame Increasingly critical Of the.low prices they received 
and of the shoddiness of the methods of processing at the factory 
many began quit ting, the industry. Others, including the heads 
. of; the co-operative societies and Africans'working in the'factory 
and running the union, began demanding African control * ;-:-Ey 
.1952, the African critics had gained the upper hand and 
Eurooearis in the industry were making. Concessions on ,control 
.and participatipni In’195^ , the Europeans .withdrew from the. 
industry. Until the African takeover, activists in the 
* co-operativei movement appear not to have become involved ,in: i-, V 
; political life, presumabiy because they- were preoccupied With 
wresting control. oft;dn economic force4from the Europeans/./ . V
illi/f-M/l55^10/32 * - "to" VPG-|. >28/16 of 10il2.19^5* /155>?3roup X,
■ t :AR 19^5/ RH, J.R.Johnston, AR .19^ 5*
: (Ri TNA/155Aroup. X, app. AR 19^ 5. ■ j i A'
/ ;(3 )- TNA/155/10/32,- DC) do PC, ^28/18 of 2A.1946.
; /(I) TNAA55/W1 /NAG: Orders.
Then, unforttinateDy .'fbr'-thein, after that. time they were 
preoccupied with making/the industry, an economically . 
viable entity as the last, years, of European^ Control had so 
disillusioned, growers that' most had left it and'the industry had. 
gone, into a serious decline* Accordingly, they provided no 
challenge to the leaders of the Ngoni who, instead, offered 
them assistance in rebuilding.. (1) This was to distinguish 
the co-operative movement in Songea from those elsewhere in 
the territory which became important political forces within 
their societies, (2.) '
Though the tobacco-co-operative never became a political 
force in itself, it -did fdster political activism in the,district 
'and indeed was responsible for the most important political-;, 
change to take place during these years, that of the rise of 
Ndendeule 'nationalism,. The expansion of tobacco-growing into, ; r 
the Ndendeule areas during the 19*108 was -very successful as 
conditions for growing were good and the people interested.in 
the financial, benefits it brought, and, by the late I9^0s, th'e 
Ndendeule were producing, a considerable proportion, of all the 
tobacco grown in the district. This production fostered 
wealth and self-confidence among the people and led to the 
resurgence'of periodic Ndendeule nationalism. - One early major . 
manifestation of ,this, resurgence came in 195,0 .When, a successor- 
. was being chosen"for the Ndunate of Iikuyu following Sakamaganga? 
death. As customary, the nkosi decided' on a successor. He 
selected. Zondwako , a son of the deceased'Sakamagangav However,
,     -    ^ ----- — -
(1) TNA/155/coOp27/lly NMlM meet. 21-3*5.1952; A large number 
; of files have data on this transition, Some are listed in
: the bibli6grajp%..',,;;'This -period is studied in a separate
article written by the author and to be published, shortly.
(2) G.Liebenow in H.W.Stephens, The Political Transformation of . 
Tanganyika, 1920-1967* (New York/ 1 ^8)",™p,V7 reT^Chagga,
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the Ndendeule were not prepared to accept him. They demanded
a free election in which they could choose their own nduna.
The Palangu family, seeing an opportunity to gain increased
authority, proposed a different solution. They wanted Likuyu
abolished as a separate Ndunate by bein split in two, with
; half goingjffco them and half to the nkosi. (1) When nkosi Missoro
rejected this suggestion, they supported the Ndendeule demand.
The Ndendeule demand was heeded by the government, which seemed'
to be sympathetic to them because they worked hard in tobacco
production and seemed to be trying to develop themselves than
were the Ngoni. It decided on a compromise. likuyu was to be
split, a large section becoming the Ndunate of Luegu, over which
the Ndendeule were to be given the right to elect their own
nduna, and the remainder staying as Likuyu, over which nkosi
Missoro would elect an nduna. The Ndendeule chose a certain Bilali,
a member of a leading family in the area and the Chairman of the
Litola Co-operative Society. Missoro retained Zondwako. Missoro
was bittep at the loss and only recognized Bilali "with very
bad grace".(2) There was little else he could do.
Around the same time, some Ndendeule manifested political
independence of the colonial administration as well. The
district adrninistra&don had customarily asked for and received
in
porters from any rigiomrwhich an officer visited. In 1950* it
n
found considerable difficulty obtaining any in the region of the 
Litola Co-operative Society. This was because most men in that 
region gre\\r, and profited from, tobacco so had little need to 
perform casual labour and generally refused to offer it.
This complicated visits by officials and so infuriated the District
(1) TNA/155/21/1/1» Saidi Tawete to Mbonani, 20.2.1951* ©t seq.
(2) Paragraph based on TNA/155/ARs 19A0-9 , AR1951; /16/1/41/0,
DO to PC, 530/9 of 1^.3.1951.
•Officer that he•brought a motion before .the tobacco hoard 
to havedthe‘Litola 6o^ bpera;tive Society struck off the' 
register for- "anti-sbcial‘ behavior".. HishnCtibn/wafe-,-'however, 
vetoed by the board /?which recognized' that xt hadtno. powers--; 
in this; matter. (1) Soon the force of Ndendeule nationalism , -
was to have a niuch'-^eate^/impact,c?n--N^ hi-^ s'pciety,:,\/vv/
A fittii^ fbrce .-for change; was the- educated class in . the.:'': :
district,,; While little. data .was: found on, it duringjthese years, 
-that which -waspf "they-.'were-' politically aware,. ,?;
; economically influential -and somethimeS; politically involved,
One .district: official commented/On its politicai;:awareness- /when
Writing in"19^5" ’JThe.younger intelligentsia are not necessarily.
Confined to the" ranks^of^ thotreturnin^ African/.soldier,' - they - 
have; been here for .some,;time,'‘especially in this, district- with, 
its many^lyhssion educational facilities, great and *smaiil. (2)
-He offered no comments on its importance. A second referencey 
this, time, to-economxc power,.Comes? from a ,19^9; meeting of the 
district education committee in which officials,: concerned at , 
the expense; of teachers 1 salaries,- stated these were much above.,; 
those :;6f; ; the1 people; s^ nong; w^mithey':;wprked*.• inducing -'.teacher© to 
/consider themselves a class ap&r’t- not owing allegiance ? to-the ..
;Native vAuthofities V'. (3) Despite;their political and economic ’ 
challenge, teachers, appear1to have rarely.entered the political, 
arena*. Only one instance:, of political involvement was" found. .
In 19^ 7? a Pangwal mission teachery; Joachim Luoga wrote, to . : 
nkosi, Korofindo demanding that ,a;:3Pangwa nduna • be installed in .
(1) TNA/155/8 V3,. CCh 3NTB; to/Ebcp SNTB,:&^/£89, of 19^8.1950. vi
(2) TNA/155/10/32, DO to PC, ^28/16 of 10.12.19^5. < I 
(3 ) TNA/155/®ducation Committee, meeting h* 5* 19^9 •
his area of  ^Korofindo/ignored .the first letter so k
he wrote/another.f/i/^ en. this-to he pressed
the District Officer for action. The District" Officer, , ih: turn, = 
pressed -the nkosi /who then brought Luoga to- court • on ,0 
criminal char^ eJ Luoga*was sentenced to' five months’ Imprisonment 
later changed to Shs.50/r fine. The District Officer, finding 
this .an excessive punishment for.voicing an opinion, quashed 
the sentence,. : He then wrote to the mission authorities ieliihg •
. them'that-. Luoga: was. "writing* letters about matterswhich do not 5 
concern him": and fadvising them to warn him to "confine his 
activities to. thetpropef-chaiirielsh. (d )^v Luoga appears to have 
takeh note, for nothing further, is heard from him,
: 7 A final force^ /forphahge''-in -the: district • was: the Native . , • :p 
Administration itself - Directed by /the territorial/government 
:and encouraged by/local officialsr. the Native Administration , 
began a.programme of development in Songea around 19^ 7*(2)
•It was. financed by rebates from local taxes which increased -:3 ' 
morej.than t3ri?eefpld^ ‘:hetWeen ..19^5 and 1952v,'going from ShS>6/- - 
to Shs:. 20/^ , respectively! 0 The programme/ concentrated..on / 
l^ i^ roying -‘the .'ilif-rastructUre of administration through ,, fork- : 
'example,, building court houses, improving markets and expanding j 
vthe; housing facilities for officials. However, it jalso improved- 
the services .given by-.its.- departments to the people. For example, 
in medical,work, employees increased.from 7 dressers.in 19^ 7 to 
11. dressers, 9 m.arke£-sweepers ,j. 2' sleeping sickness. sdouts,. /.5 ■ „
(1)TNA/155/2VS/1if/» Joachim Luoga to nkosi Korofindo, 20.7.19%,, 
et seq;- see also /NA2t/l/2/II, letters.from a student.
(2);-TNA/155/6^ +/6 ! contains some of .the development plans. . . "/ 
/(3)'sTNA/Sl}G/19%5, PCAR 19^ 5; /155/10/6, DO handing over notes,
* 15.;11 <19b5; v/l35/t28/l, Scs conference,* lo/l2.7.1952.
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village sanitation everts and k trainee, dressers in 
medical schools in 1951, while in agricultural work, :■ 
employees increased from 10 instructors in 19^ 7 to 13 
instructors and 11 vermin destruction guards in l^ 'l-Cl)
However, though development looked promising in 195^ , it 
looked; very bad a year later when the central government 
. asked the Native Treasuries to bear education:expenses, as 
■ mentioned above, a:burden which effectively forced the 
cancellation or postponment of further development.
Complicating the failure or underachievemenh of most: 
forces for change and development as factors frustrating the 
consolidation of any' change in the district during these 
years was the continuity of traditional life. For most 
people, the development projects following the.war brought 
little change, beyond annoyance at increased taxation and 
the demands :by colonial.officials for them to. change life styles 
in ways.such.as using new cultivation methods in agriculture. 
Earnings had increased but so had the cost of goods and people 
generally had little more than before. ;Education was improving 
but there wefe few opportunities locally of making use of it. 
Politically, the leaders may.have been facing increased criticism 
from the colonial administration, but: to. .most people they seemed 
. the same as ever. They responded to the increased ne^ ds of their 
people,, as for example, in the establishing of the Ndunate of. 
Makero once its population became sufficiently large. Their . 
court work seemed satisfactory, as did their collection of taxes. 
They appear to have had little intexest^  in the. government plans
(1) Taken from annual reports of the Native Treasuries in files 
TNA/155/26/3/2, /155/6V5 and /155/6V6.
. for Local Government/;, They had never participated in 
in politics before and.saw little reason;todo so now(1).
They failed to appreciate the schemes which the government 
wished/to introduce/ ■ .Had councils, been- chosen from, elders - 
rather than elected‘representatives, then the situation may 
have been different:,./though, even here, .elders who readily . 
.Offered their views in courts may have considered other 
matters, outside their jurisdiction., Most-must have seen no 
benefit to Cha nge, indeed possibly a distaste for subservience 
i to someone, .who had not earned power historically or in other 
. ways. . Moreover, according. to one official,, the leaders were 
./.regarded "as very much-of the people themselves".(2) With 
. -the exception of the. Ndendeule, who have been a particular 
case: through, much of./^ gonl history, it seems that the only -' , 
people who would have benefited from. Local Government were.5 
/those who would have/keeii giyen'k|^ ©iti6ns. of responsibility 
by it. At least this is indicated by the only non-Ndencleule 
• call.for more representative government during these years.
This was the one. by the Pangwa, Joachim Luoga,. After Luoga 'sj. 
protest was stilled, absolutely .nothing:further appears to .
. ‘have happened, indicating? that he/made the request for his 
.own ends. The Pangwa were the largest, and among the best-, 
integrated^■ of the,ethnic groups comprising the Ngoni, and it.': 
appears that they preferred royal family rule to that of a 
young man who had little, in his favour beyond a.good educational 
background and his ethnic oivgin.
(1) Suggested, in TNA/155/1956 Songea District Agricultural:
■ Programme, 1955 •..Report (Brookbank).
. (2) PCAR 19^ 8. V.: /
. ./ - . . . . 3 7 3
- In conclusion, the many policies promoted by various 
agents, particularly the central and district administrations, 
since 19^5 had, by the early 1950s, come to naught because 
they had been poorly prepared or managed and by the early 
!1950s,.the leaders of the Ngoni had retained their powers 
virtually unchanged* Only one force had brought any change.
That force was the rising'national identity of the Ndendeule, 
which had brought the establishment of an Ndendeule Ndunate 
in 1950-1 and was soon to bring further change.
Nqw came the turmoil of succession, as the nkosiships of 
both kingdoms became vacant upon the deaths, in 19^9 , of the 
long-ailing Korofindo and, in 1952, of the powerful Missoro. 
Ndendeule nationalism became a<major issue.in Mshope, though 
other issues, such as centralization of authority, modernization, 
and the continuing independence of Ngoni royal family rule all 
came' to the fore.
Ill
Nkosi Korofindo Zulu Gama died on 12.9*19^9* In the 
course of the succession struggle which followed, four members 
of the royal family were,at onejbime or another, to claim the 
throne; age and education were to become important issues; . 
the colonial government was to become deeply involved;, and, 
the people were to speak out on matters affecting the way 
they were ruled.
The first step in the selecting oj'a successor was the 
. convening of a meeting of the traditional selectors: the 
senior members of the royal clan and of the military clans 
which had formerly been important. At their meeting, held on
20-3.9*19^9, the electors chose Laurenti Fusi Gama, the 
eldest member of the Gama family and the main adviser to, , 
the former nkosi Usangila. Two royal family manduna, Putire 
ajid Kalubeya, refused to sign the statement confirming this.
The dispute now began.(1)
Besides the support of various members of the electors,
Fusi hdd good European support. The district administration, 
led by its District Officer, RLsley,' firmly supported Fusi.
They liked him because he was a strong and capable man with 
forceful character and considerable qualifications. Other 
candidates were less capable. Unfortunately for the administration, 
Fusi was not the senior eligible candidate since, as government 
officials appear to have known(2), his branch of Zulu's family 
had never held the throne. The missions also supported Fusi,, 
apparently because he Md been a long-time friend who had 
co-operated closely with the Church since the 1920s. What is 
uncertain about the support of the missionaries, though, was 
the strength of it. 'While it may have been considerable in the 
beginning, it could well have diminished once the missionaries 
became aware of the failings of the majority of the people.
Shortly after the election meeting, various leaders and 
people began making known their, dissatisfaction with the choice, 
forcing the government to convene a second meeting rather than 
approve Fusi immediately. At the meeting, held on 1?.10.19^ 9,
Nasoro Mbano, representative of the senior military clan in Njelu 
a^ nd, apparently, chairman of the selection committee, told of
(1) TNA/155/2b/2/5» This file contains all the letters and reports 
of this succession and, unless otherwise stated, is the source 
of the data used in this analysis.
(2) A.H.Pike to Redmond, interview 13*3*1971* Pike was Provincial 
Commissioner of the Southrn province in 19^ 9-50 and was involved
, in the succession issue.
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Fusi*s selection and of the hostile reception this had received*
The people wanted Xavier, the son of Usangila, and the man . 
whom Korofindo himself had selected to succeed. However, 
the selection committee, Nasoro concluded, remained determined 
to support Fusi, whom it considered the only remaining 
member of the older generation and, consequently, the man 
with the better claim. . Mtazama and Kapungu, leading opponents 
of the deceased Korofindo and hence, of his nominee, Xavier, 
said they agreed with Nasoro.
Xavier*s supporters then recommended other candidates.
Sakrani, Xavier1s brother, proposed himself. He presented a 
will drwan up by Korofindo on 7*8.19^9, recognizing him.
However, no witnesses had signed it and two elders whom a 
clerk had claimed \vere there, denied that they had been present.
Ho the will was discounted. Nonetheless, Sakrani*s nomination 
was still considered. He received the support of Zinganga, an 
elder who had assisted in the selection, the military clan 
elder, Mpambalioto, and the manduna Boniface, Mgendera, Putire 
and Salehe. The failure of the two sides to agree on a successor 
for«ed an inconclusive dissolution of the meeting. The District 
Officer, when closing the meeting, -announced that he would now 
have to decide the matter.
Fusils opponents, unsure of the impartiality of the District 
Officer, kept up the pressure against Fusi following the meeting,
In September, a number of manduna and elders wrote to the District 
Officer inquiring about developments in the selection issue.
They made it clear that they did not want a leader imposed on them* 
Risley, in a curt reply, said that had the leaders themselves
i Z
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had forced a delayed succession by failing to come, to a 
decision. He denied that government was making an imposition 
but rather it was merely making a decision which the people 
had been unable to make*
In February 1950, with the matter still not resolved, 
a number of manduna, all apparently of the,faction opposing 
.Fusi, held another meeting* At this meeting, or a little, 
later, it was decided to approve two candidates, Simon bin 
Kitambira bin Mharule and Xavier bin Usangila bin Mharule.
Fusi complained to the District Officer about this meeting, 
writing that the people involved were neglecting their ‘^obs 
to promote the interests of their candidates. The District 
Officer seems to have investigated the complaint, though without 
result.
On 5 April, 1950 the government announced informally that 
a provisional decision had been made. Fusi was to be recognized 
as 1 Regent * . until a successor could be decided upon. The 
District Officer, when announcing his decision also sent a warning 
to the manduna Mgendera, Boniface, Salehe and Mhomakilo and to 
the Jumbes and people, telling them not to agitate against the 
decision.
- The unofficial announcement was followed by a formal one 
on 12 April, at a general meeting to which some two hundred 
people came. The District Officer took precautions against 
any disruptions by bringing police to the meeting. After announcing 
the appointment of Fusi, the District Officer added that, untiL a 
successor was decided upon, Fusi would receive the full support 
of the government.- .He then added that, wheras formerly, the 
people had decided on a successor, now they were to be limited
to suggesting candidates, for the government was ultimately 
to be free to choose the most capable man. He was tc^ some 
extent correct, for the government could accept or dismiss 
as it pleased. However, only certain levels of government 
could do this and these levels were above that of district 
administration.
After insisting that Fusi would be supported, the District 
Officer variously dismissed, threatened and offered palliatives 
to members of the faction opposing Fusi, He first dismissed 
Sakrani, saying that he was a sick man and that the government 
was unlikely to support him. (1). Then he threatened that the 
time had come for the government to insist on efficiency in 
its leaders and that those who had taken no interest in the 
welfare and the progress of the people were to be dismissed 
unless they showed considerable improvement. In order to make 
his point, presumably, he thereupon dismissed from their 
ndunaships two of Fusi*s leading opponents, the manduna Putire 
and Mhomakilo. He added that the Deputy Provincial Commissioner 
and Fusi had concurred On the dismissals. He then offered
i
palliatives to the remaining candidates• Xavier was to 
replace Mhomakilo, while Simon was to replace Putire. Till 
that time, Simon had been Jrmbe at Liparamba. With his 
appointmentj this area was to be joined to Liganga. The 
appointments were, ostensibly, probationary, but, in actuality, 
they would have removed both men from the centre stage and, 
in addition placed them in the vulnerable position of having 
to live up to the expectations of the District Officer and Fusi.
0 ) He had leprosy*
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Fusi followed the District Officer’s speech with one of 
his own. He affirmed that the selecting of a chief had! 
always been in the hands of a few responsible elders and, 
while he agreed that the masses should be consulted, he 
warned that intimidation would not be countenanced. He 
warned manduna against holding secret meetings and threatened 
to prosecute a few who had been troubling him.
During this succession, the issue of whether ’brother1 
had precedence over ’son’ arose again, apparently with a 
vehemence that had not been known since the 1889 succession.
Numerous reports in the district books refer to this problem, 
as do Gulliver, Ehner and Komba* (1), all of which grant precedence 
to the ’brother*. It is doubtful that they are correct in their 
precedence. As, discussed*above in Chapter Two, succession by 
’son1* is the traditional Ngoni method of succession, though 
claims by ’brothers’ could be, and have been, made.' This has 
commonly been done in other Ngoni societies, (2) - This particular 
succession was a classic one of powerful ’brothers’ opposing 
the selection of a ’son’. As shown on list 4, p.37&» Fiisi’s 
known supporters were mainly his cousins, who could be classified 
as ’brothers’ and they were opposing the ’son’ line, of Mharule 
which hadheld power for fifty-eight out of the eighty-six 
years since the Maseko Ngoni explusion. Confusing the problem 
in Njelu, was its historical irregularities in succession, in 
which brothers have succeeded five times,* sons, three. The
iiiBiiOim -IU.BM^irw i ■ « m i l  »iijiiw-|i»iii»B*ii*iwn^ rt^ iiiipinwiiMiHiiHi ■ i if nan 11 ill minTi liii^ intii i> T 1-------li'T— I i JrrT~"Tlt~ t l
(1) TNA/153/SDB, file C and v.4, p.E; Gulliver, An Administrative
Survey, pp.iii, 32-6; Ebner to Redmond, correspondence1'2V2.1970;
J.Komba, God and Man, PhD, Pontifical IT., (Rome.)., p. 1.7.
(2) Eg. among the Swazi Nguni, see II.Beemer, ”The development of
the military organization in Swaziland”, Africa, v.X, (1937),p.64.
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reasons were either because sons were too young, due to •
■premature departure of an nkpsi, as with Hawaii ascesion
L J U L ia u ilU fH  ^
(1864), to the premature death of mankosi, as with Mhamle ’s 
(1874) and Usangila*s(1906) a'scesions,, or naturally, as with 
Korofindo*s(l94l) ^scesion, or because a *brother* had greater 
power than a *son*, as with MlamiIo*s(l889) ascesion* , So, 
though the *brother* had a strong claim to the nkosiship, 
he still was not the most legitimate successor* Xavier, later
in the dispute, accused some of Fusi*s supporters of being
/
deceitful by claiming otherwise. It appears that Fusi was- 
tlying to gain a throne which he knew he was not strictly 
entitled to, supported by a government which thought he could 
best serve its interests*
This intervention by the colonial government in the Njelu 
succession was a blatant attempt to impose a. desired style of 
government on the Ngoni* It revealed a determination- to gain 
fimer control over a kingdom which had become uncooperative,' 
while preserving the facade of Indirect Rule, which itself was 
under attack.(1) There were - numerous reasons why firmer 
control seemed desirable to the colonial government. First,
• it might enable the drawing up of * internal boundaries, for 
which the district administration had been calling since the 
1920s, and towards which steps were being taken at the time of 
the crisis(2). Secondly5, it might bring greater receptiveness 
to the schemes for development which were also being undertaken
(1) TNA/155/10/6, DO handing over notes, 29*9-1948; PCAR 1947,p.94
(2) Eg., see TNA/16/3/10, vol.Ill, J.J.Tawney, handing over notes,
29*9*1948; boundaries were accepted in Mshope during the 1950s
see TNA/155/ARs1940~9, AR 1951, though apparently not in Njelu
if K,Stahl, Tanganyika: Sail in the Wilderness , (Mouton. s * 
Gravenliage, .1961/ is^  co rrect in her comments bn Songea tax ' 
collection.
at the time. In particular, the tie-ridging campaign 
liras failing because the leaders were supporting the 
opposition. Presumably, it was hoped that, with a more 
pliable leadership, the new methods might be more easily- 
imposed. .
Had Fusi -become a puppet of the administration? It 
seems.not. He wanted to be nkosi and his a b i l i t y -  and status 
gave him a strong claim. His alliance with the government 
seems to have been one. of convenience, made by a candidate 
who. was quite willing to use a powerful ally to advance his 
Claim. His tough stance at the second general meeting on the 
succession and his co-operation with the District Officer tehded 
to. confirm this. For example, he agreed to use tie-ridges for 
cultivation in 1950, but after finding that they were a - 
miserable failure, refused to use them in 1951* However, he 
would not agree to internal boundaries as they were too basic 
an attack on Ngoni traditional ties of allegiance.(1)
Growing opposition to the government on agricultural 
and, possibly, taxation issues and the resentment at the way 
in. which the government was trying to impose its will, now led 
to’concentrated efforts to agreeon a successor. The first 
move came from Xavier, who.refused to accept the Ndunate which 
was being offered him. In a strongly x^ rorded letter to the 
District Officer, he asked why Fusi and 2amtanga were pushing for 
supremacy of fbrotherf over ^on* when in their own Ndunates 
sons had succeeded deceased leaders. He followed this with a
(1) Nkosi Missoro, who was certainly no friend- of. Fusi^, the 
latter having been adviser to nkosi Usangila, nonetheless 
wrote, in support of Fusifs opposition to boundaries, see 
TM/155/2V6/1 * Mbonani to DO, 17.7.1951? '
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denunciation of the governments decision. His letter
t ' ' . j
was followed by one written by Sakrani,:.on 28,4.1930, to the 
Provincial Commissioner, In his letter, Sakrani complained 
strongly about the atmosphere at the general meeting of 12.4.1950* 
and the fact that only manduna were permitted to speak. He 
criticized the District Officer for having brought so many 
policemen with guns, as there had been no question of going 
to war. He castigated the- District Officer for his injustice 
in- excluding him from the succession, particularly since, he 
added,, the people had favoured him unanimously. He noted that 
he had wanted nkosi Missoro to attend, but that the District 
Officer had forbidden it, and he ended by saying that the 
same had broken his promise to select fairly and he asked the 
Provincial Commissioner to come and rectify the situation.
In replying to Sakrani, the Provincial Commissioner justified 
the governments delay in deciding on a successor by saying that 
the issue was a complex.and important one which necessitated it. 
Privately, he forwarded a letter to the District Officer, who 
explained that Missoro had not been invited as he did not get 
along with Fusi. He added that he had brought twelve policemen 
along but denied that there had been any attempt at intimidation. 
Meanwhile the two vacant Ndunates were filled-by Anton, son of . 
Sakamaganga Gama, who took Marra over from Mhomakilo, and Simon, 
who took over in Liganga.
As the year dragged on, Ngoni leaders tried harder than 
ever to resolve the succession. They were urged on by various 
interested parties, including labour migrants from Mombo and 
Tanga, who wrote home demanding Xavier, as he was educated and 
would be of comparable stature to other leaders in the territory.
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Within Songea, dissension amongjfcobacco-growers over the 
delay in payments for their crops and general dissatisfaction 
with government legislation and restrictions did little, 
presumably, to maintain or increase Fusi*s popularity. After 
various meetings, the Ngoni leaders announced, on 18.9.1950, 
that a selection had been made which had the agreement of all. 
Xavier was to be nominated the next nkosi of Njelu. Fusi and 
his supporters had acquiesced and Fusi had withdrawn his 
nomination. The Member for Local Government in Dar es Salaam . 
closed the issue by announcing that this important chief should 
be recognized through the Governor.
A difficult anddivisive succession had finally been 
resolved. Whole-hearted intervention by the colonial government 
in support of a determined and capable nduna had failed to 
accomplish its aim of making him nkosi. The young, untested 
and less competent Xavier had been elected by leaders who 
respected legitimacy of line above most other considerations 
and who took into consideration the feelings of people 
dissatisfied \d.th a troublesome colonial administration#
The succession in Njelu had been troublesome, but not - 
destructive. That which was to follow in Mshope was to be. 
Dominikus Missoro Mbonani Tawete died on 952.(1) The
determining of his successor brought out not only a struggle 
for power between the long-feuding Chabruma and Palangu branches 
of the royal family, but also the determined push by the 
Ndendeule for their independence from a century of Ngoni 
domination# Their push, manipulated by the contentious
I ■ n wi > iim i m >m» T ~ - r ‘ T ' l  wmffiiit 'ir rn  m f i iiii »inn»i m n t n m n -  —i-ff murUfWin ihitttiti
(1) TNA/155/B/2, 4th meet. STB, 3-4.11.1952.
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Tawete family, and approved of by a reform- and 
development-minded colonial administration, culminated 
the'changes of this first post-war decade.
Dominikus Missoro had been an excellent ruler, He had 
gained full control over the Ndendeule in 1929, as Indirect 
■ Rule consolidated his control in Mshope. From then on, because 
of his effective and constructive leadership, he had retained 
a generally accepted dominance over them. An Ndendeule, who 
had been his adviser, then became a leading exponent of 
Ndendeule nationalism after Missoro*s death, praised Missoro 
while at the same time showing his people*s determination, when 
writing;
"Missoro was a good and wise ruler...He appointed me as M s  
important adviser especially in boundary affairs...so I felt 
like a chief myself, and 1 was accorded the honours of the 
Nkosi even when I went to Gumbiro (Missoro*s capital). I 
made the best use of my position; I used this chance to 
understand and study the Ngoni, so that I could later 
effectively put up a case for our independence."(1)
According to Newa(2), the issue of succession in Mshope
was complicated by the youth of Missoro*s sohs, the/ledest of
whom was Wilhelm, a lad of sixteen. Other claimants were,.
however, available. These were Albert Kangara, a .nephew of
the deceased- nkosi, Saidi, the son of Palangu,and a certain
Kassian. According to available data, neither Wilhelm nor
Kassian were serious candidates. Kangara and Saidi were.
(1) Newa, op cit, pp.20-1; Newa*s text provides the main 
source of data for the analysis of this succession. 
Though biased, in favouring the Ndendeule side, it is 
well researched and is quite useful.
(2) Ibid.
iSff
Saidi1 s bid brought once again to the for© the 
seventy year long struggle for the leadership between 
his father's family and Chrabuma's branch of Chipeta's 
family. Once more, the Palangu family was to suffer 
the distrust and disrespect of much of the kingdom. 
However,, this time, unlike before, it was not to 
accept defeat placidly.
Each of the main contenders had strong bases of 
support. Kangara had the firm backing of the people 
in Gumhiro and Mahanje Ndunates, as well as isolated
>1 nl.r— *
support from some in Likuyu Ndunate, while Saidi 
appears to have been given the backing of the people 
in Mbunga, Luegu and, to a lesser extent, Likuyu Ndunates. 
Those who backed Kangara appear to have been very 
determined that he should win. Gulliver, who was 
conducting research in the kingdom at the time, wrote: 
nNild statements are current that if he does not become 
chief his supporters will migrate en masse to Njelu, 
Upangwa and Ubena.f,(l) Though no clear reasons for 
the intense dislike of Saidi were found, it is most 
probable that he was opposed for historical reasons, 
mainly because his opponents believed that his father 
had murdered their great leader, Chabruma, following 
Maji Maji.(2) Moreover, the Palangu family had always 
been troublesome and opposed the nkosi, Missoro, on 
most issues. Those who supported Saidi appear to
(1) TNA/16/37/105» Memorandum on the Mshope (Ngoni)
Chiefdom, by P.H.Gulliver, WH/l/537 of II.7 .I9 5 3 .
(2) See above, Chapter Six, p. 364,
have done so primarily to foster dissension among 
the Ngoni as they were Ndendeule nationalists, who 
wanted neither Kangara nor Saidi to rule over them.
A smaller, unknown, number would have supported Saidi 
because they had always been under the Palangu family.
Little data itfas foxmd on the actual procedures used 
to determine the succession. As in Njelu, a selection 
committee, comprising the descendants of the former 
military manduna and members of the royal family, appear 
to have decided who would be the heir. According to 
Gulliver, the total number of members of thi& committee 
was between fifteen and twenty. It was led by Amri-Mbaya, 
the descendant of Chaforuma's famous military nduna, 
Manjoro(l), and a long-time adviser to Missoro. There 
appears to have been pressures for the democratization 
of the procedures of selection, though, in this selection, 
they were ignored.(2) The committee selected Kangara,
No reasons for their making this choice were found, 
though one appears to have been the fact that Kangara 
had a majority of the total population on his side., 
Gulliver’s statistics on the composition of Mshope note 
that the Ndendeule and their supporters, the Ngindo, 
were in the minority.(3)
(2) TNA/l6/37/105» Gulliver, Memorandum; An Administrative 
. . ,£I®X» P- 23*
(1) Also called Chilembo, see above, p.24L.
(3) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.2-3 has these as:
Swazi “2 "Manda 5-10%
Other Ngoni e.20% Bena (Other) 0*5%
Ndendeule 20-30 Matengo c,5
Ngindo 15-25 Yao c.5
Pangwa 15-25 Others c.5-10
Bena (Ndonde) 5-10
W 1
Saidi refused to acquiesce in the decision.
Bitter towards the sociaty which had, once again, 
rejected the claim of his branch of Chiepta’s 
family, he denounced his Tawete clan name and adopted 
the Ndendeule ones of 'fonera and Ngonyani(l), thereby 
forever severing ties with the people who had mistreated 
his family. He then determined, apparently, that if 
the Mshope kingdom would not have him as its ruler 
then it would not remain as it was. He entered into 
an alliance with the Ndendeule, by which he was to 
support their claim for independence in return for 
their recognition of him as their chief, Whether the 
Ndendeule agreed to this or not is not known. Little 
has been discovered about Palangu’s actions after this 
alliance. He seems to have campaigned actively for the 
Ndendeule cause, for he was later to have an important 
position in the Ndendeule division - though he was not 
to be chief. As to how effective his campaigning was, it 
is not known. The District Officer, B.C.Hill, who 
handled the government’s case in the succession crisis, 
minimizes Saidi’s importance{2 ), as does also the main 
source of the data on the succession, Newa. He may have 
helped to mobilize the Ndendeule, only to become a minor 
force once their struggle for independence was reaching 
its climax.
It may be useful here to restate some of the reasons 
for the dissatisfaction of the Ndendeule. first, they
(1) Newa, op cit. He identifies clan as kibongo,
(2) B.C.Hill to Redmond, interview 10,11*1971.
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had a long-standing dislike of Ngoni control. In
the 1360s, they had tried to become independent of
the Maseko Ngoni by allying with the Njelu and Mshope
to oust them, only to find themselves subjugated by
the Ngoni victors. Then, in 1897* they were p a r t l y
separated from the Mshope kingdom to be ruled through
an independent Sultnante of Likuyu. After Maji Maji
another portion was separated when the Sult^anate
of Mbunga was taken from the Ngoni. However, both
were brought back under Ngoni control, Mbunga in 1918
and Likuyu in 1930* In the early 1930s, some tried
again to break free, but without success. Miss oro‘s
death gave them a further opportunity to separate.
Secondly, the Ndendeule areas had Stagnated economically
and politically under Mshope rule. No roads were built
into their lands by the Native Administration, few
and
political jobs were given to them by the Ngoni,Atobacco 
and other cash crops were only introduced into their 
lands some time after being in Ungoni. It was onljr 
through self-help and their determination to do well 
in the tobacco industry that they had become strong 
and able to voice their feelings. Finally, being 
Muslims, they failed to identify with the Christian 
Ngoni.
In their initial attempts at separation, both 
Saidi and the Ndendeule leaders wrote to the District 
Officer demanding a review of the situation in Mshope 
and a consideration of their feelings. Palangu wrote 
that, because an illegitimate successor had gained the
5 m
nkosiship in Mshope, the Ndendeule no longer had true 
leadership and lie demanded independence from Mshope 
for them.(l) The Ndendeule, after a mass meeting in 
November 1 9 5 2, apparently comprising peoples from 
Luegu, Nchomoro, Mgombasi, Mbunga, Likuyu, Mkongo 
and Namtumbo, had resolved to inform the District 
Officer that they no longer wanted a foreign chief. 
Their actions soon led to further consideration of 
the whole succession issue.
The District Officer announced that a meeting 
would be held at Gumbiro on 18*12.1952 at which the 
issue of Ngoni rule over the Ndendeule was to be 
discussed. In preparation for this meeting, the 
Ndendeule began to organize large meetings throughout 
north-east Mshopem informing people of their aims and 
soliciting support. The leading activists in the 
Ndendeule struggle were, according to Newa, 3aid_i 
Pa-langu Tawete, Amiri Hinduka, Tanitatu (Nasoro 
Kaswera) and Hasan Mang*unyuka. Amiri Hinduka was 
a sheikh who gave the movement guidance and blessings. 
Tanitatu, the former adviser to Missoro, was the 
leading activist. He was a major force in pressing 
home to the people the advantages of separation and 
led the delegation which negotiated separation. Hasan 
Mang'unyuka was another adviser to Missoro. He had 
been actively involved in the 1932-3 attempt at 
separation, according to evidence as told to Newa, and
(1) Newa, op cit, pp.2k-7 .
during the 1 9 5 2-dp attempt at separation, became an 
important worker behind the scenes.
At a mass meeting, held at Nahoro on 9*^2.1952, 
the people decided upon demanding secession from 
Mshope and appointed a delegation to attend the 
G-umbiro conference and work for this. The delegation 
comprised Amiri Hinduka, Nasoro Kaswera and Hasan 
Mang'unyuka, The Ngoni delegation was led by 
Mbaya, who was acting as Regent until the official 
installation of Kangara. At the meeting, held 011 
1 8 ,1 2 ,19.5 2, each side presented its case and as neither 
was prepared to compromise, the conference ended in 
stalemate. The government now decided to take the 
initiative.
In early 1953, the District Officer conducted a 
fact-finding tour through central and eastern Mshope.
He found in the Ndendeule a widespread desire for 
separation from the Ngoni. He then called a second 
conference, this time at Songea. It resolved nothing.
During this period, the Ndendeule put forth some 
interesting proposals for replacing the existing political 
system with another. They noted that they had no special 
right to govern, as all men were equal, but they pressed 
the Ngoni to abolish their form of rule "which does not 
bring us developments and progress". They recommended 
that the elite structure of Ngoni rule be replaced by a 
more egalitarian one in which each person would be equal 
to any other. This appears to have been an interesting 
application of history as politics. Traditional, pre-
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Ngoni, Ndendeule society had been egalitarian and 
the people, in wanting to return to this, were 
taking advantage of contemporary calls by the colonsl 
government for increased democracy in Songea. As the 
Ngoni found this concept quite alien to their own, 
they found it impossible to accept.
The issue dragged on through 1953. Meanwhile, 
for various reasons, British colonial and official 
opinion was swinging quite decisively behind the 
Ndendeule. first, colonial officials wanted to 
acknowledge what they saw to be a genuine, popular 
movement for separation. Secondly, the Ndendeule 
appear to have been more receptive to development 
than the Ngoni. They had shown considerate interest 
in tobacco production throughout the 19^0s and itf&re 
now dominating the industry. Presumably, it was 
desirable for the government to support progressive 
forces wherever they existed.
Gulliver, who was in Songea at the time as a 
government sociologist, came out in support of the 
Ndendeule.(1) He was an idealistic and progressive- 
minded official who disliked the autocratic Ngoni rule.
He recommended "a broadening of the basis of Local 
Government and reduction of the monopoly of the true 
Ngoni minority... for the whole region’'{2), so was thinking 
of a much more encompassing change than just that in 
Undendeule,
(1 ) At the Njelu meeting of 1 2 .^ .1 9 5 0  (see p.516) it had 
been stated that an anthropologist was to visit the 
district to investigate the hereditary rights of all 
candidates. Though this refers to Njelu, he did the
- *-1 same f or Mshope .
(2 ) TNA/l6/3?/l05, Gulliver, Memorandum.
In late 1953, the government decided that 
Mshope would be split in two, with the eastern 
Ndunates of Mbunga, Likuyu and Luegu becoming a 
new Undendeule subdivision, and the I'emaining 
Ndunates of Gumbiro, Msindo and Mahanje continuing 
to be in Mshope. The population of each subdivision 
was approximately of equal size.
In Undendeule, councils were set up in each of 
the former Ndunates. The representatives, bo each 
were elected by the people. Each council was to be 
headed by an elder^ called a nahota. Mselemu was 
elected at Mbunga, Faraja at Likuyu and Amiri at 
Luegu* Over these councils was established the 
Ndendeule Council, with headquarters at Namtumbo.
It was also an elected body, whose members comprised 
a Great Elder, called nahota nkorungwa, a Vice- 
President, and several councillors from each council.
A chief adviser to the council was also elected. Nasoro 
Kaswera became the nahota nkorungwa, Saidi fSalangu^became 
the Vice-President, and Hasan Mang'unyuka became the 
chief adviser. All members were to be elected every 
three years.
The Ndendeule system was considerably more democratic 
in concept than the Ngoni one. As befitted a politically 
decentralized society, it was organized in such a<( way 
as to prevent any consolidation of unmerited power. The 
Ndendeule were very pleased with what they had accomplished. 
Newa exuded: nFor the Ndendeule it was the beginning of 
a new era in their history: a period of self-rule by 
the Ndendeule M•(1)
Unfortunately, democracy did not last long 
in Undendeule. In the mid-1950s, the elections 
which were due and which would have been the first 
in the new subdivision, were cancelled, apparently 
because of political unrest. Nasoro Kaswera remained 
as nahota nkorungwa, A number of people from the 
area, including some who were later to achieve 
national prominence, bitterly resented the cancellation 
and Kaswera's remaining in power. However, there are 
indications that he was genuinely popular among his 
people and might have won the election.
In the remaining area of the old Mshope kingdom, 
Kangara was elected nkosi. His official inauguration 
was held on 23.1*195^* He and his people felt bitter 
about the colonial government's handling of the 
succession in such a way as to cost them half their 
kingdom. from then on, they frequently,but unsuccess­
fully demanded its return.(1) Bitterness seems to have 
coloured relations between Mshope and the colonial 
government for the next decade.
V
Thus, by 195^, the Ngoni kingdoms had undergone 
difficult and complex successions. The political,
(1) p.53^ Newa, op oit, pp.59-61.
(1) Ibid., p^69 notes their dissent over boundaries in 
later years; however, Gulliver, An Administrative 
Survey, p .1 1 7 claims that they meekly accepted the 
loss of Undendeule, because they knew where they 
stood and that traditionalism was the only basis 
to their continued control.
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economic and social changes which had greatly affected 
Ngoni society daring the previous nine years had produced 
a divided society in Njelu, a much-reduced Mshope which now 
had to accommodate itself to a confident Ndendeule section, 
and strained relations between the people of both kingdoms 
and the colonial government, Njelu because its leadership 
was not wanted and Mshope because its corporate identity had 
been roughly treated# Both kingdoms managed to resolve 
internal divisions and to manipulate successfully relations 
with their now-independent former subjects. Neither, however, 
appears to have been able to manage to restore good relations 
with: the colonial administration, and throughout the 195°s, 
the Ngoni kingdoms were to be looked down upon by. the colonial 
administration for their unwillingness to accept the schemes 
for economic development being fostered by the district officials 
not to accommodate to the plans for political democratization 
w hich officials had in mind# The political disillusionment 
of colonial officials was frequently made obvious. Officials 
lamented the lack of deep involvement by the people in their 
political life# The Member for Local Government wrote in 1953 
that though the chiefs and people of an area discussed evesy 
appointment, selection was inevitably based on closeness of
relationshi betw, een the eandidate and the ex-office holder.(1)v
Another tried to explain lack- of involvement when writing that 
!tpeople find it strange that they shohld be invited to consult 
with their chief ob public affairs1'#(2) Gulliver sought to 
assure fellow officials that the-advent of democracy was 
inevitable:
(1) Tm/155/L5/13, MLG report, 50071/2/19 of 5-3-1953.
(2). TNA/155A5/13, DO to PC, 16/6/148 of 5.9.1954-.
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"..•the nkosi will have to yield in part to the popular 
demands for a , share in local government at the highest 
level* . Present policy to retain the nkosi as sole 
Native Authority in each chiefdom does not, of course, 
and should not, preclude the institution of some kind 
of representative council to advise and to chetk him*
Such popular expression is almost bound to arise even 
were it not encouraged by the Administration. Despite 
the; traditional nkosifs authority and the modern nkosi*s 
increasing power, yet at neither time has he been able 
to become entirely independent of advice, pressure and
, restrictions.n(1)
What Gulliver and other officials failed to appreciate was 
that the Ngoni had a form of democracy which, though not 
overt, was certainly present. In Ungoni, the power of the 
nkosi >derived from identification with the people and not... . 
from independence from .them.
Gulliver reflected the thinking of many administrators 
of his day, and his hopes for the establishment of a
- democracy weakened his ability to understand the society 
which he was studying* . It is possible that he failed to 
appreciate the change which had taken place in the basis of 
power after Maji Maji. Before that disasterous'event, the 
leaders were powers because of their abilities. They did not 
depend on the people for their position. Bather, the people 
were forced to adapt to them. However, after Maji Maji , which 
destroyed their military power base, they learned to adapt to 
the sensitivities of their followers, whom they increasingly 
came to represent. Ngoni political structures, by the 195is» 
were representative,, though not in the way in which colonial 
administrators understood.
Though the colonial government was unable to implement change 
among the Ngoni, a new force was entering that would be able to. 
This force was the territorial political party, the Tanganyika 
African National Union(TANU). An interesting relationship, was
(1) Gulliver, An Administrative Survey, p.39-
now to emerge between TANU and. the leaders of the Ngoni 
basedon corporation -for mutual: benefit, .which was to 
assist the advent of Independence in Songea.: Unfortunately, 
for the leaders,. of the Ngoni, co-operation was to be based on 
a misunderstanding', -which was to .end in 19^ 2 with the demise 
■ of; royal family - rule, over the Ngoni. But that is another
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